Blasier 1985: "Castro sought to lessen Cuba's extreme dependence on U.S. sugar purchases and to diversify her sugar markets. Talk in the United States about cutting the sugar quota made finding new markets more urgent" (page 189). 'Pressure mounted within the United States during 1960 to cut the Cuban sugar quota. The argument ran that Cuba should no longer enjoy preferential treatment in the purchase of sugar and, particularly, the benefit of the quota premium, which amounted to $150 million in 1959, while the Cuban government was seizing or 'intervening' U.S.-owned property and otherwise damaging U.S. private business interests" (page 192).
Domínguez 1986: "From 1960 to 1965 counterrevolutionaries rose up against the Castro government in all six provinces. At one time the country had as many as 179 insurrectionary bands…The number of regular troops committed by the Cuban government to defending the regime against insurrection was ten times greater under Castro than it had been under Batista…Revolutionary government in Cuba could not have survived without effective armed forces" (page 267).
Kapcia 2000: The "original three allied groups (26 July Movement, the DR and the PSP) each kept their own organizations, memberships, and insignia well into 1960" (page 109).
Kirk 1989: Church leaders "initial relief at the fidelista victory vanished as the import of the reforms dawned on them. With the injection of the 'East-West struggle,' the church hierarchy descended into despair, expressed through outspoken opposition and denunciation. However, the church had again lost touch with the majority of Cubans. Even though large numbers of Cubans (not just Catholics) were indeed alarmed at the evolution of the U.S.-Soviet-Cuban triangle, and the success of a national Catholic convention in November 1959 with a million people present clearly indicated the level of opposition, a large majority of Cubans were reaping the benefits of the revolution's social reforms. The more the church insisted on the unhealthiness of the link with the Soviets, the weaker its position became with many impoverished Cubans who wondered why the church had not been as free to criticize the excesses of capitalism" (page 79). The Church's "fragile power base began to disintegrate in early 1960, when large numbers of middle-class Cubans chose the path to Miami...Since they represented the backbone of the church as well as of the internal opposition movement, their loss was critical" (page 88).
Pérez 1999: "Most Cubans who left early expected to return shortly, after the United States had stepped in to return things to the way they used to be" (page 500). "What many Cubans could not have appreciated, of course, was that North American hegemony in Cuba had depended on their presence inside Cuba, those who shared U.S. values and identified with U.S. ways, and who, in defense of their own interests, could be relied on to defend U.S. interests. Emigration guaranteed the internal success of the revolution" (page 501).
Bray 1974: "In February of 1960, the Soviet Union extended $100 million in credits to Cuba, and agreed to exchange sugar for oil" (page 639).
Kirk 1989: Anastas Mikoyan, first deputy chairman of the USSR's Council of Ministers, visits Cuba in early February 1960 (pages 76 and 81).
Blasier 1985: "Castro feared U.S. armed intervention long before Eisenhower reached his decision in March 1960 to arm a counterrevolutionary force, and Castro had been seeking, sometimes with bitter frustration, to buy arms to protect himself" (page 195).
Domínguez 1993: "(O)n 17 March 1960, President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to organize the training of Cuban exiles for a future invasion of Cuba" (page 99). Describes the deterioration of Cuban-U.S. relations.
Kirk 1989: "March 1960 was perhaps the point at which the course was set for U.S.-Cuban relations for the next quarter-century. Two incidents deserve particular attention-the destruction on 4 March of a French freighter, the 'Coubre' and, on 13 March, President Eisenhower's decision to accept a CIA recommendation to arm and train Cuban exiles and to plan an invasion of Cuba. This decision marked the beginning of a new phase in aggression against Cuba" (page 76).
Kirk 1989: "In May 1960, a week after the government announced the restoration of Cuban-Soviet diplomatic relations and the arrival of Ambassador Kudriatsev, the archbishop of Santiago delivered a fiery broadside [that] stirred considerable controversy among Cuban Catholics" (page 82). "By the summer of 1960, church-state polarization was complete" (page 83).
Kirk 1989: Describes evolving Cuban relationship with the Soviet Union (pages 76-77). "(W)hile the Cold War climate obviously permeated both relationships, Cuba until the summer of 1960 was able to maintain a discrete policy with each superpower. In June these bilateral relationships shifted dramatically to a trilateral one, a U.S.-Soviet-Cuban triangle. The Eisenhower administration's policies of confrontation on the one hand and the Khrushchev line of support on the other swept Cuba into the vortex of superpower politics" (page 77).
Langley 1989: "In June 1960 Castro ordered American and British refineries in Cuba to process Soviet crude oil. They were apparently ready to acquiesce in the demand but, after severe pressure from the American government, resisted the order. In retaliation, Castro seized the refineries" (page 202).
Blasier 1985: "Armed with authority from Congress, President Eisenhower cut the Cuban sugar quota by 700,000 tons on July 6 for the balance of 1960, permitting new authorization of only 39,752 short tons" (page 193). "The U.S. action in cutting the Cuban sugar quota on July 6 brought the USSR dramatically and prominently into the picture…To counter congressional authorization to Eisenhower to cut the sugar quota, the Cuban Council of Ministers authorized the nationalization of U.S. properties on July 6, the same day Eisenhower suspended the Cuban sugar quota" (page 197).
Blasier 1985: On August 5, Castro "announced the takeover of 26 companies wholly or partially owned by U.S. citizens" (page 197).
Osterling 1987: "The Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas-FMC) was created on August 23, 1960, as a mass organization with the task of uniting, organizing, and enabling all women over age 14 to participate in the revolutionary process. Vilma Espín Guillois, a Rebel Army coordinator during the 1950s, wife of Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces Raúl Castro Ruz, and the highest-ranking woman in the Cuban government, was the organizer, founder, and the first president of the FMC" (page 84).
Kirk 1989: On August 10, 1960, "President Dorticós condemned those who wished to use religion as a weapon against the revolution and vowed, despite church provocation, to continue respecting all religious faiths. That same day...Fidel Castro himself issued a blistering attack on the hierarchy...Until this speech, he had made a point of remaining outside the church-state debate. Now that the lines were being drawn so clearly and the religious controversy was flaring again, he had no alternative but to speak out. His words enraged the Catholic hierarchy" (page 84).
Blasier 1985: On September 17, Castro "seized U.S.-owned banks" (page 197).
Osterling 1987: "The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución-CDRs) were created on September 28, 1960, as neighborhood mass organizations" (page 83).
Suárez Hernández 1991: "The General Assembly of the Cuban People, convened on September 2, 1960, became the genesis of a parliament whose proceedings led to the analysis and eventual approval of the First and Second Declarations of Havana" (page 58).
Azicri 2000: Since October 19, 1960, when U.S. President Eisenhower "declared a trade embargo that President Kennedy extended and expanded, Cuba has lived under an embargo enforced by nine American presidents" (page 180).
Blasier 1985: On October 24, Castro "seized 166 additional U.S.-owned properties, which largely fulfilled Castro's earlier pledge to seize U.S. investments to compensate for Cuba's loss of the sugar quota" (page 197). "On October 19, the United States prohibited exports to Cuba except for nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies" (page 198).
Langley 1989: "On 14 October Castro ordered nationalization of the sugar industry. With this act the last American property in Cuba fell victim to the revolution" (page 203).
Blasier 1985: "On December 16, 1960, the president fixed the Cuban quota at zero for the first quarter of 1961, thus establishing the policy of eliminating the Cuban quota entirely" (page 193).
Kirk 1989: "The final curve in the [church-state] spiral of invective and emotion came in December 1960, although it was already clear that coexistence between the church and the revolutionary government was now impossible, so distant were their respective positions on almost everything. On 4 December another collective document was issued by the hierarchy in the form of an open letter to Prime Minister Castro" (page 86). Describes contents. "Speaking on television twelve days later, Fidel Castro delivered the coup de gráce to the moribund church-revolutionary government relationship...The church, true to its Spanish nature and influenced by the historical context of the 'Cold War' and pre-Vatican II conservatism, gambled by staking its credibility on this frontal attack on the revolutionary government-a battle it could not hope to win...During this period, the church in Cuba passed from its early unrealistic expectations (which Fidel Castro chose not to dash, perhaps believing that he could realize his reforms without alienating the church) to its demise as a political force by the end of 1960" (page 87).
Fernández 1986: "En el año 1961 se crearon las Juntas de Coordinación, Ejecución e Inspección (JUCEI) que asumieron las funciones de las administraciones locales que habían existido hasta ese momento. Estas estaban investidas de una mayor autoridad para ejercer en sus jurisdicciones un papel más efectivo en la coordinación de todos los factores que intervenían en la vida económica y social de cada territorio" (page 209).
Pérez-Stable 1993a: "By 1961, popular militias numbered more than 300,000; the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, nearly 800,000. The Federation of Cuban Women mobilized housewives for the chores of the revolution" (page 99).
Suárez Hernández 1991: "Among the new organizational forms created by the revolution was the Junta de Coordinación, Ejecución e Inspección (Council for Coordination, Execution, and Inspection, JUCEI), which had the attributes of a local political authority and a special state apparatus for coordination and inspection at the local or provincial level…It functioned from 1961 until September 1965" (page 59).
Blasier 1985: "Alarmed by the mounting activities of the counterrevolutionary invasion forces, Castro proclaimed his fear of a U.S.-sponsored invasion and on January 2 demanded that U.S. embassy persons assigned to Havana be cut down to eleven, the same number as in the Cuban embassy in Washington. President Eisenhower responded by announcing the severance of diplomatic relations on January 3" (page 198).
Domínguez 1993: "U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations were finally and formally broken in the waning days of the Eisenhower administration in January 1961...The swift and dramatic changes in U.S.-Cuban relations were paralleled by the reorganization of Cuba's internal political and economic affairs, one consequence of which was a massive emigration to the United States…Most emigrants came from the economic and social elite" (page 100). "The administration of John F. Kennedy inherited the plan for [the Cuban exile community's] invasion [of Cuba] when it came to office on 20 January 1961" (page 101).
Kirk 1989: "Even after 3 January 1961, when Washington broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, many members of the bourgeoisie refused to believe that the revolutionary process could last much longer without toning down its rhetoric and reining in its socioeconomic reforms... Accordingly, many Cubans left for Miami to wait things out, confident that the revolution would be brought to heel, that cooler heads would prevail, and that they would then be able to return to the patria. They would wait in vain" (pages 91-92).
Prevost 2002: In "January 1961 the Eisenhower administration instituted an embargo on most exports to Cuba" (page 336).
Azicri 1988: On "31 March  President John F. Kennedy reduced the Cuban sugar quota in the US market to zero" (page 30).
Blasier 1985: "The Bay of Pigs invasion failed due to faulty military planning and implementation. The 1,400 well-armed and well-trained Cuba exiles were no match for Castro's 200,000-man well-equipped and ably led army…Only an insurrection in Cuba would have overcome Castro's military advantages…The Bay of Pigs left the Cuban policies of President Eisenhower and Kennedy in ruins. Castro emerged stronger than ever within his own country, his prestige at a high point around the world…Most significantly, the Bay of Pigs fiasco emboldened Castro and the Soviet Union to establish nuclear missiles in Cuba, an effort which led directly to the Cuban missile crisis of 1963" (page 202).
Domínguez 1989: "In April 1961 the Cuban government defeated an invasion of Cuban exiles who had landed at the Bay of Pigs; the government used that opportunity to arrest tens of thousands of the domestic opposition. Moreover, from 1960 to 1962 the United States received about a quarter million Cuban emigrants disproportionately drawn from the ranks of managers, administrators, and professionals and from the religious and political opposition. The combined effect of military victory and the export of the opposition ended the most serious challenges to the regime" (page 137).
Domínguez 1993: In April " President Kennedy agreed to let the CIA-trained invasion force go forward, provided that U.S. forces were not used" (page 101). "On the morning of 15 April planes piloted by Cuban exiles bombed several airfields in Cuba…On Monday morning, 17 April 1961, Brigade 2506 landed at Girón beach on the Bay of Pigs in south-central Cuba. The Cuban government mobilized both its regular armed forces and the militia. Led personally by Fidel Castro, they defeated the invasion force within forty-eight hours and captured 1,180 prisoners" (pages 101-102).
Kirk 1989: "In spite of the CIA's claims that a popular uprising would overthrow Castro, the invasion had the opposite effect on many Cubans, strengthening their loyalty to the fidelista cause...For many formerly undecided, the invasion helped define the position they wanted to take. Church consternation grew as the revolutionary government outlined the role specific Catholics had played in the abortive invasion" (page 95).
Bray 1974: "The showdown between the Church and the Revolution was triggered by the Playa Girón invasion of April 1961…On May 1, 1961, Castro announced the nationalization of all private schools, most of which were Catholic" (page 654).
Kirk 1989: "The Bay of Pigs invasion convinced church and government leaders that dialogue was impossible at that time...In the light of the continuing politicization of religion, the Castro government declared [Castro's speech of May 1, 1961], religious education henceforth was to be restricted to the churches themselves" (page 108).
Osterling 1987: "The National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños-ANAP) was organized in May 1961 as the mass organization to represent and protect the interests of Cuba's small farmers" (pages 85-86).
Kapcia 1996: "Between 1959 and 1961 there were two leading political groups (all others having collapsed): Castro's 26 July Movement (including the ex-guerrilla Rebel Army) and the pre-1959 Communist Party, the 'Partido Socialista Popular' (PSP), which joined the rebellion in 1958. The increasingly close alliance between these groups led, in 1961, to the nomination of a leading PSP activist, Aníbal Escalante, as the person responsible for coordinating them, and a third group, the 'Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil,' into one umbrella grouping, the 'Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas' (ORI)" (page 127).
LeoGrande 1981: "Building a new set of political institutions proved to be as difficult as building a planned economy. Initially, the revolutionaries dismantled the administrative apparatus of the old regime and replaced it with the embryonic administrative structure developed by the rebel army during the guerrilla war. The result was a through lack of co-ordination and control when the rebels began to administer the entire country…But nowhere were the difficulties of creating a new polity clearer than in the attempts to build a new communist party. In 1961, the PSP, DR and M 26/7 merged to form the Integrated Revolutionary Organisations" (page 241).
McDonald 1989: "In 1961 the three main groups in the revolutionary coalition-Castro's M-26-7 purged of its right wing, the student-based DER, and the Communist PSP-were merged into the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI)" (page 25).
Pérez-Stable 1993a: "When Aníbal Escalante became organization secretary, the PSP assumed control of the ORI. Escalante used the PSP infrastructure to organize the new party and therefore tended to favor the communists over the July 26th Movement and the DRE. Because recruitment was based on membership in the July 26th Movement, the DRE, and the PSP, mass participation in the selection process was, moreover, precluded. Although within a few months the ORI had about 15,000 members, party formation was exacerbating deep-seated tensions among the three organizations and was divorced from 'el pueblo cubano.' Thus, the two objectives the leadership hoped a vanguard party would meet-elite unity and popular involvement-were being sidetracked" (page 101).
Azicri 2000: "The confrontation [between the Catholic church and the Cuban government] came to a head in September 1961, during a procession in Havana on the feast day of the nation's patron saint, Nuestra Señora de la Caridad del Cobre…The religious gathering of four thousand people…turned into a political demonstration against the regime…The regime claimed that its intent was not to harass Catholic churches but to curb counterrevolutionary activities disguised as religion. When similar demonstrations were reported in three other cities, the government responded swiftly. One hundred and thirty priests…were rounded up and deported to Spain. In three years of confronting the regime, the Church paid a heavy toll: it lost its source of income when the affluent faithful left the country, the number of priests declined from eight hundred to two hundred, religious schools were closed, and relations with government leaders became hostile" (page 252).
Cuba: the contours of change 2000: On September 4, 1961, the "U.S. Congress passes the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, prohibiting aid to Cuba and authorizing the president to establish and maintain 'a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba'" (page 133).
Domínguez 1993: "On 2 December 1961, Fidel Castro proclaimed that he was a Marxist-Leninist" (page 102).
Kirk 1989: "As 1962 dawned, the church found itself widely excoriated, reduced to a fraction of its former membership and the ranks of its religious decimated. It was clearly the time to pursue a drastically different tack. The seven-year hiatus that followed was a period of silence and reflection that ultimately led to the church's reconstruction" (page 110).
Pérez-Stable 1993a: "In 1962, over 4,000 delegates attended the FMC congress. At the time, FMC membership totaled 376,000" (page 107).
Drachman 2002: "On January 22, 1962, the United States pressured the Organization of American States to suspend Cuba. Cuba responded by calling for armed revolt throughout the hemisphere against what it termed repressive capitalist regimes" (page 181).
Cuba: the contours of change 2000: On February 7, 1962, "President John F. Kennedy declares an embargo on all trade with Cuba" (page 133).
Drachman 2002: "Before this embargo, the Cuban economy was tied tightly to the United States...But when the United States stopped trade and investment and urged other coutnries to do the same, the Soviet Union and other communist states rushed to fill the breach" (page 181).
Azicri 1990: "In March 1962 Castro announced publicly drastic measures aimed at rectifying the direction followed by the ORI under Escalante. In the process of integrating the three major revolutionary organizations in a new political party,...Escalante had tried to steer the ORI away from the revolutionary leadership by appointing loyalists from the PSP ranks to key party posts" (page 5).
Domínguez 1989: Describes the changes in the ORI in March 1962 (pages 137-138).
Kapcia 2000: "In March 1962…Escalante announced the ORI National Directorate of twenty-five, fourteen from the July 26 Movement, one from the Directorio, and no fewer than ten from the PSP. It then rapidly became clear that Escalante, following either advice from Moscow or his own political nose, had assigned too much power to the PSP…Escalante…was sent into a diplomatic semi-exile in eastern Europe, and the ORI was suspended, half the members being expelled" (page 131).
Suárez 1967: "The ORI was…reorganized in accordance with a procedure invented by [Castro]-unprecedented in the international Communist movement-by virtue of which the workers in every enterprise were to elect 'model workers' from among whom, in turn, the future members of the party would be selected. This procedure would prolong the actual formation of the ORI indefinitely [author's note: 'To the best of my knowledge the new procedure was first put into practice at the end of May , at a meeting of the electric workers']" (page 156).
Domínguez 1993: "In July 1962 Raúl Castro, the armed forces minister, travelled to Moscow to secure additional Soviet military backing" (page 102).
Country profile. Cuba 1993-94: "In 1962 the positioning of Soviet warheads on Cuban soil produced a major flashpoint in the cold war, the missile crisis, which perhaps more than any other event exemplified the new place of Cuba in the world order" (page 4).
Domínguez 1993: "On 22 October, Kennedy demanded the withdrawal of Soviet 'offensive missiles' from Cuba and imposed a naval 'quarantine' on the island to prevent the additional shipment of Soviet weaponry" (page 102).
Suchlicki 1997: "The missile crisis had a significant impact on the countries involved. While it led to a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations, it significantly strained Cuban-Soviet relations. Castro was not consulted throughout the Kennedy-Khrushchev negotiations and the unilateral Soviet withdrawal of the missiles and bombers wounded Castro's pride and prestige" (page 169). "Despite Sovet attempts to appease Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations were still marred by a number of difficulties. After the missile crisis Castro increased contacts with Communist China, exploiting the Sino-Soviet dispute and proclaiming his intention to remain neutral and maintain fraternal relations with all socialist states" (page 170).
Kirk 1989: "Frequently harassed by Cuban exile groups based in Florida, the Cuban government introduced legislation in late 1963 obligating all Cuban males between the ages of seventeen and forty-five to military service" (page 111).
LeoGrande 1981: In "1963, the revolutionary leadership abandoned hopes for rapid industrialisation, replacing the balanced growth strategy with an unbalanced strategy based upon expanding rather than reducing sugar production" (page 241).
Kapcia 2000: The "PURSC…was formally set up in a February 1963 congress, with a much more selective membership procedure" (page 131).
LeoGrande 1981: "The second attempt to build a new party began immediately, but this time it was constructed from the ground up. Members were chosen by the 'mass method,' by which workers nominate outstanding co-workers as candidates for membership and then ratify the Party's final recruitment decisions…The new party was initially called the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista, PURS)" (page 242).
McDonald 1989: "By 1963 ORI had been dismantled and reorganized into the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS), with Fidel himself in place as secretary-general" (page 25).
Statistical abstract of Latin America volume 12 1968: In February 1963 "Castro announces the establishment of the Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista (PURS) to replace ORI" (page 148).
Suárez 1967: "In March 1963 the party organ had only 16,000 members throughout Cuba although in October 1961 it had had 800 active nuclei in the province of Havana alone" (pages 179-180).
Langley 1989: "(O)n 10 April 1963, in a surprising move that stunned the exile community, Kennedy withdrew American support from the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the main exile organization" (page 215).
Bray 1974: "On October 3, 1963, the 'second agrarian reform' law was passed, expropriating the medium farmers, those who still owned more than 67.1 hectares or about eleven thousand farms" (page 636).
Eckstein 1994: "A second [land] reform in 1963 led roughly 76 percent of the total land area and 63 percent of the cultivated land to pass to state hands" (page 33).
Suárez 1967: "In November 1963 the PURS had 28,000 members, but, except in the field of revolutionary education, the influence of this 'apparat' was almost imperceptible" (page 195).
Country profile. Cuba 1993-94: "The diplomatic isolation of Cuba in the wake of the 1959 revolution and its expulsion from the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1962 meant that by 1965 only Mexico and Canada among the countries of the western hemisphere still recognised the island's government" (page 5).
Pérez-Stable 1990: "In 1965, [Che] Guevara conceded that a structured relationship between the Cuban people and the revolutionary leadership was missing...Unlike other socialist countries, Cuba could count on the masses: Popular militias were the revolution's mainstay. The revolution would forge its own institutions to channel mass support" (page 24).
Del Aguila 1993: "Membership in top organs of the Cuban Communist Party, 1965" (page 68). Lists names of members of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat.
Domínguez 1993: "In the autumn of 1965, the party's name was changed again to the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). At the same time, Fidel Castro unveiled the first one-hundred-member Central Committee, along with two smaller organs: the Political Bureau, responsible for the making of basic political decisions, and the Secretariat, charged with their implementation" (page 129).
Eckstein 1994: "Unlike the prerevolutionary PSP, the PCC was relegated the role of a 'vanguard' Leninist party, following the Soviet example-albeit under Fidel's tutelage. It became the only legal party, with membership in it being highly selective. The proportion of the population belonging to it ranged from less than 1 percent to a high of about 6 percent-with an additional 8 percent in the Party's youth division, the Communist Youth Union (UJC). Workers could propose candidates, but they were outnumbered by white-collar folk at the base as well as at higher levels. This is partly because the (UJC), a main channel of Party recruitment, operated largely at the universities. The PCC was topped by a Political Bureau and Secretariat, then by a broader-based Central Committee comprised of individuals holding important posts in industry, government, and the military" (pages 20-21).
Kapcia 1996: "Finally, in 1965, the 'Partido Comunista Cubano' was created, but, with only some 50,000 members, and with no party congress until 1975, it remained something of a vehicle for the ex-guerrillas who constituted the majority of the leadership" (page 127).
Kapcia 2000: After "the PCC was established in 1965, based on the PURSC statutes, there were only twenty-three PSP members on the 100-strong Central Committee and none at all on the Buró Político" (page 131).
McDonald 1989: "In 1965 PURS was officially renamed the Cuban Communist party (PCC) but throughout the rest of the decade still failed to assume an important role" (page 25).
Pérez-Stable 1993: "The founding of the Communist Party of Cuba in 1965 absorbed most of the old communists and confirmed the primacy of Fidel Castro and his closest associates, especially in the Revolutionary Armed Forces and in the Ministry of the Interior. The first Central Committee, therefore, constituted a second refashioning of the ruling coalition" (page 69).
Pérez-Stable 1993a: "In October 1965, Fidel Castro convened the Central Committee (CC) of the Cuban Communist Party. Nearly 60 percent were military men...By 1965, the revolution thus had a vanguard organization. The party, however, did not legitimate the revolution; rather, Fidel Castro and the revolution bestowed legitimacy upon the PCC" (page 101).
Prevost 2002: The PCC "had a small politburo at the top composed primarily of Sierra Maestra veterans and a handful from the old PSP, a central committee of a few hundred members, and a National Party Congress that was to meet every five years to establish broad policy guidelines…The first Party Congress was not convened until 1975; in the interim, decision making revolved almost exclusively around the small core of 26th of July movement veterans who had led the revolution from its beginning" (page 341).
Statistical abstract of Latin America volume 12 1968: On October 3, 1965 "Castro announces the formation of the Partido Comunista Cubano (PCC), replacing PURS. PCC incorporates a politburo and a secretariat, which ORI and PURS lacked" (page 149).
Suárez Hernández 1991: In October 1965 JUCEI "was succeeded by Poder Local" (page 59).
Prevost 2002: "In 1966 Castro convened the Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where, in his keynote speech, the Cuban leader attacked U.S. imperialism, Latin American elite governments, and all political movements that opposed the necessity of armed struggle, including communist parties" (page 338).
Blasier 1985: "After Ché Guevara's death in 1967, Castro stopped fomenting revolution in the Americas for a decade" (page 278).
Bray 1974: "The execution of Ché Guevara in Bolivia on October 8, 1967 preceded a shift in the course of the Cuban Revolution. By early 1968, a more conservative trend in international policy had emerged along with a dramatic intensification of efforts to increase national production and to heighten the political consciousness of the population. Cuba significantly lessened its support of revolutionaries abroad" (page 663).
LeoGrande 1981: "By 1968 the moral incentive programme had clearly failed. In addition, the government bureaucracy's weakness and inefficiency made it incapable of directing the massive economic effort required to produce 10 million tons of sugar in 1970. The revolutionary leadership turned to the only institution that was sufficiently well organised to direct the economy-the armed forces. From 1968 to 1970, the military essentially took over management of the economy, both to improve administrative efficiency and to instill military discipline into the lagging workforce" (pages 243-244).
Bray 1974: "The trial of the 'microfaction'" (pages 664-665).
Domínguez 1989: "Former PSP members were appalled by [Castro's] policies toward labor and toward the Soviets and their allies. Led again by Aníbal Escalante, they began to discuss what could be done among themselves and also with Soviet, East German, and Czech government and party officials. In late January 1968 Fidel Castro and his brother, Armed Forces Minister General Raúl Castro, announced the discovery of what they called the 'microfaction.' Microfaction members were found in the party, the armed forces, the Interior Ministry, the labor federation, some state enterprises, and intellectual circles, illustrating the faction's broad scope and the wide-ranging organizational affiliations of its members. Some microfaction members were dismissed from the party's Central Committee and others from the party itself" (page 142).
Pérez-Stable 1993: "In 1968, a group of old communists, in conjunction with the Soviet embassy, mounted a challenge of sorts against radicalism and advocated a reorientation of Cuban domestic and international policies. Labeled a 'microfación,' the incident was…an indication of incipient elite disharmony over the course of Cuban socialism" (page 70).
Eckstein 1994: "In the spring of 1968 the so-called Revolutionary Offensive absorbed into the public sector some 55,000 to 56,000 small businesses, especially retail food and service shops but also other stores, bars, restaurants, and snack and artisan shops. As a result, the one sector besides agriculture where private activity had partially escaped earlier nationalizations officially passed to state hands" (page 34).
Bray 1974: "A growing understanding between Church and State culminated in 1969 when high Church officials in Cuba proclaimed as a group their objection to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and denounced the U.S. blockade of Cuba" (pages 654-655).
McDonald 1989: "By 1969 the PCC had only 55,000 members, which made it the smallest Communist party relative to population in any Marxist state…The party's executive organs, the Politburo and Secretariat, as well as its Central Committee, met infrequently, and no party congress ever took place" (pages 25- 26).
Andrain 1988: "In 1970 Castro tried but failed to mobilize the whole Cuban population to produce a ten-million-ton sugar harvest" (page 135).
Azicri 1990: "The changes brought about by the failure to reach the 10-million-ton goal set for the 1970 sugar harvest-output fell short by 1.465 million tons-modified in different ways the course of the revolution. At the most visible level, it moved the regime towards institutionalizing the revolution during the first half of the 1970s" (page 5).
Domínguez 1989: "The effectiveness of many policies adopted by the Cuban regime in the first half of the 1970s-to promote growth in the economy, education, and public health and to project political and military power overseas-owed much to the lessons learned during the factional and organizational debates of the 1960s, even if many of the participants in those debates had paid dearly for the expression of their views and for their association with other like-minded people" (pages 143-144).
Kapcia 1996: "(T)he disastrous 10 million ton 'zafra' (sugar harvest) of 1970…effectively ended the radicalism of the 1960s economy and began an era of greater orthodoxy" (page 124).
LeoGrande 1978: "The Cuban conception of democracy underwent substantial revision in the reorganization of the political system which began in 1970. The failure of the economic policies of the late 1960s, culminating in the failure to produce ten million tons of sugar in 1970, was a severe blow to the prestige of the revolution…The problems in the economy were blamed, in part, on the weakness of Cuban political institutions and on the lack of popular participation in the formation of public policy. To remedy these failings, a total reorganization of the political system was initiated" (page 118).
LeoGrande 1981: "Politically, the revolution entered a 'new phase' in 1970 marked by a strengthening of all political institutions and an expansion of mass participation in the policy process. After improving its internal coordination and control, the PCC finally began to take over direction of the political system" (page 244).
McDonald 1989: "The Cuban Communist party did not assume its current role as the revolution's vanguard institution until the 1970s….The strengthening of the party became a high priority, and the PCC quadrupled in size in just six years (1969-1975)" (page 26).
Pérez 1995: "The 1970 harvest produced a record crop, but not ten million tons...The ten-million-ton effort had been made at the expense of all other sectors of the economy, and even the 8.5-million-ton harvest could not adequately compensate for the damage inflicted everywhere else in the economy" (page 341).
Roman 1999: "The catalyst for the recognition of the need for profound changes in all sectors of the society was the failure to reach the ten-million-ton goal in the 1970 sugar harvest. The Cuban leadership had staked the reputation of the revolution on reaching this goal. Not only did the harvest fall short of the goal, but the massive effort caused serious disruptions and distortions in other major sectors of the economy, along with excessive centralization and near collapse of governmental channels and other modes of citizen input" (page 68).
Roman 1999: "At the meeting of the political bureau and the secretariat of the PCC in August 1970, it was decided to begin systematic studies of how to go about building state institutions" (page 71).
Country profile. Cuba 1993-94: "The Partido Comunista reoriented Cuban trade away from the West to socialist countries by joining their economic union, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), in 1972. This move was a formal acknowledgement of the island's dependence upon the USSR for its defence and economic survival following the severing of relations with the USA in January 1961, when Cuba expropriated assets worth over $1bn belonging to US enterprises" (page 4).
De Lima-Dantas 1987: "(I)n 1972 the regime's top leadership, i.e., Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, and President Dorticós, delegated command to trusted associates, who undertook greater responsibilities as vice premiers, ministers, and heads of state agencies" (pager 54).
Suárez Hernández 1991: "The restructuring of the Council of Ministers and the creation of its Executive Committee took place at the end of 1972" (page 60).
Suchlicki 1997: "In the early 1970s Soviet military and economic aid increased substantially and Cuba moved closer to the Soviet Union, becoming in 1972 a member of the Eastern European Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)" (page 175).
Roman 1999: "In 1973, the judicial system and the criminal and procedural codes were reformed" (page 71). "Preparations were made to organize for the following year a pilot program of the OPP, first in the municipality of Cárdenas in Matanzas Province, and then in the entire province. A team was set up to study local governments in both capitalist and socialist countries...One result of this groundwork was the 'Constitution of Organs of People's Power' which became the basic document for the elections in Matanzas in June and July of 1974. In fact, the essential characteristics of what were to become the OPP were already present in this document: direct, competitive popular elections for municipal assembly delegates; indirect elections for higher parliamentary bodies; no campaigning for office; municipal delegates meeting periodically with electors to receive and answer mandates; immediate recall procedures; and delegates as unpaid volunteers" (page 72).
Suárez Hernández 1991: "Preparations for the first experiment in People's Power, in the province of Matanzas, began at the end of 1973" (page 60).
Cockburn 1979: "On January 2, 1974, Raúl Castro, head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, first announced the forthcoming 'experimental' introduction of People's Power in Matanzas Province…Although the Matanzas elections were called experimental, it was made clear at the outset that they were experimental only as to methodology-a firm commitment had already been made within the Communist Party of Cuba and the Council of State to bring People's Power to the whole of Cuba within a few years" (page 19).
Fernández 1986: "(E)n mayo de 1974, con vistas a la implantación de los órganos del Poder Popular, de forma experimental en la provincia de Matanzas, se promulgó la Ley de Reforma Constitucional que modificaba algunos de los artículos de la Ley Fundamental de la República de Cuba de 1959, referidos a la división territorial político-administrativa; a la abolición de la obligatoriedad del voto; el establecimiento del derecho al sufragio por todos los ciudadanos. Asimismo se dejó a la regulación de la ley la fijación de la edad para ejercer el voto y se dictaron otras leyes que daban basamento legal a esta experiencia" (page 209).
Azicri 1988: Describes the 1974 pilot project in Matanzas (pages 39-40).
Chaffee 1992: "People's Power was tried initially in 1974 as a one-year experiment in the province of Matanzas" (page 22).
Cockburn 1979: "Experiment in Matanzas" (pages 23-28). "The results of the Matanzas elections, held on Sunday June 30, 1974, were later analysed by Fidel Castro, as reported in Granma. Of the 1014 successful candidates for membership of the eighteen Municipal Assemblies in the Province, 46% were members of the Communist Party of Cuba, 13% were members of the Communist Youth organisation, 41% were at the time studying on full or part-time courses, 20% had primary education only (i.e. no higher than 6th grade). Only 3% of the members (7% of the candidates) were women" (page 26).
Roman 1999: The "1974 elections for municipal delegates in the Matanzas Province pilot project were competitive and by secret ballot. Candidates were nominated by neighborhood groups without Communist Party participation or interference. The municipal delegates, in turn, elected delegates to the higher bodies" (page 72).
Cuba: dictatorship or democracy? 1980: Gives Fidel Castro's statement on Cuban elections in a speech on July 26, 1974 (pages 72-73).
Cuba: dictatorship or democracy? 1980: Gives Raúl Castro's statement on Cuban elections in a speech on August 22, 1974 (pages xxxvi-xxxvii).
Cockburn 1979: "A Mixed Commission of the Communist Party of Cuba and the Government was set up in October 1974 and briefed to draw up a preliminary draft constitution" (page 20).
Fernández 1986: "(E)l 23 de octubre de 1974 se creó una Comisión Redactora para trabajar en el proyecto de una nueva Constitución que se adecuara al desarrollo político-económico y social que ya había alcanzado el país y sus proyeciones futuras" (page 209).
Roman 1999: "On October 24, 1974, a constitutional commission was appointed by the central committee of the Communist Party, consisting of lawyers and constitutional experts from the party, the government, and the mass organizations" (page 72).
Del Aguila 1989: "In terms of size, the FAR grew to a peak strength of approximately 200,000 in 1975, with over 80 percent of the troops in the Army and the balance in the Navy and Air Force. Thousands more belonged to paramilitary organizations, and the pool of reserve manpower was substantial given the maintenance of compulsory military service for males between 16 and 50 years old" (page 30).
Pérez 1995: In 1975 "Cuban combat troops participate in the Angolan war for national liberation against Portugal" (page 422).
Suchlicki 1997: "The electoral failure of the Popular Front in Uruguay and more importantly the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile in 1973, however, marked a turning point for the Cuban-inspired revolutionary struggle in Latin America. The Cuban leadership examined its strategy and tactics in the area and concluded that the way to power in Latin America was not through ballots but through bullets. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Castro increased his support to select groups, particularly in Central America, providing them with propaganda material, training, advisers, financial help, and ultimately weapons. An acceleration of the revolutionary armed struggle in the area followed" (page 178).
Roman 1999: The constitutional commission "submitted a draft constitution on February 24, 1975. During a two-month period, the draft was discussed throughout the country...As a result of the popular debate, some changes were considered and accepted, but the essential structure of the OPP was kept" (page 72).
Blasier 1985: "In 1975, having now completely folded the Cuban Communist Party into the old 26th of July Movement under the leadership of the latter, Castro convened the party's first National Congress. Cuban institutions-political, economic, and social-were now restructured along Soviet lines" (page 278).
Chaffee 1992: People's Power was "extended nationally following a December 1975 recommendation of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba that the system be included in the new constitution" (page 22).
Domínguez 1993: "The party's first Congress was held in December 1975, the preparatory work for which was a major step forward to institutionalize PCC rule...The Congress approved the draft of the new national Constitution" (page 129).
LeoGrande 1986: The Congress "brought together 3116 delegates, cadres from all levels and sectors of the apparatus as well as grass roots members, for discussions and explanations of new policies, of the PCC's new role in the political system, and of the party's new internal procedures" (page 174). "On the eve of the First Congress, party membership stood at 202,807, nearly four times the 1969 membership of 55,000" (page 175). "Occupational distribution of PCC membership, 1975" (page 176). "Women as a proportion of PCC cadres, 1975" (page 179).
McDonald 1989: "The process of party institutionalization culminated in 1975 when Cuba finally held its first Communist party congress" (page 26).
Roman 1999: "The First Party Congress approved the new constitution in December 1975" (page 72). The Congress "also approved resolutions for a new national political and administrative division that became law in July 1976" (page 74).
Suárez Hernández 1991: "A second stage in the development of political leadership in Cuba began with the inauguration of People's Power-the institutionalized participation of the masses in state administration in general rather than just in the election of their representatives" (page 60).
Suchlicki 1997: "The First Party Congress in 1975 was a watershed in legitimizing the position of the party as the guiding and controlling force in society...The Congress...expanded the party's Central Committee from 91-112, increased the Political Bureau from 8 to 13, and maintained the Secretariat at 11 members with Fidel and Raúl as First and Second Secretaries" (page 185).
Valdés 2000: "En su Primer Congreso el Partido Comunista de Cuba discutió y aprobó la Tesis sobre el Pleno Ejercicio de la Igualdad de la Mujer. Sin embargo, ese año no había ninguna mujer en el Buró Político, tampoco en el Secretariado y sólo seis entre los 95 miembros titulares del Comité Central" (Anexo: Participación política de las mujeres en los últimos 20 años: Cuba).