Allison 2006: “After several years of US-training and several billion dollars in economic and military aid, the Salvadoran military could not defeat the insurgents or prevent them from attacking and occupying exclusive neighborhoods in the capital. In addition, when challenged, the military reverted to bombing civilian neighborhoods and murdering religious figures. The FMLN and the US-backed Salvadoran military had fought to a stalemate, whereby any change in the balance of forces was unlikely in the near future and would most likely require a significant investment (or disinvestment) on the part of international benefactors—the United States, Cuba or the Soviet Union. As a result, pressures for a negotiated settlement to the conflict were brought to bear on each party to the conflict” (page 57).
Central America report February 2, 1990: “One achievement of the FMLN’s recent prolonged offensive was to bring to a head the serious differences among the Salvadoran military leadership. Shortly before charges were brought against those officers blamed for killing the Jesuits, several officers most adverse to a dialogue with the rebels were retired…Salvadoran political observers consider that the changes in military leadership [strengthen] Cristiani’s position and [assure] greater support for his efforts to dialogue with the FMLN and reinforce the ‘moderate’ image he wants to present before the US Congress” (page 26).
McClintock 1998: “‘Tandona’ member [René Emilio] Ponce became minister of defense in 1990” (page 138).
Tilley 2005: “In the early 1990s, in an unprecedented shift, the Salvadoran government began officially to celebrate El Salvador’s indigenous peoples as valued components of the Salvadoran nation” (page 32).
Central America report January 12, 1990: “In a surprising January 7 announcement, President Cristiani confirmed the findings of a joint investigation by Salvadoran officials and police investigators from Spain, Great Britain, France and Canada, that the Salvadoran army was involved in the assassination of the six Jesuits” (page 4).
Dunkerley 1994: January 19, 1990: “(N)ine military personnel formally charged with UCA killings” (page 119).
Ladutke 2004: “By January of 1990, the guerrilla offensive was over. The Salvadoran government continued to face domestic and international pressure, however, to prosecute those responsible for the massacre at the UCA” (page 41).
Central America report March 2, 1990: “José Napoleón Duarte, former president of El Salvador, died on February 23 at the age of 64, after a two-year bout with cancer. Duarte, along with the Christian Democrat party, governed the country from 1985 to 1989…Duarte was three times mayor of San Salvador and presidential candidate for a moderate left alliance in 1972” (page 64).
Dunkerley 1994: February 23, 1990: “José Napoleon Duarte dies of cancer, aged sixty-four” (page 119).
Central America report March 23, 1990: March “will mark the closing of two refugee camps in Honduras, as the last 1,800 Salvadorans return to the conflictive homeland that they left over the last 10 years…The camps became populated when in 1980, the Salvadoran government initiated its bloody counter-insurgency campaign and more than 50,000 Salvadorans fled to Honduras for asylum” (page 87).
Dunkerley 1994: March 21, 1990: “(O)ccupation of El Rosario church, San Salvador, in protest at sacking of 11,000 public employees accused of supporting FMLN’s November offensive” (page 119).
Central America report December 18, 1992: “Under the auspices of the UN in Geneva, [on April 4] the government and the FMLN agree to reopen the dialogue” (page 378).
Castro Morán 2005: “Después de cuatro meses de intercambio de pareceres, gestiones y opiniones, etc., y por peticiones de los Presidentes Centroamericanos, se suscribió el Documento de Ginebra, el 4 de abril de 1990” (page 270). “Con el Documento de Ginebra…arranca una nueva etapa en el proceso de paz…La ONU viene a darle más garantía y mayor credibilidad al proceso, en un rol de intermediación muy claramente definido” (page 272).
Dunkerley 1994: April 26, 1990: “US House Foreign Relations Committee votes 50 per cent cut in military aid, to be restored only if FMLN fails to negotiate” (page 120).
Brockett 2005: “(O)n May 1, 1990 the combined opposition mounted the largest demonstration of the past decade as some eighty thousand marched, calling for a peaceful settlement of the war” (page 11).
Central America report May 4, 1990: “In the first major rebel offensive since last November, shortly after midnight on May 3, members of the [FMLN] attacked military posts and electricity towers through the country” (page 121).
Central America report June 1, 1990: “The US Congress cuts military aid to El Salvador by 50%, while attaching heavy conditions to the remaining sum, including the ‘good faith’ of both the rebels and the government in the current negotiation process” (page 155).
Castro Morán 2005: “La confianza en el proceso de paz, aumentó cuando en Caracas, Venezuela, se firmó el 21 de mayo de 1990, entre las partes negociadoras, la ‘Agenda General y Calendario del Proceso Completo de Negociación’” (page 272).
Castro Morán 2005: “El 26 de julio de 1990, el Gobierno de El Salvador…y el [FMLN], firmaron en la capital costarricense, San José, un trascendental acuerdo sobre Derechos Humanos, el cual incluyó el establecimiento de una misión de verificación de las Naciones Unidas para vigilar a escala nacional y a largo plazo, el respeto y garantía de los derechos y las libertades fundamentales” (page 274).
Central America report December 18, 1992: On July 26 “Government and FMLN reach a human rights accord in Costa Rica” (page 378).
Ladutke 2004: “The first major breakthrough came in July of 1990 with the signing of the San José Agreement, in which both sides promised to guarantee human rights and agreed to the deployment of a UN mission to monitor human rights prior to any cease-fire” (page 43).
Central America report October 12, 1990: “On September 24 Mario Aguiñada Carranza, secretary general of the UDN, announced that the party had begun the legal process preparatory to participating in next March’s elections. The last time the UDN participated in an election was in 1977” (page 307).
Dunkerley 1994: September 25, 1990: “FMLN publicly proposes state and rebel armies be replaced by single civilian police force” (page 122).
Gamero Q. 2000: “El Código Electoral de 1988 reformado en el año 1990, estableció que el número de diputados sería de ochenta y cuatro, distribuidos así: veinte diputados por la Circunscripción Nacional y sesenta y cuatro Diputados por las Circunscripciones Departamentales” (page 126).
García 1995: “(I)n a September 1990 agreement reached by an interparty dialogue commission, political parties agreed with the [FMLN] and the government to revise the election rules governing the March 1991 legislative and municipal elections. These changes expanded the size of the legislative assembly from sixty to eighty-four seats, a measure deemed essential to securing participation by the left” (page 41).
Ladutke 2004: In October, “growing criticism from U.S. civil society groups, as well as Salvadoran refugees living in the United States, contributed to [the U.S.] Congress’s decision to withold half of the military aid that had been allocated to El Salvador for 1991...The resulting aid reduction may have had an important impact on the negotiations, as the High Command then became more open to compromise” (page 42).
McClintock 1998: “In October 1990, the U.S. Congress voted to withhold 50 percent of the U.S. military assistance requested for El Salvador for fiscal year 1991, conditioning its release of the funds on progress in the investigation of the murders of the Jesuit priests and in peace negotiations. President Bush signed the bill into law soon thereafter. The law was a clear signal to the Salvadoran military that the U.S. funds that had been available for the war in the 1980s were diminishing” (page 154).
Dunkerley 1994: November 20, 1990: “FMLN launches extensive attacks on anniversary of 1989 offensive; over one hundred government soldiers killed” (page 123).
Castro Morán 2005: “En diciembre de 1990, el Secretario General comunicó al Consejo de Seguridad su intención de proponer el establecimiento de ONUSAL, esto es, la Misión de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador” (page 274).
Artiga-González 2008: “(L)as reformas constitucionales de 1991 afectaron a la organización y administración de las elecciones. Una de las más importantes reformas fue la sustitución del anterior organismo supremo electoral, el Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE), por un nuevo Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), como máxima autoridad en materia electoral” (page 557).
Montgomery 1998: “The Salvadoran government invited the Organization of American States (OAS) to monitor the electoral process leading up to and including the March 10, 1991, elections for Legislative Assembly deputies, Central American parliamentarians, and all mayors” (page 118).
Central American update January 11, 1991: “The campaign for the March 10 elections commenced on Jan. 8. Four leftist political parties will participate in the elections [MNR, MPSC, PSD, UND]. The five remaining parties fielding candidates in the upcoming elections are [ARENA, PCN, PDC, MAC, and AD]” (LADB).
Dunkerley 1994: January 2, 1991: “Helicopter carrying US servicemen shot down by FMLN missile; two US soldiers summarily executed by rebels” (page 123). January 15, 1991: U.S. president “Bush unfreezes $42.4 million military aid after execution of soldiers” (page 124).
Eguizábal 1992a: Electoral code reform creates 20 congressional seats elected at the national level and increases total seats in congress from 60 to 84 (page 61).
Central American update March 8, 1991: On February 28 the “Salvadoran National Workers Union (UNTS) endorsed Democratic Convergence (CD) candidates in the March 10 elections for national deputies and municipal officials” (LADB).
Dunkerley 1994: February 21, 1991: “(A)ssassination of left-wing congressional candidate Heriberto Robles and his wife” (page 124).
Latin American regional reports. Caribbean & Central America report March 28, 1991: “The left-wing political leader Guillermo Ungo, who was the Convergencia Democratica’s candidate in the March 1989 presidential elections, died of a cerebral embolism in Mexico City on 28 February” (electronic edition).
Williams 1997a: “The first of the evangelical-inspired parties to emerge, the Movimiento de Solidaridad Nacional…, was founded in February 1991 by a group of mostly evangelical businessmen and professionals…In addition to evangelicals, the MSN also counted Catholic charismatics…among its founders” (page 192).
Castro Morán 2005: “(E)n marzo de 1991, [ONUSAL] envió una misión preliminar que evaluó sobre el terreno las posibilidades de verificar dicho acuerdo sin un cese del fuego. La Misión mantuvo contactos con representantes gubernamentales y un amplio espectro de corrientes políticas y visitó…zonas de conflicto donde se reunió con representantes del FMLN” (page 274).
Central American update March 13, 1991: On March 6 “opposition political parties called for emergency measures to allow voters who had not yet received voter identification cards to participate in the elections. According to a recent report by the Organization of American States (OAS), up to 500,000 eligible voters were not registered, or did not have ID cards. The Salvadoran government’s Central Election Council (CCE) rejected the OAS count, asserting that the real number was less than 23,000” (LADB).
Montgomery 1998: Lists concerns cited by the OAS report (page 118).
Central American update March 13, 1991: On March 9 the “FMLN declared a three-day truce beginning Saturday to facilitate the vote, an unprecedented move which rebel leaders attributed to participation of opposition parties in the election. Excluded from the rebel truce were 31 towns located in areas under FMLN control in northern and eastern El Salvador…The National Assembly voted 49 to 11 to approve an electoral reform that would permit about 70,000 citizens who have yet to receive voter ID cards to participate in the elections by presenting other forms of identification at polling stations…In a statement, the independent Salvadoran Human Rights Commission (CDHES) accused the government and ARENA of creating an environment of violence and repression as a backdrop to the elections. CDHES said that between Jan. 3 and March 6, the end of the campaign period, soldiers and paramilitary groups were responsible for 31 assassinations of political opposition party members, and persons described as FMLN members or collaborators” (LADB).
March 10: congressional, municipal, and Central American Parliament election
Acevedo 1991a: “La diferencia fundamental estriba en que, por vez primera en más de una década de guerra, las elecciones se realizarán, no sólo en un contexto de negociación, sino como un instrumento para la negociación” (page 71).
Acevedo 1991b: “Distribución de diputados en las elecciones legislativas del 10 de marzo de 1991" (page 158). Gives by department the seats won by each party, gives by party the national level seats won, and totals seats won by each party.
Alcántara Sáez 1999: “El tirunfo de Alfredo Cristiani y la revalidación de la mayoría absoluta de ARENA en la Asamblea Nacional tras las elecciones legislativas de 1991 asentó con solidez a la derecha salvadoreña en la mesa de negociación según lo ya señalado” (page 143).
Central America report March 15, 1991: Gives first tentative official figures, including absenteeism rate, and percent of vote for PDC, PCN, CD, ARENA, and UDN (page 78).
Central America report March 22, 1991: “While the official count is still pending in the March 10 municipal and congressional elections, reports from the foreign press continue to confirm fraud and intimidation charges...[Reports include accounts that] ARENA, which controls the CCE, selectively delayed the necessary identification cards for voters in the rebel-controlled zones” (page 82). Gives predictions by “reliable sources” on seats won by each party.
Central America report April 5, 1991: “El Salvador: final results of the March 10, 1991 congressional elections” (page 93). Gives number and percent of total votes for each party, seats won, and total number of null and contested votes and abstentions.
Central American update March 13, 1991: “On March 10, Salvadorans went to the polls to elect 84 national legislators, mayors and town council members for 262 municipalities, and 20 deputies to the future Central American parliament…About 300 foreign observers were on hand to monitor the elections…Over half of the nation’s 2.2 million registered voters did not participate in the elections” (LADB). Gives details on problems with the elections and gives preliminary election results.
Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 25 1991: For the March 10, 1991 elections for the Legislative Assembly gives the purpose of elections, the characteristics of parliament, the electoral system, the general political considerations and conduct of the elections, and statistics (pages 69-70).
Córdova Macías 1998: “Distribution of seats by party in the 1991 elections, controlling by means of selection” (page 147). Gives by department the number of seats for each party won either by quota or remainder.
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras 1991-92: “In March 1991 legislative elections were held in which Arena lost its majority. The ruling party remained the largest political force with 39 seats and with the PCN’s nine it can still control Congress. Nevertheless, the elections represented a significant breakthrough because the far left, represented by Convergencia Democrática (CD), participated in the elections, capturing eight seats. The PDC continued as the second largest party with 26 seats” (page 35).
Country report. Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras 1991, 2: “National Assembly election results” (page 27). Gives percent of the vote won by seven parties, the number of seats each won at the departmental level, and the number of seats each won at the national level. “Only 52 per cent of the electorate participated in the election and 9 per cent of the vote consisted of abstentions, annulled or contested votes” (page 27).
Crónica del mes. Marzo 1991: “La jornada electoral del día 10 transcurrió en un ambiente de tensión bélica, pese a la tregua del FMLN, debido al ánimo provocativo del ejército, que se empecinó en incursionar en las áreas en disputa con el pretexto de garantizar el ‘normal desarrollo’ de los comicios en esos lugares” (page 216).
Eguizábal 1991: Gives percent of vote and seats won by major parties (page 23). Gives numbers of municipalities and Central American Parliament seats won by the major parties (pages 23-24).
Eguizábal 1992a: Gives percent of vote and seats won by major parties (page 61).
El Salvador elecciones 1995: Gives percent of vote and seats won by ARENA and seats won by PDC, PCN, CD, UDN, and MAC (page 104). “A pesar de su triunfo, ARENA no logró la mayoria absoluta en el Congreso Legislativo de 84 escaños y bajó su porcentaje de votación en relación a las elecciones presidenciales del 1989, que había sido del 53%.” Gives municipalities won by ARENA.
El Salvador: elections 1994: Rubén Zamora is elected to the Assembly (page 18).
Las elecciones del 10 de marzo 1991: “El 10 de marzo se eligirá un total de 84 diputados, 20 elegidos por circunscripción nacional y 64 elegidos por circunscripción departamental, todos por el sistema del cociente electoral...(S)e elegirán también, por circunscripción nacional, 20 diputados al Parlamento Centroamericano” (page 226). Gives number of registered voters as of February 7, 1991 in each department (page 228). “Consejo Central de Elecciones. Escrutinio final por departamento. Elecciones para diputados del 10 de marzo de 1991" (page 234). Gives for each department the number and percent of votes received by each party and total valid votes. “Consejo Central de Elecciones. Escrutinio final de la votación para concejos municipales por departamento y municipio. Elección del 10 de marzo de 1991" (pages 235-248). Gives for each municipality in each department the number of votes for each party and the total valid votes.
Johnson 1993: “1991 legislative elections” (pages 306-311).
Keesing’s record of world events March 1991: “Elections took place on March 10 to an enlarged 84-seat Legislative Assembly, and to seats on 262 local councils” (page 38093). Gives official results.
Latin American regional reports. Caribbean & Central America report March 28, 1991: The Consejo Nacional de Elecciones’ “preliminary figures showed that Arena’s support had fallen from 53% in the 1989 presidential elections to 47%. Running second was the centre-right [PDC] with 31%, down from 36% in 1989, follwed by the right-wing [PCN] with 11.3%. The vote of the left-wing Convergencia Democratica (CD) more than doubled, from only 3.8% in the presidential elections to 8.2%” (electronic edition).
Lazo 1993: Gives percent of vote and number of seats won by ARENA, PDC, and PCN in the eight departments with three delegates to congress (page 16-18). “Escrutinio final por departamento elecciones para diputados del 10 de marzo de 1991" (page 23). Gives total votes and percent of votes by department for seven parties. “Cocientes y residuos por partido y circunscripción (elecciones de 1991)” (page 24). Arranged by department. “Distribución de diputados por partido (cocientes y residuos) (elecciones de 1991)” (page 25). Arranged by department. “Votos residuales en las elecciones de 1991" (page 26). Arranged by department.
Luciak 2001: “Gender composition of FMLN representatives in the Legislative Assembly (until December 1994)” (page 211). Lists numbers of men and women serving as candidates or substitutes by party.
Lungo Uclés 1996: Gives percent of the vote and seats won by the CD (page 29).
McClintock 1998: “Citizens’ explanations of low turnout in El Salvador in 1991” (page 127). Results of a survey. “In 1991, the FMLN declared a truce for the elections and the political left was competing in earnest for a significant share of political power…(D)espite the cease-fire, turnout was down relative to the 1988 municipal race…Considerable blame is placed on the electoral authorities, primarily for not duly providing the electoral card or for losing names of voters from the electoral register” (page 127).
Montgomery 1995: Gives percent of vote and Assembly seats won by major parties. Gives mayoralties won by ARENA, PDC, and PCN (page 223).
Montgomery 1998: “Election day and after” (pages 119-120).
Stahler-Sholk 1994: “When the CD again took part in the elections (for the legislature) of 1991, with the peace talks already underway, it won 12% of the vote and 8 (out of 84) seats in the Legislative Assembly, where Rubén Zamora gained increased visibility as its vice-president” (page 26).
Step 1991: “New distribution of legislative assembly seats” (page 20). Gives seats to be elected for each of the fourteen departments, indicating how many are new additions, and including the new national level seats to be elected in 1991.
Ulloa 1991: “Elecciones 1991” (page 24-44).
Vickers 1992: “The March 10, 1991, Legislative Assembly elections brought increased voter turnout for the first time since 1982; it was up 15 percent from the preceding election” (page 26). Gives total number of votes cast (page 50 note 7), votes for ARENA and all rightest parties (page 50 note 9), and votes for PDC and all centrist parties (page 51 note 51).
Zamora 1997: “The political left participated in elections, winning 12 percent in 1991, up from 3 percent in 1989. For the first time in sixty years, there was a parliament in which no political force had a majority and in which the left sat with its own legislative faction" (page 175).
Castro Morán 2005: “El 27 de abril de 1991, el Gobierno de El Salvador y el [FMLN], firmaron los Acuerdos de México” (page 275).
Córdova Macías 1994a: “(L)as reformas constitucionales aprobadas en el marco de las negociaciones de paz, introdujeron importantes modificaciones en cuanto a la composición y funciones de la instancia electoral. Se creó un nuevo Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), en sustitución del Consejo Central de Elecciones. El TSE ha pasado a ser la más alta autoridad administrativa y jurisdiccional en lo electoral. Se ha buscado --en el diseño original--que en su composición no predomine en él ningún partido o coalición” (page 20-21).
Guía de elecciones 2009 2008?: El documento “reza textualmente en la parte III, numeral 1, sobre las reformas constitucionales: ‘Creación del Tribunal Supremo Electoral en sustitución del Consejo Central de Elecciones, El Tribunal Supremo Electoral, será la más alta autoridad administrativa y jurisdiccional en lo electoral. Se ha convenido que su composición será definida por la legislación secundaria, de modo que no predomine en él, ningún partido o coalición de partidos’” (page 2).
Lazo 1992: Constitutional reform creates the TSE and gives congress responsibility for electing the members (page 17).
Primer informe centroamericano de gobernabilidad jurídica e institucional 2007: El Salvador 2007: “Con la reforma constitucional de 1991, pasó a denominarse Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), con rango constitucional aunque con atribuciones limitadas…El TSE está regulado en los artículos 208 y 209 de la Constitución Política” (page 127).
Ulloa 1994: Discusses changes in electoral system “con las reformas constitucionales de 1991, dentro de las cuales se creó el Tribunal Supremo Electoral, se garantizó el derecho de la vigilancia permanente de los partidos políticos durante ‘todo el proceso electoral’...así como la inscripción ciudadana en el Registro Electoral, el cual sería organizado y actualizado con la vigilancia de los partidos políticos” (page 149).
Castro Morán 2005: “El Consejo de Seguridad adoptó unánimemente, el 20 de mayo de 1991, la resolución que estableció la Misión de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador (ONUSAL) para vigilar todos los acuerdos que convengan el Gobierno y el FMLN” (page 276).
Dunkerley 1994: May 1, 1991: “CD leader Rubén Zamora [is] elected vice-president of National Assembly after nomination by Roberto D’Aubuissón” (page 125).
McClintock 1998: “Until after the May 1991 reforms, the Salvadoran Central Elections Council was composed of three members, each of whom represented one of the three political parties with the most votes in the preceding presidential election; its president was from the winning party in the most recent presidential elections. The departmental and municipal elections councils, as well as voting-table officials, were also composed of members chosen by the political parties” (page 128).
Dunkerley 1994: July 18, 1991: “FMLN kidnaps ARENA leaders Guillermo Sol Bang and Gregorio Zelaya…[July 25] US Senate delays military aid vote until September” (page 126).
Montgomery 2000: In July 1991 “the United Nations Observation and Verification Mission (ONUSAL)…opened with a human rights observation team that operated throughout the country” (page 483).
NotiSur May 3, 1996: “The UN sent its first verification team, ONUSAL, in July 1991 to verify the human rights pact, which was the first formal agreement between the two sides in the armed conflict” (LADB).
Castro Morán 2005: “El 25 de septiembre de 1991, el Gobierno de El Salvador y el [FMLN], firmaron los Acuerdos de Nueva York…En dicho Acuerdo se crea la Comisión Nacional Para la Consolidación de la Paz (COPAZ), para que supervise el cumplimiento de todos los acuerdos políticos alcanzados por las partes” (page 277).
Central America report December 18, 1992: On September 25, “Government and FMLN reach accords on military and police issues” (page 378).
Central American update September 13, 1991: “On Sept. 4, the Nueva Fuerza party…requested legal registration from the [CCE]. Nueva Fuerza members include former adherents to the PCN, [ARENA], and the Christian Democrat Party” (LADB).
Dunkerley 1994: September 28, 1991: “Col. Guillermo Benavides and Lt. Yusshy Mendoza convicted on Nov. 1989 murders in the UCA” (page 127).
Wade 2003: “The New York Accords (September 1991) addressed the purification, reduction and redefinition of the armed forces and provided for the creation of the new civilian police force. Additionally, it also provided for the creation of [COPAZ] as the party responsible for ensuring the implementation of the peace accords. COPAZ was to be composed of two government representatives, including a member of the armed forces, two FMLN representatives, and one representative of each party or coalition in the Legislative Assembly, while the Archbishop of San Salvador was given observer status” (pages 69-70).
Dunkerley 1994: October 23, 1991: “US Congress withholds half of military aid pending improvement in human rights and advances in peace process” (page 72).
Gamero Q. 2000: “En Octobre de 1991…se creó un Tribunal Supremo Electoral” (page 125).
Guía de elecciones 2009 2008?: “La Reforma Constitucional hecha por la Asamblea Legislativa el 31 de octubre de 1991, Art. 2 dice textualmente ‘Sustitúyase en el artículo 77 la expresión Consejo Central de Elecciones, por Tribunal Supremo Electoral’” (page 2).
Dunkerley 1994: November 25, 1991: “(M)urder of former judge Francisco José Guerrero whilst carrying papers naming intellectual authors of UCA killings” (page 128).
Central America report December 18, 1992: On December 31, “Government and FMLN reach a last-minute accord to end the war” (page 378).
Dunkerley 1994: December 7, 1991: “100,000 at peace rally, San Salvador” (page 128).
Gamero Q. 2000: Describes the 1992 reform of the electoral code (page 126).
Llanes 1995: “In 1992, the Lutheran churches, the Episcopal churches, Emmanuel Baptist Church, and the Christian Reformed churches formed the Consejo Nacional de Iglesias (CNI)…These churches had joined a national debate, initiated by Catholic churches, and tried to include representatives from various political viewpoints in discussion of a solution to the Civil War. In 1992, the churches belonging to the CNI suffered the capture of some of their leaders, who were accused of belonging to the guerrilla army (FMLN)…Conservative churches remained clear in their position against Communism or Socialism, liberation theology, and ecumenical relations with Catholics…For the most part the conservative churches had developed an attitude of noninvolvement in the political process” (page 196).
Nickson 1995: “At the end of the civil war, COMURES was resurrected [it had been first established in 1941], and its revised statutes were officially recognized by the central government in 1992. Despite the extremely polarized political situation that then prevailed, COMURES soon gained a high degree of acceptability thanks largely to the political pluralism of its governing body” (page 181).
Sollis 1993: “The government created the Secretaría de la Reconstrucción Nacional (SRN) in January 1992 to adminster the implementation of the NRP” (page 5). “During 1992 the rapid reaction battalions, security forces and military intelligence organizations were dismantled. Downsizing also took place; the number of troops fell from a wartime strength of 63,000 to 31,000 over one year” (page 33).
The state of democracy: democracy assessments in eight nations around the world 2002: “In 1992, there were some million Protestant evangelicals in the country” (page 28).
Zamora 1998: “La composición del órgano legislative sufrió una doble modificación, tanto en el número de diputados a elegir que pasaron de 60 a 84, como por la introducción de un criterio adicional de elección, ya que a los diputados a elegir en base a circunscripciones departamentales --un total de 64--, se añadieron 20 diputados a elegir de una lista nacional y sobre la base del número de votos obtenidos en todo el país por cada partido politico” (page 79).
Central America report December 18, 1992: On January 13 “Government and FMLN agree on a schedule for demobilization of the guerrillas and dismantling of the state security apparatus” (page 378).
Allison 2006: “According to the Peace Accords, the legislature was supposed to pass a law decreeing official recognition of the FMLN as a political party. Instead, the FMLN pursued legal recognition as required by the constitution for all other new political parties” (page 58).
Bland 1992: “The signing of the final peace accord in Mexico City on January 16, 1992, an occasion marked by extraordinary displays of mutual affection and respect among once-bitter enemies, demonstrated a genuine desire on the part of key actors in society to work toward democracy in El Salvador. The series of agreements reached between the Cristiani government and the FMLN touch all areas of society, including human rights protections, reforms in the judicial and the electoral systems, reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new national civilian police, economic and social policy changes, and the disarmament of the FMLN” (page 163).
Castro Morán 2005: “El 16 de enero de 1992, el Gobierno de El Salvador y el [FMLN], firmaron los Acuerdos de Paz en Chapultepec, México, que pondrán término definitivo al conflicto armado salvadoreño…Los Acuerdos de Paz de Chapultepec, México, comprenden nueve capítulos que son los siguientes: Capítulo I. Fuerza Armada. Capítulo II. Policía Nacional Civil. Capítulo III. Sistema Judicial. Capítulo IV. Sistema Electoral. Capítulo V. Tema Económico y Social. Capítulo VI. Participación Política del FMLN. Capítulo VII. Cese del Enfrentamiento Armado. Capítulo VIII. Verificación por las Naciones Unidas. Capítulo IX. Calendario de Ejecución” (pages 278-279).
Córdova Macías 1998: “After twenty-three working meetings in slightly less than two years of negotiations, and with the mediation of the United Nations, an accord put an end to twelve years of civil war” (page 142).
Foley 1996: “The peace that culminated in the signing of the last of the Peace Accords (16 January 1992) was made by ‘políticos,’ not by Salvadoran society as a whole. It was negotiated behind closed doors, and its terms responded to the demands of the participants and their immediate constituencies: the Army High Command and the Salvadoran elite, in the case of the Salvadoran government, and its soldiers-in-arms, in the case of the FMLN. Deals were struck with other ‘políticos’ to achieve election reform, an agreement on land distribution…, and new mechanisms for negotiating social and economic reforms. But the core institutions of the Salvadoran government remained untouched, and the core interests of the FUSADES wing of the ARENA party were guaranteed, at least until the next election” (pages 76-77).
Ladutke 2004: “On January 16, 1992, the government and the FMLN signed the peace accords which officially ended the war. They created [COPAZ], a body composed of representatives of the Salvadoran government, the FMLN, and all of the parties represented in the Legislative Assembly, to oversee implementation of the agreements” (page 44).
McClintock 1998: “The key factors in the path toward peace were the realizations by both Salvadoran officers and FMLN leaders that they could not win the war outright and that they had lost external support” (page 154).
Montgomery 2000: “The Chapultepec Accords…sought to deal with the fundamental causes of the war by ending the armed conflict as quickly as possible, promoting democratization, guaranteeing absolute respect for human rights, and reunifying Salvadoran society” (page 483).
NotiSur May 3, 1996: ONUSAL “stayed on to monitor compliance with the final peace accords, signed in January 1992, which ended the nation’s 12-year civil war” (LADB).
Sollis 1993: “With the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992, peace returned to El Salvador and the reconstruction of its deeply divided society began…After 12 years of fighting neither side won the war; the [FMLN] could not achieve power through armed revolution, and the government was unable to subdue the guerrilla movement through the use of force. The Peace Accords implicitly recognize the existence of two modes of governance with their own particular models of social service delivery” (page 1).
Stanley 1993: “The January, 1992 Chapultepec peace accords ending the civil war between the Government of El Salvador and the [FMLN] provide for a fundamental transformation of the way internal order and security is maintained. Internal security in El Salvador has historically been based on vigilance by militarized security forces and paramilitary organizations under the direct control of the military…The peace accords change all of this. Under the Accords the government agreed to eliminate the old public security forces—the National Guard, Treasury Police, and National Police—and disarm and abolish the paramilitary patrol structure in the countryside…In place of the military and its auxiliary forces, the Accords provide for creation of the National Civilian Police” (page 1).
The state of democracy: democracy assessments in eight nations around the world 2002: “The 1992 peace accords partially established mechanisms for democratic participation, but a small elite dominates political, social and economic life” (page 27).
Wade 2003: “The peace accords created political space through: (1) the dissolution of security forces and the creation of a new civilian police force; (2) purging, reducing the size and redefining the role of the military; (3) legalizing the FMLN and organizations affiliated with the left; and (4) guaranteeing respect for human rights” (pages 89-90).
Williams 1997: “On 16 January 1992, in the Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City, representatives of the government of El Salvador and the FMLN signed a historic peace agreement, culminating almost two years of intensive negotiations mediated by the United Nations. The accords represented an important step toward a genuine process of democratization and national reconciliation. More specifically, they provided a unique opportunity for subordinating the armed forces to civilian control, thereby dramatically reversing the military’s traditional role in politics” (page 151).
Ladutke 2004: The ARENA “government passed the 1992 amnesty law before the Ad Hoc Commission and the Truth Commission began their investigations. Salvadoran nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), religious organizations, and unions cried out against this legislation. They claimed that the government’s stated rational for this legislation—forgiving and forgetting past abuses—clearly went against the purpose of these commissions, which was to establish accountability. These groups were unable to prevent passage of the legislation” (page 88). “(T)he government and its allies began efforts to pass an amnesty law even before the peace accords were signed. The Assembly approved the National Reconciliation Law on January 23, 1992—just a week after the official signing of the accords” (page 89). “One reason why the human rights advocates’ public denunciation failed to stop this amnesty was that the Democratic Convergence—the small leftist coalition that had taken part in the 1989 and 1991 elections—was on board from the beginning...ARENA had wanted a complete, unconditional amnesty right away. Zamora and other leftist politicians therefore helped limit the scope of the amnesty through their willingness to participate in drafting this law” (page 90).
Dunkerley 1994: January 24, 1992: “Col. Benavides and Lt. Mendoza sentenced to thirty years for UCA murders” (page 129).
Dunkerley 1994: February 1, 1992: “’D-Day’: formal ceasefire starts; end of forced conscription; tabling of legislation to guarantee security of FMLN, COPAZ and other commissions; start of transfer of farms over 245 hectares. [February 7] FMLN to start demobilization. [February 16] Designation of Supreme Electoral Court” (page 73). February 20, 1992: “(D)eath of Roberto D’Aubuissón from throat cancer” (page 129).
Johnson 1993: “(A) peace accord [is] signed on February 16, 1992. The two and a half year negotiating process involved establishing a consensus among El Salvador’s key groups with respect to the most divisive issues” (pages 284-285). The 100-page peace accord signed by the government and the FMLN did not simply end a twelve-year civil war, but also ended a 60-year old political system dominated by the military” (page 286). The 1983 constitutional provisions “provided the Salvadoran military with the legal rationale for its political mission of controlling the political process and maintaining its own institutional dominance. Under the peace accords, the military’s constitutionally-mandated role has been limited to external defense” (page 289). “Changes in the institutional structure of the military have had a more direct impact in reducing the political role of the military. The peace accords called for the dissolution of the National Guard and the Treasury [Police], the two military institutions most closely tied to the traditional landowning elite and to the worst human rights abuses, including those committed by the paramilitary death squads” (page 290).
Latin American regional reports. Caribbean & Central America report February 20, 1992: “Portraying the peace agreement as a defeat for the armed forces, right-wing terrorist groups have already made clear they will not stomach it. A group calling itself the Ejercito Secreto de Salvacion Nacional has issued death threats against 11 leaders of the Consejo Nacional de Iglesias (CNI), the local counterpart of the World Council of Churches, accusing them of actively backing the FMLN and of being members of the Communist party” (electronic edition).
Llanes 1995: “The message of the pastors and leaders in the Assemblies of God continued to be void of any political content. Even when some of their churches in the conflicting areas of the country suffered casualties, the conference maintained a position of neutrality” (page 200). “Institutions in general remained uninvolved in the political debate, but after the war, individual members who belonged to the middle class became active participants in the political life of the country. A member of the Assemblies of God formed a political party, Movimiento de Solidaridad Nacional” (page 201).
Williams 1997a: “The MSN received legal status in February 1992 after collecting the required number of signatures (3,000)…Positioning itself as a party of the center, the MSN presented itself as an alternative to the traditional political parties” (pages 192-193).
Wood 2000: ARENA “proved capable of managing internal tensions without significant schisms, even after D’Aubuisson’s death in 1992. Party decision making was centralized and secretive under the leadership of both D’Aubuisson and, later, the National Executive Commission, leaving local party units little autonomy” (page 248).
Central America report May 15, 1992: “All five of the rebel groups who make up the FMLN have affirmed their commitment to work together to establish themselves as a strong cohesive political force. During March, three of those five groups, the [ERP, FPL, and PCS] held their first internal peace-time assemblies to clarify their own political ideologies and discuss how to merge into a united FMLN political force while maintaining the integrity of their individual positions. In each case, the central conclusion was a firm commitment to transform the FMLN into a single, unified political party…Shafick Handal, secretary general of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS),…confirmed the PCS’s split with the Democratic Nationalist Union (UDN) with whom it had been allied since 1969. Although the PCS was founded in El Salvador more than 60 years ago, it was never legalized and was forced to use the UDN as its legal front” (page 132).
Dunkerley 1994: March 2, 1992: “(G)overnment announces redistribution of 42,300 acres to former rebels…[March 23] World Bank ‘rewards’ peace process with $800 million over two years” (page 129).
Sollis 1993: “Both sides agress that El Salvador should be rebuilt into a unified, cohesive and economically successful nation. However, this requires enlightened policies and daring political initiatives. The government’s five year National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) launched in March 1992 seeks to meet this daunting task, particularly in those areas where government institutions have traditionally been weakest and where popular support for the FMLN is greatest” (page 1). Describes the NRP (pages 3-4).
Dunkerley 1994: April 1, 1992: “PCS and UDN formally end alliance of twenty-four years…[April 4] MNR withdraws from Convergencia Democrática; reported remittances by Salvadoreans in USA and Canada in 1991 amount to $435 million (in 1979: $49 million)” (page 130).
Dunkerley 1994: May 31, 1992: “Deadline for reform of electoral system” (page 73). May 12, 1992: “UDN joins Covergencia Democrática (CD)…[May 23] FMLN declares itself a political party” (page 130).
Ladutke 2004: “The Ad Hoc Commission did not officially begin its evaluation of military officers until May 19, 1992” (page 89).
Luciak 2001: The Movimiento de Mujeres “Mélida Anaya Montes” “had been founded by militants in the [FPL] in July 1992 and was initially closely associated with the FPL” (page 150).
Ladutke 2004: “The Truth Commission was installed on July 13, 1992” (page 89).
Central America report September 18, 1992: “The first demobilization of the five Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalions (BIRI) was completed August 15…The other…battalions will be dissolved by December and those troops will be relocated…The BIRI was formed in 1981 by the armed forces as part of its counterinsurgency strategy to debilitate the increasingly effective [FMLN]. These elite battalions have been linked to numerous human rights violations” (page 278).
Montgomery 1995a: “(I)n August, the first technical mission from the electoral division of the UN arrived; its conclusion, that the major problem lay with voter registration, would haunt ONUSAL and the entire electoral process into 1994” (page 151).
Dunkerley 1994: September 1, 1992: “FMLN becomes legal party” (page 132).
Ladutke 2004: “The Ad Hoc Commission officially presented its report in September 1992” (page 92). Describes findings.
Dunkerley 1994: November 16, 1992: “Jesuit order requests freedom for those jailed for UCA killings…[November 30] UN Security Council extends ONUSAL mandate until May 1993” (page 133).
Allison 2006: “(O)n December 14, 1992, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal officially inscribed the FMLN enabling it to compete for the first time as a political party in the 1994 presidential, legislative, and municipal ‘elections of the century’” (page 58).
Central America report February 5, 1993: “El Salvador’s new electoral code is approved, in mid-December, almost six months after the May 1992 deadline. The greatest point of contention revolves around media restrictions on political publicity. In compliance with the peace accords, the Salvadoran Central Elections Council was abolished and a new Supreme Electoral Council (TSE) established, mandated to develop a new electoral code” (page 27). “The electoral code was passed on December 13 and forwarded to President Cristiani” (page 28).
Dunkerley 1994: December 8, 1992: “Atlacatl Battalion—responsible for El Mozote massacre and UCA killings—disbanded…[December 10] Assembly approves judicial and electoral reforms” (page 133). December 15, 1992: “US waives three-quarters of $615 million debt to federal agencies” (page 134).
Guía de elecciones 2009 2008?: “El Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) fue creado en 1992…El Consejo Central de Elecciones había sido creado en 1950 y dejó de funcionar en 1992, fecha en que se le dio vida al Tribunal Supremo Electoral” (page 2).
Johnson 1993: “In December of 1992, the Truth Commission completed its work and compiled a list of over 100 individuals, many of them senior officers of the Salvadoran military, who were involved in the assassination of Archbishop Romero (1980), the rape and murder of four North American nuns (1980) and the killing of four Jesuit priests…in 1989” (pages 288-289).
Keesing’s record of world events December 1992: “The 12-year civil war in El Salvador was formally brought to an end on Dec. 15 when, after a series of delays and setbacks, the planned demobilization of guerrilla forces and active army units was finalized...The FMLN was formally registered as a political party on Dec. 15, and on Dec. 21 its members elected a 15-member political directorate” (page 39232).
Luciak 2001: “Following the transformation of the FMLN into a political party in 1992, the FMLN elected its new party authorities…(T)hey consisted of a Political Commission with fifteen members and the sixty-six-member National Council. The first Political Commission had three female members while the party’s National Council was made up of nine women and fifty-seven men” (page 159).
Primer informe centroamericano de gobernabilidad jurídica e institucional 2007: El Salvador 2007: “(E)l primer Código Electoral…fue reformado en 1992” (page 127).
Sollis 1993: “The FMLN’s demobilization on December 15, 1992 ended the Salvadoran civil war” (page 33).
Wade 2003: “Like other guerrilla organizations in the region, the FMLN has faced the challenge of transitioning from guerrilla movement to political party. None of the five guerrilla organizations, perhaps with the exception of the [PCS], had any experience in the day-to-day operations of a political party. While the peace accords created political space for the FMLN’s reinsertion into Salvadoran society, the peace process did little to turn the FMLN into a modern, viable political party” (page 94).
Booth 2006: “The FMLN demobilized its forces by early 1993 and engaged openly in electoral politics” (page 111).
Montgomery 1995a: “Even though a preparatory office opened in June 1993, the [electoral] division’s day-to-day director…did not arrive until September, nor did the division’s staff until October. Given the mammoth problems subsequently encountered with registration of voters, this was very late indeed…By the Spring of 1993, a UN-sponsored poll concluded that 786,000 adults were not registered to vote…The Electoral Division was created with a mandate to verify and observe the process before, during, and after the elections scheduled for 20 March 1994” (pages 153-154). Gives details.
Montgomery 2000: “By 1993, a new police force, the National Civilian Police (‘Policia Nacional Civil,’ PNC) had replaced the old security forces [and] a new governmental institution, the National Counsel for Human Rights (‘Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos,’ PDH), was created where citizens could bring their complaints about governmental abuses” (page 484).
Nickson 1995: “At the eighth national municipal congress hosted by COMURES in 1993, all presidential candidates for the period 1994-1999 signed a joint declaration committing their parties to greater autonomy for local government” (page 181).
Sollis 1993: “In the first months of 1993, with the onset of the 1994 electoral campaign, the opportunities to build consensus [for reconstruction] have begun to close. Elections promote competition and confrontation rather than cooperation. The 1994 elections for president, national assembly and municipal councils may well be the most important in the country’s history. Consequently, the reconstruction process has entered a difficult period. The prospect of the government allocating reconstruction assistance to its 1994 election campaign is an obvious worry…Electoral considerations not only mean denying political advantage to the ‘other side,’ they also create pressure to manipulate assistance in order to show that it is the party in power that has the capacity to deliver goods and services” (page 10).
Central America report February 5, 1993: “Following a year of negotiations in the Special Electoral Commission of COPAZ…, then COPAZ itself and finally the Legislative Assembly, the electoral code was finally completed the first week in January…The new electoral code governs elections for president and vice president, the Central American Parliament, the Legislative Assembly and Municipal Councils. It establishes the administrative structure and operations of the [TSE]. The TSE has five members who will hold office for five years…The code also describes the voter registration process, with the TSE maintaining its own data bank of voter statistics. Under the new code Salvadorans must register to vote according to where they live or work. Other provisions of the code include no proportional representation in the municipal councils, with the mayor and all council members to come from the political party that wins the majority. The code also creats an ‘Electoral Counsel’ to investigate code violations and to respond to complaints of voting irregularities, as well as an ‘Electoral Registrar’ to oversee voter registration” (page 27). Gives additional details. “President Cristiani…sent [the code] back January 7 with 12 proposed changes. The next day the assembly accepted ten of the president’s more technical recommendations but rejected two…The section on Election Propaganda has caused the most upheaval since the code was made public…One complaint about the code from some observers is that it does not include overall limits on campaign spending but, they point out, neither does the current law” (page 28).
Montgomery 1998: “In January 1993, President Alfredo Cristiani made his formal request to the United Nations to ‘observe and verify’ the 1994 elections for president, Legislative Assembly deputies, mayors, and delegates to the Central American Parliament. ONUSAL’s mandate was expanded ‘to include the observation of the electoral process…’ The new Electoral Division became the fourth division of the ONUSAL mission” (page 121). “The Electoral Division” (pages 122-129).
Primer informe centroamericano de gobernabilidad jurídica e institucional 2007: El Salvador 2007: “A partir del año 1993, el carné electoral fue sustituido por el documento único de identidad (DUI) y la obtención de éste se facilitó, toda vez que sería útil no únicamente para procesos electorales ordinarios sino, además, para la creación de un sistema de voto residencial…Mediante el mismo acto en que se solicita el DUI se pasa a formar parte de la base de datos que el TSE utilizará para actualizar el Registro Electoral” (page 130).
Williams 1997a: “A potentially more promising development for politically activated Pentecostal leaders was the decision of Jorge Martínez to found his own political movement in January 1993 [Movimiento de Unidad]. Martínez, a prominent Pentecostal with close ties to the Pentecostal community, had served as vice minister of agriculture and of interior during the Alfredo Cristiani government” (page 193).
Central America report May 7, 1993: “The Unity Movement (MU), was formally registered in the Supreme Electoral Court last February. MU president Jorge Martínez Menéndez…and several of the new party’s leaders are all members of the Assembly of God Church” (page 124).
Central America report May 7, 1993: “Pueblo Libre was formally registered by the Supreme Electoral Court in March and describes itself as a democratic pluralist party” (page 124).
Dunkerley 1994: March 12, 1993: “Defence Minister Gen. Ponce presents resignation” (page 135).
Booth 2006: “In March 1993 El Salvador’s Truth Commission Report found that 95 percent of the human rights abuses committed since 1980 were the fault of the armed forces and ‘death squads’” (page 111).
Central America report March 19, 1993: “The 600-page report of the Truth Commission, made public March 15, details some thirty cases as illustrative of the character of the political violence which reigned in El Salvador throughout the country’s long and violent civil war” (page 1). “Unlike the recommendations of similar commissions in Argentina and Chile, the Truth Commission published not only the crimes but also, in the majority of cases, the names of those responsible…The Commission called for the removal of some 40 military members from the armed forces and any other public office, including almost all the members of the high command during the 1980s. It also named several FMLN commandantes, including the entire leadership of the ERP who it also recommended should be prohibited from holding public office” (page 2).
Córdova Macías 1994a: The International Truth Commission Report states that 27 percent of voting age Salvadorans do not have the voting card required to vote (page 23). Gives results of TSE campaign to register voters (page 24).
Dunkerley 1994: March 15, 1993: “(P)ublication of 600-page Truth Commission report on political crimes since 1981; leading military figures named” (page 135).
Radical women in Latin America: left and right 2001: “1993: The U.N.-sponsored Truth Commission finds that 85 percent of the nine thousand human rights abuses investigated and 95 percent of the killings that took place in the 1970s and 1980s were committed by government-supported death squads and the military” (page 35).
Schroeder 1995: “Although denied for years by the Salvadoran government, the Salvadoran Truth Commission of 1993 implicated the military in large scale massacres of civilians in El Junquillo, El Mozote, Las Hojas and the Sumpul River” (page 49).
Booth 2006: “Five days later, a general amnesty law was passed by the legislative assembly insuring that there would be no legal recourse, either criminal or civil, for crimes committed during the war” (page 111).
Central America report April 2, 1993: “March 20, after five days of intense negotiations, the Salvadoran Legislature approved a general political amnesty for all those involved in criminal actions during the war, including those persons named in the Truch Commission report. The amnesty is absolute and unconditional and covers all crimes except for kidnapping, extortion and drugtrafficking” (page 1). Lists number of legislators from each party that voted for the amnesty.
Dunkerley 1994: March 20, 1993: “Assembly approves by 47 votes to 9 (13 abstentions; 15 absent) a general political amnesty for all those involved in political crimes committed during the civil war, including those named in Truth Commission report” (page 135).
Ladutke 2004: “The ARENA government and its allies quickly followed the publication of the Truth Commission Report in March 1993 with a second, broader amnesty law designed to protect the human rights violators identified within the report” (page 89). “The Assembly passed the amnesty law March 20, 1993 with a total of forty seven votes from ARENA and two smaller right-wing parties. Nine Democratic Convergence deputies voted against the bill, while thirteen Christian Democratic Party deputies abstained” (page 115).
Dunkerley 1994: March 23, 1993: “Defence Minister Ponce describes Truth Commission report ‘unethical and disrespectful’ and an insult to the armed forces” (page 135).
Dunkerley 1994: March 26, 1993: “Supreme Court attacks Truth Commission report for ‘damaging the dignity of the justice system’” (page 135).
Central America report May 7, 1993: “During ARENA’s March 28 national convention, San Salvador’s mayor, Armando Calderón Sol, was chosen as the party’s candidate for the 1994 presidential elections. His closest rival for the slot was Roberto Murray Meza…Calderón, considered a loyal follower of ARENA’s founder, Roberto D’aubuisson, also has the full-fledged support of President Alfredo Cristiani” (page 123).
Wood 2000: “There were signs of significant tension within ARENA as the party selected its candidate for the 1994 elections. Some tensions were political; hard-liners from the D’Aubuisson wing struggled against the more moderate Cristiani faction” (page 248).
Dunkerley 1994: April 1, 1993: “Col. Benavides and Lt. Mendoza released under amnesty” (page 136). April 28, 1993: “ARENA convention elects Armando Calderón Sol as 1994 presidential candidate” (page 137).
Dunkerley 1994: May 3, 1993: “Shafik Handal declares that FMLN will not present candidate for 1994 presidential election” (page 137). May 23, 1993: “(L)arge explosion destroys FMLN arms cache in Managua” (page 138).
NotiSur May 14, 1993: “During separate party conventions held in San Salvador on May 9, leaders from the three parties affiliated with the [CD] coalition formally agreed to nominate current Legislative Assembly vice president Ruben Zamora as the coalition’s presidential candidate for the March 1994 general elections. The CD brings together Zamora’s [MPSC], the [PSD] and the [UDN]…Zamora is the third presidential candidate to emerge for 1994. The governing [ARENA] nominated San Salvador Mayor and ARENA party president Armando Calderon Sol, while the small, social democrat-oriented [MNR] nominated party secretary general Victor Manuel Valle. The MNR formed part of the CD coalition until 1992, when it broke from the alliance…The FMLN has confirmed publicly that the party will not run its own presidential candidate, but will instead throw its support behind the candidacy of another party or coalition” (LADB).
NotiSur June 4, 1993: “On May 23, the [PDC] held primary elections to nominate a presidential candidate for the March 1994 general elections. Former foreign minister and party secretary general Fidel Chavez Mena emerged victorious in the balloting over former Ad Hoc Commission member and PDC founder Abraham Rodriguez. Chavez Mena said he received about 60% of the 19,000 votes cast during the nationwide primary” (LADB).
Central America report July 23, 1993: “The FMLN announces its support for [CD] presidential candidate Rubén Zamora in the general elections next March. On the other end of the political spectrum, retired General Juan Rafael Bustillo will run as the presidential choice of the [PCN]. Still undeclared are a few of the smaller parties such as the [MAC] and the evangelical [MSN]” (page 214).
Baloyra-Herp 1995: “In July 1993 the Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced a massive registration drive” (page 55).
Crónica del mes. Julio-agosto 1993: “(E)l 6 de julio, el [PCN] ratificó la candidatura del ex general Juan Rafael Bustillo para la presidencia de la república. Al referirse al informe de la Comisión de la verdad que señala a Bustillo entre los responsables del asesinato de los sacerdotes jesuitas en noviembre de 1989, tanto éste como Ciro Cruz Zepeda, secretario general del PCN sostuvieron que la mencionada comisión no tiene ninguna fuerza, ni legal, ni constitucional” (page 767). “Ciertamente, el clima electoral empieza a vivirse cada vez más. Sin embargo, en el sistema y en el proceso electoral persisten graves problemas. Sobre todo en el área del empadronamiento, la carnetización y la depuración del registro electoral” (page 768). Gives details.
Montgomery 1995a: “In a country with 60% illiteracy, [the TSE] devised a complex, byzantine voter registration process that would have cowed even a well-educated voter. The whole process required massive logistical support, including registration forms, photocopying machines, Polaroid machines for taking photographs and making laminated voter registration cards, as well as vehicles for transporting registrars to and from remote municipalities” (page 153).
NotiSur July 30, 1993: “Calderon Sol’s hopes of exclusively representing the right wing in the elections were dashed in early July with the surprise announcement by the [PCN] that it will run an extreme-right presidential candidate—retired air force Gen. Juan Rafael Bustillo—separately from ARENA…The PCN—traditionally considered the party of the Salvadoran armed forces—has seen its ranks swell in recent months with officers forced out of the military under the peace accords…(M)any…believe that the Army hopes to use the PCN to regain through elections the power it lost as a result of the peace accords…On the other side of the political spectrum, the five organizations which comprise the [FMLN] announced on July 8 their decision to back the presidential bid of Ruben Zamora, putting an end to a prolonged internal debate…In addition to ARENA, the PCD, CD, and PCN, several smaller parties will also present presidential candidates in the elections. Among these are the recently formed evangelical [MSN] and the social democrat-oriented [MNR]” (LADB).
NotiSur August 6, 1993: “On July 21, [TSE] president Arturo Zaldivar announced plans to launch a massive voter registration drive aimed at facilitating the broadest possible participation in the general elections…Under the plan, teams of TSE contract employees will fan out around the country to register as many eligible voters as possible” (LADB)
Central America report October 29, 1993: “In August, [FPL] leader Oscar Grimaldi was killed” (page 324).
Luciak 2001: “FMLN women who held their first national meeting in August 1993 criticized the party for its lack of support” (page 149). “In August 1993, the FMLN created a Women’s Secretariat. One should not infer from this that the party leadership was fully supportive of women’s rights. Evidence indicates that it agreed to the creation of such an institution to appease female activists who demanded a Secretariat and to present the picture of a progressive movement to its many international supporters” (page 152).
Central America report September 10, 1993: “The [FMLN] has chosen Francisco Lima as a vice presidential candidate for the 1994 elections…In other election news, retired armed forces General Juan Rafael Bustillo withdrew as PCN presidential candidate” (page 272).
Central America report October 8, 1993: “The three parties that made up the [CD]—the [MPSC, PSC, UDN]—announced September 16 they were formally merging into the CD, dissolving their own party structures and eliminating their individual party identities” (page not listed).
Crónica del mes. Julio-agosto 1993: “Pese a toda su defensa, el 1 de septiembre, el ex general Bustillo anunció su renuncia a la candidatura acusando a la dirigencia del PCN de falta de apertura y de no delegarle el poder que como candidato presidencial necesita” (page 768).
Baloyra-Herp 1995: “In October 1993, 28 percent of the public reported not having the ‘carnet’” (page 55).
Central America report October 29, 1993: “The [PCN] has named retired Colonel Roberto Escobar García as its presidential candidate, to be joined on the ticket by businessman Roberto Marchessini as vice president…The nomination brings to an end a month-long crisis sparked when retired General Rafael Bustillo withdrew as the PCN presidential candidate. His resignation and accusations of corruption intensified an internal power struggle in the military-backed party which governed El Salvador from 1962 until 1979…FMLN leader Francisco Veliz was shot to death on October 25…Veliz had been a member of the [PRTC]….The Catholic Church, the Democratic Convergence, the FMLN and [ONUSAL] all warned that Velis’s death is the work of reactivated death squads which continue to act with impunity…The [TSE]…has come under harsh criticism for its sluggish registration drive. More than 700,000 eligible voters have yet to be registered and time is running out. A group of nongovernmental organizations participating in the drive suggest that it be extended beyond the November 20 deadline. The coalition strongly opposes the Legislative Assembly resolution that all voters must be in possession of their registration cards by January 1, 1994” (page 324). Describes difficulties encountered by the registration drive organizers.
Central America report November 5, 1993: “Heleno Hernán Castro Guevara, member of the FMLN’s National Council…, was found shot to death October 30…The killing…has deepened doubts about the prospects for lasting peace in El Salvador and the possibility of a ‘clean’ election, and has reinforced the fear of the reemergence of death squads” (page 332).
Córdova Macías 1996: “In his October 1993 report, the UN secretary general suggested that there were serious deficiencies in the voter registry. The most serious deficiency was the large number of citizens who were not registered to vote or who did not have a voter identification card” (page 39).
NotiSur October 8, 1993: “In early October, the three political parties affiliated with the [CD] coalition formally came together to constitute a single political party” (LADB).
NotiSur October 29, 1993: “Capping several weeks of reports…of increased death squad activities, the Oct. 25 assassination of Francisco Veliz, a top leader from the [FMLN], finally thrust the issue squarely into the public spotlight. The resurgence in death squad activity has not only cast a shadow over preparations for the March 1994 general elections, but has also raised new questions about the viability of the Salvadoran peace process itself…With the electoral campaign set to begin on Nov. 20, the Veliz assassination, combined with other recent acts of intimidation against leftist forces, is but the latest in a series of signs that sectors on the far-right remain adamantly opposed to successful culmination of the Salvadoran peace process” (LADB).
Central America report November 12, 1993: “Support broadened for an in-depth investigation into the resurgence of death squads…As the violence continued,…pressure for an independent investigation increased from the FMLN, the popular movement, the Catholic Church, ARENA officials and the international community, and by November 3, a large-scale ONUSAL investigation was underway. Cristiani has consistently dragged his feet on compliance with the Truth Comission’s recommendations, which are due to be completed by November 20” (page 337). Recently unclassified U.S. government documents “shed light…on US involvement in the war as they prove that former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush received detailed information on the Salvadoran government’s involvement in death squads and other human rights violations while continuing to supply what totaled US$1,000mn in military and non-military aid by the war’s end” (page 338).
Central America report December 17, 1993: “Campaign season for the March 1994 presidential and vice presidential elections began officially on November 20” (page 382).
Montgomery 1995a: “The election campaign for the office of the presidency was formally opened on 20 November 1993…[ONUSAL] Chief of Mission Ramírez Ocampo negotiated a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ among the presidential candidates of all major political parties regarding the conduct of the election and the campaign and their support for the peace process. On 5 November 1993, all the [presidential] candidates with the exception of the Christian Democratic candidate, signed the agreement in a ceremony at ONUSAL headquarters” (page 154).
Central America report December 17, 1993: “(B)y December 1 Congress had approved the second series of election law reforms this year, accepting the proposals of the ruling [ARENA] party and the Christian Democratic Party…Registration problems continue...According to the Electoral Tribunal, 786,153 people otherwise eligible to vote, of a total of 2.5 million, are still unregistered. In preparation for the campaign the Tribunal registered upwards of 785,000, however, only 100,000 have received the required voter registration cards. Current electoral law states that citizens must have their registration cards by March 12, 1994 in order to vote, a deadline the Tribunal may have trouble meeting. However, the legislature rejected an FMLN request to extend the deadline by two weeks…The FMLN lost another leader December 9 with the assassination of Mario López, leader of the [PRTC]” (page 382).
Central America report January 28, 1994: On December 17, “the [MNR] withdraws its presidential, vice presidential and mayoral candidates to throw its support behind the [CD] and the [FMLN] alliance” (page 3). Gives additional details.
Central America report August 5, 1994: “The Joint Group was set up in December 1993, following several death-squad style assassinations of high-level [FMLN] leaders” (page 4).
Crónica del mes. Enero-febrero 1994: “(D)esde los últimos días de diciembre, un grupo de diputados de ARENA conocidos por su ideología extremista impulsaron una marea de acusaciones infundadas contra el FMLN” (page 115). Gives details.
Guía de elecciones 2003: “El Consejo Central de Elecciones nació en 1950, funcionó con las proyecciones y limitantes establecidas por la ley primaria hasta el 15 de diciembre de 1993, fecha en que se le dio vida al Tribunal Supremo Electoral” (page 12).
NotiSur December 17, 1993: “During a special municipal convention held on Dec. 5, the [FMLN] nominated party coordinator general Shafick Handal to run for mayor of San Salvador in the March 1994 general elections. Over 650 FMLN delegates participated in the convention, unanimously backing Handal’s candidacy” (LADB).
NotiSur January 7, 1994: “On Dec. 19, Victor Valle, presidential candidate for the social democratic [MNR], announced his decision to withdraw his candidacy. Valle said the MNR had decided to throw its support behind the [CD-FMLN] ticket, led by presidential candidate Ruben Zamora. With Valle’s withdrawal, the Salvadoran left is now positioned to present a unified block against the governing [ARENA] in the March 20 general election…Under the new deal agreed upon by leaders from the MNR and the CD-FMLN, the MNR will support the candidacy of Zamora for president, as well as CD-FMLN candidates in a large number of municipal races. Nonetheless, in races for legislative seats and for some municipalities, the MNR will be allowed to run its own candidates” (LADB).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral enero 1999: “Partido Pueblo Unido Nuevo Trato [fue] fundado en 1994” (page 4).
Foley 1996: “Though AID would cease to fund the operating expenses of FUSADES in 1994, a scheme worked out in 1991 provided FUSADES with a minimum income of $5 million a year” (page 72).
Luciak 2001: “In 1994, the central dividing issue among the women who participated in Mujeres’94..., a women’s coalition formed for the elections, concerned the question of ‘doble militancia:’ Were active participation in both the women’s movement and a political party compatible? To no one’s surprise, the main opponents in this debate were the MAM and the Dignas. The Dignas considered party militancy incompatible with membership in a women’s movement, while the Mélidas argued that these roles could be combined” (page 151). “The female militants of the FMLN…developed innovative strategies to increase their representation on the candidate lists” (page 200). Describes the system of proportional representation used in El Salvador (pages 200-201). “(W)omen had to fight to be ranked at the top in the department lists and very high in the nationalist list” (pages 200-201).
Montgomery 2000: “In preparation for the 1994 elections, a broad coalition of women’s organizations hammered out an agenda called ‘Mujeres 94’, which it asked every party to adopt as part of its platform. Only the FMLN agreed, thanks to the pressure of its women members. The FMLN also adopted a rule that one-third of all its candidates for office be women. This was a compromise; the women had pushed for 50 percent” (page 486).
NotiSur January 14, 1994: “As the March 20 general elections approach, violent attacks against supporters of the [FMLN] have grown. The political violence against the left is now aggravated by constant problems in voter registration and allegations that the governing [ARENA] party is attempting to limit FMLN participation in the post-election vote count, all of which create doubts over the legitimacy of the electoral contest” (LADB).
Tilley 2005: “In 1994, twelve…organizations came together to form the National Coordinating Council of Indigenous Salvadorans (CCNIS), which launched a bitter competition with ANIS for domestic and international recognition and funds” (page 39).
The state of democracy: democracy assessments in eight nations around the world 2002: “The Assembly elected a new Supreme Court in 1994” (page 27).
Wade 2003: “The third stage of the ONUSAL mission dealt with electoral reform and elections monitoring of the 1994 elections. While the accords had created the TSE to replace the existing electoral commission (the CCE), recommendations regarding electoral reform were to be determined by a special commission appointed by COPAZ” (page 78).
Central America report January 28, 1994: “The legislature approved modifications to the electoral code for the third time in the last year on January 5. Changes included a lengthening of the registration period for the elections, allowing candidate registration until January 31 instead of the previously stipulated January 15. The modifications also call for the [TSE] to complete the ballots no later than 45 days before the elections. In addition, candidates will now be required to submit only three documents to register themselves for the elections” (page 4).
Central America report January 13, 1995: “In January 1994, President Alfredo Cristiani announced the suspension of PN demobilization. He proposed instead a plan for an internal purge, with a complete investigation into each agent’s record…Throughout its efforts to delay PN demobilization, the government used the increasing crime rate to rationalize the forces’ continued existence. The suspension was seen as merely another ploy in Cristiani’s systematic attempts to block compliance with peace accords” (page 6).
Crónica del mes. Enero-febrero 1994: Gives information on the various parties’ candidates for mayor of San Salvador (page 116). “(E)l 5 de enero, la asamblea legislativa aprobó las reformas al…Código Electoral” (page 118). Gives details.
Montgomery 1995a: “The election campaign…for the Legislative Assembly [was opened] on 20 January 1994” (page 154).
Crónica del mes. Enero-febrero 1994: “Fue bastante tarde, hasta el 8 de febrero, que el presidente del Tribunal Supremo Electoral informó que entre 60 y 70 mil de las Solicitud de Inscripción al Registro Electoral (SIRE) presentadas no pudieron ser validadas por no tener respaldo de la partida de nacimiento y que la población votante la constituye un aproximado de 2,750,000 ciudadanos” (pages 117-118).
Montgomery 1995a: “The election…campaigns for municipal office [began in February 1994]” (page 154).
NotiSur March 4, 1994: “(I)t appears that some 400,000 registered voters may not be able to vote on election day due to irregularities and bureaucratic problems in the process of handing out registration cards to voters, which are required as identification at the polls, even if the voter is included on voting rosters. According to the [TSE], as of Feb. 23, a total of 2,718,008 citizens had registered to vote, but of that total, only 2.3 million had actually received a registration card…On Feb. 28, the TSE reported that it had contracted a foreign firm to rapidly tabulate the election results on March 20, so that official vote counts will start to be released within six hours after the polling places close…In addition, the entire electoral process will be scrutinized by some 900 international observers stationed around the country by the UN’s Observer Mission in El Salvador” (LADB).
Montgomery 1995a: “On 10 March 1994, in a gathering at the ONUSAL headquarters…, all the candidates for president signed a declaration in which they denounced violence and promised to respect the results of the elections and fulfill the peace accords” (pages 154-155).
NotiSur March 18, 1994: Detailed discussion of pre-election “irregularities” (LADB).
Zamora 1998: “(S)egún datos del mismo Tribunal Supremo Electoral el número de personas registradas pasó de 2,100,000 en 1989 a 2,715,628 en marzo de 1994, es decir un aumento de más del 20% en menos de 5 años” (page 80). “Por otra parte, el número de personas que, estando registradas, han obtenido su documento de identificación electoral—indespensable para ejercer el sufragio—es aún menor, con lo cual, en la práctica, el número de votantes se reduce; al suspenderse la entrega de carnets, previa a las elecciones de marzo 1994, el TSE reportaba la entrega de 2,200,000 carnets, lo cual nos da un deficit de 500,000 personas respecto a los dos millones setecientos mil habitantes en edad de votar reportados por el censo de población; a esto habría que añadir todos los carnets entregados cuyos portadores emigraron, murieron o lo han extraviado…(C)reo que puede afirmarse con relative seguridad que, de un poco más de dos millones setecientos mil salvadoreños en edad de votar, entre 500,000 y 1,000,000 no están en capacidad de hacerlo” (page 81).
March 20: general election
Acevedo 1994: “(N)o ha dejado de ser sorpresivo el elevado índice de ausentismo registrado...Por primera vez en casi dos décadas habría elecciones supuestamente libres, en las cuales participarían todas las fuerzas del espectro político” (page 198). Gives total valid votes and total votes in the presidential election; total valid votes and total votes in the congressional election; and total valid votes and total votes in the municipal elections. Discusses abstention rate (page 199). Discusses performance of ARENA in each race (page 202). “Distribución de diputados en las elecciones legislativas del 20 de marzo de 1991" (page 211). Gives for each department and the national slate the seats won by each party.
Alcántara Sáez 1994: “El Salvador: escrutinio final presidencial, 1994" (page 167). Gives by department the votes for each party and total valid votes. ”Distribución por departamentos / Partidos de los diputados electos” (page 171). Gives by department the congressional seats won by each party, the country total, and the percent of congress they constitute. “El Salvador: distribución de municipios por partidos ganadores” (page 174). Gives for each department the total number of municipios and the number won by each party. “El Salvador: comparación de los resultados porcentuales en las tres elecciones” (page 179). Gives percent of vote won by each party in the presidential, congressional, and municipal elections.
Allison 2006: “In the 1994 ‘elections of the century,’ the FMLN captured 21% of the national vote. This translated into twenty-one of the National Assembly’s eighty-four seats and immediately transformed the FMLN into the country’s second largest political party. At the same time, the incumbent party and main adversary of the FMLN, ARENA, won thirty-nine seats in the assembly...At the presidential level, the FMLN entered into a coalition with the center-left ‘Convergencia Democrática’ (CD)…In the elections, neither the FMLN-CD candidate, Rubén Zamora, nor the ARENA candidate, Armando Calderón Sol, surpassed the 50% threshold required for a first round victory” (page 58). “FMLN performance in 1994 ‘elections of the century’” (page 171). Gives number of votes and percent of vote in municipal, legislative, and executive elections for each department.
Bird 2000: “The 1994 elections” (pages 34-35).
Cardenal 1994: Gives number of registered voters and number of these who were able to obtain voting cards (page 6). Gives number of voters with cards who voted (page 7). Gives number of valid votes and number and percent of votes for ARENA, Coalición, PDC, and “others” (page 12). Gives seats won by ARENA, FMLN, PDC, PCN, CD, and MU. Gives municipalities won by ARENA, PDC, FMLN, Coalición, PCN, and MAC and number of municipalities in which each of these had candidates (page 13).
Central America report March 25, 1994: “ARENA presidential candidate Armando Calderón Sol’s 49.3% falls just short of the required 51% and the presidential election goes to a second round next month” (page 1). Gives congressional seats won by each party, municipalities won by ARENA, and PARLACEN seats won by each party.
Central America report April 8, 1994: Official results (page 3). Gives percent of vote won by each party in the presidential election. Gives number of seats won in congress by ARENA, FMLN, PDC, PCN, CD, and MU. Gives number of mayoralties won by ARENA, FMLN, PDC, and PCN (page 4).
Cerdas Cruz 1996: “El Salvador: results of 1994 presidential elections (first round)” (page 22). Gives number and percent of votes for each party. “El Salvador: results of 1994 congressional elections” (page 25). Gives number and percent of votes and seats won by each party.
Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 28 1994: For the March 20, 1994 elections for the Legislative Assembly gives the purpose of elections, the characteristics of parliament, the electoral system, the background and outcome of the elections, and statistics (pages 73-76).
Colindres 1997: Gives statistics and information on the 1994 election in comparison with the 1997 election.
Córdova Maciás 1994: Gives total votes cast in presidential election, percent this constitutes of registered voters and voters with the “carnet electoral” (page 37), and percent of presidential vote won by ARENA, Coalición, and PDC (page 38). Gives Congressional seats won by ARENA and FMLN and mayoralties won by ARENA, PDC, FMLN and PCN (page 39).
Córdova Macías 1996: “On March 20, four elections were held simultaneously: (1) presidential; (2) parliamentary, using a proportional representation formula to fill eighty-four seats in the Legislative Assembly; (3) municipal, using a simple majority formula to fill 262 mayoralties (the party that obtains the most votes obtains all the seats of the municipal council); and (4) for the Central American Parliament, using a proportional representation formula in national single districts to elect twenty deputies. Nine parties ran in these elections” (pages 38-39). Lists the parties. “The electoral outcome” (pages 40-43).
Córdova Macías 1998: “Distribution of seats by party in the 1994 elections, controlling by means of selection” (page 148). Gives by department the number of seats for each party won either by quota or remainder.
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1994-95: “The [PCN] is a small conservative party with historic links to the armed forces. It won only four seats in the legislative assembly in March 1994, but its loyalty to ARENA will give that party the working majority needed to pass most legislation” (page 40).
Country report. Guatemala, El Salvador 1994, 2: “Probably the most important long-term victory for ARENA came at the municipal level, where it gained control of 211 out of 262 municipalities, 50 more than before. Because the municipal elections are decided on a winner-take-all system, in which the municipal council seats all belong to the winning party in the mayoral race, opposition forces will have no representation in local governments across most of the country. The FMLN did much worse than expected, winning in some 12-14 municipalities, with the PDC taking twice as many. In almost all municipalities, ARENA won with under 50% of the popular vote ... Approximately 1.4 million out of an eligible 2.7 million voters went to the polls” (page 26).
Dada Hirezi 1994: Gives percent of vote won by ARENA, Coalición, and PDC (page 55). Gives seats won by ARENA, FMLN, PDC, PCN, CD, and MU. Gives municipalities won by each party.
Eguizábal 1994: Gives the percent of congressional vote, number of seats, municipalities, and percent of presidential vote won by ARENA (page 86). Gives the number and percent of congressional votes, number of seats, municipalities, and percent of presidential vote won by FMLN. Gives the percent of congressional vote, number of seats, municipalities, and percent of presidential vote won by PDC.
El Salvador elecciones 1995: Gives for ARENA percent of presidential vote received and number of seats and municipalities won (page 104). Gives for Coalición the percent of presidential vote and number of seats and municipalities won (page 105). Gives names of the municipalities where FMLN won the mayoral races (page 106). Gives for PDC the percent of vote received and seats and municipalities won. Gives seats won by PCN and MU. MAC, MNR, and MSN each received less than 1 percent of the vote (page 107). Gives number of mayorships won and number of mayorships for which a party candidate stood for election for ARENA, PDC, FMLN, Convergencia, PCN, and MAC (page 106). “Elección presidencial. Resultados electorales, marzo 20 de 1994, primera vuelta” (pages 142-143). Gives by department the votes received by seven parties, valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, total votes, and percent of registered voters.
El Salvador: elections 1994: Gives number who voted, congressional seats won by four parties, and municipal councils won by ARENA (page 1). “In the Assembly race, parties ran slates of candidates for each of 14 Departments and another slate of 20 national seats (64 of the 84 members of the Assembly were thus elected from departmental slates). The seats were awarded according to proportional representation for each slate, so that if a party won 25% of the vote in a Department with 16 seats its top four candidates would be elected...Municipal Council seats, on the other hand, were awarded on a winner take all basis; the party with the most votes, whether it wins 50% or 15%, wins the mayorship and all council seats” (page 4). Gives number of voting centers and number of voting tables (page 6). “Women and the political culture” (page 14-15). Gives number of women elected to the Assembly and to mayorships in the 1994 election. “March 20, 1994 National Assembly vote” (page 38). Gives for each department the total seats available and total valid votes, and for each party gives the number and percent of votes and number of seats won. Totals for the country the percent of the vote and number of seats won by each party.
Las elecciones: “el fiasco del siglo” 1994: Gives election results, including total valid votes; number and percent of presidential votes for each party; null votes; blank votes; and total votes cast (page 156). Gives seats won by each party. Gives results of municipal elections, including the number of municipalities won by each party and the number of municipalities in which each had candidates (page 157). “En este nivel, la abstención forzada fue determinante, puesto que en muchas municipalidades el triunfo del partido oficial se decidió por muy pocos votos. Aparentemente, esta sería la menos llamativa de las cuatro elecciones...pero en la práctica es la más importante, porque en este nivel es donde se comienza a constituir el Estado. El poder del presidente muy rara vez llega hasta las 262 municipalidades, pero el poder municipal se ejerce y se experimenta de manera permanente y directa.”
FLACSO 1995: Extensive election data for 1994 election throughout. “Electores inscritos y votos emitidos en los comicios de 1994" (page 173) gives total registered voters and the number and percent of voters who voted in the two presidential elections, the congressional elections, and the municipal elections (includes contested, null, and blank votes). “Distribución de la Asamblea Legislativa 1994-1997" (page 189) gives departmental and national seats held by each party. “Resultados electorales elección concejos municipales” (page 192) gives valid votes and percent won by each party. “Alcaldías 1994-1997" (page 193) gives total mayors elected by party.
Keesing’s record of world events March 1994: Gives preliminary results of elections, including the percent of the vote for the top three presidential candidates, the congressional seats won by each party, and the municipal councils won by each party (page 39906). “The left, while expressing satisfaction at its performance, estimated that more than 300,000 of 2,400,000 eligible voters had been prevented from voting by irregularities such as omission from electoral lists, or denial of voter cards because of the loss of birth certificates during the war. Transport and the availability of polling centres in rural areas had been poor.”
Ladutke 2004: “The voters elected [Nidia] Díaz to the Legislative Assembly in March 1994” (page 170).
Lehoucq 1995: “Presidential election results in El Salvador 1994" (page 179). For first round gives the number and percent of votes received by each party, the annulled and invalid votes and abstentions, and the total votes. “Legislative election results” (page 180). Gives the number of seats won by each party.
Luciak 1998a: “In the 1994 parliamentary elections in El Salvador, the [FMLN]female militants had succeeded in getting 21 women, representing 25 percent of the 84 candidates, onto the party lists. Women were most successful at the national level. There they represented 35 percent of the candidates and 40 percent of the substitutes. Ana Guadalupe Martínez and Lorena Peña, who had held the second and third spot, respectively, were elected from the national list. In addition, two women, Norma Guevara and Sonia Aguinada, who had occupied positions 4 and 5 in the department of San Salvador, were elected, as was ‘Nidia Díaz,’ the only women heading a department list” (page 220). “Gender composition of FMLN candidates for parliament 1994 elections” (page 220).
Luciak 2001: “FMLN Legislative Assembly candidates for the 1994 elections by FMLN group” (page 98). “In El Salvador, the legislative assembly consists of eighty-four members. Twenty members are elected from the countrywide national list of candidates, while the remaining sixty-four are selected by voting for candidates in individual departments” (page 99). Discusses the FMLN candidates and how they are selected (pages 99-100). “The former guerrillas obtained 287,811 votes out of a total of 1.3 million and won twenty-one out of the eighty-four seats in parliament” (page 101). In the 1994 elections the FMLN “failed to win several seats in parliament and the mayoralties of about forty towns by a few votes because the party chose to enter few electoral alliances” (page 108). “Gender composition of FMLN candidates for the 1994 elections by FMLN group” (page 202). Discusses the election (pages 201-202). “Gender composition of Partido Demócrata in the Legislative Assembly, 1994-1997” (page 211). “ARENA swept the elections, gaining control of 207 of the 262 municipal councils. The FMLN was victorious in only 15 towns” (page 212). Describes irregularities surrounding the election (pages 212-213). “Of a total of nine women in the Salvadoran parliament, five belonged to the FMLN. ARENA had three female legislators…and the Christian Democratic Party had one female representative. This meant that less than 11 percent of all seats in parliament were held by women. Similarly, few women were elected as mayors. Out of a total of 262 mayors, only 32 were female” (page 213).
Lungo 1995: “At the national level, the FMLN emerged as the second most powerful political force in the country. The organization came away with an important share of power in the Legislative Assembly, despite its limited resources and political inexperience. At the municipal level, however, the left suffered an undeniable defeat, winning in only 15 mostly small municipalities” (page 33). Lists names of municipalities won by FMLN (page 34).
Lungo Uclés 1996: “The FMLN gained recognition as a legal political party and cooperated with the CD in supporting Rubén Zamora as a joint presidential candidate” (page 29). Gives for ARENA the percent of the presidential vote, number of legislative seats, and municipalities won. Gives seats won by the FMLN (page 30).
McElhinny 2004: “The 1994 ‘elections of the century’ delivered very modest gains to the FMLN in its debut as a legal political institution. It polled strongly in San Salvador but poorly in the countryside, especially in areas where its support during the war should have translated into votes...In all, the FMLN coalition won only 15 of the country’s 262 municipalities in 1994” (page 156).
McElhinny 2006: Discusses the election (page 398).
Montgomery 1995: Gives percent of presidential vote for major parties (page 265). Gives number of assembly seats and mayoralties won by each party.
Montgomery 1995a: “During the elections of 20 March 1994, 900 UN observers were sent to voting stations across the country in teams of 2-30 members. Their task was to accompany the voting materials throughout the entire election day: from the moment they were dispensed in San Salvador, to the tabulation of votes, and the final transport of the official totals and ballot boxes back to the capital…ONUSAL’s own ‘quick count,’ and its transmission to the political parties, prevented President Cristiani from declaring a premature, and erroneous, first-round victory for his party” (page 155).
Montgomery 1998: “Election days” (pages 131-132).
Montgomery 2000: “Since the 1994 elections, when the FMLN first won thirteen mayoralties, the national government has treated opposition-led municipalities more as enemies than as collaborators in serving the people” (page 490).
Mujeres 1995: “Resultados electorales (en porcentajes sobre total de personas carnetizadas)” (page 21). For ARENA, Coalición, PDC, and PCN gives percent of vote for mayors, congressional seats, and president, and percent of persons with “carnets” who abstained. “Resultados electorales (en porcentajes sobre total de votos válidos emitidos)” (page 22). Same arrangement as above, based on valid votes. “Mujeres y hombres en las candidaturas del FMLN a la Asamblea Legislativa y el PARLACEN” (page 28). Gives number of male and female FMLN candidates for departmental slate, national slate, and for PARLACEN.
Murguialday 1994: Gives number of women elected to congress and percent they constitute of all representatives, number of women delegates elected by FMLN, ARENA, and PDC, number of mayors elected by the left and the number of these that are women, and the number of female candidates for congress and mayor on FMLN slates (page 25).
Murguialday 1996: Gives number of women candidates for mayor on the FMLN slate and the total number of municipalities in which the FMLN had mayoral candidates (page 38). Gives number of women who won congressional seats and the percent they constitute of congress and the number of female mayors elected and the percent they constitute of all mayors. Gives percent of FMLN delegates who are women and states that FMLN and ARENA are the only two parties with female delegates. Gives rate of absenteism in the first and second presidential rounds and discusses possible reasons for the high abstention rate of women (page 141). Estimates the number of eligible women who did not vote in the 1994 election.
Murguialday 1997: “No es de extrañar, por tanto, que fueran mujeres la mayor parte de la ciudadanía que, teniendo edad de votar, no se empadronó ni solicitó documento electoral; tampoco extraña que ellas constituyeran la mayoría de los 400 mil salvadoreños que, estando empadronados, nunca llegaron a obtener su carné” (page 285). “(C)oncluimos que entre 800 y 850 mil mujeres no votaron, por unas u otras razones, en las pasadas elecciones: es decir, seis de cada diez salvadoreñas en edad de votar no ejercieron su derecho al sufragio. A la vista de estos datos, el ausentismo electoral femenino deja de ser un hecho anecdótico para convertirse en un fenómeno relevante de la vida política nacional” (page 289).
NotiSur July 30, 1993: “In the elections, scheduled for March 20, 1994, Salvadorans will elect a new president and vice president, all 84 deputies in the Legislative Assembly, 20 deputies to the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), and 262 mayors to head municipal administrations through the country. The elections—considered a fundamental step in the consolidation of the 1992 peace accords—will feature the broadest participation in Salvadoran history. They will mark only the second transfer of power from one elected civilian administration to another after half a century of rule by the military” (LADB).
NotiSur March 25, 1994: “Despite the presence of some 4,000 international observers, El Salvador’s March 20 general elections—the first since the 12-year civil war ended in 1992—were marred by widespread irregularities and charges of electoral fraud. Nearly 50% of the 2.7 million Salvadorans who registered to vote did not cast ballots. Many abstained voluntarily. But hundreds of thousands of registered voters were simply barred from voting because the [TSE] either failed to grant them the voter identification cards necessary to cast ballots, or neglected to include them on voter lists at the polling places” (LADB). Discusses documented election irregularities and preliminary results.
NotiSur April 4, 1994: Gives national level results by party and total number of valid ballots cast, contested ballots, non-valid ballots, blank ballots, and total number of ballots cast (LADB).
NotiSur April 8, 1994: Gives results of assembly elections (LADB).
NotiSur May 3, 1996: ONUSAL “coordinated the oversight of the 1994 elections” (LADB).
Resultados electorales 1994: “Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Elección presidencial. Votación para Presidente y Vicepresidente por departamento. Primera vuelta--20 de marzo” (page 363). Gives for each department the votes for each party, valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, and total votes. “Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Elección de diputados. Votación para Diputados por departamento. 20 de marzo” (page 364). Gives for each department the votes for each party, valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, and total votes. “Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Elección de concejos municipales. Votación para concejos municipales consolidado por departamento. 20 de marzo” (page 365). Gives for each department the votes for each party, valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, and total votes. “Votación para concejos municipales por departamento. 20 de marzo” (pages 366-379). Gives for each municipality in each department the votes for each party, valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, and total votes.
Schroeder 1995: “The 1994 elections” (pages 88-111). Includes many statistical tables.
Seligson 1995a: “El 20 de marzo de 1994 se realizaron de forma simultánea cuatro elecciones: presidenciales, parlamentarias con fórmula de representación proporcional para la Asamblea Legislativa de 84 escaños, municipales en las 262 alcaldías con fórmula del mayoría simple (el partido que obtiene más votos obtiene todos los puestos del concejo municipal), y para el Parlamento Centroamericano, para el cual se eligen 20 diputados con la fórmula de representación proporcional en distrito nacional único” (page 63). Gives total valid votes cast and percent this constitutes of the registered voters and voters with the “carnet electoral” (page 64). “El Salvador: elección presidencial” (page 67). Gives percent of vote received by each party. “Voto para diputado (1994)” (page 69). “Quién vota en El Salvador?” (pages 69-76). Based on surveys, examines statistically who votes in El Salvador by education, age, sex, income, occupation, place of residence, ideology, level of information, and religion. Also gives reasons given for abstaining. “Distribución de votos y concejos municipales por partido, 1994" (page 77). Gives by party the number of municipalities won and the percent of the vote received. Emphasizes the disparity between actual votes received and municipalities won, for example, ARENA with 44.48% of the actual vote won 79.01% of the municipalities while the Coalición with 24.48% won only 5.73% of the municipalities. “Porcentaje del voto en las elecciones locales y nacionales para los 3 paratidos principales, 1994" (page 79). Gives by department for ARENA, PDC, and FMLN the local and national vote and the difference between these. “Resultados elecciones municipales, 1994" (page 80). Gives percent of vote for each party.
Stahler-Sholk 1994: Gives composition of the TSE for this election and distribution of campaign funds (page 24). Describes problems with registering voters for the 1994 election and gives numbers involved (page 25). Gives percent of presidential vote for ARENA, the Coalition, and PDC (page 28). Gives seats won by ARENA, PCN, FMLN, CD, PDC, and MU. Gives municipalities won by ARENA, PCN, PDC, MAC, and FMLN.
Wade 2003: “1994 Legislative Assembly election results” (page 95).
Walter 2000c: Discusses the election and gives results (pages 633-636).
Wantchekon 1999: Discusses the election.
Williams 1997: Gives percent of presidential vote for top three candidates, seats won by each party, and mayoralties won by ARENA (page 178).
Williams 1997a: The MSN “received only 1 percent of the national vote in the March 1994 elections and failed to win a seat in the Legislative Assembly…One of the MSN’s greatest limitations was its weak connection to the Pentecostal community. Most of its leaders came from non-Pentecostal churches. This was a severe limitation, given that Pentecostals account for at least 75 percent of the Protestant population…Unlike the MSN, Martínez [Movimiento de Unidad] made no bones about his ties to the Pentecostal community and his efforts to attract support among churches…Although Martínez believed that his party was well placed to tap Pentecostal disillusionment with the traditional parties, its performance in the March 1994 elections was not much better than the MSN’s, only 2.4 percent of the vote nationally, It was, however, enough to guarantee the party one deputy in the Assembly” (page 193).
Wood 2000: “From the presidential race to municipal races, ARENA swept the 1994 elections. The party demonstrated considerable strength in all regions of the country; indeed, in only one of the fourteen provinces did ARENA candidates for the national legislature poll less than 40 percent of the vote. Moreover, ARENA appealed to voters across socioeconomic classes” (page 248). Discusses five reasons for ARENA’s success (pages 249-250). “ARENA’s clear dominance of the 1994 elections was tempered by a high abstention rate. Abstention was about 40 percent in the first round of the presidential race and 50 percent in the second round…”(S)ome voters were effectively disenfranchised due to the inadequate condition of the electoral roster. Despite constitutional and regulatory reforms and United Nations support, electoral authorities failed to furnish significant numbers of voters with the necessary electoral credential” (page 250).
Central America report March 25, 1994: “While the presidential race will have to go to a second round, the congressional, mayoral and Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) results were declared official. ARENA dominated, winning 37 of the 84 seats in the legislature to the FMLN’s 20...The key mayorship of San Salvador went to ARENA legislator Mario Valiente. Overall, ARENA took 210 of the 262 mayorships in the country, with majorities in 13 of the 14 departments. The remaining 52 mayorships were divided among the FMLN and the other parties” (page 1). Calderón Sol “formally requested that CD-FMLN-MNR presidential candidate Rubén Zamora cede the election so as not to waste government funds. Needless to say, Zamora refused” (page 2). Gives additional details.
Central America report April 8, 1994: Gives the official results (pages 3-4).
NotiSur April 4, 1994: “On March 30, ten days after the March 20 general elections in El Salvador, the [TSE] released final official results from the presidential race. Nevertheless, the final results for legislative and municipal races have still not been issued. As anticipated, a runoff election must now be held since none of the presidential candidates won the 50% plus-one-vote majority necessary to secure victory in the first round” (LADB).
NotiSur April 8, 1994: “On April 6…El Salvador’s [TSE] released official results for the Legislative Assembly race…(T)he TSE must still issue the final vote tally for the country’s 262 municipal governments, and for 20 seats in the Central American Parliament” (LADB).
April 24: presidential election--second round (Calderón Sol / ARENA)
Cardenal 1994: Gives number and percent of votes won by ARENA and Coalición and how much more these are than votes received in the first round (page 12).
Central America report April 29, 1994: ARENA “candidate Armando Calderón Sol wins the run-off elections with 68% of the vote…Rubén Zamora…received 32% of the vote. The [TSE] tabulated a 55% abstention rate, 10-15 percentage points higher than that registered in the first round” (page 1).
Cerdas Cruz 1996: “El Salvador: results of 1994 presidential elections (second round)” (page 24). Gives number and percent of votes for the two parties.
Country report. Guatemala, El Salvador 1994, 3: Gives percent of vote won by each candidate, voter turnout, and abstention rate (pages 25-26).
El Salvador elecciones 1995: “Elección presidencial. Resultados electorales, abril 24 de 1994, segunda ronda” (page 146). Gives by department the votes for ARENA and Coalición, valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, and total votes. “Elección presidencial, abril 24 de 1994" (pages 149-177). Gives for each municipality in each department the number and percent of votes for each party, total valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, total votes cast, and percent of registered voters who voted.
El Salvador: elections 1994: Gives percent of vote won by Calderón Sol/ARENA and Zamora/FMLN (page 1).
FLACSO 1995: “Resultados electorales elecciones presidenciales segunda vuelta--24 de abril” (page 185). Gives for ARENA and Coalición number and percent of votes received, the total of contested and null votes and abstentions, total valid votes, and total votes cast.
Keesing’s record of world events April 1994: Gives number and percent of valid votes received by the two candidates (page 33953).
Lehoucq 1994: “Presidential election results in El Salvador 1994" (page 179). For second round gives number and percent of votes received by two parties, annulled and invalid votes and abstentions, and total votes.
Montgomery 1995a: “On 24 April 1994, a second round of voting took place between the two candidates who had received the most votes in the election the preceding month: Armando Calderón Sol, of ARENA, and Rubén Zamora of the coalition made up of the FMLN, the ‘Convergencia Democrática’ (CD), and the ‘Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario’ (MNR). For this run-off election, ONUSAL dispatched the same number of observers. Calderón Sol was soon pronounced the victor. Despite the fact that the observers reported improved voting conditions during the second round of voting, irregularities persisted, such as voting ‘mesas’ that failed to open on time and then closed early and citizens who were denied the right to vote due to faulty documentation” (pages 155-156).
Montgomery 1998: “The runoff” (pages 133-134).
Resultados electorales 1994: “Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Elección presidencial. Votación para Presidente y Vicepresidente por departamento. Segunda vuelta--24 de abril” (page 364). Gives for each department the votes for each party, valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, total votes, ballots used, ballots left over, missing ballots, and total ballots.
Williams 1997: Gives percent of vote won by each candidate (page 178).
Allison 2006: “Shortly after the legislature convened in 1994, Joaquín Villalobos, Ana Guadeloupe Martínez, and other members associated with the FARN and the ERP separated from the FMLN because of strategic, tactical and ideological differences related both to the conflict and the party’s new role in the postwar period” (page 59).
Central America report May 6, 1994: “The new Assembly, whose first ordinary plenary session will be held May 6, is composed of 39 ARENA deputies, 21 FMLN, 18 Christian Democrats, 4 National Conciliation Party, and one deputy from the Democratic Convergence and the Unity Movement, respectively” (page 4).
Central America report May 20, 1994: Seven FMLN legislators are suspended by the party after they “broke with an internal party decision and participated in the election of the Legislative Assembly’s directorate May 1” (page 1). “The question now is whether the five organizations that make up the FMLN can or should remain united, or how the party as a whole might be reorganized” (page 2).
Central America report January 13, 1995: “The Salvadoran government and the FMLN met in May 1994 to reschedule the PN demobilization, setting the date for April 1995” (page 6).
McElhinny 2004: “A political crisis within the FMLN was touched off by a poorer-than-expected showing in the 1994 presidential elections and latent political strategies that have always divided the five-member organization” (page 157).
Wade 2003: “Following the ‘elections of the century” the FMLN found itself in a quagmire that it had managed to avoid for more than a decade. On May 1, 1994, during the first session of the General Assembly, seven FMLN deputies from the ERP and RN broke rank and voted for ARENA…On May 10, the seven deputies and Villalobos [who was accused of collaborating with ARENA] were suspended from the FMLN” (page 96).
Central America report June 3, 1994: “Armando Calderón Sol is sworn in June 1…In his inauguration speech, Calderón Sol, a 45-year old businessman and lawyer, promised to confront the nation’s greatest challenges” (page 1).
Central America report June 3, 1994: “At a meeting of the party’s National Council June 22-23, the FMLN agreed to hold a party convention on July 31 to debate the different proposals for the party’s future. Following an explosive rift in early May, the FMLN’s five organizations have drawn the battle lines over ideology, strategies and tactics” (page 5).
Crónica del mes. Junio-julio 1994: “(E)l 14 de junio, el presidente del Tribunal Supremo Electoral, Luis Arturo Zaldívar, informó que se estaban analizando las pruebas—o argumentos técnicos—presentadas por los partidos cuya existencia política estaba en peligro; se trata de los movimientos Auténtico Cristiano, Solidaridad Nacional y Nacional Revolucionario…El 30 de junio, el magistrado Rutilio Aguilera informó que el tribunal había resuelto cancelar las inscripciones de los referidos institutos políticos por haber obtenido menos del uno por ciento de los votos válidos en la elección para diputados” (page 720). “El 21 de junio, el presidente de la república anunció que Rodrigo Avila, hasta entonces subdirector de la gestión administrativa de la Policía Nacional Civil, sería el nuevo director a partir del 1 de julio” (page 725).
NotiSur June 3, 1994: “On June 1, Armando Calderon Sol was sworn in as El Salvador’s first elected post-war president…His inauguration was only the second transfer of power from one elected civilian to another in the country’s history. Outgoing president Alfredo Cristiani was the first” (LADB).
Tilley 2005: “At its first news conference on June 15, 1994, CCNIS…[presented] itself as a coalition of Salvadoran indigenous groups formed to lobby for the government’s ratification of ILO Convention 169” (page 229).
Central America report August 5, 1994: “In its 94-page report, the Joint Group describes the functioning of death-squads during the 1980s…, and concludes that these structures have mutated somewhat in recent years” (page 4).
Central America report August 19, 1994: “On July 31, the Legislative Assembly appointed four new members and their alternates to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal with only minor scuffles. The official [ARENA] and the legislative coalition composed of the [FMLN, CD, and the MNR] each have one representative on the court. The other two magistrates were nominated by the recently sworn-in Supreme Court justices…The appointment of the fifth magistrate, in the hands of the Christian Democrats as the third political force in the country, is still up in the air due to an internecine conflict” (page 8).
Central America report January 13, 1995: “In July, the Joint Group Report, an investigation of illegally armed groups engaged in politically motivated violence, linked PN members to the still active death squads…President Armando Calderón Sol decided to accelerate the demobilization of the PN for December 1994” (page 6).
Crónica del mes. Junio-julio 1994: “El 30 de julio, la asamblea sólo pudo elegir a cuatro magistrados del Tribunal Supremo Electoral, pues la democracia cristiana discutía aún su propuesta” (page 724). Gives details and names of those elected.
Central America report September 9, 1994: “On August 27 the [PDC] party leadership announces the suspension of the national convention set for…August 28…The Christian Democratic party was sent into disarray by the poor showing in the March 20 elections of PDC presidential candidate Chávez Mena, prompting many to wonder whether the party was undergoing a restructuring or schism. His defeat at the polls made it apparent that the PDC was taking the backseat as a political force in El Salvador and the party’s predicament became a focus of national discussion over the changing political order” (page 7).
NotiSur September 16, 1994: “With its unity strained by internal dissension, the [FMLN] held a special National Convention on Aug. 29 to salvage the alliance that held it together through 12 years of civil war” (LADB).
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1997-98: “In October 1994 a well-known newspaper columnist, Kirio Waldo Salgado, led a group of far right-wing ARENA members to found the Partido Liberal Democrático (PLD)” (page 73).
McElhinny 2004: “As the FMLN was splitting, [ARENA] had solidified its political control...Yet ARENA was also suffering internal divisions between the landed, hardcore right-wing elements of the party and the ascendant self-described modernizing elements whose interests were more diversified in finance and commerce” (page 157).
NotiSur October 21, 1994: “Intraparty squabbles within El Salvador’s governing [ARENA] have led to the founding of a new breakaway party, the Partido Liberal Democrata (PLD), led by hard-line disciples of the late ARENA founder, Roberto D’Aubuisson…[ARENA] has recently suffered from divisive political infighting between the ultraright faction and more moderate party members...(W)hen Alfredo Cristiani was elected president in 1989, the more moderate wing of the party prevailed and was instrumental in allowing the government to initiate peace talks with the rebels, which culminated in the signing of a peace accord in January 1992…On Oct. 5, the disillusioned D’Aubuisson followers announced their split from ARENA and the formal establishment of their new party, the PLD” (LADB).
Zamora 1998a: “El surgimiento del PLD no puede separarse de la crisis del Partido ARENA; en torno a la Convención de ARENA de octubre 1994, en la que se eligió un nuevo COENA, se afirmó que el ingreso a la dirección de ese Partido de personajes como Raúl García Prieto, estaba directamente vinculado a la división que los planteamientos de Salgado habían generado en el Partido ARENA” (page 123). “El 15 de octubre de 1994 ‘el Partido Liberal Democrático (PLD), nace por la inspiración de su líder, Dr. Kirio Waldo Salgado Mina’” (page 124).
Central America report December 2, 1994: “Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas died of a heart attack on November 26 at the age of 74. Rivera y Damas served as Archbishop of San Salvador since the assassination of his predecessor, Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero in 1983. Rivera y Damas took an active part in the Salvadoran peace process, acting as a mediator when negotiations began in 1984. He continued to play an important role in Salvadoran politics, continually urging both sides to comply with the peace accords” (page 7).
Central America report December 16, 1994: “At the national party convention in late November, the [PDC] elect a new directorate with hopes of revitalizing the party. Ronald Umaña, a Fidel Chávez Mena supporter, is elected secretary general” (page 4).
Central America report May 5, 1995: “In November 1994 Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas passed away. Less vocal, nevertheless he was a progressive in the spirit of Archbishop Romero” (page 6).
Castro Morán 2005: “Después de 127 años de haber sido fundada, la Policía Nacional, de raigambre militar, se desmovilizó con fecha 31 de diciembre de 1994, dejando el control de la seguridad interna de nuestro país en manos de la Policía Nacional Civil” (page 284).
Central America report December 16, 1994: “On December 11, over 1,000 dissident PDC party members met to found the [MRSC]” (page 5).
Central America report January 13, 1995: “After several delays, the National Police (PN) is demobilized on December 31, 1994 in keeping with the 1992 peace accords between the Salvadoran government and the [FMLN]” (page 6).
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1997-98: “Meanwhile, after the centrist PDC lost ground in the 1994 elections, a division emerged between the Abraham Rodríguez and Fidel Chávez Mena factions of the party. Mr Rodríguez left to found the Partido Renovación Social Cristiana (PRSC), which aimed to present itself as a centrist alternative, in alliance with the older centre-left Convergencia Democrática (CD), and a small evangelical party, the Movimeinto de Unidad (MU)” (page 74).
Luciak 2001: “A special congress of the FMLN, held in December 1994, recognized that the differences among the five groups could not be reconciled” (page 102). “The sectors remaining in the FMLN reorganized the party at the second National Convention, held December 17-18, 1994” (page 103). Describes the reorganization (pages 103-104). “At the December 1994 party convention, when the commitment to implement a female quota was not yet in force, four women, Nidia Díaz, Angela Zamora, María Ofelia Navarrete, and Mirna Perla…were elected to the FMLN’s Political Commission. Further, women increased their participation in the National Council from 13.6 to 18.2 percent when twelve female militants were elected” (page 159). “Following the elections, disagreements among the five groups intensified, resulting in the December 1994 exodus of parts of two of the historic FMLN groups, the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo and the Resistencia Nacional” (page 210).
McElhinny 2004: “Demands by the [FPL] for greater unification motivated the exit of the ERP and elements of the [Resistencia Nacional] from the FMLN in December 1994 to form a separate...Partido Democratico” (page 157).
Zamora 2003: El 10 de diciembre “el líder del ERP, Joaquín Villalobos anunció la salida de su organización del FMLN y 10 días después hizo lo mismo la RN” (page 103). “El 18 de ese mismo mes el FMLN en su Convención Ordinaria, eligió una nueva dirección en la que los dirigentes del ERP y la RN ya no aparecían. Dentro y fuera del partido hubo un respiro, pues el nivel de desgaste sufrido era muy alto” (page 104).
NotiSur October 6, 1995: Discusses 1995 proceedings in the corruption cases involving ARENA officials in the administration of Alfredo Cristiani.
Allison 2006: “During the 1994-1997 legislative session, seven deputies broke ranks with the party lowering its number of deputies to fourteen” (page 59).
Central America report March 17, 1995: “On March 28, two of the five member organizations of the FMLN party will formalize the creation of the Democratic Party in an official ceremony. Former guerrilla comandante and now Vice President of the Legislative Assembly Ana Guadalupe Martínez informed the press that the Democratic Party will join together the [ERP] and the [RN] along with the National Revolutionary Movement within the RN” (page 8).
Central America report April 7?, 1995: “ERP leader Joaquín Villalobos and Eduardo Sancho of the RN, officially dissolved their groupings, formerly member-organizations within the 25-year old FMLN. Together with the MRN, led by Oscar Bonilla, they revealed the new Democratic Party’s constitution on March 28…The creation of the new party is the culmination of a process that began in May 1994, when internal frictions went on public display as the 21 FMLN deputies fought over congressional leadership positions…The creation of the Democratic Party is just one of the sounding bells for the 1997 elections at the municipal and legislative levels. Several new political groupings have also emerged from splits within the more established parties” (page 6).
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1997-98: “In March 1995 ... the Partido Demócrata (PD) [was formed] under the leadership of Joaquín Villalobos, a former guerrilla commander” (page 74).
Luciak 2001: “This exodus [to form the PD] reduced the number of FMLN legislators elected in 1994, from twenty-one to fourteen, since seven joined the new ‘social-democratic’ sector” (pages 102-103).
NotiSur April 7, 1995: On March 28 “leaders of the…[ERP] and [RN] formally disbanded their organizations to join with the [MNR] to form the new Partido Democrata (PD)…[Joaquín] Villalobos and [Eduardo] Sancho, two of the most effective FMLN guerrilla chieftains during the civil war, accused the peacetime FMLN leadership of taking ultra-left positions permitting the governing [ARENA] party to win some of the political center” (LADB).
Wade 2003: The ERP and RN “established the [PD] in March 1995…The PD openly criticized the FMLN for its lack of vision in creating a peace-time identity for the party” (page 96).
Central America report May 5, 1995: “In the last five months [Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas’] auxiliary bishop, Monsignor Gregorio Rosa Chávez, who had taken over his duties, was considered the likely successor. Pope John Paul II’s appointment of Monsignor Fernando Sáenz Lacalle took many by surprise, even Rosa Chávez, and murmurs of disappointment resounded. However, the decision of the Vatican is final and there are no accepted routes in the Church to challenge the appointment. The most reliable indicators of Sáenz Lacalle’s political tendencies are his membership in Opus Dei and his rank of colonel in the Salvadoran military…Pope John Paul II and his right-hand man in the Vatican, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger are conducting a systematic effort to redirect the Latin American Catholic Church away from the progressive, Liberation Theology path adopted in the 60’s, 70’s and early 80’s” (page 6).
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1997-98: “ONUSAL left the country on April 30, 1995, leaving behind a small mission of eight observers (MINUSAL) to monitor the remaining tasks of land distribution, electoral and judicial reform” (page 71).
Luciak 2001: “(T)he Third National Assembly of FMLN Women…was organized by the Secretariat and held on April 30, 1995, in San Salvador…Three hundred delegates, representing all fourteen departments, met to elect the Secretariat’s new leadership…The Secretariat’s leadership, seeking to control the outcome of the elections, presented a slate of candidates that would have ensured the representation of all five FMLN groups. Yet its proposal was rejected in a heated debate” (pages 153-154).
NotiSur May 3, 1996: “In April 1995, the UN Security Council extended ONUSAL’s term through October 1995. Renamed MINUSAL, the mission operated with a drastically reduced staff…The extension was deemed necessary because the government had still not complied with all terms of the peace accords” (LADB).
Wade 2003: “The UN Mission in El Salvador closed on April 30, 1995; however, the UN has maintained a continued presence in the country through the UNDP and MINUSAL” (page 89). “Shortly after his appointment in April 1995, [Archbishop of San Salvador, Fernando] Saenz Lacalle stated that he would not use the church to promote political opinions…While the Left was skeptical about the appointment and feared a reversal in the direction of the Church in El Salvador, the Right was thrilled by the appointment” (page 112). “Members of the ultra-right within [ARENA] formed the Partido Liberal Demócrata (PLD) in April 1995, charging that party traditionalists were being excluded from decisionmaking. Others defected to the right-wing [PCN]” (page 140).
Central America report June 9, 1995: “President Armando Calderón Sol took the country by surprise on May 28, when he announced a pact with the opposition to break the legislative deadlock over the tax package…The pact, presented as an agreement between the government and opposition parties, was immediately rejected by various parties whose leaders declared that they had never set eyes on the document” (page 2).
Central America report June 9, 1995: “On June 4, President Calderón Sol announced the creation of a Ministry of Public Security in an effort to respond to the escalating levels of crime and violence” (page 8).
Central America report August 18, 1995: “One by one, beginning in late July, the [FPL, the PRTC, and the PCS] held general assemblies in which the party delegates approved the proposal to dissolve their party structures. The formation of the unified FMLN is expected to be completed by the end of the year…(T)he [RN]…also decided to disband and reform as another current or tendency within the FMLN” (page 4).
Central America report October 13, 1995: “The opposition political parties are pushing for the approval of reforms to the electoral code. President Armando Calderón Sol agrees with the reforms and had promised to pass electoral reforms by September 14th, but deputies from the ruling [ARENA] are blocking the passage of the reforms through the legislature. Together with ARENA party bosses at the local level, they are fearful of the code change that would threaten their hold on the country’s municipal councils…The electoral reforms proposed are the conclusions of a cross-partisan electoral commission…If the reforms remain blocked, the mid-term 1997 elections will take place under the old rules. The reforms proposed include the creation of a National Registry to centralize the local citizens’ lists; simplification of the identification process for elections to only one document; organization of votes according to residential areas; administrative reforms to the [TSE] and proportional representation in the municipal council…The anti-reformist elements within the ARENA party are particularly concerned with the reform of proportional representation. In El Salvador, ‘winners-take-all’ at the municipal level, and the winning party fills all the council seats. ARENA currently controls the majority of the municipalities…The reform proposed would divide the non-leadership positions among the losing parties” (page 4).
Crónica del mes. Septiembre 1995: “(E)l 1 de septiembre, los magistrados que integran el Tribunal Supremo Electoral expusieron los elementos de la reforma electoral y el proceso de modernización institucional” (page 902). Gives details (pages 902-903).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral octubre 1997: El “Registro Nacional de las Personas Naturales (RNPN) [fue] creada el 27 de octubre de 1995” (page 3).
NotiSur May 3, 1996: “Again in October 1995, the [UN] Security Council ordered a six-month extension after a visit to the country by Alvaro de Soto, an official of the UN Department of Political Affairs, who said he doubted that all the pending issues, such as land transfers to veterans of the civil war and problems with the new national civilian police force…could be taken care of before Oct. 31” (LADB).
Central America report December 1, 1995: “Ex-combatants in the Salvadoran civil war occupy a government building [on November 23] to protest against what they allege is the Government’s failure to make good promises made in the peace accords that ended the war. The violent eviction of the protestors in turn sparks rumors of an impending coup…AEGES is comprised of demobilized members of the army, the guerrillas, and families who lost relatives in the war” (page 1).
Central America report January 12, 1996: “In December, the [FMLN] holds what it describes as an ‘historic’ national convention. The purpose: to redefine its political platform, strategies and organizational structures so as to convince the Salvadoran public that it is a genuine alternative to the right-wing [ARENA] in power since 1989” (page 3).
Luciak 2001: “The FMLN started to reregister its members in order to reflect its evolution toward a unified party and to consolidate the different membership registers of the individual groups. At the time of the third National Convention, held in December 1995, the FMLN had about 28,000 official members” (page 107). “The political commitment to guarantee a minimum level of female representation was first implemented at the party’s December 1995 National Convention…In order to ensure that women would indeed gain the seats allotted to them, separate slates were used for male and female candidates in the elections to the National Council. This was an efficient mechanism that led to the election of 17 women (32.7%) to the fifty-two-member body…In the elections for municipal and departmental party structures, however, female candidates were not as successful, demonstrating the need to universalize the voting procedures used at the national level” (pages 159-160).
NotiSur January 12, 1996: “The [FMLN] held its third national convention Dec. 16-17, re-electing former guerrilla commander Salvador Sanchez Ceren as the party’s national coordinator. Looking ahead to the 1997 local and congressional elections, Sanchez Ceren said that the party needs to change political course to broaden its electoral appeal…Also elected were 52 members of the party’s National Council, which then selected the 15-member Political Committee. The committee now includes both veteran leaders such as Shafik Handal, Facundo Guardado, and Marcos Jimenez, as well as a number of new leaders…To prepare for the  elections, the party has restructured its local organization in 240 of the country’s 262 municipalities during the past year” (LADB).
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1997-98: “In 1996 the PDC continued to flounder, as factions led by Ernesto Claramount and Ronal Umaña struggled for control of the leadership. Mr Umaña won the battle” (page 74).
Luciak 2001: “By 1996, the FMLN’s Women’s Secretariat was starting to play a central role in the effort to raise the consciousness of the male leadership regarding women’s rights. The Secretariat maintained that the position of female militants within the party could only be strengthened if the gender composition of the party structures were changed fundamentally” (page 156).
Radical women in Latin America: left and right 2001: “1996: Female representatives in the Legislative Assembly create the Women’s Political Party Forum, a nonpartisan women’s coalition” (page 35).
The state of democracy: democracy assessments in eight nations around the world 2002: The Assembly “passed landmark judicial reforms in 1996. But the ‘cleansing’ of members of the judiciary associated with past violence was resisted by the government and proceeds very slowly” (page 27).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral enero-abril 2000: El Partido Demócrata fue “inscrito ante el Tribunal Supremo Electoral el 31 de enero de 1996…Surgió de la integración del Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, MNR (Líder Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo), del Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) y de la Resistencia Nacional (RN) ex miembros del FMLN” (page 7).
Central America report February 29, 1996: “One of the most recent political events was the February convention held by the [PRSC], a party born out of one of the many splits in the [PDC]. Founded in March 1995 and legalized in December of the same year, the PRSC named Abraham Rodríguez as its Secretary General” (page 3).
Luciak 2001: “In February 1996, representatives of the women’s movement held a meeting to evaluate the experience of Mujeres ’94. The first task of the Initiativa de Mujeres por la Igualdad en la Participación Política…was to revise and update the 1994 platform” (page 196). “The majority of participants in the Initiativa de Mujeres…held the view that they were all women supporting parties on the left of the ideological spectrum and therefore they could not work on behalf of their political rivals…Because of this infighting, the crucial task of agreeing on a common agenda was not completed until February 1997” (page 197).
NotiSur May 3, 1996: “US Secretary of State Warren Christopher…during his February 25-27 visit…signed an agreement commiting the US government to a US$10 million donation to help defray the expenses involved in compliance [with the verification]…[There were] accusations that Christopher’s donation was contingent upon rapid passage of electoral reforms acceptable to the US…The reforms in question include the preparation of a new voter-registration list to replace the current one, which has been in use since the end of the civil war. Also pending are proposals for a voter identification document, proportional representation in the municipal councils, and ‘professionalization’ of the TSE, all of which were suggested by ONUSAL based on irregularities observed in the 1994 general elections” (LADB).
Crónica del mes. Marzo 1996: “El mes de marzo fue escenario de dinamismos políticos y sociales en los cuales salieron a relucir, una vez más, los ingentes obstáculos que aún tiene que sortear el proceso de transición de nuestro país. Ante todo, la recomposición de los partidos políticos encontró, en el caso del Partido Demócrata Cristiano, la expresión más palpable de lo difícil que es conciliar la necesidad de renovación interna de los partidos con los intereses de camarillas que sólo buscan perpetuarse en el poder” (page 255).
Luciak 2001: “By March 1996, FMLN records showed a total of 33,000 members. Of those, 10,890, or 33 percent, were women” (page 157).
NotiSur May 3, 1996: The PTT “is supposed to give land titles to 40,000 former combatants on both sides in the armed conflict…According to government estimates, over 94% of those elegible have received property titles for land parcels…Angered over the slow pace of the land transfers, the association of former combatants [AEGES] held the latest in a succession of organized protests on March 28. Thousands of former combatants demanding titles joined in a street demonstration with campesinos demanding debt relief” (LADB).
Central America report May 9, 1996: “The April 30 departure date for the UN Mission to El Salvador (MINUSAL) sparks a debate between sectors of civil society who feel international observation must continue in order to conclude the peace process, and the government, which feels no further observation is needed” (page 6).
NotiSur May 3, 1996: “The mandate of the UN observer mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL) was extended past its April 30 expiration date, though with a name change and a greatly reduced staff. Four years after the peace accords were signed between the government and the [FMLN], many of the terms have not been fully met by President Armando Calderon Sol’s administration…The mission will continue under the name of the…Oficina de las Naciones Unidas para la Verificacion (ONUV)…The views of the various political forces in the country clash on the issue of outside verification. Because the peace accords were brokered and then verified by the UN, both the administration and the opposition are forced to seek support for their views on compliance within the international community. This has created a three-way dialog among the government, the opposition, and the UN” (LADB).
Central America report May 30, 1996: “(A)s political parties gear up for municipal elections again, the [PDC] remains seriously wounded by infighting, the recently formed Democratic Party has been abandoned by at least four national leaders, and the official ARENA party also shows signs of internal rifts” (page 6). “The divisions [in the PDC] came to a head with open fighting between opposing factions during the May 12 party convention…In the past 12 years the contours of the Salvadoran political arena have shifted profoundly, with the open participation of the left around a less radical agenda, and the consolidation of a right-wing official party that has also moderated its discourse from the counterinsurgency rhetoric of its founder Roberto D’Aubuisson…The divisions within the PDC over which way to shift are the logical result of a party seeking to increase its political capital in a crowded center” (page 7).
Central America report August 15, 1996: “A little over a year after the appointment of Fernando Sáenz Lacalle as archbishop of San Salvador there are visible signs of discontent within the Catholic Church among those displaced by this follower of the arch conservative organization Opus Dei. The rifts were expected since Juan Pablo II chose Sáenz to succeed the more liberal Arturo Rivera y Damas…For their part the Jesuits, Liberation Theology advocates, rejected the leadership of Saenz Lacalle ever since the Pope’s decision to put him at the head of the Salvador Church was announced. That rejection continues, at the same time as one of Sáenz Lacalle’s major concerns appears to be the removal of Jesuits from posts of authority” (pages 3-4).
Central America report September 19, 1996: “Businessman Juan José Domenech resigned from the presidency of the Nationalist Executive Committee of the ruling [ARENA] party on September 7. Although allegations of corruption have been weakening the position of Domenech for some time, the suddenness of his resignation has left politics in general and ARENA leaders in particular somewhat surprised and bewildered” (page 7).
Central America report October 17, 1996: “The divisions between sectors within the ruling [ARENA] party appear to be widening, as the party prepares for legislative and mayoral elections in early 1997. Increasingly, the party’s old guard is displaced by the modernizing right, affecting the alliance between conservatives bred in cold war anticommunism, and the urban-based economic groups linked to finance, commerce and manufacturing. While ARENA delegates were inside the Hotel El Salvador electing Gloria Salguero Gross as president of the National Executive Council on September 29, outside old guard ARENA members were protesting their exclusion from the assembly meeting” (page 7).
NotiSur September 7, 1996: “On Sept. 7, Juan Jose Domenech, president of El Salvador’s governing [ARENA] resigned, increasing speculation that the rightist party is in serious disarray. The problems within ARENA could have repercussions on the peace process and the fragile stability in the country…[The party’s executive committee] named Gloria Salguero Gross, president of the Asamblea Nacional, as interim president until the party chooses a new president at its convention in October” (LADB).
Crónica del mes. Octubre 1996: “El 6, el FMLN inició formalmente su camino hacia las elecciones de 1997, al ratificar a sus candidatos y oficializar la plataforma de gobierno del instituto político…Como resultado de la convención, las Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL) colocaron la mayoría de sus cuadros en las planillas de alcaldes y diputados, los cuales fueron juramentados el día del evento. Los otros puestos fueron compartidos por la tendencia del Partido Comunista (PC), que ubicaron a su líder, Schafik Handal, en la primera posición de la nómina de diputados por la plancha nacional, y la tercera tendencia, el Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC), que logró una modesta representación. Asimismo, como ya se había anunciado, la convención ratificó la decisión de unirse a otras fuerzas políticas para la elecciones de 1997, aunque las alianzas se realizarían sólo para las elecciones de alcaldes y concejos municipales, pues para la elección de legisladores el FMLN presentará sus candidatos” (page 948).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral octubre 1997: El “Partido Popular Repúblicano (PPR) [fue] inscrito el 29 de noviembre de 1996” (page 18).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral noviembre 1998: “A partir de las reformas realizadas por Decreto Legislativo No. 898 de Noviembre de 1996, las Juntas Electorales Departamentales se integran con un número de seis Miembros Propietarios y sus respectivos Suplentes, los primeros cuatro miembros son por ley, de aquellos partidos políticos o coaliciones contendientes que hayan obtenido el mayor número de votos en la última elección, los dos restantes son electos por sorteo de entre los partidos o coaliciones que participen en la elección y serán nombrados por el Tribunal” (page 4).
Central America report November 28, 1996: “The [TSE] sets municipal and legislative elections for March 16 of next year. There are 84 deputies’ seats and an equal number of substitute positions up for grabs. Municipalities will elect 262 council members across the country…According to Electoral Code, deputies may begin campaigning on January 15 for legislative elections now set for March 16. Mayors preparing for municipal elections on the same day will have to wait until February 14. Campaigns for both polls close four days before election day...The [TSE] is looking to eliminate the electoral irregularities that have taken place in the past…The TSE has for the past six weeks been carrying out its so-called ‘Penetration Plan’ which brings voter registration straight to citizens’ doors. According to official data, so far only about 30% of the nation’s 900,000 eligible voters have been registered…Another important reform concerns the ability of the Tribunal to name the authorities which it hires temporarily. By changing article 117 of the Electoral Constitution, the members of the electoral boards for departments and municipalities as well as polling stations will no longer be chosen by the political parties but by the Tribunal itself” (page 5).
Central America report December 12, 1996: “On November 20 the [TSE] opened registration for candidates for congressional deputies and mayors…The registration period will be over on January 24 and elections will be held in March. Political leaders question the TSE’s commitment to ‘transparent’ elections, especially following the recent reforms to three articles in the Elections Code referring to the creation of the Departmental and Municipal Elections Juntas, and the voting mechanisms. The TSE has also modified the Regulation regarding Political Propaganda” (pages 5-6).
Crónica del mes. Noviembre-diciembre 1996: “(D)os de las dinámicas de mayor relevancia en el mes de noviembre fueron, primero, la que atañe a la propaganda electoral; y, segundo, la que tiene que ver con las reformas al código electoral” (pages 1083-1084). Gives details.
NotiSur February 20, 1997: “Under the amendments—approved by ARENA and other conservative parties in the legislature—all parties must now win at least 3% of the valid votes to maintain their legal [status]. Previously, parties only needed 1% of the valid votes. And, even if the smaller parties pool their strength and form a coalition, the joint ticket must now win 6% of the valid votes cast for the individual parties in the coalition to retain legal recognition…(T)he reforms prohibit parties that have no representatives in Congress from receiving state funds to finance their campaigns” (LADB).
Wade 2003: “(I)n November 1996, the Legislative Assembly passed laws increasing the number of signatures required to form a political party and increasing the required percentage of the valid vote from 2 percent to 3 percent to retain legal status. Together, these policies have served to limit the scope of available representation” (page 88).
Luciak 2001: “The FMLN failed to hold its annual party convention in December 1996 because all the party’s energies were devoted to the 1997 elections” (page 108).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral octubre 1997: “A casi un año de su aprobación oficial, el Partido Popular Republicano (PPR) ha decidido el cambio de nombre por Partido Popular Laborista (PPL)” (page 7).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral diciembre 1997: “(E)n 1997 hay 34 mujeres diputadas en la Asamblea Legislativa” (page 3).
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1997-98: “(I)n 1996 and early 1997, with the international spotlight no longer on El Salvador, ARENA blocked many of the judicial and electoral reforms agreed in 1992” (page 71).
Wade 2003: “(I)n January 1997 the Archbishop was named Brigadier General by the military…The appointment and his acceptance of the title drew harsh criticism from the religious community persecuted by the military during the war” (pages 112-113).
Crónica del mes. Enero-febrero 1997: El 14, el TSE “informó que los partidos políticos y coaliciones contendientes inciarían, al día siguiente, la promoción de los programas políticos y de los distintos candidatos a diputados. El presidente del organismo electoral, Jorge Díaz, no sólo formuló un llamado a los dirigentes políticos para mantener una campaña de altura en la que se respeten las disposiciones del Código Electoral, así como su reglamento, sino que advirtió de que las sanciones por violar el reglamento consisten en multas que van desde mil hasta 50 mil colones, o, incluso, la cancelación del partido que utilice recursos del Estado para fines propagandísticos” (page 152).
Luciak 2001: The Initiativa de Mujeres por la Igualdad en la Participación Política’s “platform was first available on March 10 (six days before the election)—the day representatives of all parties were invited for its presentation. Only three parties, ARENA, the FMLN, and the Coalition (three parties supporting a joint candidate for mayor of San Salvador), bothered to show up; and not surprisingly, all three refused to sign the protocol of commitment” (page 197).
March 16: congressional and municipal election
Allison 2006: “(I)n the 1997 elections, the FMLN captured twenty-seven seats, which translated into roughly one-third of all assembly seats…The 1997 elections saw the FMLN not only survive the loss of a number of its historic leaders and the airing of much of the party’s dirty laundry from the war, but almost double its actual deputies from fourteen to twenty-seven in becoming the second largest party in El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly” (page 59).
Bird 2000: “The 1997 elections” (pages 35-36).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral diciembre 1997: “En las pasadas elecciones del 17 de marzo ’97, del total de 1441 candidatos para diputados a la Asamblea Legislativa, 350 fueron mujeres, equivalentes al 24.30%. Los partidos políticos han capitalizado el factor carismático del sexo femenino, incluyendo en las planillas de candidatos el PCN 24 mujeres, ARENA 29, FMLN 52, MU 31, PRSC 42, PL 31, MAS 5, MSN 29, PD 30, PLD 27, CD 24 y Coalición PDC – PD 6” (page 4).
Booth 2006: “Discontent with neoliberal policies helped the FMLN make significant gains in the 1997 legislative and municipal elections. While ARENA won the most seats, it lost nearly 210,000 votes (a reduction of 39 to 28 seats) while the FMLN gained nearly 82,000 (an increase of 21 to 27 seats). The FMLN alone or in coalition also won 54 mayoralties, including San Salvador. The tensions within ARENA also aided the right-wing PCN, which increased its representation in the legislature by 7 seats. The Christian Democrats posted significant losses, dropping from 18 to 7 seats” (page 112).
Caribbean and Central America report January 14 1997: 84 congressional seats and 262 municipal governments are to be elected (page 3).
Caribbean and Central America report May 6 1997: Gives by party the number of seats won (page 1).
Central America report March 20, 1997: “Unofficial preliminary figures suggest that the FMLN and the ruling Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) will have virtually equal representation in the Legislative Assembly...On its own, the FMLN also wins most of the country’s major cities, including traditional ARENA strongholds” (page 1). Gives number of municipalities won by FMLN and names many of them, including San Salvador (page 2).
Central America report April 3, 1997: The official results are announced on March 16 (page 8). Gives by party the number of votes and seats won. Gives by party the number of municipalities won.
Central America report May 1, 1997: “The wake of the municipal and congressional elections on March 16 affects the smaller political parties in anticipation of presidential elections in 1999…[There is] the threat of dissolution in the event of achieving under 3% of the vote, a prerequisite under electoral law, recently increased from 2%” (page 7).
CIDAI 1997: “(A) lo largo del artículo se defienden básicamente dos argumentos: primero, que como resultado de los comicios se abrirá, a nivel municipal, un espacio de poder local en el cual el FMLN podrá dar muestras tanto de su capacidad administrativa como de su habilidad negociadora; y segundo, que en el plano legislativo, el Partido de Conciliación Nacional jugará un rol decisivo a la hora que los partidos mayoritarios--el FMLN y ARENA--quieran sacar adelante determinadas iniciativas de ley” (page 203). “Resultados de las elecciones para diputados y alcaldes 1997" (page 221). Gives for each party the number and percent of votes for congress, the number and percent of votes for municipal elections, the number of seats won, and the number of mayoralties won.
Colindres 1997: Contains statistics and detailed analysis of the 1997 election. “Indice de representación poblacional y clave de representación por departamento. El Salvador, marzo 1997” (page 8). “Posición de preferencia de los partidos políticos a nivel departamental en la votación a diputados. Marzo de 1997” (page 11). “Número y porcentaje de la diferencia de votos en diputados por partido. Marzo 1997” (page 17). “Votos para diputados por departamento y partido político. Marzo 1997” (page 62). “El Salvador: municipios según tamaño y partido ganador alcaldía. 1997” (page 63). “El Salvador: porcentaje municipios según tamaño y partido ganador alcaldía. 1997” (page 63). “El Salvador: porcentaje municipios según tamaño obtenido por partido. 1997” (page 64). “El Salvador: habitantes por tamaño de municipio y partido ganador alcaldía. 1997” (page 65). “El Salvador: porcentaje habitantes por tamaño municipio y partido ganador alcaldia. 1997” (page 65). “El Salvador: porcentaje habitantes por tamaño municipio obtenido por partido. 1997” (page 65).
Córdova Macías 1998: “Much to the contrary of the previous nine years in which ARENA had become the unquestioned dominant party in the system, the March 1997 vote gave a historic victory to the FMLN at the municipal level...and in the Legislative Assembly” (page 156). Gives number of municipalities won by the left and seats won by ARENA and FMLN.
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1997-98: “(I)n March 1997 the mid-term elections deprived ARENA of its majority in the legislature” (page 71). “Election results, March 16, 1997" (page 73). Gives seats in the assembly and municipalities won by each party. “On March 16, 1997, the FMLN became one of the main beneficiaries of a protest vote against the ARENA government. The former rebel organisation increased its share of the national vote from 25% in 1994 to 33% in 1997, even after the defection of the ERP and the RN. The FMLN won 27 seats in the Legislative Assembly and took the municipalities in most major cities, including San Salvador, making it the local government for around half of the population…The PCN is a conservative party with historic links to the armed forces…(I)n the March 1997 elections the PCN won eleven seats, up from four three years earlier. This gives it a powerful position in the new legislature and it is unlikely to remain an unconditional supporter of ARENA” (page 74).
Country report. Guatemala, El Salvador 1997, 2: “The ruling right-wing [ARENA] has suffered a serious setback in the March 16 legislative and municipal elections. ARENA lost one-quarter of its strength in the Legislative Assembly, ending up with 28 of the 84 seats in the unicameral legislature, down from the 39 it won in 1994. Although some erosion was expected in the mid-term elections, many leaders of the party were visibly shocked by the extent of voter rejection and reacted angrily to the results” (page 45). “The former guerrillas of the [FMLN] emerged as the main beneficiary of the March 16 elections. The FMLN captured 27 legislative seats, up from the 21 it won in 1994. It also took control of 48 local governments and won five other municipalities in coalition with smaller centrist parties…Most independent analysts and some FMLN leaders interpreted the results as a reaction by voters to a flagging economy and to widespread corruption at the municipal level, rather than a positive vote for the left. ARENA had reformed the electoral law several times in recent months to provide disincentives to the smaller centrist parties. As a result, the only way for many voters to register their discontent was to vote for the left or to stay at home. However, Mr Calderón Sol argued that the high abstention rate meant that most Salvadoreans were pleased with his government…Some 60% of the 3 million eligible voters stayed at home” (page 46). “El Salvador: election results, Mar 16, 1997” (page 46).
Crónica del mes. Marzo-abril 1997: Discusses the election (pages 321-323).
Cruz 1997: “Composición de los votantes del 16 de marzo en el municipio de San Salvador según variables” (page 445). Gives sex, age, and educational level attained.
Gamero Q. 2000: “La legislatura 1997-2000…tiene representados nueve partidos, ninguno por sí solo alcanza mayoría simple” (page 143).
Holiday 1997: “(T)he former leftist guerrillas of the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN) scored unprecedented victories at the polls in municipal and legislative races, reversing nearly a decade of political dominance by the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) party” (page 6). Gives information on municipalities won by FMLN, including San Salvador and half the fourteen departmental capitals, and losses by ARENA. Gives turnout, percent this represents of the estimated voting-age population, and the overall increase in votes for FMLN since 1994.
Keesing’s record of world events March 1997: “The 84 Legislative Assembly members were elected for a three-year term, 64 members in multi-seat constituencies and 20 by proportional representation” (Page 41535). “Unofficial results of legislative assembly elections.” Gives party and seats won. “In the election for mayors, the FMLN reportedly won 100 of 262 municipalities, including the capital, San Salvador, and many other major cities, compared with the 118 won by ARENA.”
Latin American regional reports. Caribbean & Central America report February 22, 2000: “Arena suffered heavy losses in the 1997 elections, before which it had 39 seats. It also lost the mayorship of San Salvador to the FMLN in those elections…The FMLN won a total of 54 mayorships in 1997, including Santa Ana, the country’s second city” (electronic edition).
Luciak 1998a: “In the 1997 elections, women did considerably better [than in 1994] in terms of occupying top positions that were considered safe. There were 24 female candidates (28.6 percent) and 26 substitutes (30.1 percent) for parliament. Of the five top positions considered safe on the national list, women occupied two spots. In the department of San Salvador, the top two positions, as well as the fifth place (also considered safe), were held by women. Female candidates also headed the department lists in Santa Ana, Chalatenango and San Vicente. Overall, in four out of fourteen departments, women were heading the ticket” (pages 220-221). “Gender composition of FMLN candidates for parliament 1997 elections” (page 221).
Luciak 2001: “The results of the March 1997 parliamentary and municipal elections were evidence that the FMLN had consolidated its political structures and that voter support for the new party was strengthening. The former guerrillas almost doubled the number of their representatives in parliament…Hector Silva, the candidate of the Left, [gained] the position of mayor of San Salvador” (page 108). “The 1997 elections also proved that Joaquín Villalobos and his allies, who had formed the Democratic Party, enjoyed little support among the electorate…The PD suffered a devastating defeat and gained an embarrassing 13,533 votes (out of 1,119,603). Only one of its previous seven deputies was reelected to parliament, and this was only due to an electoral alliance the party had formed with the Christian Democrats” (page 109). “In the 1997 elections, women did considerably better in occupying top, ‘safe’ positions on candidate lists and thus being virtually assured of election” (page 201). Describes the election and female candidates (pages 201-207). “Gender composition of FMLN candidates for parliament, 1994 and 1997” (page 203). “Women made considerable progress in the 1997 parliamentary elections. Nine of the twenty-four female candidates were successful. On the male side, eighteen of the sixty candidates were successful. The electoral success of 37.5 percent of the women, compared to 30 percent of the men, indicates that the female militants had indeed managed to place their candidates in safe list positions. A crucial part of their success was their strategy of fighting for one-third of the safe positions and not being satisfied with merely securing their quota on the list as a whole” (page 213). “Female candidates elected in 1994 and 1997 Salvadoran elections” (page 214). Gives by party the number of women elected as mayors and to the Legislative Assembly.
McElhinny 2004: “Perquin’s loss of the municipal government to an ARENA-led coalition in the 1997 municipal elections signaled a low point in the Left’s political organizing in northern Morazán” (page 158).
McElhinny 2006: Discusses the election (page 399).
Montgomery 1998: “On March 16, 1997, the FMLN won significant victories in municipal and legislative elections, just five years after these former guerrillas had signed the peace accords that ended eleven years of civil war. The most dramatic victory was winning the mayoralty of the capital, San Salvador, in coalition with two smaller parties. The FMLN also won six of fourteen provincial capitals and seven municipalities in the capital, and it carried several other departments in coalitions with other center-left parties. As a result, the Salvadoran Left would govern almost 50 percent of the country’s population, including most of metropolitan San Salvador, between 1997 and 2000” (page 135). “Just as surprising as the size of the FMLN’s gains in 1997 was the magnitude of the governing party’s losses. ARENA…captured some 200,000 fewer votes in 1997 than in 1994, and it lost 49 of its 207 municipalities and 11 of its 39 seats in the Legislative Assembly…(W)omen candidates continued to make electoral gains, particularly on the Left. Twelve women were elected to the Legislative Assembly, eight of them from the FMLN. Seven of the fifteen new city council members in San Salvador were women. Across the country, women won twenty mayoralties, four of them in large muncipalities in greater San Salvador” (page 136).
NotiSur February 20, 1997: “On March 16, El Salvador will hold legislative and municipal elections, marking the second national-level electoral contest since the civil war ended in 1992…About 3 million Salvadorans are registered to vote in the upcoming elections, and they will choose 84 deputies to the National Congress and 262 mayors and municipal councils around the country. In the legislative vote, 20 national-level representatives will be elected. The remaining 64 representatives will be elected at the departmental level, with the number of deputies in each of the country’s 14 departments determined by the size of the local population. The department of San Salvador—the nation’s most populated zone with nearly 30% of the registered electorate—will contribute 16 of the 64 departmental representatives. Of the 13 parties that registered to compete in the elections, only eight presented a complete slate of congressional candidates…It is unlikely that most of the five parties with partial slates will be able to win the number of votes necessary to maintain their legal standing” (LADB).
NotiSur April 3, 1997: “The [FMLN] emerged as the big winner in El Salvador’s midterm elections on March 16, nearly doubling the number of seats it controls in the legislature and mroe than tripling the mayoralties held by the party. The governing [ARENA] is still the single strongest party in the country, but it lost a substantial percentage of its legislative seats and mayoralties…Although ARENA suffered substantial losses, the PDC was the biggest loser in the elections. That party—which dominated the country’s political landscape throughout the 1980s—lost a whopping 146,000 votes compared with the 1994 elections…In fact, the PDC has now fallen to a distant fourth place in electoral strength, behind the [PCN], which, in contrast, experienced a major political comeback in the elections. The PCN, which dominated El Salvador during the military governments of the 1970s, had become nearly insignificant by the early 1990s” (LADB). “El Salvador: March 16 legislative & municipal election results” (LADB). Gives additional election details.
Nuevas posibilidades para la transición política 1997: “(N)adie pudo prever el actual escenario político, donde ningún partido tiene mayoría en la asamblea legislativa y donde los concejos municipales controlados por el FMLN tienen bajo su jurisdicción más población que los controlados por ARENA” (page 183). Abstention rate was 60%. FMLN received 81,000 more votes than in 1994 and ARENA received 209,000 fewer votes than in 1994 (page 184). Gives votes in the congressional election received by each party (pages 184-185). Gives results of mayoral election for each party (page 185-186). Gives composition of new congress, including the increases and decreases in seats for each party from the previous congress (page 186).
Resultados electorales 1997: “Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Unidad de procesamiento de datos. Escrutinio final para concejos municipales elecciones 16 de marzo de 1997. Consolidado nacional de votos válidos” (page 339). Gives at the department level the total votes for each party in the elections for municipal councils and at the country level the total number of councils won. “Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Unidad de procesamiento de datos. Escrutinio final para concejos municipales elecciones 16 de marzo de 1997. Distribuciones de votos válidos” (pages 340-353). Gives for each municipality in each department the total votes for each party in the elections for municipal councils and the total number of councils won at the department level. “Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Unidad de procesamiento de datos. Escrutinio final para concejos municipales elecciones 16 de marzo de 1997" (pages 354-357). For congressional election gives total votes at the country level for each party for the national slate, the number of seats won, the residual votes, and the number of votes required for each seat won. Gives the same information at the department level for seats elected to represent the department. “Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Unidad de procesamiento de datos. Escrutinio final para concejos municipales elecciones 16 de marzo de 1997. Distribución de alcaldías por partidos y coaliciones” (page 358). For each department gives the number of municipal councils won by each party.
Walter 2000c: Discusses the election and gives results (pages 633, 636-637).
Williams 2003: “In the 1997 legislative elections, the Christian Democrats won only 8.4% of the vote, putting it fourth behind ARENA, the FMLN, and the PCN” (page 315).
Wood 2000: “After the 1997 legislative elections, the FMLN was the leading opposition party; FMLN candidates received 33.0 percent of the vote, only slightly less than ARENA’s 35.4 percent…Moreover, in 1997 the FMLN won control of San Salvador and Santa Ana, El Salvador’s two principal cities. Deepening tensions within ARENA under the leadership of President Armando Calderón Sol (1994-1999) contributed to the FMLN’s strong electoral showing” (page 252).
Central America report May 8, 1997: “The new congress, elected March 16, took on its duties on May 1. In the days and hours before the legislative handover, the assembly raced against the clock to approve constitutional reforms. The ruling [ARENA] package of 22 reforms was passed by approval of the ruling party’s 42 deputies, plus three so-called independent votes. The new congress will now have to ratify or reject them…The new composition of the legislative, with ARENA’s deputies down to 28, almost level with the FMLN’s 27, makes the reforms’ final approval uncertain…One of the most important changes was to lengthen the president’s term of office from its current five years to six, with effect from the 1999 elections. From 2005 onwards, presidential elections will then coincide with those for deputies and municipalities…The FMLN opposed the initiative on the grounds that it leaves the president in government for too long. Also on the electoral theme, the number of [TSE] magistrates was reduced from five to three. The selection process for TSE magistrates was also changed…[to do] away with the system of choosing TSE members from designations by the party with greatest electoral votes. Both ARENA and the FMLN had put forward this reform…The hatchet finally came down on those parties who failed to achieve 3% of the vote during the recent elections. [PL, MAS, MU, and MSN] were legislated out of existence. The split from the FMLN, Joaquin Villalobos’ [PD], was saved by the assembly’s ‘authentic interpretation’ which included the votes received in coalition with the PDC in seven departments” (page 3).
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1997-98: “Several [ARENA] factions have begun to fight for control of the party’s all-powerful executive committee. In early April the committee was restructured, and Roberto Murray Meza, a well-known entrepreneur and patron of sport, was brought on to it” (page 73).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral enero-abril 2000: “El 26 de septiembre de 1997 el PPL [Partido Popular Laborista] fue inscrito ante el Tribunal Supremo Electoral, y sus principios se basan en el espíritu nacionalista y defensor de los sectores productivos, que trabajan por el desarrollo de la propiedad privada” (page 7).
Central America report September 25, 1997: “The ruling [ARENA] reshuffled its executive committee on September 21, putting ex-president Alfredo Cristiani in charge, in a desperate move to win back support after the blows suffered in the March municipal elections…The [PD] faces a severe crisis, with its [principal] leader [Joaquín Villalobos] ducking out at the same time that the membership is abandoning ship…The PD is left with its other main leader, Ana Guadelupe Martínez” (page 37).
Crónica del mes. Septiembre 1997: “En el plano político, tres fueron los hechos más relevantes del mes: el resquebrajamiento del Partido Demócrata (PD), las divisiones suscitadas en el seno del Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN) y la reestructuración del Consejo Ejecutivo nacional de ARENA (COENA)” (page 920).
Zamora 2003: “De nuevo, las diferencias internas se hacen públicas en Septiembre, 1997, en torno a la Convención Nacional en la que se eligieron autoridades partidarias. Las posiciones encontradas son encabezadas por dos líderes históricos de las FPL: Facundo Guardado y el Coordinador General del FMLN, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, quien cuenta con el apoyo del líder histórico del PCS y jefe de la bancada legislativa, Shafik Handal” (pages 108-109).
Central America report October 23, 1997: “On October 5, the [PDC], the center-left [CD] and the ex-guerrilla [PD] announced their participation in a new National Opposition Union (UNO). UNO echoes a 1970s coalition, but this time without the main ex-guerrilla force, the [FMLN]” (page 41).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral enero 1998: “Con fecha 12 de diciembre de 1997 fue emitida la resolución del TSE con la aprobación de las reformas a los estatutos del Partido Renovación Social Cristiano…Según las reformas, el PRSC en lo sucesivo podrá identificarse como Unión Social Cristiana, UNION y con las siglas U.S.C.” (page 13).
Central America report January 8, 1998: “During their fifth general assembly in early December, the FMLN changed their political commission. Out of the 15 commission members, six were replaced. Facundo Guardado, considered one of the FMLN’s ‘historic’ ‘comandantes,’ was elected party coordinator, replacing the more radical Salvador Sánchez Cerén who had hoped for re-election. Another radical and one of the most well known FMLN leaders, Schafik Handal, also lost his seat on the commission, but remains on the 50-member National Council” (page 6).
Crónica del mes. Noviembre-diciembre 1997: “El 6…el FMLN inició su Convención” (page 1204). “(E)l 7, casi dos tercios de la Comisión Política del FMLN fueron renovados. Se nombraron las autoridades para el período 1997-1999, resultando de ello la salida de Schafik Handal del organismo de dirección y poniendo a la cabeza del mismo a Facundo Guardado…(L)a votación de los convencionistas reveló un apoyo creciente a las mujeres. El mayor número de sufragios, entre los 81 candidatos por la ‘plancha nacional’, lo obtuvo la diputada Elvia Violeta Menjívar y, de los primeros 10 puestos, cinco fueron ocupados por mujeres. En la elección de los 30 miembros del Consejo provenientes de la plancha, se notó un predominio de ex militantes de las FPL” (page 1205).
Luciak 2001: “In the wake of the party’s 1997 electoral success, many observers considered the FMLN to be in a position to win the 1999 presidential elections and to become the governing party. Instead the FMLN self-destructed. Having weathered the 1994 division, it failed to successfully resolve important internal disputes that had been festering for several years…The basic disagreement concerned how to transform the FMLN into a majority party” (page 109). “At the December 1997 [FMLN] Party Congress, Guardado’s reform movement gained control over the party’s leadership structure with Guardado himself elected party coordinator” (page 110). “Female militants succeeded in maintaining one-third of the seats on the party’s Political Commission and increased their representation on the National Council from 33 to 38.5 percent” (page 160).
Wade 2003: The “tension between the ‘Renovadores’…and the ‘Ortodoxos’…factions for control of the FMLN has led to public exposure of their internal squabbling…The conflicting desires to remain true to the character of the revolutionary movement (‘Ortodoxos’) and the desire to evolve into a more viable political party (‘Renovadores’) are the core tensions within the FMLN. For the ‘Ortodoxos, democracy is merely a path to socialism, while the ‘Renovadores’ embrace participatory democracy as an end. These divisions reflect the ideological underpinnings of the guerrilla organizations established in the 1970s. The [FPL], now represented by the ‘Ortodoxo’ faction, historically favored a socialist society and the [ERP]…, now part of the ‘Renovadores,’ desired a democratic society” (page 97). “(T)he FMLN decided at its December 1997 convention that the presidential ticket must consist of a male/female combination” (page 100).
Central America report March 19, 1998: “Parties have begun the process of identifying candidates and allies for next year’s general elections” (page 7). UNO reforms with PDC, CD, and PD. FMLN joins with USC, which incorporates MU and MSN.
Central America report February 12, 1998: “Francisco Flores, currently president of the Legislative Assembly, announces his intended candidacy for the 1999 presidential elections. He has not been officially endorsed by the ruling [ARENA], but is perceived as a popular, moderate politician” (page 1).
Central America report March 19, 1998: “ARENA’s presidential nomination will not be officially decided until the party’s March 29 general assembly, when it will be ratified by the party’s national executive. However, Flores is well placed to win, with support from a range of sectors within his party. Flores has the support of ARENA women and youth sections, the party’s political commission, all the country’s ARENA mayors, and the ARENA bloc in Congress” (pages 6-7).
Central America report March 19, 1998: “Parties have begun the process of identifying candidates and allies for next year’s general elections. The first electoral coalition to emerge is the National Opposition Union (UNO), formed by the [PDC, CD, and PD]. UNO appears to be the democratic center, in an attempt to reduce the traditional polarization of the Salvadoran political spectrum…A second coalition formed when the [USC] decided to throw in its lot with the [FMLN]…The left-leaning coalition has not named a presidential candidate” (page 7).
Central America report April 16, 1998: ARENA “confirms the nomination of Francisco Flores at its party conference on March 29, marking a new phase in the party’s history…Flores’ candidacy…brings together the modernizing forces of a right wing in urgent need of new figureheads…Flores hails from a middle-class background, with no links to the oligarchy that gave birth to ARENA and continues to be its guiding power” (page 3).
Central America report April 23, 1998: “The FMLN and the USC have formed an alliance for the March 7, 1999 elections. They released their draft ‘Government Plan – 1999-2004’ on March 20…The document prioritizes electoral reforms, some left pending since the 1994 general elections. These include the possibility of home votes, and establishing a single identity and electoral card” (page 5).
Gamero Q. 2000: “El Salvador: partidos politicos legalmente inscritos a marzo de 1998” (page 122).
Central America report May 21, 1998: The FMLN “met with its allies from the [USC] on May 8 to outline the presidential candidates who will take part in the elections of March 7, 1999” (page 7). Discusses possible candidates.
Zamora 2003: “En el mes de Mayo de 1998, el conflicto se avivó y entró a su fase de batalla en los medios de comunicación social con el aparecimiento de un documento denominado ‘Sobre el rumbo actual del FMLN’” (page 109).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral julio 1998: “El Partido LIDER, Liga Democrática Republicana, quedó asentado en el libro del Tribunal Supremo Electoral como un Partido legalmente inscrito, a partir del ocho de julio de 1998” (page 10).
Central America report August 28, 1998: “Party primaries held by the ex-guerrilla [FMLN] on August 15 ended without a decision on the 1999 presidential candidate” (page 1). “Victoria de Avilés, who until recently held the top post in the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office, won 441 votes, while Héctor Silva, currently mayor of San Salvador, won 431. Party regulations stipulated that the winner needed to secure a minimum of 518 votes, one more than half the total present at the party convention. With abstentions and spoiled votes in the secret ballot, neither candidate reached the necessary 518…New elections are to be held on August 29, with a simple majority sufficient to determine the winner. This is the first time that the FMLN has held elections to determine its candidates. Under party statutes, the electoral ticket must include a man and a woman” (page 2).
Central America report September 11, 1998: “The second attempt by the [FMLN] at primary elections falls through on August 29. San Salvador Mayor Héctor Silva leaves the coast clear for the former human rights ombudswoman, Victoria de Avilés, but opponents at the party convention refuse to elect her. De Avilés, supported by the traditional left-wing sector of the party, calls for debate with the reformist faction. The decision will be put to a third election on September 27” (page 7). “ARENA’s general assembly is scheduled for September 27, when the running mate for presidential candidate Francisco Flores will be decided. However, members of the ruling party have suggested changing the date so that it does not coincide with the FMLN’s third convention” (page 8).
Luciak 2001: “A lesson in self-destruction: the 1999 nominating process” (pages 112-117). Describes the nominating process at the FMLN convention in August 1998.
Montgomery 2000: “The FMLN irretrievably damaged itself in a bitter internecine fight over who would be its presidential candidate. The August 1998 party nominating convention began in a spirit of unity but deteriorated into chaos as a relatively small group of radicals without credentials invaded the convention and drowned out the speech of the moderates’ candidate, San Salvador mayor Hector Silva” (page 482).
Wade 2003: “As evidence of further fracturing, the FMLN held three conventions before a presidential ticket was agreed on. The first convention on August 15, 1998 was a tug of war between the ‘Ortodoxo’ nominee Victoria de Aviles…and the ‘Renovador’ candidate, San Salvador mayor Héctor Silva. Neither nominee received the votes necessary to win the nomination, and since neither faction was willing to concede, a second convention was scheduled for two weeks later…Weary of factionalism and unwilling to sacrifice the reputation he had built as mayor in such a public showdown, Silva withdrew his nomination at the second convention. The ‘Ortodoxo’ ticket…again failed to win a majority of the votes necessary” (page 100).
Zamora 2003: “En 1998, para las elecciones presidenciales del siguiente año, la dirección del FMLN, planteó que los pre-candidatos debían inscribirse con anterioridad y participar en un proceso de discusiones con la militancia en asambleas departamentales y locales, así mismo la Convención debería escoger al candidato por una mayoría calificada. La práctica de esta iniciativa no tuvo los efectos que se esperaban…Antes que generar una experiencia democrático-participativa, se creó mayor polarización al interior del partido y un serio deterioro a la imagen nacional del FMLN” (page 81-82).
Allison 2006: “During the process of choosing its candidate for the 1999 presidential election, the FMLN again presented itself as a divided party, unable to manage its internal differences and poorly prepared to resolve the country’s problems” (page 59).
Central America report October 2, 1998: “On September 27 the [FMLN] elected ex-‘comandantes’ Facundo Guardado and Marta Valladares as its candidates for president and vice president for the March 1999 general elections. Valladares is more commonly [known] by her ‘nom de guerre’ of Nidia Díaz. Two previous conventions failed to reach a decision, when neither [de Avilés nor Silva] managed to win the required 518 votes—one vote more than half of those present. For the third round, this requirement was removed, and the Guardado-Díaz nomination won 463 votes, 33 more than their more traditional left-wing rivals, de Avilés and Salvador Arias” (page 2).
Luciak 2001: “Instead of being praised for demonstrating internal democracy, the FMLN was perceived as a divided party that could not be entrusted with running the country. This benefited the governing party, which had selected its candidate in the traditional fashion hidden from public scrutiny. ARENA leaders were quick to denounce the FMLN as being too immature to govern” (page 116).
Montgomery 2000: In September “the FMLN nominated a former guerrilla, Facundo Guardado, as its candidate. But the election was already lost” (page 482).
NotiCen April 8, 1999: “During the party’s long nomination process, the divide between Guardado’s reformist wing and the revolutionary or orthodox hard-liners led by Schafik Handal and Salvador Sanchez forced the party into an embarrassing pre-election struggle that required three party conventions to select a candidate” (LADB).
Wade 2003: “A third convention was held in September 1998 in which ‘Renovador’ Facundo Guardado and María Marta Valladares (Comandante Nidia Díaz) won the FMLN’s presidential/vice-presidential nomination” (page 100).
Central America report October 23, 1998: ARENA “announced its presidential ticket at its October 11 convention. The 773 delegates voted unanimously for Carlos Quintanilla Schmidt as vice-presidential candidate” (page 8).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral noviembre 1998: “El día viernes 06 de noviembre, el Tribunal Supremo Electoral, convocó a los partidos legalmente inscritos a participar en la elección presidencial de 1999” (page 3). “Juramentan las JED para 1999 [el día 18 de noviembre]. Un total de 168 miembros, entre propietarios y suplentes, forman las 14 Juntas Electorales Municipales que coordinarán el trabajo de los organismos Electorales Auxiliares para la elección presidencial de 1999” (page 6). Lists the members by party for each department (pages 6-10). “Con la característica de facilitar el acceso de la ciudadanía salvadoreña a los lugares de votación, el Tribunal Supremo Electoral instalará más de 400 centros de votación…Se ha calculado que funcionarán 8500 mesas de votación, en donde se instalarán igual número de JRV en todo el país. Cada mesa electoral tendrá 400 papeletas de votación
Latin American regional reports. Caribbean & Central America report December 8, 1998: “The campaign for next March’s general elections got under way on 20 November, after a two-week delay caused by Hurricane Mitch…The former guerrillas of the FMLN have attempted to widen their appeal by concluding an alliance with the Union Social Cristiana (USC), baptised ‘El Cambio’” (electronic edition).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral diciembre 1998: “Con la inscripción de 7 banderas contendientes para la elección presidencial del 7 de marzo, se han definido los 407 centros electorales que albergarán las 8132 Juntas Receptoras de Votos a nivel nacional. Los centros de votación serán prioritariamente Escuelas e Institutos, los que han sido seleccionados por su ubicación y por las facilidades de instalación de las mesas de votación y las urnas correspondientes. De acuerdo al Código Electoral se dispondrán para cada Junta Receptora de Votos (JRV) 400 papeletas de votación…De acuerdo con las cifras que maneja el Registro Electoral, en las elecciones del 7 de marzo se convocarán a 3,171,224 ciudadanos aptos para el sufragio, los que podrán acudir a 8132 urnas en los 262 municipios” (page 5).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral diciembre 1998: “Opciones presidenciales para el nuevo milenio” (pages 6-19). Presents background information on all the presidential candidates.
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral enero 1999: “Los partidos en contienda” (pages 4-5). Gives the history of each participating party and coalition, their candidates, and the symbol that will appear for them on the ballot.
Central America report February 19, 1999: Gives the backgrounds of the major presidential candidates (pages 6-7).
Crónica del mes. Febrero-marzo 1999: “(E)l mes de febrero inició con la problemática de los secuestros que se destapó a principio del año. Las declaraciones que el ex líder guerrillero Joaquín Villalobos hizo con respecto al caso, en las que implicaba al actual jefe de fracción del FMLN, Shafick Handal, en el rapto de varios empresarios nacionales, atrajeron la atención de la opinión pública de nuevo” (page 249).
Crónica del mes. Febrero-marzo 1999: “El 2, venció oficialmente el plazo para que los ciudadanos mayores de 18 años o próximos a cumplirlos retiraran su carné electoral de los centros autorizados para tal fin. Desafortunadamente, el Tribunal Supremo Electoral informó que las expectativas que se tenían no habían sido cumplidas, dado que unos 174 mil documentos no pudieron extenderse. De esta forma, el padrón definitivo determinó que 2 millones 996 mil 585 salvadoreños estaban habilitados para ejercer el sufragio en las elecciones presidenciales. Asimismo, se informó que unas 5 mil personas, entre periodistas y observadores internacionales, habían sido acreditadas para cubrir y verificar el desarrollo del evento electoral” (page 253).
Crónica del mes. Febrero-marzo 1999: El 4, el Tribunal Supremo Electoral “informó que doce mil agentes de la Policía Nacional Civil (el 60 por ciento de la fuerza policial del país) serían desplegados para custodiar el orden y la legalidad de los comicios” (page 253).
Crónica del mes. Febrero-marzo 1999: “(E)l 5, según datos no oficiales publicados por un matutino, el costo de la maquinaria electoral montada por los partidos políticos que participarían en las elecciones ascendia a unos 63 millones de colones…Y el TSE volvió a divulgar datos concernientes a los comicios. En esta ocasión se confirmó la habilitación de 387 centros de votación (con 8 mil 132 urnas) en todo el país, quienes tendrían que recibir a los ciudadanos aptos para ejercer el sufragio. Además, la cifra de observadores internacionales se elevó a 1000” (page 253).
Crónica del mes. Febrero-marzo 1999: “El 6, el número de personas aptas para votar en las elecciones del día siguiente alcanzó los 3 millones 171 mil 224. De ese número, las mujeres constituyen un 50.65 por ciento, perfilándose como la mayoría de electores. Además, casi un tercio del padrón estaba conformado por jóvenes con edades entre los 18 y 29 años” (page 253).
March 7: presidential election (Flores / ARENA)
Alcántara Sáez 1999: “Las elecciones presidenciales del 7 de marzo de 1999 se saldaron con el triunfo, en la primera vuelta, del candidato de la nueva generación de ARENA Francisco Flores quien derrotó por un amplio margen a Facundo Guardado que lideraba la coalición electoral ‘Por el cambio’ integrada por el FMLN y la Unión Social Cristiana (USC). El tercer lugar lo obtuvo el candidato del Centro Democrático Unido (CDU) Rubén Zamora” (page 146).
Allison 2006: “After a tainted primary process, Facundo Guardado captured fewer than 30% of the vote for the FMLN in the national election. Though Guardado’s total votes surpassed those captured by Zamora in 1994, the election was a major setback for the FMLN as it was unable to capitalize upon its strong showing in the 1997 midterm elections. In addition, unlike 1994, the FMLN failed to force a second round of voting as the ARENA candidate, Francisco Flores, attained over 50% of the vote” (page 59).
Bird 2000: “The 1999 elections” (pages 36-37). “(T)he turnout (38.6 percent) for the 1999 presidential election was only slightly beter than that in 1997. Low turnout appeared to favor the incumbent ARENA, whose presidential candidate, Francisco Flores, won a majority (52 percent) in first-round voting…The bipolarization of the Salvadoran party system, still present in the 1999 elections, hurt small and centrist parties the most but pointed to the fact that the ideological distance between the two major parties was shrinking” (page 37).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral febrero-marzo 1999: Articles throughout discuss the election. “Resultados electorales. Consolidado nacional del escrutinio final para elección de presidente y vice-presidente” (pages 14-21). Gives results by municipality. Political parties LIDER and PUNTO do not receive enough votes to survive as political parties (pages 29-30).
Booth 2006: “Guardado was easily defeated by ARENA’s Francisco Flores, 52 to 29 percent” (page 112).
Central America report March 19, 1998: General elections are scheduled for March 7, 1999 (page 6).
Central America report March 12, 1999: “After 95% of the votes had been counted, Flores polled 51% on the first round while [FMLN] candidate Facundo Guardado won 29%. Salvadoran electoral law requires candidates to win 50% plus one vote, or hold a second round…In a surprise, Rubén Zamora of the recently formed [CDU], won 7.47% of the vote. This turned his center-left party into the country’s third political force, displacing the [PDC]. The PDC won 5.68%. The conservative [PCN]…won only 3.83%. It barely escaped losing its legal status as a party, which requires 3% of the vote. Two recently formed parties disappeared under this rule…[LIDER] won just 1.68%, and…[PUNTO] polled 0.35%. No major irregularities were reported, although civic action groups complained that the electoral register was not updated. They said that, of three million people authorized to vote, a third of these were dead or living abroad…There is no provision in El Salvador for a home vote, for those unable to get to the polling station” (pages 1-2).
Central America report March 26, 1999: Discusses FMLN’s performance in the election (pages 4-5).
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador 1999-2000: “The ruling right-wing party, Arena, rebounded strongly from a disastrous performance in the mid-term legislative and municipal elections in 1997 by winning the presidency in March 1999 with Francisco Flores, a little-known, 38-year-old academic. Mr Flores emerged from the internal party rivalry between his mentor, the outgoing president, Armando Calderón Sol, and the former president, Alfredo Cristiani, who tried to reimpose his authority on the party. Mr Flores’s candidacy turned out to be a master-stroke at the polls, as the electorate, weary of politicians with roots in the civil war, supported the more moderate and forward-looking candidate” (pages 42-43). “Presidential election results, Mar 1999” (page 43). “The final choice of the [FMLN’s] uncharismatic general secretary, Facundo Guardado, a former guerrilla commander, proved fatal in the 1999 campaign. Arena’s choice of candidate…not only demonstrated how the right had moved towards the centre under pressure from the left, but also how the FMLN had failed to move from its own extreme position towards a more moderate doctrine” (page 44).
Crónica del mes. Febrero-marzo 1999: “El día de las elecciones al fin llegó para los salvadoreños y en su desarrollo, aunque tranquilo, prevaleció el ausentismo” (page 254). Gives details on the election.
Keesing’s record of world events March 1999: “In a presidential election held on March 7 Francisco Flores, the candidate of the ruling right-wing [ARENA], won outright in the first round of voting with 51.98 per cent of the ballot, thereby avoiding a run-off contest on April 18. Facundo Guardado, of the former guerrilla [FMLN], received 28.88 per cent of the vote. Turnout was below 40 per cent” (page 42829).
NotiCen March 11, 1999: “Flores took 52% of the vote, defeating former guerrilla commander Facundo Guardado, coalition candidate of the [FMLN-USC]. Guardado won 29%, and third-place Ruben Zamora, candidate for the Centro Democratico Unido coalition, took 7.44%. Eking out a majority on the first ballot obviated the need for a second-round vote upon which Guardado had based his election strategy…Political observers blamed Guardado’s defeat on the inability of the FMLN to convince voters it had left its revolutionary past behind” (LADB). Describes “last-minute mud-slinging” tactics of various parties.
Resultados electorales oficiales. Tribunal Supremo Electoral. Consolidado nacional del escrutinio final para elección de Presidente y Vicepresidente de la República. Elección 1999 1999: Results at muncipal level (pages 286-299).
Revista electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral septiembre 2000: “En las elecciones de 1999 emitieron el sufragio un millón 183 mil 135 ciudadanos, con la participación de 603 mil 210 electores hombres, mientras el voto femenino fue de 579 mil 925 sufragios comprobados en el Padrón Electoral” (page 5).
Soto Gómez 2005: “Fue electo Presidente de la República el 7 de marzo de 1999, ante seis adversarios que incluían el exComandante guerrillero Facundo Guardado (FMLN), el más fuerte rival, los otros rivales fueron el Dr. Rubén Zamora (CDU), el Dr. Rodolfo Parker Soto (PDC), el doctor Hernán Contreras (PCN), el Dr. Nelson García (LIDER) y el Lic. Francisco Ayala Paz (PUNTO)” (page 229).
Wade 2003: “Not surprisingly, the FMLN’s Guardado/Díaz ticket lost the presidential election in the first round of voting to ARENA’s Francisco Flores 52 percent to 29 percent” (page 101).
Walter 2000c: Discusses the election and gives results (pages 633 and 639).
Williams 2003: “In 1999, [PDC’s] presidential candidate polled a disappointing 5.8% of the vote” (pages 315-316).
Wood 2000: “The FMLN also performed strongly in the 1999 presidential election. The party won 29.1 percent of the valid vote…One contributing factor was the PDC’s declining share of the vote…However, ARENA also benefited from the PDC collapse, capturing 52.0 percent in the 1999 election’s first round. As a result, no second round was held” (pages 252-253).
Crónica del mes. Febrero-marzo 1999: “El Partido Demócrata Cristiano, por haber sido relegado al cuarto lugar en la preferencia de voto, había perdido el derecho de gozar con una representación en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral. En su lugar, la coalición del Centro Democrático Unido había quedado habilitada para ello” (page 254).
Crónica del mes. Febrero-marzo 1999: Guardado con su renuncia “se proponía iniciar una lucha para convertir al FMLN en un partido de las mayorías. Junto con él también renunciaron de sus cargos en la dirigencia del partido María Marta Valladares, ex candidata a la vicepresidencia, Francisco Jovel y Violeta Menjívar, coordinadores adjuntos….La Comisión Política del Frente abrió una sesión permanente para discutir una posible recomposición del partido. Se esperaba que para el 19 de marzo ya se hubiera consolidado una línea de acción” (page 255).
Keesing’s record of world events March 1999: “In the wake [of] his defeat, Guardado resigned as a member of the FMLN’s national co-ordinating body in mid-March. The FMLN had appeared to have a good chance of winning the presidency after making strong gains in legislative elections held in 1997” (page 42829).
NotiCen April 8, 1999: “Following his defeat in the March 7 presidential election, [FMLN] candidate Facundo Guardado resigned as the party’s general coordinator and laid the blame for his loss on party hard-liners. He told reporters on March 15 that he was also resigning his seat on the FMLN’s political committee. Guardado heads the democratic or reformist wing of the party that has tried to shed the FMLN’s guerrilla image and move closer to the political center” (LADB).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral febrero-marzo 1999: “El Partido Acción Nacional, en formación, hizo las primeras gestiones para su inscripción el 23 de marzo ante la Secretaría General del TSE” (page 31).
Central America report May 21, 1999: “The Ninth Extraordinary Convention of the [FMLN] began…on Sunday May 8…According to observers, everything started to fall apart for the FMLN in 1994, when members fearful of the divisionism within the party decided to reform its by-laws. The reforms abolished the various factions that had joined forces under one banner during the 12-year civil war to form a united front…This forced union caused more problems, however…(T)he convention did manage to open a space for party supporters to discuss reforms to the by-laws, and it resulted in a new internal-nomination system which will allow party members to vote directly and secretly” (page 7).
Luciak 2001: “Following its electoral defeat, the FMLN decided to hold a party convention to rally the party faithful and to resolve the disputes between the reformers and the revolutionary socialists. The FMLN’s fourth convention took place May 9, 1999…In an apparent victory for the revolutionary socialists, the delegates decided to move up the date for the election of new party authorities (then dominated by reformers) from December to July” (page 116). “The delegates approved new provisional rules for the election of party authorities. These rules, to be approved at the July meeting, established that candidates running for one of the thirty national seats on the National Council could do so as individuals or as part of a list. Candidates were to be elected by direct, secret vote” (page 117).
Central America report June 4, 1999: “On June 1, Francisco Flores took possession of power in El Salvador, the third consecutive president to belong to [ARENA]” (page 6).
NotiCen March 11, 1999: “Flores takes office June 1” (LADB).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral julio 1999: “Los nuevos Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo Electoral fueron juramentados por la Asamblea Legislativa el 28 de Julio y entrarán en funciones a partir del 1o. de agosto para un período de cinco años” (page 4). “El Artículo 59 del Código Electoral establece que ‘El Tribunal Supremo Electoral estará formado por cinco magistrados, quienes durarán cinco años en sus funciones y serán elegidos por la Asamblea Legislativa’” (page 5).
Central America report August 6, 1999: “During its 10th extraordinary national convention on July 17 and 18, the [FMLN] elected 52 members to the party’s National Council, 15 of whom will serve on the organization’s Political Committee, which directs the party…One of the reasons the party was able to come together and elect new leaders…was the emergence of yet another wing—the ‘integrationists’” (page 3).
Luciak 2001: “The July 1999 [FMLN] convention saw the victory of the orthodox faction of the party. The revolutionary socialists gained control of over half the seats in the National Council…The July [FMLN] elections brought the most significant change in the composition of the FMLN’s national decision-making structures since the signing of the peace accords. For the first time the coordinator position was not held by one of the historic FMLN figures, and none of the original five guerrilla commanders held a seat on the Political Commission” (page 117). “(A)t the 1999 convention…women raised their representation on the party’s executive committee to 40 percent. Their numbers in the National Council, however, declined from twenty to nineteen (36.5%) of the fifty-two seats” (page 160).
NotiCen July 29, 1999: “(T)he election of [FMLN] party leaders at the July convention showed the left-wing or ortodoxo faction (Corriente Revolucionaria y Socialista) has consolidated its position, almost guaranteeing that the factionalism will not go away…Besides Guardado’s reformista faction and Jorge Shafik Handal’s ortodoxo faction, a third group of ‘institucionalistas’ and ‘independientes’ has emerged. Their goal is to end factionalism without either of the other factions taking control of the party. The FMLN met July 24-25 in an attempt to address its factional differences. Each group presented its slate of candidates for congressional, municipal, and Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) seats in the March 2000 election” (LADB).
Wade 2003: “In July 1999 Fabio Castillo, an ‘Ortodoxo,’ was elected the FMLN’s General Coordinator. Castillo’s broad popularity provided temporary unity following the electoral debacle as he vowed the FMLN would unite to win the 2000 elections” (page 101).
Zamora 2003: “En 1999, se introduce una especie de sistema de representación proporcional que permite a personas y grupos articular propuestas de paquetes para poder optar a la conducción partidaria a nivel municipal, departamental y nacional” (page 82).
NotiCen August 26, 1999: “On Aug. 13, hundreds of former paramilitaries belonging to the campesino organization Asociacion de Productores Agricolas (APROAS) renewed their campaign with protests around the country demanding the government set up a…fund from which to pay out compensation and pensions…The [FMLN]—which fought PACS during the war—sided with the demonstrators and blamed Flores for the violence” (LADB).
Central America report September 24, 1999: “The [FMLN] has lent its support to San Salvador Mayor Héctor Silva for re-election to a second term in the March 2000 elections. Silva was renominated at the FMLN party convention on September 18. Silva was elected by a coalition of left-center parties in 1997” (page 8).
Central America report October 22, 1999: “Disgruntled over the influence of the [FMLN] in the campaign, the [CDU] announces its withdrawal from the coalition that elected San Salvador Mayor Héctor Silva in 1997” (page 5).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral noviembre 1999: “La convocatoria al cuerpo electoral a participar en los próximos comicios del 12 de marzo de año 2000, se desarrolló el día 12 de noviembre” (page 3). “En este evento electoral, las primeras del milenio, se eligirán los Concejos Municipales de los 262 Municipios de El Salvador, 84 Diputados Propietarios e igual número de Suplentes a la Asamblea Legislativa; además 20 Diputados Propietarios y 20 Suplentes al Parlamento Centroamericano” (page 4).
Boletín electoral: órgano informativo del Tribunal Supremo Electoral enero-abril 2000: El “Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) [es] inscrito en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral el 15 de noviembre de 1999…Sus bases sociales se fundamentan en las asociaciones paramilitares” (page 7).
Country report. Guatemala, El Salvador May 2000: “The election campaign coincided with a crippling public-health strike—the Arena-led government refused to negotiate with healthcare workers in the social security system—that began in November 1999” (page 33).