Alexander 1957: “Communist influence in the Partido Frente Popular Libertador was cited…as a reason for the formation of the Partido Socialista by dissident members of the former group” (page 358).
Berger 1986: The Partido Socialista is formed in 1951 (page 162). PROG is dissolved in 1951 (page 164).
Black 1983: “In 1951 the government granted legal status to the communist party, and in the next election four party members were elected to the legislature” (page 27).
Forster 2001: “Simultaneously, alliances were fracturing in the political arena and the National Assembly was sinking into disarray. By 1951, opportunism and corruption had crept into virtually every crevice of political life. The middle classes possessed the opportunity to govern themselves for the first time in decades, but they often used their positions for personal enrichment…This disintegration worsened at the same time that the old elites and cold warriors were moving into high gear in preparation for nothing less than civil war” (page 101).
Garrard-Burnett 1998: “During the Arbenz years, it was the members of the Central American Mission and the Presbyterian Church, the denominations that had the greatest presence in the highlands, who tended to be most active in the revolutionary reforms” (page 94).
Luciak 2001: “Particularly during the Arbenz government, women became active in the public sphere. One of the first manifestations of women’s organizing was the creation of the Alianza Feminina Guatemalteca…which fought for the right to vote, just salaries, and other demands raised at that time” (page 183).
Schlewitz 1999: “The party which had championed Arbenz, the [PAR], split up soon after the 1950 election into the communist [PGT] and the more moderate Socialist Party (PS). Fortunately for Arbenz, his opposition was also divided” (page 218).
Berger 1986: “Colonel Arbenz…took office on March 15, 1951. This transition represented the first time in the history of the Guatemalan republic that executive power had passed from one individual to another in a peaceful manner” (page 203). “(T)he Arbenz government reinitiated a Guatemalan tradition, rejected by the Arévalo regime, of appointing military officers to important civil government posts. Consequently, all twenty-two governorships were replaced with military officers” (page 212).
Brockett 2005: “Contentious rural movements were at the heart of the controversies surrounding the government of Jacobo Arbenz in the early 1950s. Not only was the centerpiece of his administration an agrarian reform that struck hard at the domestic and foreign agro-elite but it was accompanied by a concerted effort at organizing peasants…When Arbenz was deposed, undoing this structure and demobilizing the peasantry was one of the primary motives behind the counterrevolution” (page 132).
Schlewitz 1999: “The US initially greeted Lt. Colonel Jacobo Arbenz’s election with cautious optimism. Arbenz’s shadowy role in the death of Colonel Arana in 1949, his suffocation of the military rebellion that followed, and his ties to the ‘Partido de Acción Revolucionaria,’ led US officials to suspect him of left-wing sympathies. They revised this opinion upon noting the absence of anti-US rhetoric in his campaign speeches and his reasonable tone in talks with US officials” (page 206).
Grandin 2004: “(T)he Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas (CEUA) [was] a group of about fifty young university students mostly from the capital but also from the provinces” (page 82). “The CEUA was formed in September 1951, but its roots go back to the debates that gripped Guatemala City’s political class surrounding the adoption of a new constitution in 1945” (page 83). Describes the U.S. CIA partnership with CEUA to destabilize the Arbenz government (pages 84-86).
Alexander 1957: A few weeks after returning from an extended trip to the Soviet Union in November 1951 Gutiérrez “suddenly announced the dissolution of the P.R.O.G. and urged its members to join the Partido Comunista” (page 356).
LaCharite 1973: “The period from the unification [of PCG and PROG] late in 1951 until Arbenz allowed the party to take part in politics a year later under the name of the Guatemalan Labor Party was spent in consolidation…One of the major achievements of this period was the winning of total acceptance from president Arbenz, in addition to gaining the good opinion of the other government parties” (page 95).
November 30: mayoral elections
Ebel 1998: “(V)ictory by the anti-Arbenz forces in the mayoralty elections of November 30  in Guatemala City” (page 35).
IIPS 1978: Gives number of votes cast in Guatemala City in the mayoral race and the total registered voters in the city (page 423).
Kitchen 1955: In 1951, “49,000 or approximately 57 per cent [of those eligible to vote in Guatemala City] voted for candidates for [alcalde]” (page 185).
Alexander 1957: “It was not until 1949 that the Communist Party of Guatemala was officially reorganized, and not until 1952 that it was registered as a legal political organization” (page 356).
Holden 2004: “The Guatemalan armed forces were now emerging as the key instrument through which the United States would seek to dislodge the increasingly leftist government of Arbenz. When it became clear that the army was unwilling to throw Arbenz out of office before his constitutional term of office expired, efforts to ensure its indirect cooperation were undertaken in 1952” (page 140).
LaCharité 1964: “The U.S. arms embargo in 1952 did nothing to lessen the influence of the Communist Party in the Government, its position depending more on the political attitudes of the elite than on the level of arms buildup” (page 87).
Kitchen 1955: “7,282…votes were cast in the [Guatemala City] council elections of 1952…This amounted to only about 8 per cent of the number eligible to participate in these elections” (page 185). “A high proportion of certain economic and social groups in the capital city did participate in municipal elections. In the off-year council elections of 1952, and 1953, for example, the victorious PUA candidates received support from almost the entire upper economic group and their domestic servants” (page 186).
Metallo 1998: “(S)hortly after taking office, Arbenz began to slow the tide of Americans coming into Guatemala...As time went on...it became increasingly clear that the foreign missionaries were a target for the highly nationalistic Arbenz government. By 1952, missionaries found it nearly impossible to obtain visas” (page 295). “By the end of Arbenz’s first year in office, the American missionaries, reflecting the opinion of American policy-makers and businessmen in the country, were nearly united in their opposition to the regime” (page 299). “While the missionaries almost all opposed the most ambitious government programs, many of their parishioners were among the most active advocates of the radical reform...Since people of the lower classes made up the largest proportion of the Protestant membership, it was predictable that the radical reform would find considerable support in the Protestant churches” (page 302). “It was in the predominantly Indian sections of the country where the indigenous Protestants became most actively involved in the radical reform” (page 303).
Alexander 1957: “The unification of the Guatemalan trade union movement came in January, 1952, when a Unity Congress established the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala” (page 357).
Ebel 1998: “The mobilization of the anti-communist opposition continued apace during 1952. In February, massive demonstrations in Guatemala City…forced the Arbenz government to open up communication with the opposition” (page 35).
Ebel 1998: Gives details of the Pact (pages 36-37).
Gleijeses 1991: “Castillo Armas and Ydígoras did try to unite. On March 31, 1952, they signed the ‘Pacto de los Caballeros’ in San Salvador, but the pact was stillborn…Intense rivalry drove these two champions apart. Each wanted to be the ‘supreme savior’ of Guatemala, and each wanted to replace Arbenz” (page 222).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “(E)l 31 de marzo de 1952, el ex candidato presidencial, General e Ingeniero Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes y el Teniente Coronel Carlos Castillo Armas…acordaron en San Salvador firmar un Pacto de Caballeros, destinado a organizar un movimiento reivindicador para derrocar al gobierno del Coronel Arbenz” (page 103).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “El 9 de mayo de 1952 el Presidente Arbenz sometió a consideración del Congreso y de la Nación el Proyecto de Ley Agraria” (page 108).
Alexander 1973: “Arbenz’ pressure was largely responsible for the formation in June 1952 of the Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteco through the merger of the PAR, FPL, Partido Socialista, and Renovación Nacional” (page 303).
Berger 1986: “Decree 900: the agrarian reform of 1952” (pages 231-244). “The Catholic Church became an especially important oppositional force for it used the pulpit to propagandize aganst the agrarian reform bill” (page 242).
Castellanos Cambranes 1984: Arbenz began an agrarian reform program which “was of great social significance because it aimed at returning large areas of land to the peasantry ... Promulgation of Decree 900 of Agrarian Reform on June 17, 1952 was the first victory of the Guatemalan peasantry in centuries and a solid blow against the established order” (page 139).
Gibson 1989: “June 1952: The most extensive agrarian reform law in Guatemalan history is enacted. Part of land held by the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company is expropriated. Other measures are taken to counter U.S. economic influence in Guatemala” (page 169).
Grandin 2004: “Despite eight years of reform legislation, planters throughout Guatemala managed to retain a good deal of sway over rural workers. Not until June 17, 1952, with congressional approval of Decreto 900, the Agrarian Reform, would this authority be fundamentally challenged” (page 52). “The Agrarian Reform endowed rising local leaders with considerable political power, a threat identified by the reform’s opponents” (page 56).
LaCharite 1973: “(W)hen the government attempted to standardize the system of landownership in 1952 by issuing formal titles to all those individuals who owned land, many Indians did not understand the government’s intent and failed to file claims for land they had worked for years. These lands fell by default to government ownership” (page 48).
LaFeber 1993: In 1952 Arbenz “obtained the passage of the Agrarian Reform Law...Two percent of the population owned 72 percent of the farm land” (page 117).
North 1999: “It was the agrarian reform law of 1952…and the inclusion in his government of members of the then recently established communist party, the [PGT], that propelled president Arbenz on a collision course with the agro-export oligarchy and the United States” (page 9).
Tooley 1994: “The decree was based on a World Bank study that concluded that the poverty of the highland peasants hindered Guatemala’s economic growth…The legislation called for the expropriation of land not cultivated for three years. The government would reimburse owners for the value of the land, based on the owners’ declarations of tax value. Under the legislation, Arbenz lost a family farm. But the major target of the Decree was the United Fruit Company. Under the terms of the legislation the government expropriated 381,000 acres from the United Fruit Company, at a tax value of three dollars per acre. The United Fruit Company responded by demanding sixteen million dollars for the true value of the land…The company’s own declaration of value listed the value of the land as $627,000” (pages 34-35).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “El 18 de junio, después de discutir con algunos agricultores, el Congreso aprobó el Decreto 900, Ley de Reforma Agraria” (page 108).
Alexander 1957: “In the middle of 1952 there was a move to unite all the pro-government parties except the Communists in a new organization, to be known as the Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca (P.R.G.)...The Partido de la Revolución Guatemalteca was established on July 2, 1952. As a united party, it lasted less than a month. Its dissolution was largely the result of Communist pressure” (page 358).
Berger 1986: “The PRG ultimately degenerated following the withdrawal of PAR after just one month in July 1952” (page 208).
Schlewitz 1999: US president “Truman approved the plan [for the US to supply money and weapons to Castillo Armas to overthrow Arbenz] on September 9” (page 220). “United Fruit was not willing to wait on Castillo and the CIA. It set up another insurrection, this time with the help of Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, funneling money and arms to a group of military and civilian opponents of Arbenz” (page 221).
Silvert 1954: “As of September, 1952, 642,791 persons were inscribed in the Civic Registry. Of these, 237,941 (37%) were literates, 366,140 (57%) were illiterates, and 38,710 (6%) were women” (page 59).
LaCharité 1964: “The successful organization of the Democratic Front was the final achievement of the planning and effort of the PGT. The Front was organized during the 1953 congressional election campaign without much difficulty, because the leadership of the other government parties had gradually gotten into the habit of relinquishing decision making responsibilities to the PGT” (page 49).
U.S. Department of State 1954: “In October 1952 the Communist Party formally entered the [Frente Democrático Nacional] for the congressional elections of January 1953” (page 73).
Alexander 1957: “The Communist Party was legalized just before the 1952 [should say 1953] congressional election. In their Second National Congress, held December 11-14, 1952, the Communists changed the Party’s name to Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, thus clearing the way for its inscription as a legal party” (page 359).
Grandin 2004: “In 1952…[the PGT] held its second congress calling for a broad national alliance with democratic parties to end feudalism in the countryside, establish political independence, and promote economic modernization” (page 89).
LaCharite 1973: “Arbenz’s policy of accepting the Communist Party in free party competition drastically changed the course of events in party politics. With its new freedom, the Communist Party was able to grow rapidly, consolidate its control over labor, gain further influence in the government, and develop a more intimate working relationship with the president” (page 100).
Schlewitz 1999: “Arbenz permitted a communist party (formally recognized as the Guatemalan Workers Party, or PGT, in December of 1952) to operate openly, despite the Guatemalan Constitution’s prohibition against parties of international or foreign character” (page 209).
Alexander 1957: The Communists “sponsored the formation late in 1953 of a Front of Democratic Parties...The four government political parties—P.A.R., P.R.G., Renovación Nacional, and the Communists—were represented in this Front, as were the Confederation of Workers and the National Peasants Confederation” (pages 362-363).
LaCharité 1964: “In 8 years [since the 1944 revolution] the rural Indians had grown from ignored and scattered social nonentities to potentially important elements in the political life of Guatemala. All the legislation favoring the Indians and all the attention given them by aspiring political groups, however, had not managed to impress upon them their potential political force as a special interest group. The vast majority of Indians remained detached and wedded to their own culture and their traditional village life” (page 28). “Full acceptance of the PGT on an equal footing with other government parties gave the Communists a freer hand. An all-out recruitment campaign resulted in rapid growth; the party doubled its membership in the first months of 1953” (page 49).
Gleijeses 1991: The Partido Anticomunista Demócrata Cristiano is founded in January 1953 (page 211).
Kitchen 1955: “Guatemalan politics in 1953 was marked by a sharp dividing line between support for or opposition to the national administration, but on neither side of this watershed did there exist a monolithic, disciplined party organization. Rather, there were two coalitions, each operating more or less as a unit on the national scene but whose components were highly competitive in local contests. Elements of the majority bloc [Frente Democrático Nacional] supporting the policies and administration of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, were the [Partido Revolucionario Guatemalteco, the Partido de Acción Revolucionario, the Partido de Renovación Nacional, and the Partido de Trabajadores Guatemaltecos]. Support was also given by the [Confederación General de Trabajadores Guatemaltecos, the Confederación Nacional de Campesinos, and the Frente Universitaria Democrática], and a number of similar smaller groups outside the regular party structure” (pages 169-170). Describes the parties and the structure of the Frente. “The conservative opposition was largely discredited after the Revolution of 1944 because of their association with the Ubico dictatorship…and because of the continued opposition to reforms of the national economic and social structure…It was only the overwhelming strength of the government coalition which at last forced the opposition groups into closer co-ordination with each other. The basis for cooperation was negative, however, resting on the sole issue of anti-Communism…Further consolidation of the conservative coalition occured late in 1953 with the formation of a university group, the [Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anti-comunistas], and the linking of this movement with PUA and PIACO in a new [Frente Anti-comunista Nacional]” (pages 171-172).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: The Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN) is founded in 1953 (page 100).
Schlewitz 1999: “The land reform infuriated United Fruit…and US officials were duly alarmed by another apparent example of communist penetration of Guatemala” (page 217). “The Arbenz administration’s reforms also provoked domestic hostility. The great majority of agrarian elites, the targets of reform, was vitriolic, and repeatedly lambasted the Agrarian Reform and the government in full-page advertisements in the dailies” (page 218). “Probably the most coherent opposition emerged in the Catholic Church. Archbishop Rossell y Arellano became a vociferous critic of Arbenz, and in early 1953, he helped establish the Christian Democrat Anticommunist Party (PADC), and directed his clergy to encourage anti-Arbenz sentiments among their parishioners. This campaign had some success among the urban and rural poor, but the PADC soon crumbled, apparently unable to reconcile the disparate interests of its middle and upper class members” (page 219).
Weaver 1994: “The most powerful reaction [to the land reform] came from the most powerful landowner, the United Fruit Company, whose lands constituted about one-third of the expropriations. The United Fruit Company had been unhappy with the unionization of its transportation and plantation workers, with the national transportation plan that was undermining its monopoly of commerce through the Caribbean coast, and with the first governmental audit of its books, which resulted in a large bill for back taxes. The land reform, however, was even more serious” (page 137). “The United Fruit Company...in addition to protesting to the Guatemalan government...appealed successfully to the U.S. government. The appeal and protest were couched in the most effective terms possible: anticommunism” (page 138).
Gibson 1989: “January 1953: Dwight D. Eisenhower is inaugurated President in the United States. Conflict with the U.S. government grows” (page 169).
Gleijeses 1991: “On January 5, 1953, Arbenz signed the first four decrees expropriating private land. For the next eighteen months, the agrarian reform proceeded at a swift pace” (page 153).
LaFeber 1993: “In 1953 Arbenz announced that under the Agrarian Reform Law he was expropriating 234,000 acres of land that United Fruit was not cultivating” (page 119). “UFCO had bribed dictators until it owned 42 percent of the nation’s land...Arbenz also drew up blueprints for new roads and railways that threatened to break United Fruit’s monopoly on Guatemala’s transportation...United Fruit launched a massive lobbying campaign for U.S. intervention” (page 120).
Schlewitz 1999: U.S. “President Eisenhower established an administration even less tolerant of communism [than Truman’s], and more disposed to use covert force against it” (page 224).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “(E)l 5 de enero de 1953, el Presidente Arbenz dictó el Acuerdo No 1 de Expropiación de la Reforma Agraria…El pueblo se sorprendió: Arbenz hablaba en serio; la burocracia no hacía lo usual: retrasar y demorar” (page 109).
January 16-18: congressional election
Alexander 1957: “(I)n the 1952 [should say 1953] elections...the government parties supported certain Communist candidates” (page 359). “The Communists participated in the congressional elections of December, 1952 [should say January 1953]. They had two candidates, José Manuel Fortuny in the city of Guatemala and Carlos Manuel Pellecer in the province of Escuintla. In both cases, they won the endorsement of the other pro-government parties for their candidates...Pellecer was victorious, but Fortuny lost out in Guatemala City, where the pro-government forces generally did poorly” (page 360).
Ebel 1998: Discusses the election (page 38).
Gleijeses 1991: “In the January 1953 congressional elections, the revolutionary parties increased their majority. In a Congress of fifty-six members, the PAR now held twenty-two seats, the PRG sixteen and RN seven. By contrast, the PGT had only four deputies, the opposition had five, and there were two progovernment independents” (page 182).
Rodríguez de Ita 2003: “(L)a votación favoreció a los partidos adictos al gobierno y la Asamblea contó con una mayoría de partidos revolucionarios: el PAR obtuvo 19 curules, seguido por el PRG con 14, RN con 7 y los comunistas con 4” (pages 164-165). (L)os comicios tuvieron lugar del 16 al 18 de enero…(L)a ciudadanía mostró gran interés por inscribirse en el Registro Cívico para poder sufragar, lo que obligó a aumentar el número de boletas expedidas; de acuerdo con datos publicados en la prensa, el padrón para esos comicios fue del orden de los 290 000 electores en la república y de 60 000 en la capital” (page 226). “Cuadro 13. Número de diputados por partido para la Asamblea Legislativa de 1953-1955” (page 228).
Schlesinger 1982: “There were only 4 Communist deputies in the 1953-54 Congress. (The rest of the ruling coalition consisted of 24 deputies from the dominant PAR, 16 from the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution and 7 from the National Renovation Party--for the most part moderates and liberals)” (page 59).
Schneider 1959: “As late as the January 1953 congressional elections, the opposition was so divided that its 105,000 votes brought it only three seats while the 130,000 ballots cast for the government coalition elected 29 deputies. The five opposition members in the new Congress represented four different parties” (page 303).
Silvert 1954: Describes the guidelines for congressional elections in 1953 and gives details on the age, occupation, and distribution by department of deputies in the 1953 congress (pages 41-44). Gives general election procedures and practices (page 59). “All are elected for periods of four years, the elections being so arranged that half of the body changes every two years in order to preserve legislative continuity.” “In early 1953, only 241,318 votes were cast in [national elections for seats in the Chamber of Deputies], or 37.5 per cent of the persons registered three months previously. It is plain that the compulsory voting requirement for literate males over eighteen is not enforced, for in the election to the Chamber of Deputies referred to, only 113,408 votes of literates were recorded, as against 127,910 votes of illiterates” (page 60). Discusses local government case studies compiled by the author in 1953 (pages 70-91).
U.S. Department of State 1954: Arbenz “brought the Communist leaders into the political meetings of administration parties which he holds in his office, and these parties, which he controls, openly supported Communist candidates in the January 1953 congressional elections” (page 68). “In the legislative branch of the Guatemalan Government, the PGT has only 4 of the 56 deputies in the unicameral Congress, but these are in key positions” (page 71). “(T)he ‘Frente Democrático Nacional,’…which is an alliance of the parties and labor groups supporting the Arbenz administration,…holds 51 of the 56 seats in the Guatemalan Congress” (page 72).
Schlewitz 1999: “The [United Fruit-sponsored] rebellion took place during the Holy Week in March 1953, just as the first land expropriations had begun…The rebels…were defeated in less than 24 hours by loyal troops. Apparently, all the rebel leadership escaped, and many of them made their way to Honduras to join Colonel Castillo Armas…The…debacle led to a crackdown on anti-Arbenz opposition. Police raids and arrests dismantled the Comité Cívico Nacional and weakened the CEUA, depriving the CIA of all of its assets within Guatemala” (page 222). US intelligence conclusions from the failed rebellion “became the blueprint for the US’s successful intervention the following year…Rather than convince officers to fear communists, the US would supply the fear by summoning disorder and the spectre of economic collapse with a propaganda campaign, sanctions, and the threat of a US invasion” (page 223).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “(E)l 5 de marzo [Presidente Arbenz] dictó el Acuerdo No. 57 de Expropiación de la Reforma Agraria a la Compañía Agrícola de Guatemala (United Fruit Co.)…Exclamaciones de admiración brotaron de labios de muchos y condena de otros. La Compañía Frutera buscó alero en su país señalando un deliberado sentimiento antiamericano y procomunista en el gobierno de Guatemala…Tres semanas después (el 28 de marzo) el anticomunismo organizado y sus fuerzas unidas manifiestan en la prensa” (page 109). “El día siguiente (29 de marzo) estalla en Salamá, Baja Verapaz, un movimiento armado…El Ejército logró controlar el movimiento” (page 110).
Kitchen 1955: “As of April, 1953, there were 322 Guatemalan municipalities” (page 68). Provides statistics on size, racial composition, political organization, and other characteristics (pages 68-96).
Ebel 1998: “Convinced of the necessity of ridding the hemisphere of the ‘Marxist’ government of Jacobo Arbenz, the Eisenhower government approved the organization of Operation Success (PBSUCCESS) sometime during the late summer (probably August) of 1953” (page 39).
Schlewitz 1999: “In August of 1953, senior CIA and State Department officials, with the President’s approval, began planning a covert operation to oust Arbenz” (page 226). Describes the plan. “Since this invasion force had no chance of defeating the Guatemalan army, US officials hoped to foment anti-Arbenz sentiments among civilian groups and the military, or at least neutralize Arbenz supporters, with light air raids on the capital, a propaganda offensive via radio, and the US government’s threat of broad economic sanctions and outright intervention. They never seriously considered sending in US troops, though they made sure that the Guatemalan government and military did not realize that” (page 227).
November/December: municipal elections
Garrard-Burnett 1998: “Biennial elections to ‘alcalde’ and town council posts in the 1946-1954 period yielded a variety of shifting alliances and strange political configurations, but the upshot was that during this period the traditional lines of authority in local political officeholding were broken forever. The union-affiliated PRG, which captured important posts in almost every election, ceased to consult and then ignored the local ‘cofradía.’ Political party membership and union activity became decisive considerations for elected office, and men who had never served in the religious hierarchy took public office for the first time” (page 95).
Grandin 2004: “In 1953…the PAR won all but one of Alta Verapaz’s municipal elections” (page 59). “In Alta Verapaz, the 1953 municipal elections mark a turning point of sorts for the Revolution. Nationally…a deal was struck between the PRG and the PAR to split equally the mayoralty of Alta Verapaz’s sixteen municipalities. This deal, supposedly brokered by Arbenz, was made to allay the fears of the more moderate PRG that the revolution was getting out of hand. In the new political climate that allowed for fairer voting, the PAR overwhelmingly won fifteen of the sixteen races and reneged on the deal, deepening divisions between pro- and antigovernment forces” (page 228).
Kitchen 1955: “Importance of…party alignments to municipal government and administration lay in the fact that local electoral contests were reflections of the national controversy between ‘revolutionary’ and ‘anti-communist’ groups…Newspaper accounts and personal interviews regarding twenty-three municipal elections held outside Guatemala City in November, 1953, indicate that in all but one instance candidates ignored issues normally considered of municipal concern” (pages 172-173). “Official results of the 1953 municipal elections were not available for public inspection at the offices of the National Electoral Commission. On the basis of newspaper accounts, PAR was victorious in some 220 ‘municipios,’ followed by PRG in about 50, and lesser government parties or joint slated in some 25 more. PUA was successful in only about 25 campaigns” (pages 173-174). Discusses additional municipal elections held in December (pages 174-175). Quotes interviews with foreign landowners in a municipio in Quetzaltenango who observed that “most of the ballots were cast by voice rather than in secret, and the PAR-dominated election officials marked ballots for their candidate regardless of the name called by the voter” (page 177). “6,574 votes were cast in the [Guatemala City] council elections…of 1953…This amounted to only about 8 per cent of the number eligible to participate in these elections” (page 185). “A high proportion of certain economic and social groups in the capital city did participate in municipal elections. In the off-year council elections of 1952, and 1953, for example, the victorious PUA candidates received support from almost the entire upper economic group and their domestic servants” (page 186). “Estimates of votes received by the major parties in municipal elections throughout the country in 1953, were: PAR, 60,000; PRG, 25,000; RN, 3,500; PTG, 2,500; PUA and PIACO, 10,000” (page 184). Describes the practice of bringing agricultural workers from outside Guatemala City in to vote: “It is impossible to ascertain how many votes were imported in this manner, as some ‘citizens’ voted at more than one polling place, and estimates vary from 300 to 2,000” (page 187).
Schneider 1959: “(T)he PAR continued to cooperate with the Communists in the 1953 municipal elections” (pages 228-229). “The ambiguous nature of the relations between the PRG and the Communists can be seen in the fact that, while the two parties ran joint slates in some communities during the 1953 municipal elections, in other places there was bitter rivalry between the two parties” (page 244).
Ebel 1990: “Rather than attempting to broaden the base of his support or conciliate the disaffected groups, Arbenz increasingly implemented the programs and policies of the left. The agrarian-reform committees, dominated by urban ladinos, alienated the Indians; the growing influence of Communist leaders in Guatemala’s trade unions and government agencies alarmed the middle classes; the confiscation of 26,000 acres...of United Fruit Company land under the famous Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 antagonized the United States; and the threat to arm the industrial workers to preserve the revolution provoked the army” (page 503).
Gleijeses 1991: “In early 1954, as a companion measure to Decree 900, the government began a literacy campaign in the rural areas” (page 161).
Grandin 2004: “In 1944, hardly any unions existed. By 1954, three hundred thousand members filled the ranks of nearly two thousand rural and urban unions. At over 60 percent of the total 1950 voting population, organized labor suddenly held decisive political power” (page 51). “Although the [PGT] grew rapidly—from less than one hundred members in 1950 to five thousand in 1954—and made impressive showings whenever it fielded candidates in local or national elections, it gained most of its strength from its fortuitous alliance with Arbenz, who legalized the party and its commitment to reform” (page 53).
Krennerich 1993: “La oportunidad de elegir se vio fuertemente recortada después de 1954 a causa de: la prohibición de ciertos partidos, las elevadas barreras a la participación electoral de partidos y el terror estatal. Los partidos legales que participaban en las elecciones solo se distinguían entre sí superficialmente en sus programas. Solo existían pocos partidos del centro moderadamente reformistas, mientras que los gobiernos se constituyeron por distintas coaliciones de partidos derechistas y estrictamente anti-comunistas que se relacionaron en parte con los militares, en parte con la elite económica” (page 194).
LaCharité 1964: “In the decade between 1944 and 1954, 24 different political parties were legally recognized. Many were short-lived personal parties, organized merely for electioneering. Others lost their original identity through mergers with other parties. In fact, Guatemalan politics following Ubico’s deposition was characterized by combinations of parties to form blocs and the subsequent splintering away of dissident factions to form new parties” (page 43).
The 1990 national elections in Guatemala. 1991: “Destiny placed Arbenz and his innovative economic reforms in the midst of the most tense period of the Cold War, and his government was viewed as a communist threat by the United States” (page 9).
Schirmer 1998: “(I)n 1954 Arbenz antagonized the older and more traditional officers (and wealthy landowners) with his attempt to create a civilian militia to protect [the] agrarian reform process” (page 13).
Steigenga 2001: “While the primary forces behind the 1954 coup were the United States and UFCO, Arbenz was not without enemies inside Guatemala. As in the past, religion played a significant role in the political struggle” (page 68).
Villagrán Kramer 2004: “Durante la Revolución de Octubre—1944 a 1954—los pastores protestantes mostraban simpatía por las acciones y las medidas que adoptaban los gobiernos revolucionarios, en tanto que la Iglesia católica, por razones ideológicas y no teológicas, enfrentó al gobierno del presidente Arbenz. En consecuencia, al triunfar el Movimiento de Liberación algunos pastores fueron encarcelados, llevando a la apoliticidad a las iglesias protestantes” (page 254).
Parker 1981: “The United States government, which had become disturbed about Communist influences in Guatemala as early as February 1950, supported United Fruit’s financial claims against the Guatemalan government and carried its perturbations concerning Communist influence to the Organization of American States at a meeting held in Caracas in March 1954" (page 100).
Schlewitz 1999: “Guatemala’s international duel with the US became…sharper in March 1954, at an [OAS] conference in Caracas…The US [convinced] the OAS to pass a resolution condemning communism as a foreign intervention in American affairs. This resolution was the US’s…effort to isolate Guatemala within Latin America, expose the communist penetration of Guatemala, and give US unilateral actions against Guatemala a multilateral façade” (page 213).
Ebel 1990: “Arbenz’s ordering of a shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia in May 1954 was the ‘trigger’ that provoked the United States into assisting an exile army, led by dissident Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, to overthrow him” (page 503).
LaCharité 1964: “The ‘Alfheim,’ arriving at Puerto Barrios on May 15, 1954, was met by the Minister of Defense and other ranking officers…Army officers…felt that the shipment could have only terrible consequences for Guatemala and that it was time to take a stronger stand against communism” (page 87).
Schlewitz 1999: “The Guatemalan military had not managed to purchase much war material since 1948, when the last of the US Lend-Lease allotment had arrived. After 1950, in order to punish the revolutionary regime, the US refused to sell arms to the Guatemalan military. In 1952, the US denied Guatemala Mutual Security Aid, and the following year, it began blocking weapon sales from other countries. Furthermore, the US provided generous amounts of armaments to Guatemala’s neighbors, where hostility had grown with that of the US. Desperate for munitions, Arbenz resorted to an undercover operation to make the purchase…Though there was nothing illegal about the transaction, and much of the purchase turned out to be obsolete, the US now had concrete proof of the connection between Guatemalan communists and the Soviet Bloc…Instead of relieving the Guatemalan military, the Czech arms became a pretext for US naval and air maneuvers near Guatemala” (page 236).
Gleijeses 1991: “By June 1954, over 1.4 million acres had been expropriated (that is, one quarter of the total arable land of Guatemala)” (page 155).
Dunkerley 1992: “(T)he regimes of Juan José Arévalo (1945-51) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54) for almost a decade pursued policies of progressive socioeconomic reform, accepted and sometimes encouraged the spread of unionization, and fostered a nationalist sentiment that increased pressure on foreign enterprise and tension with the United States...As a result, the Arbenz regime was eventually overthrown, in perhaps the most open and emphatic example of U.S. Cold War interventionism to be seen in Latin America, when the CIA organized a counterrevolutionary invasion from Honduras in June 1954” (page 300).
Gibson 1989: “In June 1954 the CIA-supported invasion force entered Guatemala. It suffered very heavy losses against Guatemalan forces. Toward the end of the month the invasion force had captured one departmental capital, but it was apparent that it had no chance of a military victory as long as the Guatemalan armed forces remained united behind their government. Arbenz’s major problem, however, was not the invasion force, but his own rebellious military” (page 172).
Schirmer 1998: “In June 1954, a motley group of 150 émigres and mercenaries, the self-styled ‘liberacionista’ army, under the nominal control of the fugitive colonel Castillo Armas, aided and equipped by the CIA, invaded Guatemala” (page 14).
Schlewitz 1999: “The 1954 Liberation” (pages 223-247). Looks “at the Liberation as a US intervention and as a military rebellion. Actually two simultaneous rebellions” (page 224). “The invasion finally began on June 17th. Starting from a United Fruit plantation in Honduras, Castillo led 150 men across the border uncontested” (page 237).
Tooley 1994: “The coup, called ‘Operation Success,’ approved by President Eisenhower, was implemented by the CIA in cooperation with the United Fruit Company and a few dissidents from Guatemala…In the months before the invasion, Guatemala asked both the United Nations and the Organization of American States to investigate threats from the United States, but U.S. influence prevented the approval of an investigation. Two of the most powerful men in the United States, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, and Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, had ties with the United Fruit Company. The Dulles brothers spearheaded Operation Success” (page 37).
Weaver 1994: “(T)he U.S. government, through the CIA and with the cooperation of Presidents Juan Manuel Gálvez of Honduras and Somoza of Nicaragua, financed and organized an invasion of Guatemala from the Honduran border” (page 139).
Gibson 1989: “On 25 June President Arbenz received an ultimatum from his senior officers on the front that demanded his resignation; these officers threatened to come to an agreement with the invasion force if he refused to resign. Arbenz immediately ordered the army chief of staff to distribute arms to his supporters in the labor unions and political parties. The army, however, refused to carry out the president’s orders” (page 172).
Alcántara Sáez 1999: “La invasión de Castillo Armas en junio de 1954 y su subsiguiente acceso al poder inauguraron una etapa que se va a extender a lo largo de tres décadas, en las que las Fuerzas Armadas se convirtieron en el elemento estructural básico de la vida política del país” (page 181).
Brockett 2005: “The single most important political event in twentieth-century Guatemala was the overthrow of the government of Jacobo Arbenz. His forced departure from the presidency and the country in June 1954 ended ten years of elected progressive government and increasing popular mobilization throughout the country…To Guatemalan elites and the rest of the right, the elimination of what they perceived as the communist threat of the Arbenz years was crucial to the purposes of their counterrevolution” (page 201). “However, the right faced two big problems. First, their ally in the overthrow of Arbenz, the U.S. government, had different objectives for what was supposed to follow. Second, popular forces did not intend to remain demobilized” (page 202).
Ebel 1998: On June 27, 1954, “Col. Elfego Monzón, who had been appointed interior minister by Arévalo to calm the opposition during the Minute of Silence disturbances in July 1950, was declared the leader of the junta” (page 40).
Garrard-Burnett 1998: “Castillo Armas’s victory was a matter of urgent concern to Protestant missionaries in Guatemala. Of primary consideration was the fact that Castillo enjoyed the strong backing of conservative Catholics…Their fears were not unjustified, for Castillo Armas made it clear from the beginning that he would reward the Catholic Church for its political support in the ouster of Arbenz” (page 100).
Gibson 1989: “27 June 1954: Arbenz resigns from the presidency following an ultimatum from his military high command” (page 169). “The 1954 overthrow of the constitutionally elected President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, presents a clear case of a democratic regime breaking down through foreign intervention. The government of President Arbenz was overthrown following an extended campaign of political and economic destabilization by the government of the United States, and an invasion of rebel forces armed, trained, supported, and reportedly directed by the U.S. government” (page 169). “Yet it should also be noted that efforts by the United States to overthrow the Arbenz government could not have succeeded without opposition to the government from important sectors of Guatemalan society, and without the loss of active support for the government by sectors that could have rallied to the regime’s defense in the final stages of the crisis” (page 170).
Gleijeses 1991: “Díaz was doomed. The United States had not launched Castillo Armas’s invasion in order to hand the presidency to a friend of Arbenz. Washington intended to impose its own man, a man with unblemished anticommunist credentials, a man who would not urge communist leaders to seek asylum, but who would destroy them” (page 351). “In the eleven days following Arbenz’s resignation, five provisional governments (staffed entirely by officers) suceeded one another, each more amenable to Castillo Armas than its predecessor” (page 352).
Jiménez 1981: “El 27 de junio de 1954 entrega [Arbenz] la presidencia, cuando un ejército fuertemente armado al mando del coronel Carlos Castillo Armas, invade el territorio nacional, desde la república de Honduras...Arbenz entregó el poder al coronel Carlos Enrique Díaz de León, quien en esos días era jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas de Guatemala” (page 254).
Kitchen 1955: “Despite the lack of direct influence on the outcome of elections, it was well understood that the sympathy of the Roman Catholic Church lay with opposition groups. Reports received by the author since the June revolution indicate that the Catholic Church is now claiming much of the credit for the overthrow of the Arbenz regime, thus suggesting a more active role in national politics. Protestant minority groups are still supervised to some degree by foreign missionaries, who practice a scrupulous avoidance of all political activity” (pages 182-183).
Metallo 1998: “(F)ew missionaries mourned when CIA-backed forces under Carlos Castillo Armas forced Arbenz to step down in June, 1954. Most missionaries, however, backed the Castillo Armas coup with only passive support. Although they were relieved to have the leftist government out of power, they were unsure how the new government would regard mission work, especially since so many indigenous converts had been actively involved in revolutionary programs” (page 310). “Their fears were not groundless, for Castillo Armas had made it clear from the beginning that he would reward the Catholic Church for its political support in the ouster of Arbenz” (page 312). “It was the indigenous Protestants in the staunchly Catholic Indian villages who suffered the most for their flirtation with the radical left when Castillo came to office” (page 314).
Schlewitz 1999: “Colonel Díaz…stepped in as provisional president, the head of a ‘junta militar’ that included Colonel Angel Sánchez, Arbenz’s Defense Minister, and Colonel Elfego Monzón, who had been a Cabinet Minister without portfolio. Díaz announced a state of emergency, and declared the [PGT] illegal. He granted a blanket amnesty for all political prisoners, freeing opponents of the Arbenz government…as well as communists and labor leaders arrested the previous day. This was not the deal, however, that Colonel Díaz had cut with [the U.S.] Ambassador…He insisted that Díaz negotiate directly with Castillo (which the US government needed in order to appear as a mediator between anticommunist and communist forces rather than a sponsor of an invasion)” (page 244). Díaz and Sánchez resign from the junta. “A new military junta was then established, with Monzón as head…The Arbenz loyalists had been defeated, but the new junta was no more amenable to the Liberation than the previous one, and thus unacceptable to the US government, which was determined to put Castillo in the palace” (page 245).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “Tres gobiernos en 24 horas” (pages 165-175).
Weaver 1994: “Rather than subject the nation to a bloody civil war, Arbenz resigned after being assured by the Guatemalan generals that they would not allow Castillo Armas to rule and that they would protect the reforms of the post-Ubico governments. The generals, pressured by the U.S. ambassador, reneged on their promises” (page 139).
Alcántara Sáez 1999: “Castillo Armas dirigió el Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, autodefinido como anticomunista, hasta que fue asesinado en 1957. En los primeros meses de su gobierno derogó la Constitución de 1945 y la Ley Agraria de Arbenz, convocó a un Congreso no pluralista que redactó la nueva Constitución de 1955, implantó medidas tendentes a combatir a los partidos de izquierda, al movimiento obrero y campesino, y controló al movimiento sindical” (page 182).
Calvert 1985: “On July 1 the (U.S.) ambassador secured Castillo Armas’s position on a junta of five headed by Monzón. Monzón’s friends on the junta were then induced to resign, and it was Castillo Armas, as had been intended all along, whom the remainder elected on 8 July 1954 as provisional president” (page 80).
Casey 1979: “In July of 1954 illiterate Indians who had been give the right to vote were disenfranchised” (page 441).
Castellanos Cambranes 1984: “Castillo Armas immediately annulled Decree 900, returning to the entrepreneurs the lands which had been confiscated for distribution to the peasantry. More than 9,000 peasant activists were murdered during the first months of the estate owners’ triumph, and thousands of peasants were forced to flee to the mountains and to the neighboring countries” (page 142).
Ebel 1998: The “Pact of El Salvador…stipulated that a five-man junta be set up under Col. Monzón (consisting of Monzón, Castillo Armas, Col. Trinidad Oliva (Castillo’s chief military aide), Lt. Col. Maurico Dubois and Col. Cruz Salazar)…It was also agreed that within fifteen days one of the five would be elected as the permanent head of the junta and that presidential elections would be held as soon as a new constitution had been promulgated” (pages 40-41). “However, what appeared to be a smooth transition, was marked by underlying tensions between Castillo Armas and Monzón, between the liberacionistas and the leaders of the regular army that had had to be pushed to abandon Arbenz. Monzón was forced to watch as officers acceptable to the new national hero were placed in the top positions while his colleagues were either sent to military attache posts overseas or into exile” (page 41).
LaCharité 1964: “On July 8, 1954, after much negotiation, leaders of the Guatemalan National Army and chiefs of the ‘Liberation Army’ chose Castillo Armas as head of a three-man junta…The first real efforts of the Armas Government were directed against Arbenz and his colleagues…The [PGT] was outlawed, as were other parties, unions, and organizations that were suspected of being ‘Communist influenced” (page 101).
Parker 1981: “From 8 July 1954 Carlos Castillo Armas was the ruler of Guatemala as head of the fourth military junta in succession” (page 105).
Schlewitz 1999: “Monzón met with Castillo in San Salvador…Both sides agreed to create an anticommunist, pro-US regime, but Monzón and Castillo stubbornly disagreed over who was to head the government, and over the integration of the National Army and the Liberal forces…Monzón insisted on sharing power…By the afternoon of July 1st, both were ready to give up on talk and return to battle…[The U.S. ambassador] rushed to San Salvador [and] pushed Monzón and Castillo into compromise…Castillo and one of his Liberation officers, Major Enrique Oliva, would join the junta...Monzón would remain as head of the junta for two weeks, at which time the members would select a president by vote…This Pact of San Salvador spelled the end of the Guatemalan military’s attempt to establish an independent anticommunist regime. Monzón’s junta allies…resigned within a week” (pages 245-246). “On July 15th, the Junta elected Castillo president” (pages 246-247). “Castillo initiated the counter-revolution as mandated by his fellow liberationists and Northamerican patron. He first moved against communists. On July 19th, the Junta banned communism, outlawing the [PGT] along with three other political parties which had supported Arbenz. The junta also created a National Committee for Defense against Communism (CNDC), empowered to investigate and indict all those suspected of being communists” (page 280). “The next step was to deal with workers and peasants. Their union activities had aggravated United Fruit, IRCA, and landlords, and their attempt to create popular militias had vexed the military. On July 24th, the Junta outlawed 533 unions” (page 281). “Along with destroying the labor movement, Castillo reversed Arbenz’s land reform program, returning United Fruit’s land, and nearly seventy percent of all lands taken from individual producers” (page 283).
Steigenga 2001: “Castillo Armas handsomely rewarded the Catholic Church for aiding him in his rise to power in 1954…Protestants lost their favored status” (page 69).
Trudeau 2000: “Immediately after taking power in 1954, the new regime of Colonel Castillo Armas unleashed a major wave of violence, part of the strategy to reverse the reforms enacted in the previous decade. Precisely because many of those reforms had been successful and widely supported, more violence was required to undo them and subdue the population that had benefited by them. Levels of violence varied in intensity and focus over the next three decades, but human rights violations were a constant, if varying, dimension of political life throughout the period” (page 499).
Yashar 1997: “The military established political hegemony in the post-reform, authoritarian regime. With Castillo Armas at the helm, the counterreform movement suspended the 1945 constitution, which had provided the democratic framework for the reform period. It changed suffrage laws for illiterates, preventing the majority of the indigenous and rural population from voting” (page 208). “The redefinition of politics in post-reform Guatemala...[rested] on a political understanding between the Guatemalan military and oligarchy. The Guatemalan military assumed the right to govern in exchange for maintaining political order--particularly in the countryside... The post-1954 era, therefore, developed an enduring authoritarian regime marked by polarizing cycles of protest and repression” (page 210). “In the immediate aftermath of the 1954 invasion, the Guatemalan military repressed the urban and rural unions, persecuted political leaders, banned reform parties, and reversed much of the previous social legislation, including the land reform of 1952" (page 221).
Williams 2003: “After the U.S.-orchestrated overthrow of Arbenz in 1954, the Castillo Armas government carried out an extensive witch hunt against Arbenz supporters and Communist Party militants” (page 316).
Barrios 2001: “En el gobierno liberacionista, mientras se emitía una nueva constitución congruente con el Estatuto Político del 10 de agosto de 1954, el gobernador departamental nombró a los alcaldes de los municipios, como sucedió a finales del segundo período liberal, en el que los alcaldes electos fueron sustituidos por los intendentes designados por el Ejecutivo” (page 203).
Berger 1986: “One of the most formidable and immediate threats posed to the Castillo Armas government came from the armed forces which had agreed to President Arbenz’ resignation only under threat from the U.S. and only after being promised that the military would act as a transition government. Military feeling against Castillo Armas and his ‘Liberation’ army was thus particularly strong in 1954…(I)n August 1954…cadets at the Escuela Politécnica staged a coup attempt against the regime” (page 354). “The Castillo Armas government dismissed [government armed forces policies of the previous decade] in hopes of controlling the military…‘Liberation’ officers were…placed in top officer positions” (page 356). “Not only did the Castillo Armas government face conflicts with the army, it also ran into trouble with the Catholic Church hierarchy. One of President Castillo Armas’ most faithful supporters before the 1954 coup, the Catholic hierarchy expected unconditional favors from the President after he took power” (page 358).
Gleijeses 1991: “One hundred Guatemalans, including many innocent bystanders, were killed or wounded on August 2 and 3 as the cadets [of the Escuela Politécnica] indulged in their senseless pursuit of the lost dignity of the Guatemalan army. Castillo Armas’s retribution followed” (page 360).
Rodríguez de Ita 2003: “El nuevo régimen…derogó la Constitución Política de 1945 y la sustituyó por un Estatuto Político, promulgado el 10 de agosto. En la misma fecha…se declararon disueltos los partidos, sindicatos y diversas organizaciones” (page 175).
Schlewitz 1999: “Monzón and Oliva resigned in August, leaving Castillo to rule alone, as the US had intended all along” (page 247). Discusses Castillo’s attempts to integrate the national army and the liberation forces and the disturbances around the liberation forces’ victory march on August 1 that led to an attempted coup by army cadets (pages 257-276).
Thesing 1976: “El estatuto político del 10 de agosto de 1954 no contiene ninguna norma electoral, ya que la Junta ejercía también el Poder Legislativo” (page 17).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “(A) la altura del 10 de agosto estaba listo el Decreto de ‘medidas de seguridad’ que llevaría el número 48” (page 239). “Se declaran disueltas por ser integrantes del frente comunista, las siguientes organizaciones: [CGT, CNC, FSG, SANF, ATE, STUFC, SCAG, AJD, Grupo SAKER-TI, FUD, AFG]. Asimismo, los partidos políticos [PGT, PRG, PAR, PRN]” (page 240).
Berger 1986: “After taking power in 1954, the Castillo Armas government immediately began to restructure the state system…To this end, executive and legislative powers were condensed—at least temporarily—into the hands of President Castillo Armas. Consequently, two of the first acts of the Castillo Armas regime were to repeal the 1945 Constitution and to dismiss Congress until a new constitution was enacted in 1956…President Castillo Armas personally appointed state governors, municipal governments, and city mayors” (page 308).
Cullather 1999: “The invasion’s disastrous setbacks dispelled all illusions about [Castillo Armas’s] capabilities, and US officials had low expectations at the outset of his presidency. Even these proved optimistic. Hopes that he would align himself with centrist and moderate elements were dashed within weeks…Castillo Armas completed his lunge to the right by [disenfranchizing] illiterates (two-thirds of the electorate), canceling land reform, and outlawing all political parties, labor confederations, and peasant organizations. Finally, he decreed a ‘political statute’ that voided the 1945 constitution and gave him complete executive and legislative authority” (page 113).
Daetz Caal 1999: “El 21 de septiembre de 1954 el presidente convocó a elecciones para una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente” (page 91).
Ebel 1998: “Knowing that his opponents were fragmented and disorganized Castillo announced on September 22 that elections for a constituent assembly would be held within three weeks. Furthermore, to make certain his supporters would win, he restored the vote to illiterates (so they could be trucked to the polls by their employers), abolished the secret ballot, and eliminated proportional representation which would have assured the minority some representation in the assembly. Finally, the following proposition was added to the ballot: ‘Are you in favor of Carlos Castillo Armas continuing as President of the Republic for a period to be fixed by the National Constituent Assembly to be elected?’” (pages 42-43).
Holden 2004: “On 22 September the ‘junta’ announced a snap vote (with just nineteen days’ notice) for delegates to a constituent assembly and for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response to the question whether Castillo should remain the president for a term to be fixed by the future assembly” (page 141).
Parker 1981: “From 1 September 1954 he held the position of president” (page 105).
Thesing 1976: “Por decreto del 21 de septiembre de 1954 se ordenaba la realización de un plebiscito para el 10 de octubre de 1954” (page 17).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “A la altura del 21 de septiembre estaban listos para promulgarse y publicarse los decretos de convocatoria a elecciones para integrar la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente y llevarse a cabo el plebiscito programado” (page 251). “El siguiente 10 de octubre fue el día escogido para las elecciones de 66 diputados a la Constituyente y, para el plebiscito. Desde el punto de vista de elecciones democráticas, 19 días eran insuficientes para articular planillas y llevar adelante la propaganda de los respectivos grupos y, para discutir si convenía o no el plebiscito. Pero, no se trataba de elecciones democráticas sino de formalizar y legalizar la permanencia en la Presidencia de la República de un jefe militar victorioso y preparar un texto fundamental que sirviere de Constitución de la República. Las bases serían: primero, que el voto ‘se emitiría publicamente’ y que el escrutinio sería secreto…Los partidos políticos serían sustituidos por ‘agrupaciones cívicas’ cuya formación y funcionamiento se autorizaría” (page 252). Reproduces text of “decreto no. 89” that governed the plebiscite (pages 252-254). “Se convoca a los guatemaltecos varones mayores de 18 años y mujeres guatemaltecas mayores de 18 años que sepan leer y escribir, para que con ocasión del ejercicio del sufragio en las elecciones que se efectuaran el 10 de octubre de este año, den respuesta categorica, afirmativa o negativamente a la siguiente consulta: ‘¿Se pronuncia usted por que continue en la presidencia de la República el teniente coronel Carlos Castillo Armas, por un termino que fijara la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente?’” (page 254).
October 10: constituent assembly election and plebiscite for Castillo Armas’ presidency
Daetz Caal 1999: “Las [elecciones] se realizaron el 10 de octubre. No se utilizó la denominación de partidos políticos. El procedimiento para ejercer el sufragio fue el de concurrir a la mesa electoral con la lista de candidatos, y si la nómina era proporcionada por las denominadas agrupaciones electorales postulantes, debía estar impresa” (page 91).
Dunkerley 1991: “(T)he new president argued that an election would be excessively costly. However, because he was the leader of a movement championed as democratic he permitted the holding of a referendum over acceptance of his appointment, gaining the support of 95 per cent of the vote” (page 137).
Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “Tras emitir el marco legal provisional, conocido como Estatuto Político de la República de Guatemala, el 10 de octubre de 1954, la junta militar convocó un plebiscito, en el que Castillo Armas obtuvo el 99.9% del voto favorable. El resultado casi unánime refleja la ausencia de alternativas, pues en el plebiscito se preguntó a la población si lo aceptaba o no como Presidente de la República. El voto fue público y obligatorio, mientras que el escrutinio fue secreto…De esta manera Castillo Armas se convirtió en Presidente de la República para el período que habría de concluir el 15 de marzo de 1960, según lo fijó la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, que fue elegida al mismo tiempo. La actividad política, suspendida desde agosto de 1954, fue autorizada parcialmente para permitir la elección de los constituyentes. En esta convocatoria sólo participaron agrupaciones afines unidas en el Frente Anticomunista Nacional (FAN)” (pages 45-46).
Holden 2004: “Having banned all political parties and required that voters proclaim their votes publicly at the polls, the ‘junta’ announced the expected results of the 10 October ‘elections’: the ‘junta’s delegate slate had won unopposed, and the vote for Castillo to stay in office was 485,699 ‘yes’ and 400 ‘no.’ The assembly’s first act was to decree that Castillo’s term would continue until 15 March 1960” (page 141).
ICSPS Guatemala 1966: Gives total votes for, against, and invalid votes (page 32).
Jiménez 1981: “Esta Junta convocó a un plebiscito para consultar con el electorado si era conveniente o no que Castillo Armas quedara como presidente” (page 255).
Johnson 1967: Gives estimates of total votes cast and votes against his presidency (page 3).
Kitchen 1955: “A more aggressive political role for the Catholic Church is…indicated by the formation of a Catholic party, the [Comité Cívica Electoral], asking support for ‘Christian democracy.’ As a late entrant in the congressional elections of October 10, 1954, CCE opposed the anti-Communist coalition, FAN” (page 183). “Reports of the so-called ‘popularity poll’ on support for the Castillo government state that balloting was public and oral. If this technique is extended to the municipal elections, it should provide handsome majorities for the new controlling group” (page 187).
Martz 1959: “Early in October, 1954, he announced elections to decide whether he should retain power. To reduce ‘unnecessary paper work,’ the elections were to be conducted orally, with voters telling election boards their choice. Secret ballot was ignored. The voters were given two assignments: first, to choose members of a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution, and second, to decide whether to continue Castillo in power. Delegates to the assembly were members of the new-born National Anti-Communist Front; there were no opposition candidates. Officials would ask voters if they wanted Castillo to continue in office for a term decided by the assembly. Voters could answer yes or no, but if no, had no alternate candidate to select. Terms of the plebiscite obviously assured Castillo’s ‘re-election’” (page 63).
Rodríguez de Ita 2003: “(E)l 10 de octubre se llevó a cabo un plebiscito, así como la elección de diputados para una Asamblea Constituyente que se instaló el 29 del mismo mes” (page 175).
Rudolph 1983: “The results were never officially released, but reportedly some one-half million votes were cast--orally and publicly--and fewer than 400 were negative” (page 130).
Schlewitz 1999: Castillo “tried to manufacture a consensus behind his rule with a plebiscite confirming his presidency. Conducted orally, almost 100% of the voters predictably answered ‘yes’ to the question of whether Castillo should remain as president” (page 284).
Schooley 1987: The plebiscite asked the electorate “Do you wish Col. Castillo Armas to continue as President of the Republic for a period to be fixed by the National Assembly?” Gives votes for and against (page 22). Gives total seats and seats won by the “new National Anti-Communist Party” (page 23).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “Los eventos programados conforme al Decreto No 89 tuvieron lugar el 10 de octubre. El Ministro de Gobernación, quien también era candidato a diputado a la Constituyente informó que 485,699 ciudadanos habian contestado afirmativamente a la pregunta que se les formulara mientras que solo 400 ciudadanos respondieron ‘No.’ En cuanto a la Asamblea Constituyente habían sido electos los 66 ciudadanos que figuraban en la planilla del Frente Anticomunista Nacional que impresa había circulado” (pages 260-261).
Ebel 1998: “The results of the elections for the National Constituent Assembly were announced on October 25 as follows: 57 for FAN (the Castillo coalition), two for the CEU, two for ACCA, two for PIACO and two independents” (page 43).
Daetz Caal 1999: “La Asamblea se declaró instalada el 30 de octubre” (page 91).
Ebel 1998: “(I)t came as no surprise when, on October 30, [the Assembly] announced the results of the presidential referendum as follows: 485,600 yes votes; 400 no votes” (page 43).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “(E)l gobierno señaló el viernes 29 de octubre para la instalación de la Constituyente” (page 261). Gives names of delegates and officers, “todos, personas de confianza del Presidente Castillo Armas” (pages 261-262).
Daetz Caal 1999: “El 4 de noviembre determinó [la Asamblea] que el período presidencial del Teniente Coronel Carlos Castillo Armas terminaría el 15 de marzo de 1960, y se dispuso investirlo como Presidente de la República en la sesión del 6 de marzo. Otros decretos de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente contenían la convocatoria a elecciones generales para diputados señaladas para el 18 de diciembre de 1954, y su consiguiente regulación, y se dispuso que sólo los partidos políticos legalmente organizados e inscritos podían postular candidatos a diputados al Congreso Nacional…Se prohibió la inscripción de los partidos que propugnaran la ideología comunista o cualquier otro sistema totalitario” (page 91).
LaCharité 1964: “A list of Communists which the Government kept in order to check on their activities contained more than 70,000 names in November 1954; those on the list who had not gone into exile were barred from public office and some were imprisoned” (page 101).
Martz 1959: “In November, following the election by one month, the pro-Castillo constituent assembly set the term of office to extend until March 15, 1960, giving Castillo nearly six years to accomplish his goals in Guatemala” (page 63).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “El proyecto de Decreto estableció que el periodo presidencial del Coronel Castillo Armas vencería el 15 de marzo de 1960…(S)e investiría al Coronel Castillo Armas…como ‘Presidente de la República,’ fijando el 6 de noviembre para su investidura” (page 263).
Berger 1986: “The Castillo Armas government…gave assistance to the United Fruit Company…The first contracts [between the United Fruit Company and the Guatemalan government] were signed in December 1954…These contracts returned all expropriated lands to the Company and insured that both parties would drop all claims brought during the 1951-1954 years” (page 326).
Grandin 2004: In 1955, the PGT “adopted a more militant, anti-imperialist, and antibourgeois stance. Although the document did not mention armed struggle, implicit in its analysis was the opinion that change could not be brought about through elections” (page 89).
Paz 1993: “En Quetzaltenango, en 1955, grupos indígenas se incorporaron al Partido Revolucionario, en oposición al gobierno de la Liberación” (page 27).
Schlewitz 1999: “By the spring of 1955, to the dismay of US policymakers, the anti-communist coalition backing Castillo and the Liberation had disintegrated into feuding factions. Castillo tried to build a unified anticommunist movement with a new political party, the Movimiento Democratico Nacionalista (MDN), yet other anticommunist parties and organizations proliferated. One issue dividing anticommunists was the Catholic Church’s bid for greater power and influence in Guatemala…(T)he Church and its supporters were calling for constitutional recognition of the primacy of Catholicism in Guatemala” (page 284).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “A medida que se vislumbraba la conclusión de las labores de la Constituyente para principios de 1956, por lo que se anticiparían para fines de 1955 las elecciones legislativas, comenzaron a perfilarse diversas y nuevas tendencias generando distintos nucleos con intereses políticos particulares. Todas, desde luego, compatibles con y dentro del anticomunismo. El partido de Unificación Anticomunista—PUA…fue de los primeros en reagruparse” (page 285). Names various new and re-emerging parties (pages 285-286). The Partido Democracia Cristiana is founded in 1955 (page 302).
Berger 1986: “(I)n May 1955, [the] Archbishop…demanded that the National Constituent Assembly…give the Catholic Church a ‘pre-eminent position over other religions’” (page 359). The Archbishop “threatened to withdraw Church support for the regime if his requirements were not met” (page 360).
Ebel 1998: “Castillo Armas began his regime with the concept that it would take a number of years of relative monocratic rule before full democracy could be allowed to function in the country. However, by June of 1955 pressure from a variety of middle class groups had forced the government to make a full 180 degree turn and call for congressional elections in December. Immediately, four major political parties emerged: “Partido Democrática Cristiana’ (PDC), a reconstituted liberal party (ANDE), the ‘Frente Anticomunista Nacional’ (FAN), and the Social Democratic Party (PSD). To counter this development, the creation of the ‘Movimiento Democrático Nacionalista’ (MDN) was announced on June 18” (page 46).
Montenegro Ríos 2002: “En [el MDN] encontramos militando a...abogados de la multinacional United Fruit Company (UFCO) [y] abogados de la Embajada Norteamericana, sirviendo ambos de enlace entre el departamento de Estado Norteamericano y los liberacionistas al momento del golpe” (page 117).
Guatemala: monografía de partidos políticos 2000-2004 2004: “El Partido Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) es el más antiguo de las organizaciones políticas actualmente existentes en el país. Fundado en agosto de 1955 por un grupo de jóvenes profesionales, técnicos y militantes de la Juventud Obrera Católica, así como estudiantes provenientes de ambientes cercanos a la jerarquía de la Iglesia Católica, ha tenido una gran influencia en la historia política reciente de Guatemala” (page 18).
Montenegro Ríos 2002: “(E)l 25 de agosto de 1955 se funda el partido mas antiguo de Guatemala [PDCG]” (page 40).
Williams 2003: “(A) group of Catholic professionals established the Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca…in 1955. During the Arbenz period, a number of Catholic-affiliated political organizations sprang up to defend the Church against perceived attacks by the government. Leaders of these groups…were among the founders of the new Christian Democratic party” (pages 316-317).
Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “No sería hasta noviembre de 1955 cuando se permitió la formación de partidos políticos, con la prohibición expresa de los que profesaran la ideología comunista o mantuvieran relaciones con organizaciones de este tipo” (page 46).
December 18: congressional and mayoral election
Berger 1986: “(W)hen a legislative body was elected, all members were MDN representatives” (page 312).
Ebel 1998: “(B)y the time of the elections in December there were some six parties plus FAN (which was a coalition of ten political groupings) running candidates for the congress” (page 46). “Results in seats were as follows: MDN-58, DCG-5, PUA-3” (page 55).
Guatemala: monografía de partidos políticos 2000-2004 2004: “Poco después de su fundación, la DCG participó en las elecciones para diputados al Congreso y para Alcaldías que se celebraron el 18 de diciembre de 1955, formando la Alianza Nacional Electoral (junto con el MDN, PLN y PUA). El propósito de la alianza era unificar los esfuerzos anticomunistas para llevar a cabo el Plan de Tegucigalpa y hacerle frente a otros partidos y grupos unidos en el Frente Anticomunista Nacional (FAN). La DCG logró la elección de 4 diputados” (page 16).
IIPS 1978: Gives number of votes cast in Guatemala City in the mayoral race and the number of these that were null.
Montenegro Ríos 2002: “En diciembre de 1955, el PDCG, establece su primera alianza electoral, realizándola con el Movimiento Democrático Nacionalista...el cual posteriormente dio origen al Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (partido político de clara orientación fascista e hipercatólico)” (page 80).
Parker 1981: “In the first elections held (December 1955) all parties of the left were banned, the ready excuse being the charge that they had been infiltrated by Communists. Centre and rightist parties outside the pro-Castillo coalition were also blocked in this election, which was not governed by the system of proportional representation” (page 105).
Schlesinger 1982: “In late 1955, [Castillo Armas] decided to postpone the next year’s scheduled presidential election. Instead he held congressional elections, permitting only his own party, the National Liberation Movement (MLN), to offer candidates” (page 233).
Schooley 1987: All seats in Congress were won by the “pro-government National Electoral Alliance” (page 23).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “Las elecciones legislativas y municipales convocadas para el 18 de diciembre de 1955 le ofrecieron al gobierno de la Liberación su primera oportunidad para medir fuerzas entre sus leales…El triunfador, desde luego, fue el MDN” (page 286).
Williams 2003: The PDCG “participated in the first elections after the coup in 1955. It won four seats in the legislature” (page 317).
Schlewitz 1999: “The Castillo administration issued a new land reform in 1956. His law was similar in some respects to that of Arbenz [but it] worked very differently…(P)easants were cut out of the decisionmaking loop, and the agrarian reform process rested on volunteerism” (page 283).
Schlewitz 1999: “The [rumoured] coup came in January, but failed. Military and civilian rebels had attempted to take over the airbase in the capital, but were quickly defeated. Castillo declared a ‘state of siege’ allowing him to restrict civil rights” (page 287).
Ebel 1998: “The Constituent Assembly…produced a new constitution in 1956 which annulled the basic rights, freedoms and social guarantees of the ‘arevalista’ constitution of 1945” (pages 45-46).
Garrard-Burnett 1998: The “Constitution of 1955 rewarded the Roman Catholic Church for its efforts in the Arbenz overthrow with some of the most proclerical legislation to appear since before the Liberal era” (page 101).
Rodríguez de Ita 2003: “(E)l 2 de febrero de 1956 se promulgó una nueva Constitución Política, que entró en vigor el 1 de marzo siguiente” (page 177).
Thillet de Solórzano 2001: “El 2 de febrero de 1956, durante el período de la contrarrevolución que siguió a la caída del gobierno de Jacobo Arbenz, se aprueba una nueva Constitución de la República, la cual mantuvo el derecho al voto de las mujeres que pudieran leer y escribir” (page 106).
Black 1983: The new constitution “went into effect in March 1956...(It) disenfranchised illiterates, which meant almost all Indians. Left-wing parties were outlawed, and a wide variety of political crimes were made punishable by death” (page 29).
Thesing 1976: “Finalmente el 1o. de marzo de 1956, se promulga la nueva Constitución” (page 16). “La Constitución de 1956 no hace ningún cambio en el derecho activo de voto” (page 18).
Electoral observation in Guatemala, 1999 2001: “In 1956 secret and compulsory voting was introduced for literate men and women, while voting was left optional for illiterate males (but not for females)” (page 11).
Montenegro Ríos 2002: “(A)l promulgarse la nueva ley electoral y de partidos políticos en 1956, se sientan las bases para reorganizar la actividad de los partidos; así dentro de esta nueva ley, se reconoce [la] actuación del Partido Democracia Cristiana, que ya funcionaba legalmente inscrito desde 1955; también se reactivan los viejos partidos anticomunistas...(S)e reinicia la actividad del PUA, del PIACO y de los nuevos partidos como...el Movimiento Democrático Nacionalista (MDN)” (page 117).
Saénz Juárez 2002: “El 19 de abril de 1956 el Congreso decretó la Ley Electoral, sustitutiva de la anterior, mantuvo la acción de nulidad, habilitando para conocer de las genéricas al Tribunal Electoral y de las de Presidente al Congreso (artículo 81)” (pages 10-11).
Thesing 1976: “La Ley Electoral del 19 de abril de 1956 dificulta la creación de partidos políticos…El sistema de elección se modifica” (page 18). Gives details.
Villagrán Kramer 1993: On June 25, 1956, a student demonstration is fired upon by the police and army and those who oppose the government are jailed (pages 288-289).
Schlewitz 1999: “In June of 1957, yet another attempt to oust Castillo was foiled” (page 295).
Brockett 2005: “Castillo Armas was assassinated in July 1957, sending into motion a process that would lead to a greater opening of opportunities for challengers” (page 203).
Daetz Caal 1999: “Carlos Castillo Armas fue asesinado el 26 de julio de 1957 y asumió la presidencia el Licenciado Luis Arturo González, primer designado, quien convocó a elecciones que se realizaron el 20 de octubre de 1957” (page 91).
Ebel 1998: Describes the efforts of the “ruling ‘liberacionistas’ and their allies in the military” to retain control of the government (pages 57-59). “Who could compete: the battle over party registration” (pages 63-68).
Grandin 2004: “Following the 1957 assassination of Castillo Armas by his bodyguard, the anti-Communist students who had led the fight against Arbenz increasingly found themselves estranged from state power. The MLN continued to engage in politics, using its ties to the military, countryside, and elite to influence successive governments” (page 87).
Martz 1959: Castillo Armas is assassinated by a member of the Presidential Guard on July 27, 1957 and vice-president Luis Arturo González becomes the provisional president (page 76).
Montenegro Ríos 2002: “(C)on el asesinato de Castillo Armas, el 26 de julio de 1957, se producen nuevas divisiones dentro del anticomunismo y se perfila ya un grupo que es el que definitivamente funda el MLN” (page 118). “Al fallecer Castillo Armas, asume la presidencia el primer designado por el Congreso de la República, Luis Arturo Gonzáles López, el cual convoca a elecciones para el 20 de octubre de 1957” (page 119).
Streeter 2000: “The transition between Castillo Armas and González López on 27 July 1957 went relatively smoothly because [U.S.] Ambassador Edwin J. Sparks dissuaded Castillo Armas’s followers from forming a military junta. Washington preferred to continue the counterrevolution under the façade of a democratic government rather than a blatant dictatorship” (page 60).
Weaver 1994: “Castillo Armas was killed in 1957 by one of his bodyguards. Confident that domestic politics were properly under control by then, the military allowed an election with essentially an urban electorate” (pages 140-141).
Central America report 23 July 1999: “The PR was formed by a group of militants from the era of the 1944 Guatemalan Revolution. It was founded three years after the 1954, CIA-organized coup d’etat that brought down President Jacobo Arbenz” (page 2).
Ebel 1998: “By the end of August, stating that democracy required a unity of forces, Ortiz Pasarelli had put together a coalition of parties called the ‘Unión de Partidos Anticomunistas’ (UPA) composed of the MDN, PUA, the Liberal Party and the Workers Party” (page 68).
Montenegro Ríos 2002: “El partido Revolucionario [PR] se fundó el 28 de agosto de 1957 y sus fundadores fueron: Manuel Colom Argueta, Francisco Villagrán Kramer y Mario Méndez Montenegro, entre otros” (page 59).
Schlewitz 1999: “The MDN…settled on the civilian Chief Justice, Miguel Ortíz Pasarelli. A number of small, new anticommunist parties joined the MDN under the flag of Union of Anticommunist Parties (UPA). Pasarelli faced few challengers. The newly formed Christian Democrats (DC) fielded a candidate, but could not gain the crucial backing of the Catholic hierarchy, which preferred to stay with the more conservative MDN” (page 298).
Streeter 2000: “(A)n ad hoc committee of government officials and MDN leaders met to find a candidate acceptable to both the Eisenhower administration and the army. The committee chose the president of the Supreme Court, Miguel Ortiz Passarelli, as the official MDN candidate, while promising to grant Defense Minister Oliva the ‘power behind the throne.’ U.S. officials attempted to rally the army behind Ortiz Passarelli, but their plan did not proceed as expected” (page 60). “By August 1957, more than fourteen political groups had become active in the campaign. The entry of the Partido Revolucionario into the 1957 electoral race also impeded the State Department’s scheme to keep the MDN in power. In August 1957 former members of Renovación Nacional and Frente Popular Libertador…founded the PR to defend the ideals of the October 1944 revolution” (page 61).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: Describes the founding of the Partido Revolucionario (pages 299-302). “A finales de agosto el Congreso levantó el estado de sitio y convocó a elecciones presidenciales a celebrarse el 20 de Octubre de ese mismo año. El tiempo libre de restricciones para la campaña presidencial sería corto y reducido” (page 303).
Ebel 1998: “The campaign heats up” (pages 77-81).
Schlewitz 1999: The PR chooses “Mario Méndez Montenegro as its candidate…The MDN-dominated electoral tribunal denied its registration, however, citing faulty petition forms” (page 299). Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes “returned [to Guatemala from his position as ambassador to Colombia] with much fanfare on the first of September. His followers had revived his party, ‘Redención,’ (Redemption, short for the National Party of Democratic Reconciliation, or PRDN)” (page 299).
Streeter 2000: “On 17 September 1957 the Electoral Tribunal refused to register the PR because the party had not complied with a technical provision in the electoral law. The Supreme Court initially overturned the tribunal’s decision, but a few days later the tribunal again denied the PR registration, this time alleging that the party had violated the nation’s anti-Communist law” (page 63).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “(E)l Tribunal Electoral le negó al PR su inscripción bajo el pretexto de que prácticamente todos sus dirigentes nacionales figuraban en el registro del Comité Nacional de Defensa contra el Comunismo” (page 304).
October 20: presidential election (Ortiz Passarelli / MDN)
Daetz Caal 1999: “(P)articiparon tres agrupaciones representativas de los sectores conservadores, entre ellas la Democracia Cristiana. El país aún se encontraba bajo la influencia del movimiento anticomunista y, en consecuencia, otros grupos se vieron impedidos de participar. En las elecciones citadas se recibieron 353,706 votos y obtuvo mayoría el Licenciado Miguel Ortiz Passarelli, condidato del MLN (198,931 votos). El General Miguel Ydígoras, del Partido Reconciliación Democrática Nacional, Redención, obtuvo 138,323 votos, y Miguel Asturias Quiñónez, de la Democracia Cristiana, 26,452” (page 91).
Ebel 1998: “The election and its aftermath” (pages 85-90).
Martz 1959: “Unofficial returns gave Ortiz a long lead, and he immediately claimed the presidency. The vote was 198,131 to 128,323" (page 77).
Montenegro Ríos 2002: En estas “elecciones participaron tres candidatos: Miguel Ortiz Passarelli apoyado por el MDN y la [UPA]; Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes apoyado por el [PRDN], el [PLA] y el [PIACO]; y Miguel Asturias Quiñones, apoyado por la Democracia Cristiana...Esta campaña electoral del 57 se realiza bajo el criterio de demostrar con la mayor publicidad posible al electorado, que se es más anticomunista que los otros dos rivales, lo cual hace del proceso electoral, una verdadera exhibición del conservadurismo guatemalteco” (page 119).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: “Ortiz Passarelli fue declarado vencedor, con el 62% del total de votos computados; sin embargo, Ydígoras no aceptó los resultados, alegando la existencia de un fraude en gran escala” (page 118).
Schlesinger 1982: “The MLN was not prepared to let Ydígoras take power. Five days after the voting--in which Ydígoras polled a plurality--the official electoral tribunal curtly announced that Ortiz Passarelli was the winner. Ydígoras was enraged” (page 237).
Schooley 1987: Gives number of votes received by top three candidates (page 23).
Schlewitz 1999: “It appears [the MDN]…depended on fraud on election day (October 20, the anniversary of the 1944 revolution). For example, voting booths in the Capital ran out of ballots, where Ydígoras’s electoral support was especially strong. Ortíz Pasarelli claimed victory before all the ballots were fully counted, but Ydígoras reacted immediately by calling for demonstrations…The newly reestablished Congress considered annulling the elections. The government responded by declaring [martial] law...(T)he military…refused the government’s order to forcibly quell the opposition which had overwhelmed the police” (page 301).
Soto Rosales 2002: “Elecciones presidenciales del 20 de octubre de 1957” (page 54). Gives votes for three candidates.
Streeter 2000: “The 1957 presidential election” (pages 65-68).
Williams 2003: “During the 1957 presidential elections, the DCG supported the candidacy of Miguel Asturias Quiñones, a former university rector” (page 317).
Daetz Caal 1999: “Inconforme con los resultados, el General Ydígoras inició una serie de protestas en las calles…La situación provocó que el Licenciado Luis Arturo González López fuera depuesto por una junta militar, integrada por los coroneles Oscar Mendoza Azurdia, Roberto Lorenzana Salazar y Gonzalo Yurrita Nova. Esta tomó posesión el 24 de octubre y gobernó hasta el 26, cuando ocupó la Presidencia el Segundo Designado, Coronel Guillermo Flores Avendaño, quien convocó a nuevas elecciones” (page 91).
Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “(U)na protesta masiva en las calles de la capital…provocó la intervención del Ejército, instalándose en el término de una semana una Junta Militar de Gobierno” (page 50).
Johnson 1967: “Largely under the impact of Ydigoras Fuentes’ protest, Congress nullified the election without ever actually scrutinizing the results or investigating the processes that were followed” (page 4).
Martz 1959: “Several days of continual incidents and rioting followed; on the third day the army stepped into the breach and named Second Vice-President Guillermo Flores Avendaño as chief of state...(N)ew elections were called for January 19, 1958” (page 77).
Montenegro Ríos 2002: El “régimen de González López...finalmente cae por su incapacidad administrativa, siendo sustituido por un triunvirato de Coroneles...los cuales convocan a elecciones para el 19 de enero de 1958” (page 119).
Schlewitz 1999: “(T)he military took the opportunity to exact revenge on the ‘liberacionistas’ who had been behind its humiliating submission to Castillo. After an all night session on October 23rd, the senior officers voted to replace provisional president López with three of their own—Colonels Oscar Mendoza Azurdía…, Roberto Lorenzana Salazar…, and Gonzalo Yurrita Nova…Provisional president López and president-elect Ortíz Pasarelli left the country immediately” (page 301). “In effect, this bloodless military coup annulled the presidential election. The junta planned to remain in power for at least three years, not just a few months to oversee [the] election, but this did not go over well with anyone, including fellow officers…Returning to constitutional rule would mean handing the provisional presidency to the Second Designate,…Colonel Guillermo Flores Avendaño” (page 302). “The junta formally turned over the government to Colonel Flores Avendaño on October 27th” (page 304).
Schooley 1987: On October 26 “the junta issued a decree invalidating the Oct. 20 elections on the grounds that ‘the citizens had no full guarantee of the exercise of their rights’” (page 23).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “A media noche del 26 de octubre el Congreso le dio posesión al Coronel Flores Avendaño, en calidad de Presidente Provisional…(A)nuló las elecciones presidenciales celebradas el 20 de octubre” (page 312).
Schlewitz 1999: Describes efforts by parties to pick candidates (pages 304-305). “In its efforts to control the electoral outcome, the US government had so distorted Guatemalan politics that it is difficult to know who the parties might have chosen on their own, or who the majority of the Guatemalan electorate favored” (page 305). “The MDN-controlled congress postponed the election to January 19th, giving [MDN’s candidate] Cruz Salazar more time to campaign, and hopefully weakening ‘Redención’s’ momentum. Ydígoras had lost support with the registration of the PR, but the PR candidate, Mario Méndez Montenegro, did not appear to have the popularity the US had anticipated” (page 307).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “(E)l Congreso, integrado en su mayoria con diputados liberacionistas,…emitió el Decreto 1212 convocando a nuevas elecciones presidenciales y para su renovación por mitad—33 Diputados—el domingo 19 de enero de 1958” (page 314).
January 19: general election (Ydígoras Fuentes / PRN)
Bowdler 1982: “In one observer’s opinion Mario Méndez [PR] won the 1958 election, but the odds were stacked against him from the beginning with the army in control of the electoral reporting telegram system and its backing of General Ydígoras” (page 127).
Calvert 1985: Describes voting in congress for Ydígoras, gives votes for him and total votes cast (page 81).
Daetz Caal 1999: “El 19 de enero de 1958 se realizaron los comicios, que esta vez dieron la ventaja a Ydígoras, quien obtuvo 190,195 votos. Los otros candidatos fueron el Coronel José Luis Cruz Salazar, del MLN, quien obtuvo 138,277 votos; el Licenciado Mario Méndez Montenegro, del PR, con 134,270; y el Coronel Enrique Ardón Fernández, del PULN (Partido de Unificación Liberal Nacionalista), que obtuvo 5,999 votos” (pages 91-92).
Ebel 1998: “1958—the presidential campaign, round two” (pages 90-105).
Hacia dónde vamos? Guía electoral 2003 2003: “La derrota del Movimiento Democrático Nacionalista en las elecciones de 1958 marcó su fin como partido político. Con él desapareció también el PUA” (page 31).
Guatemala, elecciones ‘95 1995: “Elecciones enero 1958. Candidatos, votos recibidos y partidos postulantes” (page 75).
Guatemala: monografía de partidos políticos 2000-2004 2004: “(L)a DCG apoyó al Coronel José Luis Cruz Salazar, postulado por el MDN y el Partido Republicano…En las elecciones parlamentarias que se efectuaron simultáneamente, la DCG logró 6 diputaciones” (page 16).
Holden 2004: “Of the two main presidential candidates competing to succeed Castillo Armas, the man least favored by the United States, Gen. Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, received a plurality of the votes on 19 January 1958…In the absence of a simple majority for either candidate, Ydígoras pacted with the runner-up, a general associated with the single-minded anticommunism of Castillo Armas’s administration” (page 147).
ICSPS Guatemala 1966: “Vote for president” (page 33). Gives for each electoral district the total votes cast, the votes cast for each candidate and the percent these constitute of the total, the total invalid ballots and the percent these constitute of the total votes, and the country-wide totals for each of these categories.
Johnson 1967: Gives margin by which candidate won the election and resolution of election in Congress (page 4).
Martz 1959: Gives results of election. “Despite the clear-cut victory for Ydigoras, he lacked a plurality, and the election was thrust into the legislature where Castillo supporters were expected to return Cruz to office...The final vote in Congress gave Ydigoras forty votes, Cruz eighteen, while seven were blank” (page 78).
Montenegro Ríos 2002: “(P)ara las elecciones del 19 de enero de 1958, el MDN juntamento con el PUA eran los partidos anticomunistas que coaligados presentan un candidato a la presidencia (Coronel José Luis Cruz Salazar) recibiendo el apoyo transitorio de la Democracia Cristiana; de estas elecciones el candidato postulado por el MDN obtiene un 29.6% de los votos emitidos ocupando un segundo lugar” (page 118). “El proceso electoral que llevó a la Presidencia a Ydigoras Fuentes produjo divisiones dentro del anticomunismo, lo que conduce a la desaparición del MDN” (page 119).
Parker 1981: Gives votes received by each candidate and seats won by each party (page 106).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: Gives number of votes for top three candidates (page 118).
Schirmer 1998: “(T)he army openly [intervened] in an electoral contest for the first time in 1958, impeding the voting for candidates other than General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes” (page 15).
Schlesinger 1982: “Ydígoras again won a plurality of the popular vote--though not enough to be elected outright--and Congress confirmed him by a vote of 40 to 18" (page 237).
Schooley 1987: Gives percent of votes cast for Ydígoras Fuentes and percent of invalid votes (page 23). He is approved as president in a congressional run-off election.
Schlewitz 1999: “Ydígoras won a plurality, pulling 41% of the vote, with Cruz and Méndez trailing by 11 and 13 points respectively. Rather than a run-off, the Constitution dictated that the election be turned over to Congress, where the Deputies would select the president by a simple majority vote. The MDN and other anticommunist party allies held 40 of the 66 seats (‘Redención’ had 16, the PR 6, and the DC 4), and could have easily elected Cruz Salazar, but there was a great deal of pressure on the Deputies to elect Ydígoras” (page 308).
Sloan 1968: “Presidential elections--Jan. 19, 1958" (page 246). Gives for each department the number and percent of votes received by the RDN, MDN, DCG, and PR. “Congressional elections--Jan. 19, 1958" (page 247). Gives for each department the number and percent of votes received by the RDN, MDN-DCG, and PR.
Streeter 2000: “The 1958 presidential election” (pages 73-77).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: Describes the electoral process (pages 314-315). “Efectuado el escrutinio dio como resultado el triunfo del General Ydígoras Fuentes con 190,972 sufragios; luego, el Coronel Cruz Salazar con 138,488 votos; de ahí, el Licenciado Mario Méndez Montenegro con 132,834 votos y por último, el coronel Dardón con 5,834 votos. La Comisión, con la aprobación de los delegados de los partidos, anuló 24,154 votos” (page 315).
Williams 2003: “When the  elections were annulled because of widespread fraud, the [DCG] joined an electoral alliance in support of the ultraright Movimiento Democrático Nacionalista’s…candidate, Miguel Ortíz Passarelli, in the 1958 elections” (page 317).
Daetz Caal 1999: “De acuerdo con la Constitución, si ningún candidato obtenía mayoría absoluta, el Congreso debía elegir al presidente entre quienes obtuvieran mayor cantidad de sufragios. Gran revuelo causó la disputa por la elección de segundo grado entre los tres candidatos mayoritarios. Sin embargo, para lograr la reconciliación de las fuerzas anticomunistas, según el texto del documento suscrito, el General Ydígoras y el Coronel Cruz Salazar firmaron un convenio en el que se aseguró la elección del primero” (page 92).
Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “El veredicto electoral fue rechazado por el [MDN], que tenía mayoría en el Congreso. La crisis hizo necesario un difícil pacto político, tras el cual se eligió finalmente, en elección de segundo grado, al general Ydígoras” (page 50).
Pinto Soria 2004: “Ydígoras ganó las elecciones presidenciales de principios de 1958, pero sin lograr la mayoría absoluta. Se celebró entonces un pacto político entre las fuerzas anticomunistas, el que fue sellado en la embajada estadounidense, y que revela el tipo de práctica política predominante en esos años. A Ydígoras se le permitiría asumir la presidencia, pero bajo la condición de ejercer un gobierno anticomunista” (page 62).
Schlewitz 1999: “Eight days after the election, MDN and ‘Redención’ leaders agreed to the…’Pacto de borrón y cuenta nueva’—a set of public and secret agreements which led to Cruz Salazar’s retirement from the race and Ydígoras’s assumption of the presidency” (page 308). Give details of the Pact (pages 308-309).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “Pacto de borrón y cuenta nueva” (pages 317-320).
Schlewitz 1999: “Congress duly elected Ydígoras on February 12th” (page 309).
Gaitán A. 1992: “El general Ydígoras Fuentes asume la primera magistratura de la nación como presidente constitucional de la República la mañana del 2 de marzo de 1958” (page 129).
Grandin 2004: “(A)fter the 1958 election of Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, who represented the less inflamed wing of the counterrevolutionary coalition, to the presidency, the MLN returned to its insurgent roots. At the same time, it abandoned its effort to fashion itself as an agent of progressive liberal democracy, instead transforming into a brute defender of the agrarian oligarchy” (page 87).
Holden 2004: “Ydígoras’s inauguration on 2 March marked a veritable redemocratization led by a general…who left no doubt that he was far more inclined than the Castillo and Flores administrations to respect civil rights and political pluralism” (page 147).
LaCharite 1973: “Ydígoras did not strictly enforce the anti-Communist laws that had been enacted by his predecessor. As a result, many left-wing groups began to improve their position” (page 79).
Steigenga 2001: “Ydígoras’s blatant corruption and close ties to the United States frustrated nationalist elements within the military” (page 70).
Ebel 1998: “In June the tacit understanding between Ydígoras and the PR, whose six seats in the Congress had helped the administration to sustain a fragile majority, came to an end when, in response to U.S. pressure over the exile question and to charges that he was soft on communism, he denounced the party as a communist front. This motivated both ‘Redención’ and the MDN to petition the Electoral Tribunal (unsuccessfully) for the cancellation of PR’s legal inscription. However, these tactics clearly backfired since they also galvanized the candidacy of the PR’s Luis Galich for the mayorship of Guatemala City” (page 155).
December: municipal election
Ebel 1998: “The victory of Dr. Luis Galich of the ‘Partido Revolucionario’ the previous December in Guatemala City’s mayoral elections had shaken the Ydígoras regime…The fact that the elections had been annulled by the Electoral Tribunal because Galich had failed to achieve the financial clearance (’finiquito’) required by law for a candidate to take office only prolonged the controversy” (page 163).
Parker 1981: PR candidate (Galich) is elected mayor of Guatemala City but is declared ineligible on a technicality (page 107).
Streeter 2000: “(T)he Electoral Tribunal…invalidated the victory of PR candidate Luis F. Galich because he allegedly failed to file a financial statement before the proper deadline” (page 89).
Central America report 23 July 1999: “The [PR] began to change its stripes in 1959, purging the ranks of hundreds of members accused of being communists” (page 2).
Grandin 2004: “In 1959, the PGT adopted a policy of ‘national reconciliation,’ calling on its supporters to vote for Ydígoras in order to defeat the MLN” (page 91).
Grandin 2004: “(I)n February 1959 a short-lived guerrilla ‘foco’ called Acción Nacionalista [was organized by an MLN member] to overthrow the government. While this effort failed, the MLN effectively built a social base that linked planters, provincial military officers, and paramilitary organizations led by military commissioners” (page 87).
Ebel 1998: “In May four congressional deputies and other party leaders were expelled from PR. Opposed to the leadership of PR chief, Méndez Montenegro, they were accused of forming a rival ‘arevalista’ party, the ‘Consejo Revolucionario’” (page 163).
Ebel 1998: “When the Supreme Court made its final decision upholding the Electoral Tribunal in June [regarding the December 1958 election], a second election was scheduled for early the following month. Because the mayor of the capital city was viewed in Guatemala’s city-state as its ‘second president’ the Ydígoras administration went all out to achieve victory” (page 163). Describes their efforts.
July: municipal election
Alexander 1973: “(T)he Partido Revolucionario…had one of its first victories in July 1959, when its candidate, L.F. Galich, was elected mayor of Guatemala City. This victory served to establish it as a major contender for power against the anti-revolutionary elements that had taken over the country after the Arbenz regime” (page 304).
Brockett 2005: “The PR scored its first big electoral victory in July 1959, winning the mayoralty of Guatemala City. Ydígoras considered annulling the election but backed down under the prospect of significant popular opposition” (page 204).
Ebel 1998: “The PR…stuck with its original nominee, Dr. Galich. The rest of the electoral line-up was composed of the ‘Partido Liberación Anticomunista Guatemalteca’ (PLAG) which nominated architect Rene Larravé, and the ‘Partido Unificación Revolucionaria’ (PUR), an ‘arevalista’ party, which nominated Julio Camey Herrera, a wealthy landowner and university professor” (page 164). “Guatemala City mayoral elections, July 5, 1959” (page 164). Table gives candidate/party, number of votes, and percent of votes. “Fearing that an annulment of the election would ultimately be blamed on the U.S., the State Department counseled Ydígoras not to undermine his reputation for democracy by keeping Galich from taking power. As a result, the published results were certified and Dr. Luis Galich was installed in office on August 5” (page 165). “The Ydígoras Fuentes regime and the entire political right were shocked at the magnitude of Luis Galich’s victory…[The] result not only demonstrated that the left was back as a major electoral force, it also was seen as a major threat to the ability of the right to win the up-coming congressional elections scheduled for November” (page 166).
Streeter 2000: “The [electoral] tribunal scheduled a new election for July 1959, which Galich again won handily. The Redención coalition, which had lost, then urged the Electoral Tribunal to annul the election on the grounds that the PR had committed fraud…PR leaders threatened to bring 20,000 demonstrators into the streets if the tribunal once again denied Galich victory” (page 89).
Villagrán Kramer 2004: “La elección de alcalde en la capital mostró en 1959 el peso que el electorado le concedía a las posiciones centristas. Así, el candidato del Partido Revolucionario…doctor Luis Fernando Galich logró un triunfo abrumador en la capital, sin que el partido comunista pudiere formalizar su participación…En efecto, el candidato del PR—Luis Galich—obtuvo el 43.7% de los votos, siguiéndole el candidato del anticomunismo con el 34.9%, luego, en tercer lugar un candidato independiente con el 9.2% y en último lugar el candidato del PUR, Camey Herrera, quien obtuvo el 8.2%” (page 38).
December 6: congressional election
Ebel 1998: “The congressional elections of 1959” (pages 172-177). Includes results.
Parker 1981: Gives number of votes received by each party (page 107).
Schlewitz 1999: “(T)he ‘Redención’-MDN coalition took sixty percent of the Congressional [seats] in the December 1959 elections” (page 423).
Sloan 1968: “Congressional elections--Dec. 6, 1959" (page 248). Gives for each department the number and percent of votes received by the RDN, MDN, DCG, and PR.
Streeter 2000: Ydígoras’s “rigging of the congressional elections of December…contradicted the notion that the general supported democracy. When Redención won 25 out of 33 congressional seats the losers immediately charged that the president had used government funds to promote the election of his party’s candidates. Although the government suppressed demonstrations, the fraud fooled no one” (page 91).
Holden 2004: “In March 1960, President Eisenhower secretly authorized the CIA to organize an invasion of Cuba to overthrow the Castro government, and Guatemala was the primary training site for the invasion force of Cuban exiles” (page 149).
Holden 2004: “In April, Guatemala broke relations with Cuba” (page 149).
Ebel 1998: “On October 28 President Ydígoras, in a message to Congress, predicted that Cuba would attack Guatemala between November 3 and 12 while the United States was preoccupied with its national elections” (page 194).
Holden 2004: “By October, the Guatemalan government was falsely denying public reports that it was allowing the United States to use a ranch owned by a government official…as a training base for the Bay of Pigs invasion…As Ydígoras’s denials of complicity with the U.S. invasion plan diminished in credibility, his already isolated government became ever more dependent on the United States” (page 149).
Ball 1999: “The armed conflict officially began November 13, 1960, when discontented army officers, many of them trained in the United States, attempted a ‘coup d’état’ against the corrupt and unpopular government of General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes. The incident led to the formation of Guatemala’s modern revolutionary movement, and, in response, the creation of a counterinsurgency state” (page 13).
Dosal 1995: “The factionalism within the army exploded in November 1960, when Captain Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and Lieutenant Luís Turcios Lima, offended by the CIA’s use of Guatemalan territory to prepare Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion, revolted against the Ydígoras government. Although the rebellion failed, (they) went on to establish the first guerrilla fronts in eastern Guatemala” (page 119).
Ebel 1998: Describes the attempted military coup (pages 197-199).
Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “Paradójicamente, la mayor oposición al régimen de Ydígoras vino de los partidos de derecha y centro, el MLN, el PR y la CD, que participaron con poco éxito en la competencia electoral contra el régimen. Considerando que el ydigorismo no era suficiente garantía del nuevo orden político y que el país era una víctima fácil del comunismo, estos tres partidos pactaron una alianza estratégica en noviembre de 1960” (page 47). “Como reacción al levantamiento militar, el Gobierno arrestó ese mismo día—13 de Noviembre—a miembros del PGT, del [PR] y del [PUR], a quienes se les acusaba de estar involucrados en la conspiración militar” (page 57).
Grandin 2004: “On November 13, 1960, nearly a third of the Guatemalan military revolted in protest at government corruption and Ydígoras’s having allowed the United States to train anti-Castro Cubans in national territory in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Although the revolt was suppressed within a week…, some of its leaders refused to surrender, instead continuing to stage guerrilla raids while at the same time establishing contacts with Cuba” (page 91). “The November 1960 military revolt…purged from the ranks of the army potential reformers who had survived the 1954 counterrevolution, leaving in their place an officer corps that was corrupt, opportunistic, and ever more brutal…Eisenhower ordered the State Department to ‘beef up’ Guatemala’s intelligence system after 1960” (page 94).
Holden 2004: “On 13 November the long-feared military revolt against Ydígoras broke out. With the Guatemalan armed forces severely divided and unable, initially, to put down the coup attempt, Ydígoras received permission from Washington for the Cuban exile air-force-in-training at Retalhuleu to assault Puerto Barrios on 15 November, where rebel troops were holed up. That operation was cancelled…Two grievances within the military inspired the revolt: the government’s political interference in military affairs, and the president’s servility to U.S. interests at the expense of Guatemalan interests” (page 149).
Jonas 2000: “Guatemala’s civil war began in 1960, only six years after the 1954 U.S.-orchestrated ouster of the popularly elected government of Jacobo Arbenz” (page 119).
Luciak 2001: “The original nucleus of what became the URNG emerged in 1960, when a group of army officers started to form a guerrilla movement…These reformist officers attempted a coup on November 13, 1960. It failed, but it gave birth to the first guerrilla activities in the country. Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima, joined by students, workers, and peasants led the effort to establish the first guerrilla ‘foco’” (page 130).
The 1990 national elections in Guatemala. 1991: “In 1960, when General Miguel Ydígoras allowed the CIA to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation, a group of young officers, who believed that Guatemalan sovereignty was being violated, revolted. The revolt failed, and the officers fled to form the nucleus of the modern-day guerrilla insurgency, with support from Fidel Castro. Although this movement was brutally repressed, its few survivors continued the cause, recruiting among the indigenous population where the guerrillas expanded and their successes grew” (page 10).
Schirmer 1998: “On 13 November 1960, some 120 left-leaning junior officers attempted a coup…The layers of motivation for this coup attempt help us to understand not only the significance of the postrevolutionary period for the army, but the resultant thirty-six years of armed conflict…(S)everal army officers escaped capture, among them 2d Lieutenant Luis Augusto Turcios Lima and Lieutenant Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, both of whom had recently returned from counterinsurgency training” (page 15).
Schlewitz 1999: “The November 13th Movement of 1960” (pages 413-437).
Holden 2004: “By year’s end, disgust with Ydígoras had increased so much that the three opposition parties representing the right, the center, and the left signed a secret pact establishing a ‘national front’ against the government” (page 149).
Schlewitz 1999: Ydígoras’s “principal opponents were the Revolutionary Party (PR), the Christian Democrats(DC), and the Movement of National Liberation (MLN), the hard-line group which had broken away from the National Democratic Movement (MDN) when it began collaborating with Ydígoras’s party, ‘Redención’ (RN)…(I)n order to overcome their marginal positions in the government, the leaders of the three parties signed a secret pact on December 2nd, 1960. In this ‘pacto tripartito,’ they essentially promised to work together to obstruct the Ydígoras administration in any way possible, to establish a new regime under their control, and to eradicate communism with social and economic reforms. By 1963, this pact would turn into an agreement to back a military coup” (page 437).
Villagrán Kramer 1993: “Pacto tripartito DC-PR y MLN” (pages 356-358).