Acker 1988: Honduras “became, in 1982, the second largest recipient of U.S. military aid in Latin America, receiving $31.3 million, which was slightly more than it had received for the whole period from 1946 to 1981. Massive U.S. manoeuvres began, not merely to intimidate the Sandinistas but moreover to provide cover for the secretly-financed contra war against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua” (page 116).
Bertrand Anduray 1992: “(E)n 1982 se volvieron a elegir 18 mujeres como Alcaldesas, yendo la cantidad en aumento cada vez” (page 26). Gives their names and towns they lead (page 54). “1982: Asumió el cargo de Presidenta del Tribunal Nacional de Eleccones, la Licda. Yolanda de Vargas (por el PINU), puesto rotatorio por representaciones de los partidos inscritos” (page 55).
Dunkerley 1996: “Formal power was handed back to civilian government in 1982...However the transition to civilian rule in Honduras was followed by an unprecedented increase in the power of the armed forces, a consequence of the new strategy towards the region adopted by the Reagan administration which made Honduras a key element in Washington’s war against the FSLN and the FMLN” (pages 71-72).
Política nacional de la mujer: primer plan nacional de igualdad de oportunidades, 2002-2007 2002: “(L)a Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación Contra la Mujer [fue] ratificada por el Estado hondureño en 1982” (page 7).
Sieder 1995: “Honduras provided the key to Washington's regional strategy after
1981, serving both as a theatre for large-scale US troop manoeuvres and
as a safe haven for the Nicaraguan ‘Contra’” (page 100).
Anderson 1988: “The new U.S. ambassador, John Dimitri Negroponte, who arrived in the fall of 1981, would conduct most of his business with General Alvarez, the leader who really counted, rather than with the ostensible president of the republic” (page 155).
Becerra 1994: Describes the portions of the 1982 constitution relating to elections (volume 1 page 343).
Haggerty and Millet 1995: “Brigadier General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, who assumed the position of commander of the armed forces in January 1982, emerged as a hardliner against the Sandinistas” (page 48). “The perception of a genuine leftist revolutionary threat to Honduran stability enhanced Brigadier General Álvarez’s power and heightened his profile both in Honduras and the United States” (page 49). “Álvarez strongly supported United States policy in Central America. He reportedly assisted in the initial formation of the Nicaraguan Resistance [Contras]” (page 50).
Nickson 1995: “Various articles in the 1982 Constitution once again reaffirmed municipal autonomy” (page 192).
Paz Aguilar 2008: “Al año siguiente  se promulgó una ley especial que creó el Registro Nacional de las Personas cuyo propósito fundamental era la elaboración del Censo Nacional Electoral” (page 626).
Rosenberg 1983a: “Despite the return to civilian rule through democratic elections in 1981, many of Honduras’ leading politicians are spectators in their own political game. The military has a decisive role in the most important decisions and is a force accountable only to itself. The newly elected president of the country confronts a serious problem: how to de-militarize Honduran politics and institutionalize civilian rule precisely at a time when the country’s major ally (the United States) is supporting militarization rhetorically and materially and when both of its neighbors are undergoing significant internal strife spilling over into or, indeed, fostered by Honduras” (page 2). “Current U.S. policy has contributed to the militarization of Central America and to the continuation of hostilities in that region. Policy toward Honduras focuses less on the country itself than on how Honduras can help the U.S. to achieve policy objectives elsewhere. The country is the pivot for U.S. efforts to stabilize the region and bring about democracy…While the Honduran military was clearly repudiated twice by the Honduran electorate in provisional and then presidential elections in 1980 and 1981, U.S. policy and not any perceived internal or external threat, is the single most important factor accounting for continued military dominance in Honduras” (page 4-5).
Ruhl 2000: “In January 1982, Roberto Suazo Córdova (1982-1986) became the first civilian president in a decade, but any hopes that his inauguration would bring genuine democratization soon evaporated. Indeed, the military grew even more formidable than before as the United States converted Honduras into a platform from which to implement its Central American policy” (page 52). “President Suazo formed a close alliance with General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez who became the country’s new military strongman. General Alvarez was one of the Honduran army’s most professional and most fervently anticommunist officers. He was intensely committed to the overthrow of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua…Alvarez also was determined to eliminate the small Marxist guerrilla organizations that had formed in Honduras…The Argentine-trained Alvarez began a systematic ‘dirty war’ against suspected subversives soon after he became armed forces chief…Although the number of individuals ‘disappeared’ by Honduran death squads was small in comparison with…neighboring countries, such extreme violence by government forces constituted a sharp break with Honduras’s less polarized political traditions” (page 53).
Schooley 1987: “At its first session on Jan. 27, 1982, the Assembly appointed...Gen. Álvarez Martínez, as head of the Armed Forces. This move confirmed the continued hold of the military over political life, in line with a pact made a month before the elections, in which the two front runners...had agreed with the senior command that the armed forces would retain their power of veto over cabinet appointments” (page 42).
Sullivan 1995: “The Honduran constitution, the sixteenth since independence from Spain, entered into force on January 20, 1982. Just a week before, Honduras had ended ten years of military rule with the inauguration of civilian president Roberto Suazo Córdova” (page 149). “Title II addresses...suffrage and political parties, and provides for an independent and autonomous National Elections Tribunal” (page 151). Title V covers the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. “Different from the 1965 constitution, the terms of legislators and the president are four years, instead of six years” (page 152). “The legislative branch consists of the unicameral National Congress elected for a four-year term of office at the same time as the president” (pages 159-160).
Vallejo Hernández 1990: “El 27 de enero de 1982 el Dr. Roberto Suazo Córdova tomó posesión del la Presidencia” (page 66).
Villanueva 1994: “En 1982 se promulga una nueva Constitución y se sigue esa tendencia a la apertura sin dejar de reconocer, empero, el significativo peso de las fuerzas armadas en la formación del poder político” (page 133).
Binns 2000: On March 31, 1982 the “U.S. initiated negotiations to acquire military base rights in Honduras” (page 302).
Anderson 1988: “In April 1982 [General Alvarez] had himself promoted to the rank of brigadier general” (page 155).
Binns 2000: “An amendment to the existing Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement was concluded May 6, 1982. It provided U.S. access to air bases at Palmerola, Goloson and La Mesa” (page 302).
Binns 2000: On September 17 “Honduran guerrillas attacked a Chamber of Commerce meeting in San Pedro Sula, taking over 200 hostages, including the ministers of finance and economy and the president of the Central Bank” (page 303).
Allison 2006: “In 1983, these three groups (MPLC, FPR-LZ, and FMLNH) joined with two other organizations (the Communist Party of Honduras and the Central American Workers’ Revolutionary Party of Honduras) to form the National Directorate of Unity (DNU)” (page 150).
Lapper 1985: “Álvarez signs a secret agreement in Washington to set up the CREM regional training centre at Puerto Castilla” (page 6).
Rosenberg 1984: “(O)ne of the key factors promoting the Suazo-Álvarez alliance during 1983-1984 was Suazo’s desire to weaken and then destroy any potential rivals within the Liberal Party” (page 569). “Party factions and leaders in Honduras” (page 570).
Schulz 1994: “In January 1983 the foreign ministers of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama…gathered on the small Panamanian island of Contadora to initiate a search for peaceful solutions to the region’s mounting crises…Their efforts presented the Reagan administration with a difficult problem. On the one hand, for political reasons, it could not publicly reject such negotiations. To have done so would have placed on itself the onus of having obstructed the peace process. On the other hand, it was profoundly suspicion of these efforts. The fear was that a settlement might be reached that would leave the Sandinista regime intact and undermine U.S. policy” (page 145).
Binns 2000: “U.S. and Honduran military forces held joint exercises involving 4,000 Honduran troops and ‘hundreds’ of Americans in the Puerto Lempira area” (page 303).
Binns 2000: In late May, “the United States and Honduras reached an agreement to increase the number of U.S. military advisers sharply and establish a regional training center at Puerto Castilla” (page 303).
Binns 2000: “Unidentified Reagan administration spokesmen described a strategy to use Honduras as a platform to project military power against Nicaragua and Cuba” (page 303).
Binns 2000: On August 28, the “’New York Times’ reported that joint military exercises in Honduras would involve 4,000 U.S. troops and cost between $10 and $30 million; the public response in Honduras was mixed” (page 303).
LaFeber 1993: “Washington’s military aid jumped from $4 million in fiscal 1980 to $77.5 million in 1984...At least eleven airfields and base camps stretched out over 450 square miles. The flagship was the Palmerola Air Base...Some 12,000 Hondurans had been involuntarily removed from their land so the base could be built” (page 310).
Binns 2000: On March 23, the U.S. “Department of Defense announced that joint exercises planned for April in Honduras would involve Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine elements totaling 33,000 U.S. personnel” (page 304).
Haggerty and Millet 1995: “The prospect of early, involuntary retirement, with its attendant loss of licit and illicit income, prompted a clique of senior officers to move against Álvarez on March 31, 1984, seizing him and dispatching him on a flight to Miami” (page 51).
Rosenberg 1984: “General Álvarez’s ouster is the most significant event in the evolution of Honduran political life since 1982. He was the architect of Honduras’s continuing critical role in U.S. defense policy and strategy toward revolutionary Nicaragua and insurgency in El Salvador...It was [his] long reach and influence which were permeating political, labor, and private-sector organizations throughout the country...Thus, his ouster provided a new ‘abertura’ to Honduran democracy” (page 561).
Rosenberg 1996: “During the early 1980s, efforts made by General Álvarez Martínez to move away from a collegial to a vertical command structure, centralizing power at the very top of the armed forces, led to his ouster by fellow officers in April 1984" (page 74).
Ruhl 2000: “President Suazo and the U.S. embassy lost their principal military ally when a bloodless military coup deposed General Alvarez in 1984. The most important reasons for Alvarez’s fall were his professional arrogance and his quest for total control over the armed forces” (page 53).
Schulz 1994: “When Alvarez [refused to resign] he was handcuffed, thrown to the ground, and beaten…(H)e was sent to Costa Rica and exile. The [U.S.] embassy and the CIA station were taken completely by surprise by these developments…Alvarez had seemed invulnerable. He had just been promoted to major general and through a constitutional reform had acquired the title of commander in chief…(T)he day after his ouster he had been scheduled to go to Washington for high-level meetings with the Reagan administration…Not until midmorning did President Suazo learn of the coup…(T)he astonished president…protested that the removal of Alvarez had been unconstitutional. At this point, Suazo was told that the plane was waiting; if he did not like the arrangement, he could accompany Alvarez to Costa Rica” (pages 98-99). Discusses the reasons for Alvarez’s fall (pages 99-102).
Binns 2000: On April 4 the “Honduran Congress confirmed General Walter Lopez, commander of the Honduran Air Force, as the new commander of the armed forces” (page 304).
Ruhl 2000: “Collegial direction of the armed forces by CONSUFFAA resumed under new armed forces chief General Walter López Reyes as the military factionalized more deeply into generational and personalist cliques. The armed forces began to drive a harder bargain with the United States over Contra aid and ended an Alvarez-negotiated program to train Salvadoran soldiers in Honduras…Honduras’s traditional political pluralism began to reassert itself” (pages 53-54).
Schulz 1994: “On 4 April, with the Congress building surrounded by troops and armed personnel carriers fitted with machine guns and air force planes buzzing overhead, the Honduran legislature voted to make Walter López the new armed forces commander” (page 99). “After the exile of those closest to Alvarez, changes were made in almost all military units. Power was decentralized and collegiality restored” (page 102). “López Reyes (the nephew of Oswaldo López Arellano) turned out to be more independent [than] many observers had anticipated” (page 103). Describes interactions with Negroponte, SOUTHCOM, and the contras. “Prior to April 1984, political and social discontent had been effectively contained through repression. Now, under López Reyes, brute force was at least partially replaced by more sophisticated methods. The result was a rapid growth of domestic political opposition” (page 15).
Binns 2000: On May 27 “General Lopez, in a public statement designed to allay growing public concern and stop mass rallies opposing U.S. military presence, announced that the United States must train increased numbers of Honduran troops and fewer Salvadoran military” (page 304).
Lapper 1985: “60,000 demonstrators in Tegucigalpa and 40,000 in San Pedro Sula protest against the US presence. The new military leadership begins efforts to re-negotiate the 1954 military treaty” (page 6).
Schulz 1994: “By this time…the Reagan administration was running into major congressional resistance to the contra program” (page 103). “In May, the Hondurans tried to cancel the U.S.-sponsored Granadero 1 joint military exercises, but the Americans brought enough pressure to bear to change their plans. Shortly thereafter, General López surprised and angered the embassy by telling reporters—before he informed Negroponte—that Honduras wanted to renegotiate the CREM agreement” (page 104). “The most troubling issue facing the two sides concerned the contras” (page 105).
Schulz 1994: The “October 1984 Boland Amendment had barred the U.S. government from spending money, directly or indirectly, for military assistance to the contras” (page 109).
End of year
Millett 1986: “At the end of 1984, a group of prominent Hondurans representing all four parties issued a manifest sharply criticizing any effort to prolong Suazo’s term of office and calling for several reforms, including internal party elections to select candidates for the 1985 elections” (page B313).
Acker 1988: “Congress finally revolted in 1985, when Suazo Córdova attempted to engineer another term in office and, when that failed, tried to hang on to control of the National Electoral Tribunal, which would have allowed him to pick a successor. When Congress fired the Supreme Court president for corruption and appointed a replacement, Suazo Córdova put this new judge in jail and charged more than fifty deputies with treason. It took the U.S. ambassador and General López to get him to back down” (pages 124-125).
Cuotas de participación política de las mujeres 2004: “Las reformas a la ley electoral y de las organizaciones políticas de 1985” (page 22).
Elecciones 85: estructura del sistema electoral e información general del país 1985: Gives detailed information on electoral system in place for this election and has names and photographs of electoral officials, color reproductions of election documents, “número de Diputados a elegir por Departamento de la República” (page 26), “autoridades municipales por departamento” (page 27), “número de votantes por sexo según departamento” (page 33), and “distribución de mesas electorales en toda la república” (divided by “mesas de varones” and “mesas de mujeres” in each department) (page 34).
Haggerty and Millet 1995: Beginning in January 1985, “the Honduran military took more active steps to pressure both the Contras and, indirectly, the United States government” (page 52).
Posas 1988a: “La crisis institucional...se inició en el mes de marzo de 1985 y concluyó en el mes de mayo del mismo año, mediante la firma de una Acta de Compromiso...(E)stableció un nuevo sistema de selección presidencial. De acuerdo a este sistema, el Presidente de la República sería aquel ciudadano que en las elecciones presidenciales del 24 de noviembre de 1985 obtuviera el mayor número de votos en el interior del partido político triunfante” (page 324).
Rosenberg 1986: “While the 1981 elections followed from a gradual process of political opening in which the civilian leadership forced the military from power, the 1985 elections saw an alliance of military and labor leaders force the country’s incumbent leadership out of office. The struggle to convince Suazo to leave office resulted in a complex electoral procedure and a campaign with mulitiple candidates for the dominant parties” (page 417).
Ruhl 2000: “When new elections approached, President Suazo used bribery and his control of the Supreme Court and National Electoral Tribunal to interfere in the presidential nomination process. His attempts to retain office beyond the one-term limit or to impose a pliable ally worsened factional divisions within both parties and led to a constitutional clash with Congress. Much of Honduran civil society mobilized to protest his abuse of power, but it was military mediation strongly backed by the United States that ultimately resolved the crisis” (page 54).
Schulz 1994: “As the 1985 election campaign approached, the traditional political parties themselves broke into deeply divided factions. No fewer than seventeen candidates would vie for the presidency (though only nine—including the Christian Democratic and PINU candidates—would be certified by the National Electoral Tribunal)” (page 117).
Schulz 1994: “On 28 March Congress accused the chief justice and four of his colleagues of bending the electoral laws in Suazo’s favor” (page 125).
Anderson 1988a: “Two major parties dominate the political scene: the Liberal party (PL) and the National party (PN). Small parties like the Christian Democrats (PDCH) and Innovation and Unity (PINU) cannot attract more than five percent of the vote. But the major parties are far from united internally. Factions abound, and party squabbles were so intense that neither the PL nor the PN could choose a candidate for the 1985 election. For that reason, the election was also considered a primary” (page 425).
Keesing’s record of world events 32 April 1986: “The two major political parties, the PN and the PLH, and their various factions, had in May 1985 reached an agreement which allowed any faction of a political party to present its own candidate for the presidential elections” (page 34288).
Schulz 1994: “On 20 May, following marathon negotiations at Toncontín Air Base, a settlement was signed by eleven members of the Liberal Party, eight members of the National Party, three Christian Democrats and three members of the PINU, fifteen workers and peasant leaders, and a representative of the armed forces. The plan, which came to be known as the Air Force Pact or Option B, was to allow all of the candidates’ names to appear on the ballot. The candidate of each party who received the most votes would become the party’s nominee and would be credited with all of the votes cast for the various candidates of that party. Option B effectively defused the crisis by eliminating the possibility that ‘official’ candidates could be imposed on the rank and file…In the short run, at least, the settlement did not contribute much to the cause of electoral reform…The issue of primaries was postponed until after the elections. Instead, the deputies amended the electoral code so as to increase (from 82 to 134) the number of seats in the next Congress, thus enhancing their own chances of remaining in office…The effect of these arrangements was to enlarge the field of candidates without significantly broadening the spectrum of political opinion” (page 127).
Vallejo Hernández 1990: “(T)uvo que llegarse a la firma de un Acta de Compromiso entre las partes involucradas, bajo el tutelaje de las Fuerzas Armadas y de las organizaciones populares. Así surge lo que se dio en llamar ‘Opción B’, por la cual se permitió que en las elecciones ya convocadas por el Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones para el 24 de noviembre de 1985, participaran en igualdad de condiciones todas las corrientes internas de los partidos inscritos, haciendo a la vez un plebiscito interno y elecciones generales” (page 67).
Izaguirre 2000: “Debido a la crisis interna de los dos partidos mayoritarios, los que no pudieron lograr consensos en su interior, mediante Decreto 89-85 de 5 de junio de 1985, se emitió una Ley Especial relativa a las elecciones internas directas y generales de autoridades supremas y municipales” (page 222).
Schulz 1994: “In June 1985 the Hondurans were informed that the United States would no longer participate in the CREM” (page 114).
Izaguirre 2000: “(M)ediante Decreto 159-85 de 19 de septiembre de 1985 el Congreso Nacional introdujo reformas a la Ley Electoral y de las Organizaciones Políticas, mediante la cual se legalizaba la posibilidad de ejecutar lo que se denominó ‘Opción B.’ De acuerdo al citado mecanismo las elecciones primarias y las generales podrían celebrarse simultáneamente, como en efecto así ocurrió; ello supuso que cada corriente interna de cada partido podía presentar candidatos a la Presidencia de la República, a Designados a la Presidencia, a Diputados al Congreso Nacional y al PARLACEN y a las Corporaciones Municipales. Al candidato presidencial que obtuviese el mayor número de votos en cada partido se le sumaban los votos obtenidos por los candidatos presidenciales de las demás corrientes del mismo partido” (page 223).
Keesing’s record of world events 32 April 1986: “A reform of the electoral law was passed in September and provided that the successful candidate for the presidency would be determined on the basis of which party gained most votes for all its candidates combined; the most successful of that party’s candidates would become president. The...TNE initially stated that it intended to rule only after the poll as to whether this new law would apply (the Constitution providing, by contrast, that the candidate gaining most votes would win). However, following meetings between the TNE president, the US ambassador,...and Brig.-Gen. López, the tribunal announced on Nov. 23 (the eve of the election) its decision to adhere to the new electoral law” (page 34288).
Millett 1987: “United States Ambassador John Ferch was abruptly recalled in September, 1985, reportedly because of his lack of enthusiasm for aspects of President Ronald Reagan’s regional policies involving the contras and the Honduran response to Nicaraguan attacks on contra camps. Ferch was replaced by Everett Briggs” (pages 411-412).
Keesing’s record of world events 32 April 1986: “With Dr Roberto Suazo Córdova’s four-year term of office due to expire in January 1986, a member of the right-wing...PN sought on Oct. 24 to introduce a bill in the Congress aimed at extending his term and converting the legislature into a constituent assembly, which would have had the effect of deferring the forthcoming November presidential elections for up to two years...The move to extend the President’s term was abandoned after the C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces...telephoned the Congress to warn that anyone persisting with this proposal would be brought to trial for violation of the constitution” (page 34288).
November 24: general election (Azcona Hoyo / PL)
Acker 1988: “Suazo Córdova did everything he could to prevent a victory by José Azcona Hoyo, who had been his minister of communications. In this election, for the first time in Honduran history, there were a total of nine presidential candidates: four from the Liberal Party, three from the National Party, one from the Christian Democrat Party, and one from the Innovation and Unity Party. The election also included 132 members of Congress and 284 mayors. The Liberal party won, at 49 per cent of the total vote, with the National Party close behind with 43 per cent. In the curious world of Honduran politics, where the top candidate in the winning party gets the presidency, Azona, with only 26 per cent of the vote, won out over the National Party’s Rafael Leonard Callejas, who had 41 per cent” (page 125).
Anderson 1988: The parties work out an electoral process. “The candidate within the party who received the highest total would become the nominee; but in voting for candidates of a political party, the voters would be expressing their preference to have that party rule, and thus the party with the highest vote total would receive the presidency” (page 162). Gives number of votes and percent of vote for two leading candidates, but because of the agreement, the candidate who came in second wins the election.
Anderson 1988a: “Rafael Callejas of the PN led all candidates with 42 percent of the vote; however, since the PN candidates won slightly less than all PL candidates, José Azcona became President, although only 25 percent of the electorate preferred him” (page 425).
Barbieri 1986: “Hondurans went to the polls on November 24, 1985, to elect a President, 132 members of its unicameral Congress and 284 mayors” (page 25). “Election results” (page 30). For the presidential election gives the number of votes, percent of party vote, and percent of national vote for each candidate in each party; gives by department the number of votes for each party; and for the congressional election gives the number of seats won by each party.
Bueso 1987: “El proceso electoral 1985" (pages 324-338). Describes the election. “Cuadro no. 4“ (page 335). Gives number of votes and percent of vote for each candidate, blank votes, and null votes. “Distribución de diputados al congreso nacional por partido” (page 337).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections 20 1986: Gives characteristics of congress and the electoral system (page 85). “The legislative polling was held simultaneously with that for President of the Republic and the country’s 284 mayors and municipal councils.” “Results of the elections and distribution of seats in the National Congress” (page 86). Gives number of registered electors, voters, blank or void ballot papers, valid votes, and the number of seats won by each party.
Cuotas de participación política de las mujeres 2004: “Mujeres diputadas al Congreso Nacional período 1986-1990” (pages 89-90). “Participación de las mujeres en las corporaciones municipales período 1986-” (pages 90-92).
Delgado Fiallos 1986: “(A)demás de presidente y designados se eligieron 128 diputados fijos más seis por cociente nacional y 283 corporaciones municipales” (page 95). Gives number of seats won by each faction within each party (page 97). “Nivel de participación electoral 1985 (por departamento)” (Anexo no. 9). Gives for each department registered voters, number who voted, number who abstained, percent who participated, and percent who abstained. “Resumen total del resultado electoral: elección 1985 (por departamento)” (Anexo no. 10). Gives for each department registered voters and number of votes for each party. “Resumen total del resultado electoral: elección 1985 (por principales municipios)” (Anexo no. 11). Gives for thirteen municipalities with over 25,000 inhabitants the number of registered voters and number of votes for each party. “Nivel de participación electoral elecciones 85 (por principales municipios)” (Anexo no. 12). Gives number of registered voters, number who voted, and percent this constitutes of registered voters.
Democracia y partidos políticos en Honduras 2004: “El proceso electoral de 1985” (pages 37-54).
Elecciónes: april de 1980, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 2000: Gives the results for the election by department and party.
Fauriol 1985: On November 24, 1985 “voters will elect a new president for a single four-year term, three vice-presidents, 132 representatives to the national congress, and local officials in 284 municipalities. Nine candidates for president are in the running from four political parties” (page 1). “The winning outcome is to be the leading candidate (of either of the two slates) from the party that wins the most overall votes...A National Election Tribunal, consisting of representatives from each of the four political parties and the Supreme Court, will oversee the elections” (pages 10-11). Lists the candidates, their party affiliations, and a summary of key aspects of their platforms (pages 12-13).
Izaguirre 2000: “Honduras: resultados electorales 1985” (page 224). “Honduras: diputados electos por departamento y por partido político, 1985” (page 225).
Keesing’s record of world events 32 April 1986: Gives detailed information on each candidate, the party faction backing them, and their political views. “On Nov. 24 the elections took place for the presidency (each candidate running on a ticket with three vice-presidential candidates); concurrently, legislative elections were held to elect 134 deputies for the National Congress (augmented from the existing 82-member legislature under the May accord), and local elections to elect the country’s 284 mayors and municipal councils” (page 34288). Describes the results of the election.
Lapper 1985: “Presidential candidates for 24 November elections” (page 114). Gives all the candidates for each party.
Millett 1986: “Elections of 24 November 1985" (page B318). Gives candidates by party with the number of votes they won. “If the voting for president was confusing, the congressional results were even more difficult to explain. Of the deputies, 101 were directly elected, based on the results in individual departments. But 20 others were chosen on a complicated formula for dividing additional departmental seats, and 6 were chosen to give representation to minority factions based on national vote totals. This formula produced a deeply divided Congress with no party or faction having a majority” (page B318). Gives number of seats won by each party.
Molina Chocano 1986: “Las recién pasadas elecciones presidenciales de Honduras...arrojaron un curioso resultado que muchos analistas califican de una ‘situación sin ganador,’ dado el balance de fuerzas derivado del evento y aludiendo a las expectativas frustradas de los principales contendientes que esperaban una mayoría aplastante a su favor. Contrariamente se produjeron precarias ventajas que obligan por primera vez en el país a un complicado sistema de alianzas en un régime político hasta ahora simplemente bipartidista” (page 2). “(S)e produce la paradoja de que no alcanza la presidencia de la República el candidato más votado en términos individuales que supera en más de 200.000 votos a su más cercano seguidor.” “Honduras: resultados finales de las elecciones celebradas el 24 de noviembre de 1985" (page 5).
Molina Chocano 1990: “Honduras: resultados finales de las elecciones celebradas el 24 de noviembre de 1985" (page 307) (also in Molina Chocano 1992 page 103). Gives number of votes and percent of vote for candidates in PL, PN, and CD; congressional seats won by each party; and total valid votes, null votes, blank votes, and total votes cast.
Oseguera de Ochoa 1987: “Proceso electoral de 1985" (pages 26-41). Describes the election and gives the number of votes for each candidate.
Paz Aguilar 1986: “Honduras: resultados finales de las elecciones celebradas el 24 de noviembre de 1985" (volume 1 page 275).
Posas 1988: Gives number of total presidential votes (and votes for leading candidates of each party) and seats won by four major parties (page 75).
Posas 1988a: Gives process by which the election is decided and the results (pages 324-325).
Rosenberg 1986: “Because of internal party competition and Suazo’s deliberate efforts to produce a leadership stalemate, the electoral procedure allowed the November election to serve simultaneously as a primary and a final election. The party with the highest total of votes would win the presidential elections, even if the leading vote-getters from each party had fewer votes than a rival candidate from the other dominant party” (pages 417-418).
Rosenberg 1989: “Voting results from the 1985 presidential elections in Honduras” (page 57) (also in Rosenberg 1987 page B322). Gives party, candidate, and number of votes cast for each, null votes, blank votes, and total votes.
Sabillón Pineda de Flores 1998: “Los resultados de 1985, se registraron mediante Acta No. 628 del Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones…Según datos del Diario Oficial La Gaceta, en estas elecciones participaron 1.597.841 votantes hombres y mujeres. Los registros electorales no aparecen en el Diario Oficial diferenciados por sexo. De los 134 parlamentarios electos, 8 son mujeres, que representan el 6% del total de diputaciones asignadas a las mujeres, en tanto que los hombres representan el 94% de la población electoral. En este caso evidenciamos las grandes diferencias en la asignación de cargos de elección popular, si las mujeres somos mayoría electoral tenemos el derecho a ocupar el 50% de los cargos” (page 41). “Honduras: diputadas y alcaldesas, por partido político, según departamento, 1985” (page 42). “De las 286 Corporaciones Municipales, salieron electas 16 mujeres, 12 del PL y 4 del PN” (page 43). Additional information, including names (pages 64-67).
Schulz 1994: Describes issues surrounding the election (pages 122-133). “The final results were as ambiguous and controversial as had been feared: Callejas won a clear plurality of the vote, 42.6 percent to Azcona’s 27.5 percent, but the combined tally of Liberal votes came to 51.1 percent. Under Option B, Azcona had won. There was again some talk of challenging the constitutionality of the May compromise, but in the end the Nationalists decided not to do so” (pages 131-132).
Segesvary 1986: Describes and analyzes the November 24, 1985 election. “A major surprise in the election was the impressive showing of National Party candidate Rafael Leonardo Callejas, who garnered over 200,000 more individual votes than Azcona but could not become president because of the second place finish of his party in the total vote count” (page 2). “Electoral results” (page 7). Gives number of votes and percent of vote for each party and each candidate. “The final results for the composition of the new congress gave Callejas’s faction 63 deputies, Azcona 46, Mejia 18, Bu Giron 3, PINU 2, and the PDCH 2" (page 8).
Sieder 1998: “Las elecciones de 1985" (pages 31-33). Gives a variety of statistics, including the number of municipalities won by each party.
Statistical abstract of Latin America volume 25 1987: “Honduras presidential winning percentages, by political party and candidate” (page 193). “Honduras presidential election results, by department and political party candidates (1985).” “Honduras presidential election results, by department and political party (1985)” (page 194).
Sullivan 1995: ”In 1985 President brazenly used the TNE to attempt to support unrepresentative factions of the two major parties. Military leader General Walter López Reyes impeded Suazo Córdova’s attempt by modifying the electoral system so that party primaries and the general elections were held at the same time. The winner would be the leading candidate of the party receiving the most votes. As a result, PLH candidate José Azcona Hoyo was elected president by receiving just 25 percent of the vote, compared with the PNH candidate, Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero, who received 45 percent” (page 172).
Schooley 1987: Gives results of election, including intricacies of election system adopted for this election (page 44).
Vallejo Hernández 1990: Discusses the election and gives results (pages 67-69). “Esta era la primera vez que se presentaba en la historia de Honduras…la celebración simultánea de plebiscitos internos de los partidos y, a la vez, elecciones generales” (page 68).
Acker 1988: “By 1986 both the contras and the U.S. troops were ubiquitous” (page 131).
Anderson 1988a: “After [the 1985] election, a pact of unity was signed between the leaders of the two parties; this gave the PN a majority on the Supreme Court and a share in the leadership of the unicameral Congress” (page 425).
Bertrand Anduray 1992: “(S)e eligieron en 1986-89 10 Diputadas Propietarias y 13 Suplentes” (page 26). Gives their names (pages 58-59).
Boussard 2005: “In 1986 [Contra rebels] were occupying over twenty villages in the departments of El Paraíso and Olancho” (page 166). “Both Contras and Sandinistas crossed back and forth over the Honduran-Nicaraguan border…(O)pposition against the Contra presence grew in every sector of Honduran society” (page 167).
Brockett 1998: There was a “resurgence of political violence beginning in 1986...Significantly contributing to the growing insecurity in the country was the large Contra presence. Around 56,000 fighters and their dependents occupied an area of 279 square miles in Honduras with deleterious consequences” (pages 196-197).
Electoral observation, Honduras, 2001: general elections 2003: “The 1986 amendments to the Law on Elections and Political Organizations authorized political parties to set their own rules for internal selection processes…Each party’s National Elections Committee and the TNE are in charge of convening and organizing internal elections, a procedure that is supposed to end no later than 45 working days after January 30 of the year in which popular elections for national and municipal authorities are held” (page 12).
Millett 1987: “While Liberals held a narrow majority in the Congress, party factionalism forced the President to work with Callejas and the National party in order to pass legislation. A Pact of National Unity gave the National party control of the Supreme Court, the presidency of the Electoral Tribunal and the posts of foreign minister and minister of labor in the Cabinet” (page 409).
Paz Aguilar 2008: La reforma electoral de 1986 “constituyó un avance importante para la democratización interna de los partidos” (page 627).
Ruhl 2000: “After a CONSUFFAA majority removed General López Reyes in 1986, in part for being too accommodating to civilians, hardline General Humberto Regalado Hernández became chief of the armed forces. Political disappearances again increased and military corruption reached new extremes…Honduras had by this time become an important transshipment point for Colombian cocaine, and the new drug money further divided the officer corps” (page 55).
Schulz 1994: “By now the Hondurans had been largely reduced to the status of a U.S. pawn. Though their interests frequently differed from those of Washington and they could often be troublesome, their lack of an alternative to the U.S. economic lifeline severely limited their ability to develop an independent policy…By 1986, moreover, the Honduran armed forces were being financed to the tune of US$88.2 million. No one had any illusions about U.S. willingness to continue this largesse under conditions of peace” (page 150).
Anderson 1988a: “General Humberto Regalado Hernández…was appointed [chief of the armed forces] just after Azcona took office” (page 427).
Millett 1987: “When he took office, President Azcona faced a formidable task. In addition to a failing economy, major foreign policy problems and the presence of the Nicaraguan contras, Azcona needed to gain some control of a military that was suspicious of him; in addition, he led a deeply fragmented Liberal party that had barely won the 1985 elections. Azcona, himself, had won less than 28 percent of the popular vote, while his principal rival, National party leader Rafael Leonardo Callejas had won 42 percent…Within a few days of his inauguration, an internal military coup removed General Walter Lopez Reyes as Supreme Commander and replaced him with General Regalado Hernandez, but real power was held by hard-line colonels of the military academy’s fifth graduating class” (page 409).
Ruhl 2000: “President Azcona, a civil engineer and Suazo opponent, was much more respectful of constitutional rules than his corrupt predecessor…A traditional politician from the conservative side of the party, Azcona showed little interest in developing coherent policy initiatives. In addition, the divided Liberal Party never provided him with a reliable base of congressional support” (pages 54-55).
Schulz 1994: “On 30 January Hondurans were stunned by the announcement that General López would step down” (page 135). “López had taken a stand against Suazo’s attempt to remain in office. He had antagonized the CIA and the embassy by obstructing the contra program and the CREM even as he had demanded more aid. Although such actions had enhanced his nationalistic and democratic image and brought him popular support, they had alienated some of the most senior officers in the armed forces. These elements, among the most reactionary and corrupt in the military, supported the contras and were subservient to North American policy” (page 136).
Vallejo Hernández 1990: “El nuevo Presidente tomó posesión de su alta investidura el 27 de enero de 1986” (page 69).
Acker 1988: “On the eve of a U.S. Senate vote over $100 million in contra aid, the U.S. defence department sprang news of an invasion of Honduran territory by fifteen hundred Nicaraguan troops. Both the Honduran armed forces and Azcona’s office denied the report…Nevertheless, after a talk with the U.S. ambassador, Azcona phoned President Reagan to ask (as the ambassador told him to do) for urgent aid. In response Azcona got $20 million to ferry troops to what was merely a routine border-crossing by Nicaraguan military chasing the contras back to camp. But the incident was enough to provide Senate approval for Reagan’s contra funds” (page 126).
Schulz 1994: “On 20 March 1986 the [U.S.] House of Representatives rejected Reagan’s request for US$100 million for the contras, and the [Reagan] administration panicked” (page 161). “On Saturday, Sandinista troops poured over the Honduran border in a raid on contra base camps. The attack presented an opportunity for the United States and a dilemma for the Hondurans. It played into the hands of the Reagan administration…At the same time, it threatened to drag the Hondurans into a shooting war and expose once again the mendacity of their official position that there were no contras on Honduran soil…(T)he Reagan administration sought to magnify the seriousness of the incursion. A media blitz was launched” (page 162).
Schulz 1994: “On 1 April reporters were told [by a Honduran government spokesman] that Honduras was being pressured into provoking a war with Nicaragua and this was why the government was moving with such caution. Two days later, officials informed the press that fewer than eight hundred Sandinista troops had crossed the border and that the incursion was similar to three hundred previous crossings that Washington had chosen not to publicize…On 7 April the government issued a communiqué denying that Azcona had asked the United States for US$20 million in aid…Seeking to contain the damage, the White House and the State Department issued a denial of the Honduran charges” (pages 162-163). “On 15 April President Azcona finally abandoned the fiction of the contras’ nonpresence, admitting that the rebels freely crossed back and forth along the border” (page 165).
Schulz 1994: “Before Congress barred the CIA from direct involvement with the contras in 1984, it had been common practice to pay key Honduran officers for their cooperation. But when in August 1986 the legislators approved US$100 million in aid to the rebels, they created a gold-rush atmosphere” (page 150). “Given these temptations, it should not be surprising that Honduran foreign policy was geared to the obstruction rather than the promotion of peace. The interests of Honduran elites, both civilian and military, were clear: War was functional so long as it did not involve ‘them’ and the contras did not become a destabilizing force within Honduras. During these years, Honduras was turned into an instrument of U.S. policy. Between 1979 and 1986, U.S. military aid increased more than twentyfold. The society became highly militarized” (page 152).
Millett 1987: “The real struggle for power in Honduras took place within the military’s officer corps. At the end of September, 1986, the Supreme Commander, General Regalado Hernandez, allied himself with officers of the academy’s sixth promotion and replaced top-level military commanders who were members of or allied with the fifth promotion” (page 410).
Izaguirre 2000: “Mediante Decreto 147-86 de octubre de 1986 se les impidió la participación en el sufragio a los cuerpos de seguridad y a los custodios de los centros penales. Se obligó a los partidos políticos a celebrar elecciones internas” (pages 225-226). Gives additional details.
Millett 1987: “In October, 1986, clashes between army units and guerrillas belonging to the Cinchonera Popular Liberation Movement led to deaths on both sides” (page 411).
Rosenberg 1988: “Since late 1986, a series of drug seizures reveal the potential magnitude of the cocaine-trafficking problem in Honduras. In October 1986, a Colombian plane carrying about one ton of cocaine was discovered at the Goloson airport in La Ceiba” (page 149).
Schulz 1994: “By late 1986, the contras were occupying more than twenty villages in a 450-kilometer area of the Honduran departments of El Paraíso and Olancho…Altogether, it was estimated that there were at least 56,000 rebels and their dependents in the country. Their impact had been devastating” (page 170). “In late October the contra-aid bill was finally signed into law, and the guerrillas gained a new lease on life” (page 171). “In October 1986 guerrilla warfare once again came to Honduras, when several dozen members of the Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement were discovered operating in the Nombre de Dios Mountains, some hundred and ninety kilometers northeast of Tegucigalpa” (page 215).
Boussard 2005: “US interest in the region and support for the Contras…declined, beginning with the Iran-Contra scandal in November 1986” (page 167).
Millett 1987: “Unlike its predecessor, the Azcona administration did not deny the contras’ presence, but it maintained that they were there without government approval. In November, 1986, the President admitted that the contras were causing serious problems for people living near the border and promised Hondurans government assistance” (page 411).
Schulz 1994: “On 25 November, in a nationally televised press briefing, [U.S.] Attorney General Meese announced that profits from the arms sales to Iran had been diverted to the contras…By late November both the Reagan presidency and the contras were in shock. It was increasingly doubtful whether a crippled administration could persuade an outraged Congress to provide the kind of ongoing, massive funding that might give the guerrillas a fighting chance” (page 172).
Acker 1988: “(T)he Democratic Action Party [is] formed in 1987 by former armed forces chief Wálter López” (page 135).
Anderson 1988a: “Honduras supports a large military establishment with the help of the United States, which has supplied training and much equipment…The United States also maintains a permanent garrison of some 3,000 personnel scattered at a dozen bases and air fields and headquartered at Palmerola” (page 427).
González 1998: “En 1987 se contempló la elaboración de la ‘Ley de Protección de las Minorías Étnicas de Honduras’ y, a iniciativa de la Secretaría de Planificación (SECPLAN), se constituyó un equipo interinstitucional con participación indígena, para formularla” (page 71). Lists concepts to be incorporated in the law.
Millett 1987: “At the end of 1986, Callejas announced that the pact was no longer in effect” (page 409). “Protests over the contra presence continued to mount in 1987. Coffee growers charged that their livelihood was threatened by the rebels and demanded compensation…Labor groups demonstrated against the contras in March and May. Even government officials began to complain publicly about contra activities” (page 411).
Anderson 1988a: “The chief of the armed forces remains General Humberto Regalado Hernández, who was…reappointed for a second two-year term in January, 1987” (page 427).
Millett 1987: “In January, the change in the power balance was confirmed when the officers elected General Hernandez to a three-year term as Supreme Commander and the lieutenant colonels of the sixth promotion took command of most of the combat battalions. All these actions were taken without any apparent input from the civilian government. The changes in command structure brought to power a group of officers generally seen as more sophisticated and more professional than their predecessors” (page 410).
Cid 1990: “En febrero de 1987, los dirigente de los partidos Nacional y Demócrata Cristiano llegaron a la conclusión de que los principales organismos electorales necesitaban ganar eficiencia en sus tareas y que ésto solo sería posible con la despolitización de los mismos y su consecuente tecnificación” (page 13).
Millett 1987: “In February, 1987, National party leader Rafael Leonardo Callejas, a strong opponent of the Sandinistas, declared that the contras must give up their camps in Honduras and carry out their struggle in Nicaragua” (page 411).
Acker 1988: “Nationalist Nicolás Cruz Torres presented a…motion to Congress against the contras, and joined other deputies in a mission to Washington to argue that the contras were a threat to Honduran democracy. The delegation told U.S. politicians that the contras were in Honduras against the will of the Honduran president and people, and were not capable of winning a war against the Sandinistas, anyway” (pages 131-132).
Acker 1988: “On May 20, 1987, some hundred thousand peasants invaded thirty-five thousand acres of land in northwest Honduras, making perhaps the largest land invasion in Honduran history” (page 134).
Millett 1987: In “Operation Solid Shield in May, 1987…nearly 6,000 United States troops actually landed in Honduras” (page 412).
Millett 1987: “In June, 1987, the commission appointed to investigate contra activities recommended that Hondurans seek $20 million in compensation from the United States for damage caused by the contras” (page 411).
Rosenberg 1988: “In July 1987, authorities in Chicago discovered a 5,000-pound shipment of cocaine in Honduran plantains which had been shipped in containers from Miami” (page 150).
Paz Aguilar 2008: “La firma de los Acuerdos de Paz de Esquipulas II, el 7 de agosto de 1987, marca el comienzo del proceso de desmilitarización del poder político en la región” (page 625).
Schulz 1994: “Joint military exercises, often involving massive numbers of U.S. troops, became an almost constant feature of Honduran life. Between October 1981 and August 1987, no fewer than fifty-eight of these operations were conducted…Civilians too participated in the influx. The number of AID projects mushroomed; the Peace Corps contingent became the largest in the world” (page 152).
Anderson 1988a: “In an internal PL election of September, 1987, [Carlos Flores Facussé] became the precandidate of the party for the presidential elections to be held at the end of 1989, beating Congress President Carlos Montoya, who had the support of President Azcona. But that does not necessarily mean that Flores will be the actual candidate” (page 425).
Millett 1987: “The fight reached a peak in the Liberal party’s September, 1987, internal elections. Over 570,000 Hondurans voted in these elections, which produced a victory for Carlos Flores Facusse, the precandidate backed by ex-President Roberto Suazo Cordova, a bitter opponent of Azcona’s. Carlos Flores received over 36 percent of the vote, while his nearest rival, congressional president Carlos Montoya, won 23.4 percent” (page 409).
Anderson 1988a: “The PL and the PN persuaded the National Election Tribunal to call off the municipal elections scheduled for November, 1987, much to the annoyance of the PDCH and PINU, because the major parties feared that these elections might heat the political atmosphere too much” (pages 425-426).
Cid 1990: “El 29 de noviembre de 1987 debieron haberse celebrado elecciones municipales en todo el país; no obstante, ese día el Congreso Nacional acordó ‘prorrogar el mandato de los actuales alcaldes mientras éstos no fueran sustituidos por corporaciones electas.’ El Congreso Nacional basó esta decisión en otra anterior del TNE declarando ‘desiertas’ dichas elecciones dado que ningún partido político había presentado su planilla de candidatos dentro del período estipulado por la Ley” (page 14). Discusses procedures for municipal elections (pages 14-15).
Rosenberg 1988: “In November 1987, 4.5 tons of cocaine shipped from Honduras to Florida were seized…By late 1987, therefore, the country was distinguishing itself as a significant narcotics transshipment point” (page 150).
Rosenberg 1988: “Within the military, there seems to be a general belief that profiteering by senior officers is a perquisite of rank. This attitude has been reinforced in recent years by US security managers eager to ensure Honduran support for the ‘contras.’ Within the government, low-level influence peddling and corruption are givens of public affairs in both the executive and legislative branches…Aspiring party leaders always are chronically underfunded and in search of resources to maintain their influence” (page 153).
Somoza 2005: “Parliamentary size was fixed at 128 seats in 1988 (first applied in 1989). Before 1988 it had depended on the size of the population” (page 402). Gives details.
Rosenberg 1988: “In February 1988, the US Congress did not approve a Reagan administration request for $36 million to aid the ‘contras.’ While the Honduran military formally requested about $80 million in US military assistance for 1988, they were given only $40 million, down from the previous year by $21 million” (page 161).
Acker 1988: “(O)n March 18, 1988,…the U.S. administration…responded to a ‘personal phone call’ from Azcona, asking for help following reported incursions by Nicaraguan troops into Honduran territory. This time, as a ‘friendly gesture,’ Reagan sent 3,200 troops into Honduran territory…In Honduras protests against U.S. militarization started to come from every side, from Congress and the Liberal Party, as well as from the street” (page 126).
Anderson 1988a: “In March, 1988, there was an apparent border crossing by the Sandinista army, and the United States reacted very strongly, sending an additional three battalions of combat troops to back up the Honduran army. It was doubtful if a real invasion was intended” (page 427).
Rosenberg 1988: “(I)n March 1988…US security managers took advantage of a Sandinista incursion into Honduras and sent US combat troops to the country. Eager to protect the ‘contras’ who were the object of the attack, US officials almost seemed to forget that they were operating in foreign territory. The news of US military deployment to Honduras reached the public there before the Honduran government could officially announce it. Honduran civilian and military officials were further embarrassed by the massive nature of US efforts” (page 157).
Schulz 1994: “On 21 March Sandinista and rebel delegations met in Sapoá, Nicaragua. Two days later, a cease-fire was signed…Contra soldiers would enter protected enclaves in Nicaragua…The agreement came as a shock to the Reagan administration…Washington had failed to reassure the contras, who, sensing that they were being abandoned, had decided to make other arrangements” (page 233).
Anderson 1988: “(D)uring the 1980’s, the chief illegal activity of certain Honduran military men, as well as many civilians, has been the drug trade. Colombia dealers have found Honduras an ideal point for transshipment to the United States” (page 427). “The drug case that caused the biggest sensation…involved both the Honduran military and the United States. This was the case of Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros, said to be a drug kingpin millionaire, who was wanted in the United States for killing a North American narcotics agent. Protected from extradition by Honduran law, Matta…on April 5, 1988…was kidnapped by 100 special forces troops and flown to the Dominican Republic, where, as had been previously arranged, United States narcotics agents seized him and escorted him to the United States…Occupied by the United States and by the contras, painfully dependent economically on the United States, and unable in the Matta case even to uphold the nation’s laws against the demands of the United States, Honduras retaliated. About 2,000 rioters…descended on the United States Embassy area on the evening of April 7…Local leaders of all political persuasions quickly grasped the significance of what had happened” (page 428).
Rosenberg 1988: “The Matta presence was generating much discomfort among political elites. Well-placed Hondurans privately acknowledged that narcotics trafficking constituted a threat to the country. In the context of the forthcoming Honduran presidential election campaign, Matta and others could quickly exert their influence over candidates from both parties” (page 153). “This sudden fury against the United States was unexpected in most circles. The Honduran public has largely been quiescent to the frequent US intromissions. Matta’s extraction was the catalyst for the anti-US demonstration, which itself was the product of the growing lack of US sensitivity to Honduran national sovereignty…Matta’s ouster exacerbated tensions within the military as well as tensions between the civilians and the military” (page 158).
Anderson 1988a: “A Liberal party convention was held in early July, 1988, in San Pedro Sula, and a curious alliance was negotiated between Flores and Jorge Arturo Reina, head of the most leftist faction of the party…By this pact, Reina appeared to give up his own presidential aspirations in favor of Flores” (page 425).
Schulz 1994: “Unable to supply their forces inside Nicaragua, rebel commanders began ordering their troops to pull back into Honduras” (page 241). “(T)housands of contras…were streaming back into southern Honduras…By late August some 11,000 guerrillas and several tens of thousands of their dependents were occupying a 190-square-kilometer area north and east of Yamales, the site of the main rebel bases” (page 244).
Schulz 1994: “In November 1988 George Bush had soundly defeated the Democratic presidential candidate…Like Ronald Reagan, Bush was a staunch conservative. Unlike the former president, however, he was a pragmatist with a long history of experience in foreign affairs” (page 252).
Una mirada al proceso electoral primario 2005: resultados del sistema de indicadores de seguimiento 2005: El Partido Liberal realiza un proceso electoral interno el 4 de diciembre de 1988 (page 17).
Cuotas de participación política de las mujeres 2004: “Las reformas a la ley electoral de 1989” (pages 22-23).
Electoral observation, Honduras, 2001: general elections 2003: “The 1989 reforms provided that the transportation, surveillance, security, and custodial duties of the electoral process would be the responsibility of the Armed Forces” (page 15).
Fúnes Valladares 2004: “En 1989, el gobierno de José Simón Azcona formula y aprobó la Política Nacional de la Mujer en su gabinete de Desarrollo Social…Esta Política no se implementó, y el seguimiento de la sociedad civil fue insuficiente” (page 197).
Izaguirre 2000: “El Decreto No. 18-89 de 28 de febrero de 1989 reglamenta lo estipulado en la Constitución estableciendo un número fijo de 128 diputados y sus respectivos suplentes, distribuidos en base al cociente nacional que se obtiene de dividir el total del Censo Nacional de Población entre el número fijo de diputados” (pages 226-227).
Paz Aguilar 2008: “La segunda reforma a la Ley Electoral se realizó en 1989 y en algunos aspectos constituyó un retroceso para la democratización de los partidos: se suprimió el cociente nacional electoral y agravó el problema de la representación política en el Congreso. En efecto, en 1985 el número de diputados aumentó de manera abusiva de 82 a 134; las reformas de 1989 fijaron su número en 128 y se suprimieron los diputados por cociente nacional electoral que le correspondían a cada uno de los partidos políticos” (page 627).
Izaguirre 2000: “Mediante Decreto 168-89 de 7 de noviembre de 1989, se elevó la suma de la deuda política de cinco a seis lempiras por cada voto válido” (page 227).
Izaguirre 2000: “Mediante Decreto 182-89 de 9 de noviembre de 1989, se incrementaron las sanciones a los extranjeros que portasen identidad hondureña, ello frente a la desconfianza que existía respecto del Censo Nacional debido a la cedulación de muchos guatemaltecos, salvadoreños y nicaragüenses” (page 227).
November 26: general election (Callejas / PN)
Arancibia Córdova 1990: “Callejas obtuvo alrededor de 52% de los votos, los liberales 43% y el resto se reparte entre el PINU-SD con 1.8% y la Democracia Cristiana con 1.4 por ciento...El triunfo de Callejas se explica por el fracaso de los dos gobiernos liberales para manejar la crisis económica del país y atenuar las condiciones de desempleo y pobreza de la mayoría de la población. La población está buscando en Callejas una alternativa. Esta alternativa es la persona, ya que no hay programa de gobierno, sino declaraciones generales y vagas. Esto no es extraño ya que la política del país es caudillista, clientelista y carente de contenido programático. Las campañas políticas se centran en las personas y no en los programas” (page 116).
Bulmer-Thomas 1991: “(T)he elections in November 1989 were exemplary, with the two leading candidates (from the Liberal and National Parties) offering the electorate a genuine choice based above all on rival economic programmes” (page 225).
Canache 1994: In 1989, “a peaceful transfer of power between political opponents, the Liberal and National parties, occurred for the first time since 1933" (page 514). “In the 1989 election, the voter cast a single vote for a party’s full slate of presidential, congressional, and local candidates. Split-ticket voting was impossible under Honduran electoral law until 1992...In , the National Party won an absolute majority for the first time in the history of competitive politics between the National and Liberal parties. Further, the National Party did well in urban and industrialized areas, traditional centers of liberalism. The HCDP and the PINU captured only 3.2 percent of the vote nationally, but they fared better in urban areas” (pages 515-516).
Central America report volume 16 number 47 December 1, 1989: “Held on a Sunday, the ‘fiesta civica’ proceeded smoothly despite the pre-election rumours of sabotage and violence...Nearly 70% of the electorate (1,380,309 voters) registered at some 7,900 polling locations” (page 372). Gives preliminary results of the election (page 373).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections 24 1990: Gives characteristics of congress and the electoral system (page 87). “The 1989 congressional elections were held simultaneously with polling for President and Vice-Presidents of the Republic, and for 289 municipal councillors.” “Results of the elections and distribution of seats in the National Congress” (page 88). Gives number of registered voters and number who voted, and the percent of votes and number of seats won by each party.
Country profile. Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras 1990-1991: “The victory of the candidate of the Partido Nacional, Rafael Leonardo Callejas, in the November 1989 presidential elections marks an important turning point in Honduran politics. He takes over from the Liberal administrations which held power throughout the 1980s following the restoration of formal electoral democracy in 1981. Sr Callejas won a predictable and convincing victory following eight years of political and economic indecision...[His] victory...broke the long tradition that the Liberals win open elections in Honduras, while the Nationalists administer under military dictators...The Nationalists achieved domination of the Congress--with 71 of the 128 seats, against 55 for the Liberals--and of the country’s municipal governments” (page 45).
Country report. Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras 1990, 1: “The clear victory by the Partido Nacional (PN) represents the first transition of power to an opposition party since 1932" (page 21).
Cuotas de participación política de las mujeres 2004: “Mujeres diputadas al Congreso Nacional período 1990-1994” (pages 95-96). “Participación de las mujeres en las corporaciones municipales” (pages 96-98).
Democracia y partidos políticos en Honduras 2004: “El proceso electoral de 1989” (pages 54-65).
Dunkerley 1994: “Honduras, general, November 1989" (page 149). Gives abstention rate, candidate, party, number and percent of votes received, and seats won (page 149).
Elecciónes: april de 1980, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 2000: Gives the results for the election by department and party.
Fernández 1989: “Resultados oficiales para presidente” (pages 42-43). Gives the number of votes and percent of vote for each party, number and percent of total votes, of null and blank votes, the total valid votes, and the total registered voters.
Izaguirre 2000: “Honduras: resultados electorales 1989” (page 227). “Honduras: distribución de diputados por departamento según partido político” (page 228).
Leonard 1998: “In 1989 the National Party candidate, Rafael Leonardo Callejas, won the presidential contest, and his party gained control of the national legislature, municipalities, and departmental administrations” (page 105).
Loser 1989: “On November 26, 1989, Honduras is scheduled to hold its fourth national election since the country’s return to civilian, democratic rule in late 1981...Voters will elect a new president for a single, four-year term, three vice presidents, 132 representatives to the National Congress, local officials in 284 municipalities and 20 representatives to the Central American Parliament” (page 1). Describes the four major parties and their candidates (pages 6-10). “While numerous electoral reforms have been temporarily undertaken to facilitate the voting process, two principal changes in the electoral system have been implemented. First, during the 1985 elections, each party fielded a multiplicity of candidates, which led the election to be a virtual combination of primaries and elections together; in order to simplify the process in 1989, each party has held primaries and will field only a single candidate. And second, voters will only directly elect 129 representatives to Congress; the remaining three congressional seats will be filled by the losing presidential candidates” (page 10). “The electoral process is administered and overseen at the national level by the National Electoral Tribunal (TNE), a technically autonomous entity--which ultimately has the final authority over the process...The president of the TNE is selected by the party which received the most presidential votes in the previous election” (page 11).
Loser 1990: Describes and analyzes the election. “The National Party has been handed a clear mandate to rule: along with Callejas’ capture of the presidency with 52% of the vote, the party also controls 71 out of 128 seats in the legislature, 212 municipalities out of a total of 289, and a victory in 16 out of 18 departments” (page 6). “1989 presidential election results” (page 11). Gives the number of votes and percent of vote won by top four parties.
Molina Chocano 1990: Discusses the 1989 election and gives various statistics (page 311).
Paz Aguilar 1990: “El 26 de noviembre de 1989, los hondureños concurrieron a las urnas para elegir un presidente, tres ‘designados a la presidencia’ (vicepresidentes), 128 diputados y 289 alcaldes” (page 22). “Honduras: elecciones generales del 26 de noviembre de 1989" (page 25). Gives number of registered voters; number of abstentions and percent this constitutes of registered voters; total votes cast and percent this constitutes of registered voters; number of blank and null votes and percent this constitutes of registered voters; total valid votes and percent this constitutes of registered voters; number of votes for each party and percent this constitutes of total valid votes; and number of “votos en ‘sobres cerrados’ (no escrutados)” (page 25).
Paz Aguilar 1992: Gives percent of presidential votes for PN and PL (page 172). Gives congressional seats, municipalities, and departments won by PN.
Ruhl 1989: Gives number of offices up for election (page B276). “However, because no split-ticket voting was permitted, the 2.3 million registered voters actually were offered only a simple choice among four competing, all-inclusive party lists. The great similarities between the traditional party presidential candidates at the top of the only two slates having any chance to win made even that limited choice a good deal less meaningful.” “Honduran election results, 1989" (page B277). Gives number of votes and percent of vote for four leading parties, null and blank votes, and total votes.
Sabillón Pineda de Flores 1998: “El Proceso electoral de 1989, fue Certificado mediante Acta No. 850 del Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones, con la participación de 1,799.146 electores, hombres y mujeres. En estas elecciones salieron electos un total de 120 diputados y diputadas. De los cuales solamente 14 son mujeres que representan el 12% del total” (page 43). “Honduras: diputadas y alcaldesas, por partido político, según departamento, 1989” (page 44). “En 1989, Honduras cuenta con 289 Corporaciones Municipales; del total de ellas, únicamente 14 son ocupadas por mujeres, todas del partido nacional” (page 45). Additional information, including names (pages 68-71).
Schulz 1994: “In November 1989, Rafael Leonardo Callejas and the National Party were swept into office in the party’s most impressive electoral triumph of this century. The final results had Callejas winning the presidency over his Liberal opponent, Carlos Flores Facussé, with 50.9 to the latter’s 43.1 percent of the vote. The Nationalists captured seventy-one seats in Congress to the Liberals’ fifty-five. The PINU won 1.8 percent of the vote and two congressional seats. The Christian Democrats took 1.4 percent but were shut out of Congress” (page 268). Discusses the campaign and election (pages 269-271).
Sieder 1998: Gives details of the 1989 election and a variety of statistics (pages 33-35).
Sullivan 1995: Gives the number of seats won by five parties (page 164). “(F)ollowing the 1989 national elections, women held 9.4 percent of congressional seats and 6.2 percent of mayorships nationwide, including the mayorship of Tegucigalpa” (page 190).
Schulz 1994: “In November 1989, Rafael Leonardo Callejas and the National Party were swept into office in the party’s most impressive electoral triumph of this century. The final results had Callejas winning the presidency over his Liberal opponent, Carlos Flores Facussé, with 50.9 to the latter’s 43.1 percent of the vote. The Nationalists captured seventy-one seats in Congress to the Liberals’ fifty-five. The PINU won 1.8 percent of the vote and two congressional seats. The Christian Democrats took 1.4 percent but were shut out of Congress” (page 268).