Gorman 1984: “(T)he actual programmatic and philosophical differences between Nicaraguan Liberals and Conservatives all but disappeared during the 1920s, and in the factional strife that flared in 1925 partisan ambition was the dominant motivation” (page 38).
Musicant 1990: “In 1925 the State Department submitted to Nicaragua a detailed organizational plan for the establishment of a United States-trained constabulary, the Guardia Nacional” (pages 286-287).
Barquero 1945: “La ascención de don Carlos Solórzano a la Presidencia de la República el 1o de Enero de 1925 causó entusiasmo…Desafortunadamente el señor Solórzano no estaba acostumbrado a las luchas formidables de las pasiones políticas y fue sumamente débil para controlarlas; fue el blanco entre dos tendencias opuestas: la de los liberales y la de los conservadores quienes le habían dado gran parte de votos en los comicios para formar el Gobierno llamado de Transacción” (page 201).
United States . Department of State 1932: “(A)fter giving consideration to the advisability both of a new election and the appointment of a coalition cabinet headed by a designate chosen by Congress, the [U.S.] Department of State decided to accord recognition to Solórzano when he assumed the Presidency on January 1, 1925” (page 52). “The genuine Conservatives refused to admit the legality of [Solórzano’s] Administration, and their opposition heightened when the Conservative Senators and Deputies, whose elections had been conceded by the National Board of Elections, were expelled by the Martínez-controlled Congress and Transactionists seated in their stead” (page 55).
MacRenato 1991: “In April 1925, the Nicaraguan Congress passed a bill creating [a nonpartisan constabulary]” (page 75).
Booth 1985: “In June 1925 the Nicaraguan government made a contract with retired U.S. Army major Calvin B. Carter to head the new National Guard and its training school” (page 38).
Bacevich 1980: “Calvin Coolidge finally ordered the last troops home in August 1925…The momentary stability that had permitted the withdrawal collapsed almost immediately, with civil war erupting within a month” (page 242).
Smith 1993: “On 3 August 1925 the remaining US marines left Nicaragua—handing over control to the Nicaraguan armed forces” (page 89).
Weaver 1994: “After trying several combinations of personnel, the U.S. ambassador and military commander believed that they had established a workable and cooperative government in Nicaragua, and the U.S. troops were withdrawn in 1925" (page 99).
Booth 1985: “Before the National Guard could develop significant strength to back up the wobbly government, General Alfredo Rivas took the first step down the road to civil war. Rivas, who was the president’s brother-in-law,…demanded that Solórzano purge the Liberals from the cabinet. The president complied” (page 38).
Booth 1985: “In October Emiliano Chamorro, fearing that the germinal but growing Guard might block his rise to power, seized control of the Conservative-dominated army. Chamorro then demanded that Solórzano purge the remaining Liberal appointees from the government. Solórzano complied. Liberal Vice-President Sacasa…fled the country. The now nearly all-Conservative Congress replaced Sacasa as president-designate with Chamorro” (page 38).
MacRenato 1991: “On October 25, 1925, former President Emiliano Chamorro, the losing candidate in the last presidential election, seized La Loma fortress dominating Managua and informed the American Minister that his purpose was to drive the Liberals from the Cabinet and restore the Conservative Party to office” (pages 76-77). “Chamorro argued that the unconstitutional procedures in the election of the Solórzano-Sacasa administration voided the nonrecognition obligations of the 1923 treaty. He did not mention but everyone knew that in 1920 Chamorro, as outgoing president, had insured the election of his uncle through a dishonest election” (page 78).
Smith 1993: “On 25 October 1925 the pro-US Emiliano Chamorro and his conservative forces occupied the La Loma fortress in Managua. After consulting with Adolfo Díaz and the US minister to Nicaragua, Solorzano resigned. He handed over the government to Chamorro, ignoring the constitutional provisions which should have placed the vice-president, the liberal Sacasa, in the presidential office” (page 89).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The American Minister at once informed General Chamorro that he would not recognize any government assuming power by force” (page 56).
United States . Department of State 1928: “Chamorro coup d’état” (pages 28-29).
United States . Department of State 1932: “After the capture of the Loma Fortress, Doctor Sacasa, the Vice President, had returned to León, there remaining in hiding. Early in November, General Chamorro sent 1,200 men to León, stating that they would be held there until Doctor Sacasa should resign…Doctor Sacasa…fled the country. Unable to secure Doctor Sacasa’s resignation, General Chamorro took steps to ascend the Presidency by means which would secure recognition of the United States” (page 56). Describes the steps taken.
MacRenato 1991: “Congress convened in December, 1925 and eighteen senators and deputies were expelled. Chamorro claimed they had been seated illegally after the 1924 elections” (page 79).
Munro 1974: “When the Congress met, it disqualified eleven liberal and conservative republican members on the ground that they had been seated by force by the Martínez government, as in fact they apparently had been” (page 191).
Barquero 1945: “El 16 de enero de 1926 el Congreso, preparado de antemano aceptó la renuncia del Presidente Solórzano y en vez de llamar al Vicepresidente doctor Juan B. Sacasa al ejercicio del Poder Ejecutivo llamó al General Emiliano Chamorro para entregarle la Presidencia de la República. El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos no lo reconoció. Chamorro depositó el Poder en el Senador Sebastián Uriza. Después de dar visos de legalidad éste resignó el Poder en don Adolfo Díaz que fué reconocido por Washington; pero la guerra civil estalló porque se había violado la Constitución de Nicaragua. Permaneció en la Presidencia hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1928” (pages 202-203).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 12 de enero de 1926 el “General Emiliano Chamorro destituye al Vice-Presidente Juan Bautista Sacasa…El Presidente Carlos J. Solórzano Gutiérrez, ante la presión del General Chamorro renuncia ante el Congreso Nacional el 14 de Enero. El Vice Presidente Juan Bautista Sacasa huye del país hacia los Estados Unidos. El General Chamorro Vargas hace que el Congreso bajo su control lo elija Presidente de Nicaragua y el día 17 es investido como Primer Magistrado ante el Congreso” (page 508).
Dunkerley 1988: “In January 1926 Chamorro assumed the presidency himself, although without the recognition of the US, which correctly viewed such a move as certain to provoke a Liberal revolution” (page 70).
Munro 1974: “Chamorro…had himself elected first ‘designado’ and on January 13 the Congress impeached Vice President Sacasa, on flimsy and ridiculous charges, and banished him from Nicaragua for two years…The Congress then gave Solórzano leave of absence but refused to permit him to resign, presumably to hold him in reserve if the United States should support Sacasa’s claim to the presidency. Chamorro took over the presidency on January 16. On January 22, Secretary Kellogg told the Nicaraguan minister at Washington that the United States did not and would not recognize the new regime” (pages 192-193).
Ramírez 1989: Chamorro’s “calculations concerning the yankee blessing he had figured on receiving quickly in order to keep him in power ran into a snag by virtue of a technical error: some years earlier the United States had made the Central American countries sign a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and had itself entered as a signatory to one of its most important clauses, in which the parties agreed not to grant diplomatic recognition to governments that emerged from coups d’état” (page 57).
United States . Department of State 1928: “Chamorro had himself elected to the Congress in January 1926. Having obtained a seat in the Congress he had himself elected as first designate for the Presidency. The Department of State again announced that he would not be recognized if he assumed the Presidency. On January 12, 1926, the Congress impeached Vice President Sacasa…On January 16, 1926, Congress, without acting upon his proffered resignation, granted President Solorzano an indefinite leave of absence and General Chamorro, as first designate, assumed the executive power of the Government” (page 30).
United States . Department of State 1932: “On January 3, 1925 [should say 1926], General Chamorro was elected without opposition Senator from Managua, the vacancy having been created by means of the resignation of one of his friends. On January 12, Congress…declared the Vice Presidency vacant…Congress then elected General Chamorro First Designate for the Presidency…On January 16…General Chamorro, as First Designate, assumed executive power…The Department of State, when it learned of General Chamorro’s scheme, indicated to him that…it considered that the manipulation of the laws to give him the Presidency was merely a subterfuge to obtain recognition by the United States in spite of the provisions of the Washington Treaty of 1923…Regardless of this advice, General Chamorro proceded to the execution of his plan, thinking that the Department of State, faced with the ‘fait accompli’ of his control, after an interval of time would recognize him” (page 57). “The policy of the United States toward General Chamorro was clearly set forth on January 22 1926” (page 58). Describes the policy. “Doctor Sacasa, after he fled Nicaragua, went to Washington to seek the intercession of the United States” (page 59). Describes the response he receives.
Bacevich 1980: “By March 1926 the Nicaraguan president had resigned, the vice-president had fled the country, and Emiliano Chamorro, the unscrupulous but charismatic leader of the Conservative party, had installed himself as chief executive. The State Department, citing the unconstitutionality of Chamorro’s seizure of power, denied him diplomatic recognition, thereby effectively declaring open season on the new regime. Internal order—briefly reestablished by the Conservative strong man—again disintegrated” (page 242).
Booth 1985: “The first Liberal uprising came in May 1926, capturing Bluefields and surprising even many of the party’s principal leaders. Sacasa assumed leadership of the movement from abroad but did not return. Major Carter and his aides had helped Chamorro build up the National Guard to nearly full strength and armed it well with the support of the State Department. Against this now rather formidable force, the uprising collapsed almost immediately” (page 38).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 6 de mayo de 1926 “Augusto C. Sandino renuncia a su trabajo en México y viaja de regreso a Nicaragua para incorporarse al ejército liberal que se está formando” (page 510).
Close 1988: “Sandino first joined the revolution of 1926 because he was a Liberal outraged at Conservative machinations to keep his party from power” (page 20).
Smith 1993: “The US sent marines into Bluefields in May 1926 to back up Chamorro’s forces against a liberal uprising” (page 90).
Booth 1985: “U.S. Embassy Secretary Lawrence Dennis…repeatedly demanded Chamorro’s resignation and even incited other Conservative factions to oust him. This failed to bring results by August, however, when the year’s second Liberal revolt commenced. This time the insurgents threatened more convincingly…Under the generalship of José María Moncada, the insurgents… rapidly extended their control over most of the Atlantic area. Once again the United States landed marines in Bluefields” (pages 38-39).
Ramírez 1988: “José María Moncada desembarca en la Costa Atlántica (agosto) como jefe del Ejército Constitucionalista” (page 80).
United States . Department of State 1932: “In August, the revolutionary movement better organized and equipped broke out again, this time on both the west and east coasts…In order to protect the lives and property of Americans, United States naval vessels were dispatched to Bluefields and Corinto” (page 60).
Bacevich 1980: “Although Chamorro struggled for months to consolidate his position, in October 1926—bankrupt, harried by a Liberal party insurgency, and frustrated by American nonrecognition—he resigned the presidency. Turning to the problem of designating a successor, the State Department threw its support behind Adolfo Diaz” (page 242).
Kamman 1968: “(O)n the evening of October 30, 1926, Chamorro deposited the presidency with Senator Sebastián Uriza, second designate of the Chamorro-controlled Congress. Before making this move Chamorro exacted from leading Conservatives a written pledge signed in the American legation that they would support his presidential candidacy in 1928” (page 66).
Smith 1993: The “US arranged a liberal-conservative conference on board the US warship the ‘ Denver’ at Corinto, and proposed that Chamorro should resign in favour of Díaz. Although the liberals rejected the ‘ Denver’ proposals, Chamorro did resign on 30 October 1926” (page 90).
United States . Department of State 1932: “On October 30, 1926, in accordance with article 106 of the Constitution, General Chamorro deposited the Presidency in the Second Designate, Senator Sebastián Uriza, the First Designate being absent in the United States. The same day, Senator Uriza appointed General Chamorro as Commander in Chief of the Army” (page 63)” (page 63).
November: presidential election (Diáz / Conservative)
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 11 de noviembre el “Congreso de Nicaragua, bajo ‘presión y consejo’ del gobierno de los Estados Unidos impone por tercera vez en este siglo al señor Adolfo Díaz Recinos como Presidente de Nicaragua…[El 14 de noviembre] Adolfo Díaz Recinos toma posesión de la presidencia de Nicaragua” (page 512).
Musicant 1990: “When Díaz assumed office in late 1926, he dismissed the “jefe” and his American assistants, in effect disbanding the organization (National Guard)” (page 306).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The election of Adolfo Diaz, November, 1926” (pages 63-65). “In the midst of renewed revolutionary activities Uriza convoked Congress in extraordinary session. The Senators and Deputies who had been expelled by General Chamorro from the previous Congress were invited to return and resume their seats. The Liberal Nationalists illegally seated by the Martínez-controlled Congress of 1925 were to be replaced by the Conservatives who had been declared elected by the National Board of Elections. On November 11, 1926, Congress in joint session designated Señor Adolfo Diaz for the Presidency” (pages 63-64). Describes the vote. “On November 14 Señor Diaz took office…(F)ormal recognition by the United States was not accorded until November 17” (page 64).
November: congressional election
United States . Department of State 1932: “The congressional elections which were postponed awaiting the outcome of the Corinto Conference were held late in November  except in the Departments of León, Chinandega, and Esteli, where the unsettled conditions made elections impossible” (page 65).
Bacevich 1980: “No happier with the new U.S.-sponsored president than they had been with his predecessor, the Liberals continued their ‘revolution’ without pause. As Diaz’s position progressively deteriorated in the face of Liberal pressure, the American commitment to his survival escalated rapidly. In order to prevent the outright collapse of the Diaz government, on Christmas Eve of 1926 U.S. Marines began returning to Nicaragua on an unprecedented scale” (page 242). “In December 1926 Mexico audaciously had recognized the ‘government’ of former Vice-President Juan B. Sacasa, the leading Liberal claimant to the Nicaraguan presidency. Accusations soon followed that [Mexican president] Calles was covertly providing the insurgents with arms and ammunition as well. To officials in the Coolidge administration, this alleged support of the revolution in Nicaragua posed ‘a direct challenge to the United States’” (page 243).
Booth 1985: “The United States…recognized the Díaz government. This action prompted Juan Bautista Sacasa to declare himself…’Constitutional President’ from the Liberal redoubt of Puerto Cabezas. Mexico recognized Sacasa’s government…(T)he U.S. government feared the spread of Mexican ‘bolshevism’ because of the possibility of Mexican nationalization of U.S. oil holdings…In the light of such fears, the doomed Conservatives still appeared to be the only acceptable choice to the Department of State” (page 39).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 1 de diciembre el “Presidente Adolfo Díaz Recinos pide al gobierno de los Estados Unidos que se levante el embargo de armas impuesto en Septiembre. El Departamento de Estado responde: que acepta la petición de Díaz, pero le solicita la destitución inmediata del General Chamorro como Comandante en Jefe del Ejército…El ex Vicepresidente liberal Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa desembarca en Puerto Cabezas, en donde se autoproclama Presidente Constitucional de Nicaragua” (page 512).
Ramírez 1988: “Se forma el gobierno liberal provisional en Puerto Cabezas, Costa Atlántica, presidido por Juan Bautista Sacasa (2 de diciembre). Fuerzas del Cuerpo de Marinos de Estados Unidos declaran ‘zona neutral’ a Puerto Cabezas (24 de diciembre) y dan a Sacasa veinticuatro horas de plazo para abandonar la localidad…Bluefields, Río Grande y Prinzapolka, en la Costa Atlántica, son ocupados por los ‘marines’ norteamericanos y declarados ‘zonas neutrales’ (diciembre)” (page 81).
Smith 1993: “In December 1926 US armed forces…evict the ‘constitutionalist’ President Sacasa from Puerto Cabezas where he had established a provisional government” (page 90).
United States . Department of State 1932: “General Chamorro, yielding to the pressure exerted upon him by the Conservative Party,…submitted his resignation on December 8” (page 65). “The Liberals did not accept the election of Diaz to the Presidency but made plans to set up a rival government. On December 1, 1926, Doctor Sacasa…landed at Puerto Cabezas, where he proclaimed himself ‘Constitutional President of Nicaragua’…On December 2 he formally asked recognition by the United States, on which request the Department of State took no action” (page 65).
Bacevich 1980: “More than mere loyalty to Diaz had triggered the sudden reversal [of U.S. policy]…Other hemispheric developments—specifically the erratic course of the Mexican Revolution—had altered the State Department’s perception of the real issues being contested in the Nicaraguan civil war and of the real contestants…To a suspicious State Department, Mexican radicalism lurked behind the uprising in Nicaragua” (page 243).
Kagan 1996: “(O)n January 6, 1927, President Coolidge ordered the marines back to Managua to shore up Díaz” (page 8).
Mahoney 2001: “(B)y early 1927 the United States was led to land an occupation force of more than five thousand marines in order to put a lid on the crisis. Hence, two years after the planned withdrawal, there were more marines present in Nicaragua than ever” (page 231).
Merrill 1994: “Fearing a new round of conservative-liberal violence and worried that a revolution in Nicaragua might result in a leftist victory, which had happened a few years earlier in Mexico, the United States sent marines...ostensibly to protect United States citizens and property” (page 21).
United States . Department of State 1932: “In January, 1927, General Moncada led the revolutionist troops over land to attack the cities of the west coast” (page 71).
Booth 1985: “By late February 1927 eleven U.S. cruisers and destroyers were in Nicaraguan ports, and more than fifty-four hundred marines were occupying all the principal cities. Nicaragua was in chaos. The fighting and forced drafts had driven peasants from the fields…Banditry had become generalized…The massive U.S. aid had permitted the Conservative forces to stalemate the rebels once again” (page 40).
United States . Department of State 1932: “In February, 1927, a band of Liberals attacked and captured the city of Chinandega” (page 71).
United States . Department of State 1932: “By March 15 a total of 2,000 [ U.S.] naval and military forces had been landed in Nicaragua to maintain the neutral zones and protect American and other foreign lives and property” (page 72).
Bacevich 1980: “Coolidge’s attempt to forestall a further widening of the U.S. military role by dispatching Henry L. Stimson to Managua in May 1927 to mediate a settlement was only a partial success. While under the resulting Tipitapa agreement, the Liberal military commander, General Jose M. Moncada, agreed to disarm in exchange for an American pledge to supervise the 1928 Nicaraguan election, many insurgents rejected out of hand any settlement underwritten by the Yankees” (page 243).
Barquero 1945: “El ejército oyó la voz del espíritu patriótico que habló por la boca del General Moncada; depuso las armas. El General Augusto Sandino accedió en apariencia; pero retornó a las montañas de Jinotega en actitud beligerante; degeneró su rebeldía en bandolerismo” (page 210).
Bulmer-Thomas 1991: “(I)n May 1927 a peace treaty between the Liberals and the Conservatives was signed under the supervision of Henry Stimson, a former U.S. Secretary of War. This time, as a further precondition for political stability the State Department demanded the abolition of all Nicaraguan armed forces (including the police) and their replacement by a non-partisan National Guard staffed initially by U.S. officers...and designed to overcome the deep divisions in Nicaraguan society between Liberals and Conservatives by convincing the opposition party that it could come to power by electoral means without resorting to force” (pages 230-231).
Kamman 1968: Stimson’s “investigation led him to believe Díaz should stay; from the American view he was an ideal president: He was cooperative; he was not eligible for reelection; he was willing to allow United States supervision of elections and, most important, to forgo many executive powers regarding constabulary and election officials, thus ensuring fair voting” (page 106). “Moncada agreed to a meeting on May 4, 1927, at Tipitapa…Americans arranged a forty-eight-hour truce, to last until noon on May 5, and five hundred Marines moved between the opposing armies” (page 107). “The Tipitapa conference began, as scheduled, on May 4. Moncada had come against the advice of his generals…José María Moncada, in his middle fifties, was a politician and revolutionist of good education. He had fought against Zelaya in the revolution which had overthrown that dictator…After the Chamorro coup he joined the Sacasa supporters and rose to head the Liberal forces, although he had not been a professional military man…Moncada was not hostile toward the United States” (page 108). On May 5 “Stimson and Moncada met in Managua to arrange details of disarmament” (page 110). “Díaz tried to make the settlement as easy as possible. On May 5 he amnestied all political prisoners and exiles…He took the first steps toward bringing Liberals into national political life by stating that there would be reconstitution of the Supreme Court as it was prior to the Chamorro coup d’état and that he would appoint Liberal ‘jefes politicos’ in six departments where that party was in the majority” (page 111). “On May 11 the two principals met once more under the blackthorn tree” (page 112). On May 12 “Stimson received [a] telegram signed by Moncada and all his prominent chiefs except Augusto C. Sandino…[and on] May 14, Moncada, as if victorious, entered the capital” (page 113). “Stimson…left Nicaragua on May 16” (page 114).
MacRenato 1991: “By a decree issued at Puerto Cabezas on May 20, 1927, Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa announced the termination of his brief regime. Oh the same date [he] left for Puerto Limón, Costa Rica…Moncada thus became the new leader of the Liberals. Eighteen months later…he would be elected President of Nicaragua” (page 104).
Mahoney 2001: “Under a May 1927 truce embodied in the Espino Negro Pact, Liberals and Conservatives agreed to accept the outcome of a free, U.S.-supervised election to be held in 1928. Both sides called for their generals to lay down their arms. Crucially, the marines were to remain in the country to assist with the creation of a politically neutral, nonpartisan national guard that would supervise the 1928 elections and eventually exercise control over all policing and military functions in the country...Augusto César Sandino was a Liberal Party general, but when the United States orchestrated the Espino Negro Pact, he refused to sign, believing that the party was in effect selling out to the United States. From the mountains of Segovia, he began to organize an army with the goal of ending the U.S. occupation in Nicaragua” (pages 231-232).
Merrill 1994: “United States forces took over the country’s military functions and strengthened the Nicaraguan National Guard” (page 21). “After the United States mediated the agreement between liberal forces and the conservative regime, Sandino...reorganized his forces as the Army for the Defense of Nicaraguan Sovereignty (Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía de Nicaragua--EDSN). Sandino then staged an independent guerrilla campaign against the government and United States forces” (page 22).
Smith 1993: The “Peace of Tipitapa” “was arranged and supervised by the United States and agreed on 4 May 1927. President Coolidge had dispatched Henry L. Stimson to Nicaragua to try to arrange a peace in Nicaragua which would maintain US interests and keep Díaz in power…The constitutionalists did not want to accept Díaz as president but Stimson managed to persuade Moncada to accept a deal. The deal was made under the shade of the ‘Espino Negro’ or blackthorn tree, and included the offer of the presidency to Moncada, once Díaz’s term of office was concluded in 1928…General Sandino was the only constitutionalist commander who refused to go along with the deal. From May to June the liberal forces—except Sandino’s troops—were disarmed. The constitutionalist president, Dr Sacasa, went into exile in Costa Rica on 22 May 1927” (page 92).
United States . Department of State 1932: Describes in detail the “Stimson Mission, 1927” (pages 71-81). “On May 8, 1927, President Diaz requested the appointment of an American officer to instruct and command the Guardia. This was immediately agreed to by President Coolidge” (page 100).
Bacevich 1980: Describes Brigadier General Frank Ross McCoy and his selection by U.S. President Coolidge on June 26, 1927 as “personal representative of the president with the rank of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. Formally, his mission was simply ‘to carry out the promise’ made by Stimson a month earlier to supervise the 1928 Nicaraguan presidential election, thereby expediting the removal of U.S. military forces” (page 245).
Bacevich 1980: “Abandoning any pretense of neutrality, the Marine Corps now launched a full-scale pursuit of the remaining rebels. Although ill-equipped and outnumbered, the Sandinistas proved aggravatingly elusive…In July 1927 the spectacular siege of an isolated marine garrison in the village of Ocotal convinced many that the armed struggle in Nicaragua had settled into a frustrating stalemate” (page 244).
Close 1988: “(A)fter the Peace of Tipitapa, [Sandino] became an ardent Nicaraguan nationalist and anti-imperalist. On 1 July 1927, Sandino issued his political manifesto in which he denounced Moncada as a traitor and pledged to drive the Americans from his homeland…For five and a half years the Marines and the US-trained Nicaraguan National Guard pursued [Sandino’s Ejercito Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional]” (page 20).
Musicant 1990: “By emergency decree Díaz created a new ‘guardia’ in late July 1927" (page 306).
August-September: congressional election
Munro 1974: “Elections had been held on September 4 in several normally liberal districts where the civil war had prevented their being held at the usual time. Except in Bluefields, the liberals won, because the conservatives had promised Stimson that they would not present candidates. In Estelí, however, bandit operations had made voting impossible in many districts, and the liberals asked that a supplementary election be held” (page 233).
United States . Department of State 1932: “American marines acted as unofficial observers in various departments where elections were held at the end of August, 1927, to select Senators and Deputies in those districts where elections were not held in 1926 because of revolutionary disturbances, but there was no American supervision of these elections. The Conservatives did not contest in the principal Liberal departments” (page 82).
Bacevich 1980: “To guarantee an orderly campaign with an agreeable outcome, McCoy would need absolute control of the Nicaraguan electoral machinery. Armed with such authority, he could block the candidacy of any Nicaraguan unacceptable to the United States and discredit those political elements inclined to question the election’s legitimacy…McCoy and Dr. Harold W. Dodds…were soon drafting an election law defining the responsibilities and prerogatives of the electoral mission” (pages 246-247).
November 6: municipal election
Dodd 1992: “Following the municipal elections, a number of alleged and fraudulent activities emerged...[ U.S. electoral advisor] McCoy concluded the Liberals were in the majority and would have won sweeping victories if fairness had prevailed on election day” (pages 37-38).
Munro 1974: Municipal elections “were held throughout Nicaragua on November 6, 1927. The United States had no obligation to supervise these elections, but it seemed desirable that they be fair and free both because the possession of the municipal governments would be important during the presidential campaign and because any serious abuses in the way the voting was conducted would tend to lessen confidence in the possibility of a free presidential election” (pages 232-233). Describes election results.
Ramírez 1988: “Bajo la supervisión ‘no oficial’ de los ‘marines’ yanquis, se celebran las elecciones municipales (6 de noviembre)” (page 89).
United States . Department of State 1932: “Municipal elections were held throughout the Republic on November 6  in an orderly manner. There were few disputes and few cases of fraud reported. An analysis of the vote indicated a fairly even division between the Liberal and Conservative parties” (page 82).
Bacevich 1980: “Hoping to extort a change in the American attitude toward him, [Emiliano Chamorro] mobilized his influence within the Conservative party to bottle up the American-designed election law, called ‘La Ley McCoy,’ in the Nicaraguan Congress. Simultaneously, he began undermining Diaz’s position by criticizing the president’s submissiveness to American demands” (page 247).
Barquero 1945: “Con las credenciales necesarias salió [Moncada] para los Estados Unidos de América, para asegurar ante el Gobierno de aquella Nación la libertad electoral ofrecida por Mr. Stimson…El General Moncada retornó a Nicaragua el 18 de Diciembre de 1927…El General José María Moncada era en aquel entonces el Jefe del Partido Liberal nicaragüense” (page 213).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The terms of an agreement for the establishment and maintenance of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua were drawn up and the agreement was signed at Managua on December 22, 1927, by the American Chargé d’Affaires at Managua and the Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs” (page 100). Describes the agreement.
United States . Department of State 1928: “There are two principal political parties in Nicaragua, Conservative and Liberal. They are based upon tradition and geographical regions, rather than political tenets or beliefs. The Conservative center is at Granada and the Liberal stronghold is at León” (page 3).
Bacevich 1980: “By mid-January 1928…Chamorro’s intrigues culminated in a full-fledged crisis. ’La Ley McCoy’ had passed the Nicaraguan Senate, but appeared irretrievably stalled in the Chamber of Deputies. Uncomfortably caught between Chamorro’s insistent attacks and pressure from the American legation, Diaz announced his intention to resign” (page 247).
United States . Department of State 1932: “On January 10, 1928, the Nicaraguan Senate passed a transitory electoral law which, it was felt by the Department of State, would assure the holding of a free and fair election such as had been contemplated by the two Governments…On January 17 the Chamber of Deputies approved a substitute electoral law which, in the opinion of the Department of State, made impossible an adequate supervision of the approaching election” (page 85).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: “(E)l 13 de febrero en “la gran convención liberal nacionalista es elegido candidato el general José María Moncada. Los americanos le habían prometido la Presidencia” (page 526).
United States. Department of State 1932: “The Liberal convention which met in extraordinary session on February 19, 1928, nominated General Moncada and Dr. J. Antonio Medrano for President and Vice President, respectively” (page 86).
Bacevich 1980: Describes McCoy’s role in the development of the new electoral law (pages 246-248). On March 13, 1928, the “lower house decisively rejected the American election law and adjourned shortly thereafter…McCoy himself began prodding Diaz to enact the election law by decree…Whatever the merits of McCoy’s argument, Diaz quickly assented to the proposal, if only to avoid having the Americans arbitrarily seize complete control of the country—as they were clearly prepared to do. A member of McCoy’s own staff drafted the proclamation, and after some minor haggling, Diaz enacted it on 21 March 1928” (page 249). Describes the decree, which recognizes McCoy as board president (pages 249-250). “The decree also gave McCoy authority over the Guardia Nacional” (page 250).
Manual electoral del periodista 1996: “McCoy llegó a Nicaragua con facultades ilimitadas no sólo para supervisar elecciones, sino para organizarlas, a tal punto que el 17 de marzo de 1928 reforma la Ley Electoral de Nicaragua, que prohibía la participación en los comicios de cualquier otro partido que no fuera el Liberal y el Conservador” (page 10).
Ramírez 1988: “El general Frank Ross McCoy, designado por el Presidente de Estados Unidos como presidente de la Junta Nacional Electoral de Nicaragua, es ‘nombrado’ para tal cargo por el ejecutivo de la nación, Adolfo Díaz (17 de marzo)” (page 92).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The Nicaraguan Senate passed the amended draft of the electoral law by a vote of 16 to 8 on March 7, 1928. The Chamber of Deputies, controlled by General Chamorro, rejected the law on March 13, 1928, by a vote of 24 to 18, and immediately adjourned” (page 85). “On March 17, 1928, the Supreme Court of Nicaragua appointed Gen. Frank R. McCoy…to be chairman of the National Board of Elections…In order to fulfill the obligation which the Nicaraguan Government had assumed in requesting the supervision of the elections by impartial Americans, by a decree of March 21, 1928, President Diaz conferred on the National Board of Elections adequate powers to supervise the elections…To assist the National Board of Elections there was an American Electoral Mission, composed of 906 Americans, likewise headed by General McCoy. American members of this mission were chairmen of the 13 departmental boards and of the 432 local boards” (page 86).
Munro 1974: “In April 1928 [Díaz]…gave his support to the presidential candidacy of Dr. Cuadra Pasos, in opposition to Vicente Rapaccioli, who was the candidate of Chamorro and the Granada ‘oligarchy’” (page 250).
Bacevich 1980: “At about the same time [May 1928] other factions, identified with neither traditional party, began to coalesce, insisting that a free and fair election would grant them a place on the ballot in November. These new splinter parties, called Liberal-Republican and Conservative-Republican, along with the split in the Conservative party, raised the possibility that no candidate would receive an absolute majority of the vote, throwing the contest into the Nicaraguan Congress and beyond McCoy’s control. It was incumbent upon the National Electoral Board, therefore, to thin out the suddenly crowded ranks of Nicaraguan party politics” (page 256).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The Conservative Party was split into two factions, one controlled by President Diaz, the other by General Chamorro. On May 20 the two factions met separately, each claiming to be the legitimate representative of the historic Conservative Party” (page 87).
Bacevich 1980: “McCoy asked for and received reinforcement, 1,000 more marines in mid-March and an equal number in June. Employing these augmented forces with greater aggressiveness, the American command increased the pressure on Sandino significantly, forcing him to seek refuge outside Nicaragua” (page 252). “McCoy supplemented this revitalized campaign against Sandino by accelerating the development of the Guardia Nacional…During the period of the electoral mission, the Guardia tripled in size” (page 253).
Bacevich 1980: “Ignoring existing Nicaraguan statutes that would have recognized the two nascent factions, McCoy denied their viability, flatly declaring in each instance that ‘no bona fide party existed.’ There would be no new parties in the 1928 election” (page 257). Describes also how McCoy resolves the split in the Conservative party to “avoid the farce of a noncompetitive election…Facing the prospect of political extinction and lacking the nerve to call McCoy’s bluff, the [Conservative] party leadership capitulated. Both factions abandoned their candidates, and on 27 July nominated a compromise figure, Adolfo Benard, acceptable not only to Chamorro and Diaz but also to the United States” (pages 257-258).
Munro 1974: “By July 1928, with the addition of a number of officers and men sent to assist in the work of the electoral mission, the American forces in Nicaragua reached a peak of 5,800” (page 246). “Two minor parties sought places on the ballot. One was the liberal republican group…The other was the conservative republican party…In July, the national board of elections rejected the petitions of both parties” (page 252).
United States . Department of State 1932: “Two minor parties, the Conservative Republican and Liberal Republican, requested of the National Board of Elections the right to appear on the ballot. The National Board of Elections by unanimous vote refused both of these requests” (page 88). Gives the reasons.
Bacevich 1980: “By August 1928, McCoy could finally turn his attention to the details of voter registration and the actual balloting itself. To ensure order at the polls and minimize procedural irregularities, McCoy intended to saturate Nicaragua’s electoral machinery with Americans. Each of Nicaragua’s thirteen departments received its own electoral board, chaired with one exception by U.S. Army officers. Grouped under each department were district boards, one for each of 352 precincts…American military personnel, usually marine enlisted men, headed these as well” (page 258).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The registration of voters, which took place during five days in September, resulted in a total registration of 148,831, an increase of 28 per cent over that of 1924” (page 90). Gives the reasons for the increase.
Bacevich 1980: “By late October, McCoy could claim publicly that Sandino had been effectively ‘eliminated as a factor in the election’” (page 254).
November 4: presidential election (Moncada / Liberal)
Bacevich 1980: “The large turnout of 88 percent of those registered resulted in an unequivocal victory for the Liberal party. More important, the defeated Conservatives professed their willingness to abide by this outcome” (page 258).
Barquero 1945: “En los comicios del 5 de Noviembre de 1928, y de conformidad con la ley electoral elaborada por el General Franklin A. McCoy, Jefe de la Misión Electoral que llegó a supervigilar las elecciones de conformidad con los Pactos concertados en Tipitapa entre el General Moncada y el Coronel Henry L. Stimson, obtuvo el triunfo el General José María Moncada” (pages 213-214).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: “Los votos liberales fueron 76.676, los votos conservadores 56.487” (page 530).
Dodd 1992: Gives votes for two presidential candidates, total votes cast, percent of registered voters who voted, and difference in number of votes cast in 1924 and 1928 (page 96).
Gorman 1984: “(S)ince the Liberal Party had discarded its extreme nationalism and anti-imperialism which it had acquired under Zelaya, the United States was able to install a Liberal president in 1928 without sacrificing even the least security for its interests in the country” (page 38).
Kagan 1996: Gives percent of registered voters who cast ballots, percent who voted in Nueva Segovia, and number of votes by which Moncada won the presidency (page 15).
Kamman 1968: “The election of 1928” (pages 143-167).
Mahoney 2001: “Although the National Guard got off to a promising start, the continued rivalry between Nicaragua’s traditional political parties ultimately led to its politicization. In the elections of 1928, the Guard seemed to supervise polling effectively, and at the time there were reasons to believe that it could develop into a cohesive and professional policing force. Following his decisive electoral victory, however, José Moncada of the Liberal Party worked to convert the institution into a political force of the Liberals” (page 232).
Manual electoral del periodista 1996: “Bajo las órdenes de McCoy, cinco mil efectivos norteamericanos montan 432 cantones electorales, presiden las mesas de votación, mantienen vigilancia policial, cuentan los votos y declaran vencedor a Moncada y al PLN con 76 mil 210 votos” (page 10).
Millett 1977: “133,000 Nicaraguans, nearly 90 percent of those eligible, voted, giving General Moncada and the Liberals a decisive 19,000-vote victory” (page 106).
Munro 1974: “The electoral mission…had given three months’ training, in special schools in each province, to the marine and navy enlisted men who were to be chairmen of most of the 432 local electoral boards. The chairmen of the 13 departmental electoral boards were for the most part officers from the United States Army” (page 252). Discusses the election and gives the results (page 253).
Musicant 1990: “Fully ninety percent of the franchise voted, the greatest number in Nicaragua’s history. Moncada received 76,696 votes, 20,000 more than his Conservative rival” (page 349).
Smith 1993: 1928 “saw elections in November at which Moncada received the reward promised by the Espino Negro pact. Despite an anti-election campaign led by Sandino and his formidable general Pedro Altamirano, the 5000 US marines standing guard over 432 polling booths ensured an easy victory for Moncada” (page 95).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The elections on November 4 took place without any disorder…The voting resulted in the election of General Moncada by a majority of nearly 20,000, his vote being 76,676 to 56,987 for Señor Benard. The Liberals elected 5 Senators and 17 Deputies; the Conservatives, 4 Senators and 8 Deputies. More than 89 per cent of those who registered voted. The total voting increased 57 per cent over 1924” (page 91). “In November, 1928, the marine and naval forces totaled 5,480” (page 107).
Vargas 1989: Gives number of registered voters, number who voted, number/percent who abstained, and number/percent of vote for top two candidates (page 103). “Resumen de la elección de 1928 por departamentos” (page 103). Gives by department the registered voters, number/percent of votes for conservatives and liberals, total number of votes, and percent of abstentions.
Kirk 1992: “A clear threat to the status quo, [Sandino] gained the disfavor of virtually all the powerful sectors of Nicaraguan society, including the leadership of the Liberal and Conservative parties, the occupying forces, the National Guard, and the Church. The Church hierarchy was totally opposed to the Sandino-led revolution and did everything in its power to see him arrested” (page 28).
Walter 1993: “(A)fter 1928, with the introduction of minority representation in diverse organs of government, control of the municipalities was divided among the Liberal and Conservative parties according to preelectoral arrangements” (page 82).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: “El general José María Moncada…líder del Partido Liberal toma posesión como Presidente. Su Vice-Presidente fue: Dr. Enoc Aguado Farfán” (page 530).
United States. Department of State 1932: “General Moncada assumed the Presidency on January 1, 1929” (page 91).
Smith 1993: “The world depression of 1929 sent coffee prices plummeting and the unemployed and hungry peasants and workers flocked to Sandino’s cause…Moncada’s government could only respond with repression, and workers moved to form the socialist-oriented Nicaraguan Workers Party (PTN) which organized in support of Sandino. Sandino left Nicaragua in May 1929 to try to gain support from the Mexican president” (page 96).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 31 de octubre el “Presidente, General José María Moncada declara a Managua, Distrito Nacional” (page 534).
Traña Galeano 2000: “(E)l 31 de octubre de 1929 fue reformado, por decreto ejecutivo, el Artículo 109 de la Ley Electoral, en todo lo concerniente a las municipalidades” (page 178).
Alexander 1957: “Throughout most of the 1930’s the Nicaraguan Communists operated within the Partido de Trabajadores Nicaraguenses, which maintained friendly relations with the Communist International” (page 379).
Kamman 1968: “In March, 1930, the [U.S.] State Department turned to the War Department for an officer to head the [Nicaraguan] national election board…The State Department had acted with the idea of avoiding connection between the director of the election board and the forces of occupation” (page 189).
Kamman 1968: “The [U.S.] State Department notified the legation in Managua early in May that Captain Alfred Wilkinson Johnson of the Navy would be president of the electoral board…Election preparations during the next six months were similar to those under McCoy” (page 189). Describes preparations (pages 189-190).
Ramírez 1988: “El presidente de Estados Unidos nombra al capitán (USMC) Alfred W. Johnson como presidente de la Junta Nacional Electoral (8 de mayo). La Corte Suprema de Justicia ‘nombra’ a Alfred W. Johnson presidente de la Junta Nacional de Elecciones de Nicaragua (23 de mayo)” (pages 101-102).
Smith 1993: Sandino “returned in May 1930, to carry on the campaign which had been led in his absence by [his] generals” (page 96).
Ramírez 1988: “(B)ajo el control de los ‘marines’ yanquis, se establecen nuevos campos de concentración, en donde se ubican sospechosos de colaborar con los sandinistas (1º de junio). Pueblos enteros son deshabitados” (page 102).
United States . Department of State 1932: “Beginning in July, 1930, additional [ U.S.] forces were sent to assist in the conduct of the elections of that year, bringing the total in November to 1,763” (page 107).
November 8: congressional election
Bulmer-Thomas 1991: “(T)he 1930 congressional elections, also supervised by U.S. Marines, produced a Liberal majority” (page 231).
Dodd 1992: Gives number of registered voters, number who cast ballots, and senate and assembly seats won by the Liberals (page 113).
Kamman 1968: “Nicaraguans went to the polls on November 2, 1930. Fewer voters cast ballots than in 1928, a result to be expected in off-year elections. Liberals gained control of both houses of Congress. By mid-November most of the electoral personnel had left” (page 191).
Ramírez 1988: “Se celebran elecciones de diputados y senadores bajo la supervisión norteamericana (2 de noviembre)” (page 105).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The seats of one-third of the Senators and of one-half of the Deputies were to be filled in the congressional elections of 1930…The two major parties, Liberal and Conservative, were the only contestants, as the Liberal Republican Party did not qualify under the terms of the electoral law. The elections, which were held on November 2, 1930, resulted in the election of 7 Liberal Senators and 16 Deputies and 2 Conservative Senators and 6 Deputies. The total vote cast was approximately 70 per cent of that in the same districts in 1928” (page 116).
Mahoney 2001: “Although Sandino started with only 150 men, his army drew significant rural support, especially among peasants who were displaced by coffee expansion in the Northern Highlands. Eventually, Sandino commanded nearly two thousand soldiers. Using guerrilla tactics, the force proved remarkably successful at ambushing the marines and the National Guard. The war dragged on into the early 1930s with no clear end in sight. In 1931, the U.S. secretary of state announced that the occupation force would leave Nicaragua” (page 233).
Smith 1993: “On 13 February 1931 Stimson announced the immediate withdrawal of two-thirds of the 1500-strong marine force stationed in Nicaragua. The rest would leave after the 1932 elections” (page 96). “The Sandinista fighters operated freely in central, northern and eastern Nicaragua throughout 1931” (page 97).
Ramírez 1989: “The shadow of Moncada’s government finally disappeared altogether on March 31, 1931, when an earthquake destroyed the capital city of Managua, and the [U.S.] Navy commander became the actual governor of the country” (page 76).
United States . Department of State 1932: “On March 31, 1931, Managua, the capital of Nicaragua and a city of 60,000 inhabitants, was shattered and virtually destroyed by earthquake” (page 112).
Ramírez 1988: “José María Moncada solicita la supervisión norteamericana en las elecciones de fin de año (18 de junio)” (page 109).
United States . Department of State 1932: “(T)he Department of State on July 11, 1931, designated Maj. Charles F.B. Price as electoral observer of the municipal elections held on November 1, 1931” (page 116).
MacRenato 1991: “Moncada did not want to leave the Presidency. In September 1931, the Nicaraguan Minister to the United States approached Secretary of State Stimson with a project for the election of a Constituent Assembly…The Secretary would listen to the plan only if the election were to be held in conjunction with the regular elections scheduled for 1932” (page 159).
United States . Department of State 1932: “On September 10, 1931, the Conservative Party issued a decree of abstention from the municipal elections” (page 117).
November: municipal election
Ramírez 1988: “Elecciones municipales supervisadas por los ‘marines’ yanquis (1º de noviembre)” (page 111).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The municipal elections of 1931 did not settle the vexatious problems of the municipal governments in the five departments under martial law…As a party, the Conservatives did not participate, but in a number of municipalities where the local Conservatives felt they had a good chance of success, they formed independent groups and nominated candidates by petition” (page 117).
MacRenato 1991: “The upcoming 1932 elections saw the Liberal Party split into two factions, one led by Leonardo Argüello and supported by Moncada, and the other faction supporting former Vice President Sacasa. The nomination finally went to Sacasa because he was the next member of the elite in line for office…The Conservatives nominated Adolfo Díaz as President and Emiliano Chamorro as his Vice Presidential running mate” (page 160).
Radical women in Latin America: left and right 2001: “1932: Women petition for the right to vote in U.S.-supervised elections. The U.S. military command denies women the right to vote” (page 31).
Ramírez 1988: “El almirante Clark H. Woodward es designado por el gobierno de Washington como presidente de la Junta Nacional Electoral de Nicaragua (4 de enero)” (page 113).
Walter 1993: “Beginning in April 1932, a group of political leaders from both parties met to discuss ways to guarantee a smooth transition in the Nicaraguan government once the U.S. Marines had departed in January 1933. Most of the debate centered on the issue of minority representation in the government’s various branches. At stake was the losing party’s number of deputies and senators in the legislature [and] the distribution of positions in the municipal councils” (page 26).
Ramírez 1988: “Matthew Hanna, embajador de Estados Unidos en Nicaragua, y Anastasio Somoza…se reúnen para discutir aspectos relacionados con las elecciones venideras (25 de mayo)” (page 115).
Ramírez 1988: “Juan Bautista Sacasa nominado candidato presidencial liberal; envía un emisario a Washington para pedir que no sean retirados los ‘marines’ (junio)” (page 115).
Walter 1993: “On 30 June 1932, after a number of meetings, all presidential and vice-presidential candidates signed a general agreement by which they accepted minority representation as a fundamental principle of the political system and consented to include this principle in the country’s Constitution” (page 28).
Munro 1974: “On July 27 the four leading liberal candidates signed a ‘pact of honor,’ promising their support to Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa, who had been the candidate of the León group, and agreeing to divide among themselves the nominations for senators and deputies” (page 273).
Ramírez 1988: “El gobierno de Estados Unidos, a través de su embajada en Nicaragua, se pronuncia por Anastasio Somoza García para Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional (28 de octubre)” (page 117).
Walter 1993: “A second agreement, signed on 3 October 1932 by presidential candidates Sacasa and the Conservative Adolfo Díaz, set down specific measures to follow in the wake of the election” (page 28). Lists the measures.
Mahoney 2001: “Under a 1932 plan, the Guard’s upper-level posts were divided evenly between Liberals and Conservatives, and the top position of Jefe Director was to be chosen by the president” (page 232).
Ramírez 1988: “El Departamento de Estado hace firmar a los partidos liberal y conservador un acuerdo sobre la Guardia Nacional (5 de noviembre)” (page 117).
Smith 1993: “Matthew Hanna, the US minister in Nicaragua secured an agreement from the two presidential candidates in the 1932 elections, the conservative Adolfo Díaz and the rehabilitated constitutionalist vice-president, Juan B. Sacasa, that the National Guard should become a ‘non-political’ force after US withdrawal” (page 97).
November 6: presidential election (Sacasa / Liberal)
Cardenal Tellería 2000: “El Dr. Juan B. Sacasa por considerable mayoría triunfa en las elecciones contra Adolfo Díaz que era candidato de los americanos. De las 429 urnas electorales 182 fueron supervisadas por los marines” (page 545).
Dodd 1992: Gives number of registered voters, margin by which Liberals won the election, percent of voters who voted for the Liberal ticket, and fact that “the election also secured Liberal party control in the national legislature” (pages 145-146).
MacRenato 1991: “In their own bizarre way, the 1932 elections were quite representative of Nicaraguan politics. The Conservative presidential candidate, Adolfo Díaz, had been President twice but had never won an election or participated in one. The Conservative vice presidential candidate, Emiliano Chamorro, had been President once, had rebelled against various administrations, and his last illegal assumption of power had provoked a civil war. The Liberal presidential candidate, Juan Bautista Sacasa, had been exiled twice, after having been elected Vice President in 1924. He had been overthrown by Emiliano Chamorro” (pages 162-163).
Munro 1974: “The conservatives elected senators and deputies in the traditionally conservative departments but the liberals had a majority in the new Congress” (page 274).
Radell 1969: “The 1932 presidential election is an excellent source of statistical evidence on sectional partisanship” (page 229). Cites “American electoral commissions to Nicaragua, 1928-1932,” RG 43 in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Ramírez 1988: “Sacasa triunfa en las elecciones realizadas por los ‘marines’ yanquis (6 de noviembre)…El gobierno de Estados Unidos expresa su apoyo al nuevo régimen de Nicaragua (14 de noviembre)” (page 117).
Ramírez 1989: “The U.S. Congress…refused to appropriate funds to finance these new elections” (page 77).
Stansifer 1998: “(A)t the end of the occupation period--in 1932--the Liberals, now finally acceptable to the United States, won a decisive electoral victory” (page 122).
Vargas 1989: “Resumen de la elección de 1932 por departamentos” (page 123). Gives by department the registered voters, number/percent of votes for conservatives and liberals, total number of votes, and percent of abstentions.
Walter 1993: The “presidential election in 1932 also was supervised by the United States and the results were surprisingly similar to those of 1928: 76,269 for the Liberal Juan Bautista Sacasa and 53,845 for the Conservative Adolfo Díaz” (page 26). “Sacasa’s election in 1932 was particularly rewarding for Liberals, because it installed in the presidency a man whose rights to that office had been violated by the Chamorro coup of 1925 when Sacasa was vice-president of the republic” (page 27). “Registered voters and votes cast, 1932 and 1936” (page 61). Gives by department the number of registered voters and the number of votes cast. “Election results, 1932 and 1936 (percentage of total vote in parentheses)” (page 62). Gives by department the number of votes cast for the Liberals and the Conservatives.
Booth 1998: “Anastasio Somoza García was appointed head of the Nicaraguan National Guard in late 1932 as U.S. occupation forces were being withdrawn after their futile attempt to defeat Augusto César Sandino’s antioccupation and revolutionary guerrilla movement. Breaking with the political neutrality of the officer corps enforced under U.S. tutelage, Somoza García and his uncle, President Juan Bautista Sacasa, began to appoint officers with Liberal Party loyalty” (page 132).
Foroohar 1989: “Following his election to the presidency, Sacasa was faced with the pressure of the American Minister to Nicaragua, Matthew E. Hanna, to appoint General Anastasio Somoza as ‘Jefe Director’ of the National Guard” (page 23).
Smith 1993: “The first Nicaraguan chief director of the National Guard who was picked by Moncada and Hanna and endorsed by Sacasa and the outgoing US National Guard chief…was Moncada’s foreign minister, Anastasio ‘Tacho’ Somoza. Somoza’s appointment was announced on 15 November” (page 97).
Ramírez 1988: “Patrullas de la guardia atacan posiciones sandinistas (9 de diciembre)” (page 118).
Barquero 1945: Moncada entregó “el poder el 1o de Enero de 1933 al doctor Juan Bautista Sacasa” (page 215). “Su período Administrativo no colmó las aspiraciones del pueblo que lo llevó al Poder y como consecuencia la Paz de la República fué alterada. Además le tocó gobernar cuando el guerrillero, General Augusto Sandino se había apoderado de los ricos Departamentos del Norte de Nicaragua y creaba al Gobierno muchos obstáculos” (page 219).
Booth 1985: “The U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary force, after twenty frustrating years of occupation, abandoned Nicaragua in January 1933. Once the occupation forces were no longer present to enforce the policy preferences of the United States on its client government, several natural realignments in the Nicaraguan political system swiftly began” (page 48). Describes them.
Kamman 1968: “On New Year’s Day, 1933, Juan B. Sacasa became president of Nicaragua and General Calvin B. Matthews, chief of the Guardia, turned over command to Nicaraguan officers. The following day—January 2—the last 910 Marines and sailors boarded ship at Corinto” (page 217).
MacRenato 1991: “Military intervention ended in 1933 after a disastrous six-year guerrilla war between the Marines and Augusto César Sandino” (page 6). “On January 1, 1933, Juan Bautista Sacasa was sworn in as President, and General Matthews turned the command of the Guardia Nacional over to ‘General’ Anastasio Somoza” (page 170).
Ramírez 1988: “Toma posesión Juan Bautista Sacasa y Anastasio Somoza García asume el cargo de Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional (1º de enero). Delegación de paz de Sacasa llega…al campamento de Sandino (19 de enero)” (page 118). “El gobierno de Sacasa decreta estado de sitio en casi todo el territorio nacional (22 de enero). Se declara una tregua (23 de enero)” (page 119).
Barquero 1945: “El Presidente Sacasa invitó a Sandino a llegar a Managua y le otorgó grandes concesiones que perjudicaron su Administración. Sandino no interpretó la magnanimidad y la sana intención del Gobernante Sacasa por conseguir la Paz y se convirtió en tirano que imponía su voluntad a las autoridades constituidas” (page 220).
Booth 1985: “Despite continued clashes between the Guard and the rebel army, Sandino met Dr. Sacasa in Managua on 2 February 1933. They came to terms that very day” (page 48).
Close 1988: “Never defeated, Sandino agreed to lay down his arms after the Americans withdrew in 1933. In return, the Liberal administration of Juan Bautista Sacasa, formerly Sandino’s commander, gave the guerrilla leader control of 36,800 sq. km. of land in the Segovia mountains where he planned to set up agricultural cooperatives” (page 20).
Kagan 1996: “(Sandino) embraced the President, and he embraced Somoza, and on February 2, 1933, he declared his crusade for Nicaragua’s freedom ended” (page 19).
Ramírez 1988: “Se suscribe en la Casa Presidencial el convenio de paz en horas de la medianoche (2 de febrero). Sacasa integra la denominada ‘comisión pacificadora’ (4 de febrero)” (page 119). “Decreto de amnistía para todos los combatientes sandinistas (9 de febrero)” (page 120).
Smith 1993: “On 22 February 1933 Sandino’s troops laid down their arms as planned” (page 99).
Smith 1993: “But the National Guard, which was quickly becoming a force and law unto itself, continued to harass the Sandinistas, even though the peace accords had agreed to the cessation of hostilities…Sandino traveled…to Managua…to try to negotiate an end to the conflict with Somoza and Sacasa. Sacasa was worried about the uncontrollable ‘Guardia’. He confided to the British and the US legations that he was expecting Somoza to undertake a coup against his government” (page 99).
Smith 1993: “In February 1934 Sacasa had agreed to Sandino’s demands that he should reform what Sandino had called the ‘unconstitutional’ Guardia” (page 99).
Walter 1993: “By early 1934 Sandino had declared that the Guardia was ‘unconstitutional’ and needed restructuring, while Somoza demanded that Sandino turn in all his weapons, as contemplated in the peace agreement of the year before. Between the two stood President Sacasa” (pages 32-33).
Barquero 1945: “En la noche del 21 de febrero de 1934 corrió la noticia en Managua de la muerte del General Augusto Sandino” (page 220).
Freeland 1988: “After [Sandino’s] assassination in 1934, Somoza’s National Guard took fierce reprisals against Miskito and Sumo communities along the [Rio Coco]” (page 30).
Smith 1993: “On the night of 21 February 1934 Sandino attended a presidential dinner…After leaving the presidential banquet the Sandinista leader, along with two of his generals,…was abducted by the National Guard, taken to the airfield and shot” (pages 99-100). “In February 1934 Somoza also ordered the murder of Sandinistas living in the Río Coco settlement, although the Guardia were not so successful in the intended annihilation of Sandino’s supporters” (page 101).
Ramírez 1988: “Somoza acepta la responsabilidad por el asesinato de Sandino, en un banquete celebrado en Granada (3 de junio)” (page 124).
Consejo Nacional de Elecciones 1937: Reprints article 16 of the electoral code dated July 19, 1934, which says “El Consejo Nacional de Elecciones lo compondrán un Presidente y dos Miembros que serán llamados Miembros Políticos y representarán a los dos partidos principales de la Nación…El nombramiento del Presidente será hecho por el Presidente de la República” (page 3).
Walter 1993: In “July 1934 the Congress had approved a modification of the 1923 electoral law whereby the president now named the head of the National Electoral Council, a post previously determined by the Supreme Court” (page 40).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 13 de mayo de 1935 el “General Somoza García desobedece al Presidente y se hace abiertamente propaganda electoral a sí mismo” (page 567).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 15 de junio de 1935 el “embajador norteamericano Mr. Bliss Lane, comunica al Presidente Sacasa que los EE.UU ‘no están a favor, ni en contra’ de ningún candidato y que los EE.UU. están practicando una política de no intervención” (page 568).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 29 de agosto de 1935 el “embajador Arthur Bliss Lane amonesta a Somoza García, porque éste dice que los EE.UU. apoyan su candidatura” (page 568).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 14 de septiembre “Somoza informa a sus correligionarios que fue aconsejado por importantes personas para que dé un ‘golpe de Estado’ al Presidente Sacasa con el apoyo de la guardia nacional, pero que no lo hizo por lealtad a su tío político” (page 568).
MacRenato 1991: “On September 14, 1935 [Somoza] officially announced his candidacy for president” (page 233).
November 3: municipal election
Cole Chamorro 1967: “El 3 de Noviembre de 1935 se realizaron elecciones municipales, bajo la garantía de la Guardia Nacional. Los alcaldes electos, en su mayoría conservadores se mostraban simpatizantes de la candidatura presidencial del Gral. Somoza García” (page 118).
MacRenato 1991: “Somoza’s next move included organizing committees throughout the country to make sure his supporters won the municipal elections of November 3, 1935” (page 233). “The November municipal elections came and went properly ‘supervised’ by the Guardia…Somoza later claimed that 80 percent of those elected in the municipal elections were his supporters” (page 234).
Walter 1993: “Sacasa, Adolfo Díaz, and Emiliano Chamorro…visited the State Department to request that the United States supervise the upcoming elections, but they were turned down” (page 63).
MacRenato 1991: “On January 12, 1936, Somoza officially launched his campaign for the presidency and held his mass rally” (page 238).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 1 de febrero el “Presidente Sacasa, el Mayor General Somoza García y…Arthur Bliss Lane se reúnen. Somoza se comprometió a retirar su candidatura, apoyar al gobierno constitucional del Sr. Sacasa para que termine su período, garantizó la imparcialidad de la G.N. en las elecciones de noviembre y apoyar el candidato presentado por los dos partidos…El día 8 de Febrero los conservadores, General Emiliano Chamorro y el Dr. Carlos Cuadra Pasos, no aceptaron la propuesta al manifestar que el único candidato liberal que ellos aceptaban era al Mayor General Somoza, por lo tanto el acuerdo se rompía” (page 570).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 30 de abril de 1936 “Estados Unidos declaró que oficialmente abandonaba su política de no reconocer los gobiernos de América Central que hubieran llegado al poder por medio de una revolución o cualquier otro medio ilegal” (page 571).
Walter 1993: “In April 1936…Conservatives presented a memorandum to the Liberal party in which they stressed the importance of the cooperation between the two parties in the face of the serious general crisis affecting the county” (page 47). Describes the issues discussed.
MacRenato 1991: “The agreement endorsed Dr. Leonardo Argüello for President and Rodolfo Espinosa for Vice President. In exchange for his collaboration, Chamorro had asked that half of the government posts in the new administration go to the Conservative Party” (page 245).
Walter 1993: “On 14 May, the Liberals and the Conservatives did come to an agreement. In the presence of Sacasa, two representatives each of the Conservatives and Liberals signed a bipartisan pact in which they pledged to run a common candidate for the presidency and to undertake a reform of the Constitution as soon as possible” (pages 48-49). Describes the rest of the agreement. “But Somoza had his own proposal, which he made known at the same time that the Liberals and Conservatives signed their agreement” (page 49). Describes Somoza’s agreement. “This was nothing less than a Somocista blueprint for government. Sacasa rejected it outright” (page 50).
Walter 1993: “Once Somoza realized that neither party would countenance his own candidacy or a candidate picked by him there was only one road for him to take if he wished to retain control of the Guardia and keep alive his own presidential ambitions: Sacasa had to go or be neutralized and the parties’ hierarchies sidelined from the selection of a candidate” (page 50). “On 31 May, [Somoza’s] forces began firing at both the fort in León and the presidential palace in Managua… While the armed uprising proceeded, Somoza sympathizers took over the municipal governments in the major cities” (page 51).
Barquero 1945: “El doctor Juan B. Sacasa…resolvió depositar el Poder Ejecutivo el 6 de junio de 1936 en el Ministro de la Gobernación doctor Julián Irías quien a su vez llamó al Vice-presidente Rodolfo Espinosa R., para que asumiese el mando Supremo de la República pero éste no lo quiso aceptar” (page 220). “El 9 de junio de 1936 el Congreso Nacional aceptó la renuncia presentada a ese alto Cuerpo Legislativo, por los doctores Juan Bautista Sacasa y Rodolfo Espinosa R. El Congreso eligió al doctor Carlos A. Brenes Jarquín, Senador de la República para que terminara el período Constitucional del doctor Sacasa” (page 221).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 6 de junio el “Presidente Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa renuncia ante el Congreso” (page 573). “El Ministro de la Gobernación, Julián Irías asumió el poder…[El 9 de junio el] General Somoza García pide al Congreso Nacional que se defina a su favor” (page 574). Reproduces the text of the congressional decree. “Dése por electo el Diputado Dr. Carlos Brenes Jarquín para que ejerza la Presidencia de la República en el tiempo que falta del período constitucional que terminará el 31 de Diciembre de 1936” (page 574).
Consejo Nacional de Elecciones 1937: Reprints the article in La Gaceta of June 10, 1936 describing Sacasa’s resignation on June 6, 1936 “con motivo de los últimos acontecimientos político-militares” and Julían Irías’ assumption of presidential powers the same day (page 15). Reports also in another article in the same issue the election on June 9 by “el Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la República de Nicaragua” of Carlos Brenes Jarquín as president (pages 19-20).
MacRenato 1991: “On Tuesday, June 9, the Congress unanimously accepted the resignations of the President and Vice President and unanimously selected Somoza’s choice as Provisional President, Carlos Brenes Jarquín. The Conservatives in Congress justified their vote by saying they were interested in a peaceful solution to the present crisis but that they wanted to be known as the party of opposition and reserved the right to name a candidate in the presidential elections” (pages 260-261).
Millett 1977: “Somoza had Congress postpone the elections until December in order that the required six-month gap between the election and the presence of one of his relatives (Sacasa) in the presidency would exist” (page 181).
Smith 1993: Irías “reign lasted just three days. On 9 June the first of a series of puppet presidents, Dr Carlos Brenes Jarquín, was placed in office by the first of the Somoza dynasty” (page 101). “All relatives of incumbent presidents were forbidden by the constitution from standing for office for a period of six months. Somoza, as the husband of ex-President Sacasa’s niece, came into this category. Somoza sorted out this problem by having the elections put back from November to December” (pages 102-103).
Walter 1993: “On 6 June Sacasa resigned and left immediately for El Salvador…On 9 June, the Congress selected a new president to finish out Sacasa’s term. The official turned out to be Carlos Brenes Jarquín, who had been suggested previously by Somoza as a compromise candidate” (pages 51-52).
Consejo Nacional de Elecciones 1937: Reprints the article from La Gaceta in which President Carlos Brenes Jarquín announces elections for December 8 and gives the guidelines under which they will be carried out (pages 23-24).
Consejo Nacional de Elecciones 1937: Reprints Somoza’s speech accepting the Gran Convención Liberal’s nomination as their candidate for president (pages 21-22).
Walter 1993: “On 16 June the Liberal party met in León to hold its convention and name its candidate for the presidency. The nomination of Somoza was totally uneventful…The old party leadership was swept aside in favor of a new group of younger, more dynamic and ambitious men” (page 52).
Walter 1993: “Emiliano Chamorro left for Costa Rica on 23 June 1936 claiming that his life was in danger” (page 53). “After Chamorro’s departure from the country, the Conservatives were divided as to what to do in the coming elections. One faction, headed by Chamorro, decided to carry on with the candidacy of Argüello according to the Liberal-Conservative pact signed just before Sacasa was removed from office. A dissident faction of anti-Somoza Liberals formed the Liberal Constitutionalist party, which joined up with the Chamorrista Conservatives to support Argüello and Espinoza as his vice-presidential candidate. Somoza’s response was to promote the formation of a rival Conservative party that would support his candidacy…Somoza’s Conservatives organized the so-called Partido Conservador Nacionalista” (page 58).
Barquero 1945: “Nicaragua entera veía en el General Somoza al futuro Gobernante. El 19 de julio de 1936 la Gran Convención Liberal, reunida, lo proclamó Candidato a la Presidencia de Nicaragua” (pages 234-235).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 7 de septiembre algunos “miembros del Partido Conservador Genuino se oponen a la ascensión de Somoza García al poder, pero otros se prestan al juego político y deciden separarse fundando su propio partido llamado ‘Partido Conservador Nacionalista’ para apoyar al General Somoza en las próximas elecciones” (page 575).
Consejo Nacional de Elecciones 1937: Letter dated September 7, 1936 to the Consejo Nacional de Elecciones from the Partido Conservador Nacionalista lists by department their candidates for congress (pages 86-90).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 15 de septiembre el “Mayor General Anastasio Somoza García reorganiza el Partido Liberal, tomando como nombre el que se usó en tiempos de presidente José Santos Zelaya ‘Partido Liberal Nacionalista’” (page 575).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 22 de octubre se “reúnen en Washington los ex-Presidentes Don Adolfo Díaz Recinos, General Emiliano Chamorro Vargas y Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa Sacasa…con el fin de pedir al Sr. Summer Welles…otra intervención para Nicaragua…El Departamento de Estado rechazó al momento tales propuestas, ya que veían en el General Anastasio Somoza García a ‘un amigo’ y no estaban dispuestos a impedirle el triunfo en las elecciones” (page 576).
Consejo Nacional de Elecciones 1937: Letter dated October 7, 1936 to the Consejo Nacional de Elecciones from the Partido Conservador de Nicaragua lists by department their candidates for congress (pages 94-96). Letter dated October 6, 1936 to the Consejo Nacional de Elecciones from the Partido Liberal Nacionalista lists by department their candidates for congress (pages 98-102).
Alexander 1957: “By the end of 1936 Somoza had maneuvered himself into control of the government and now sought to assume the presidency formally” (page 379).
Bulmer-Thomas 1991: “(I)n November Somoza resigned as Jefe Director of the National Guard so that his ascent to power could remain within the constitution. The Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN) was formed to to launch Somoza’s candidacy” (page 244).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: “Para legalizar su candidatura a la Presidencia de Nicaragua, el General Somoza García renuncia a la Jefatura de la Guardia Nacional…Por acuerdo de los Partidos tradicionales, el Mayor General Anastasio Somoza García sería el candidato único a la Presidencia en las próximas elecciones. Un mes antes de las elecciones los dirigentes Conservadores y Liberales viendo el peligro que representa Anastasio Somoza, se reúnen de emergencia y ‘acuerdan no participar en las elecciones,’ retirando a sus candidatos Dr. Leonardo Argüello Barreto y Rodolfo Espinoza Ramírez, quedando el Mayor General Somoza como candidato único en las elecciones” (page 576).
Dunkerley 1988: “With short interruptions family power was exercised through the offices of the PLN, which continued to win elections less by complex fraud than by the mechanism of issuing an identity card—the ‘magnífica’—only to those who cast a readily identifiable ballot for the Somozas and their supporters; without this card employment in the public sector was effectively closed and encounters between the individual and all agencies of the state made complicated and generally antagonistic” (page 231).
Freeland 1988: The Somoza “regime caused less upheaval on the Atlantic Coast than perhaps any other Pacific Coast development. Kept in power to insure Western strategic interests in Nicaragua, the Somozas permitted the US enclaves to continue their activities, and a series of booms and busts in bananas, lumber, rubber and gold initially prolonged the old wage-led prosperity of the enclave” (page 30).
González 2001: “Thousands upon thousands of women voluntarily supported the Somozas and their right-wing Nationalist Liberal Party (PLN) between 1936 and 1979” (page 42).
MacRenato 1991: In November “Conservative and Liberal committees supporting the bi-partisan agreement met and decided to abstain from voting on December 8 th. Their decision had the practical result of withdrawing the Argüello-Espinosa ticket” (page 269).
Smith 1993: “The PLN was financed by compulsory deductions from wages of all government workers and workers employed on Somoza’s ever-growing agricultural and industrial concerns” (page 103).
Walter 1993: “When the opposition decided to withdraw from the race in November claiming that the popular will would be flouted at the polls, Somoza was left as the only candidate, but he could still claim that he had bipartisan support” (page 59).
December 8: presidential election (Somoza García / PLN)
Alexander 1973: “The key to the continued control over Nicaragua by Anastasio Somoza, and by his sons after him, was their firm grip on the national guard. However, on the civilian front their control over the Liberal Party was almost as important. Through it they maintained an effective civilian political machine” (page 30).
Bulmer-Thomas 1991: “Argüello’s name remained on the ballot paper and he secured 169 votes to Somoza’s 107,201. The president-elect then resumed control of the 3,000-strong National Guard and combined the posts of Jefe Director and president from 1 January, 1937" (page 245).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: Sin “oposición alguna el Mayor General Somoza García gana las elecciones para Presidente, para Vice-Presidente es electo el Sr. Francisco Navarro Alvarado” (page 576).
Cole Chamorro 1967: “El 8 de Diciembre de 1936 se practicaron las elecciones...Los votos obtenidos por Somoza fueron de 110 mil. La aparente oposición había alcanzado 15 mil, 433 votos conservadores separados del chamorrismo. La otra fracción obtuvo apenas la cantidad de 5 mil votos” (page 121).
Consejo Nacional de Elecciones 1937: Reprints many documents relating to the election, supporting Somoza’s candidacy. “Resultados cantorales rectificados de las elecciones presidenciales del año 1936” (pages 167-181). “Sumario al 26 de junio de 1937” (page 181). Lists final results as Partido Conservador 57 votes, Partido Conservador Nacionalista 23,079 votes, Partido Liberal Constitucionalista 135 votes, Partido Liberal Nacionalista 89,733, total votes 113,004, total registered voters 219,668, and cantones reporting 232.
Leonard 1998: “Anastasio Somoza García ruled with an iron fist and the support of the National Guard from 1936 to 1956. Opposition to him came from elite groups. These groups were no less authoritarian; they were merely anti-Somoza” (page 95).
MacRenato 1991: “The United States Minister cabled: ‘According to the latest figures published by the local press, Somoza and Navarro had received 64,000 Nationalist Liberal votes and 15,433 Nationalist Conservative votes’” (page 271). “The final figures published by el Partido Liberal de Nicaragua were: Conservative Genuine Party, 108 votes; Conservative Nationalist Party, 21,038; Liberal Constitutionalist Party 61; and Liberal Nationalist Party 88,559” (page 272).
Mahoney 2001: “Although he ran in the 1936 elections without any significant opposition, Somoza built an electoral coalition that included urban businessmen, some urban and rural laborers, rightist middle-class groups, and some ex-Conservatives. In the years to come, Somoza would maintain this coalition through an extensive patronage network that allowed him to govern without having to rely on the day-to-day coercion found in Central America’s military-authoritarian regimes” (page 233).
Merrill 1994: “Somoza García was elected president in the December election by the remarkable margin of 107,201 votes to 108" (page 25).
Millett 1977: “With the opposition boycotting the contest, although still on the ballot, and the Guardia counting the votes, chances for a upset were nonexistent” (page 181). Gives votes by party for Somoza and Argüello as reported on December 11 and again on December 18 (page 182).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: Somoza “llegó a la presidencia de la República con el apoyo norteamericano; pero también de cafetaleros, comerciantes y ganaderos—la vieja oligarquía nicaragúense—, quienes por encima de sus diferencias políticas lo vieron como la garantía de restauración del orden social perdido mucho tiempo atrás” (page 111).
Smith 1993: “The conservatives and liberals boycotted the rigged Decenber elections but fielded a joint candidate, Leonardo Argüello, who not surprisingly, lost overwhelmingly, by 107,000 votes to 169. The elections marked the beginning of a family-based dictatorship which would last for 43 years” (page 101).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “From 1936 to 1979, the Somoza dynasty ran what was almost a caricature of a U.S. client state…Formal institutions of democracy lost their substantive meaning under the Somoza regime, as constitutions were rewritten and elections manipulated to legitimize the dictatorship. During its tenure, the Somoza family amassed an enormous economic empire, establishing alliances and dividing the spoils with the other powerful economic groupings in the nation” (page 61). “The dictatorship assiduously cultivated U.S. backing, and also carefully preserved the trappings of constitutionality. Whenever constitutional obstacles prohibited the ‘reelection’ of a Somoza, either the constitution was changed or an interim puppet president was installed. Five such caretaker presidents punctuated the 43-year Somoza reign, nominally holding office for a total of three and a half years” (page 62).
Walter 1993: “The 1936 electoral campaign” (pages 59-63). “Abstentionism seems to have been very high, even according to the official election figures released by the Consejo Nacional de Elecciones…In general, the Conservatives’ call to boycott the election was heeded by the party’s regional leadership and the mass of its voters” (page 60). “Registered voters and votes cast, 1932 and 1936” (page 61). Gives by department the number of registered voters and the number of votes cast. “With all the votes, counted, Somoza ended up with 80.1 percent of the total and the Nationalist Conservatives with nearly all of the rest” (page 61). “Election results, 1932 and 1936 (percentage of total vote in parentheses)” (page 62). Gives by department the number of votes cast for the Liberals and the Conservatives. “In 1936 a group of Genuino Conservatives participated in the election on the Nationalist Conservative ticket and won some seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate” (page 99).
Barquero 1945: Brenes Jarquín “hizo entrega del poder el 15 de diciembre de 1936” (page 224).