Alexander 1973: The Partido Aprista Peruano is established in 1930 (page 180).
Gardiner 1975: "(A)s the mid-1930 revolution led by Luis Sánchez Cerro gained the momentum that toppled Leguía, it readily generated an anti-Japanese thrust...To Peruvians caught up in the deepening economic depression of the 1930s to which their export economy made them so susceptible, the relative well-being of so many Japanese was doubly distasteful...So it happened that the revolutionary upheaval that dislodged Leguía easily included incidents in which Japanese were roughly handled, their property damaged, shops plundered, and their lives endangered" (page 48).
Klarén 2000: "Efforts to improve the conditions of ‘yanaconas' [sharecroppers] began in the early 1930s, when the Partido Socialista, founded in Piura in 1930, had worked to organize the Federación General de Yanaconas y Campesinos de Perú" (page 293).
López Jiménez 2005: "(L)a participación electoral de las clases populares creció a partir de 1930 fundamentalmente porque éstas, y sobre todo el campesinado migrante, incrementaron de modo significativo su nivel de educación" (page 119).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 15/4: "Muere en Lima José Carlos Mariátegui" (page 519).
Hunefeldt 2004: A month after Mariátegui's death, "his handpicked successor, Ravines, renamed the PSP the Communist Party" (page 195).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "En 1930 [el Partido Socialista del Perú] cambió de nombre por el de Partido Comunista Peruano" (page 673).
Chávez López 2002: "El 22 de agosto de 1930 en Arequipa el teniente Coronel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro...se levantó en armas, aunque muchos otros movimientos anteriores no habían dado resultados positivos. La revolución de Sánchez Cerro tuvo el apoyo de las fuerzas militares de Lima, obligando a renunciar a Leguía y entregar el mando a una Junta Militar" (page 8).
Clayton 1999: "Leguía was overthrown in a revolution late in August 1930. The Peruvian leader's overthrow was brought on in part by his dictatorial ways and corruption, but also by his close association with the United States" (page 141).
Davies 1974: "The new economic and political groups which Leguía had fostered and upon which he had based his regime never united into a cohesive political party (or parties), remaining divided and often mutually antagonistic. The myriad of splinter parties which formed following the 1930 coup d'état of Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro further complicated the already confused political picture. They were small, powerless, and devoid of those charismatic leaders necessary to attract great masses of people" (page 96).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 22/8: "El comandante Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, jefe de la guarnición militar de Arequipa, se subleva contra el Gobierno de Leguía en esa ciudad y pone fin al régimen" (page 519). 25-28/8: "El general Manuel María Ponce es elegido Presidente de la Junta de Gobierno" (page 519). 27/8: "La Junta Militar de Gobierno de Manuel María Ponce es reemplazada por la del comandante Luis M. Sáñchez Cerro" (page 519).
Klarén 2000: Leguía "was seized, on the afternoon of August 25, 1930, by a group of army officers...The coup was organized by Lieutenant Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, the commander of the Arequipa garrison" (page 267).
Masterson 1991: "The Sánchez Cerro ‘golpe de estado' of August, 1930 was a major milestone in the course of Peruvian civil-military affairs. The demoralizing partisan politics of the autocrat Leguía that had so badly divided the officer corps was ended. In its place the Sánchez Cerro movement unleashed new political forces that would permanently transform both the armed forces and the civilian body politic. The diminutive lieutenant colonel's Arequipa revolt opened the way for the nation's masses to enter politics for the first time" (page 40).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 2/9: "La Junta de Gobierno, a través de su estatuto, asume las atribuciones constitucionales de los poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo, y nombra a Luis M. Sánchez Cerro como Presidente de la República y Presidente del Consejo de Ministros" (page 520).
Hunefeldt 2004: "Sánchez Cerro shifted the headquarters of his coup to Arequipa and Puno, where he set up a military junta that governed Peru for six months. He became an instant national hero" (page 196). "Many people, especially young people in the army, perceived his access to power as a watershed moment in Peru's history. Surprisingly Peru's oligarchy also saw Sánchez Cerro as the right man for the difficult economic situation Peru was facing. According to their view Sánchez Cerro would keep popular unrest in check and would also-given his popularity-prevent the Socialists and Communists from taking advantage of the situation. But maintaining control was not so easy in practice. The new government was greatly challenged by the severity of the world crisis" (page 197).
Klarén 2000: "Sánchez Cerro governed Peru for six months, from September 1930 through February 1931, as the head of a military junta" (page 268).
Werlich 1978: "Sánchez Cerro continued to be the hero of the masses, but he quickly alienated many of the nation's most powerful groups" (page 189).
Pike 1967: "In October 1930 the Socialist Party of Peru was founded by Luciano Castilla" (page 259).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 8/11: "Se realiza la convocatoria a una Asamblea Constituyente cuyas finalidades serán elegir un Presidente Provisorio y promulgar la nueva Constitución que reemplace a la de 1920" (page 520).
Clayton 1999: "In late 1930 President Luis M. Sánchez Cerro...needed money to meet the government's payroll. He turned to I.P.C. for the loan" (page 107). "After urgent consultation with the company's high command, the loan was granted and the government saved...Soon after the loan was made, I.P.C. received a monopoly on the distribution of petroleum products in Peru" (page 108).
Masterson 1991: "Military and civilian support for Sánchez Cerro began to evaporate in early December, 1930...when it became clear he was planning to seek the presidency without first resigning as head of the governing ‘Junta.' His intentions were signaled earlier by the adoption of repressive measures against APRA and the Communist Party...The lines between the military leader and the APRA became even more clearly drawn when conservative elements of the decades-old ‘Civilista' party began to support the army colonel's presidential ambitions" (page 44).
Werlich 1978: "(M)any members of the old elite...were appalled when the ‘cholo' colonel announced that he would seek election to a constitutional term as president while remaining at the head of the provisional government" (page 190).
Alexander 1957: "By the end of 1931 the Aprista Party had been outlawed, its deputies expelled from the Chamber, and Haya himself arrested" (page 227).
Basadre 1980: "La aparente transformación radical del sistema en 1931" (pages 141-162). Discusses the changes to the electoral system in 1931.
Chávez López 2002: "Independencia del régimen electoral: (Desde 1931 hasta 1962). Se instaura el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, con máximo organismo electoral, con el propósito de garantizar la independencia en la labor electoral. El JNE esta integrado por un representante de la Corte Suprema (el Fiscal más antiguo, que lo presidía), cuatro delegados de las universidades nacionales y cuatro delegados de las Juntas Departamentales. Así, el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones surge como un ente colegiado integrado por representantes de la comunidad jurídica y académica de la sociedad. En ésta epoca también se establece el Registro Electoral permanente y el Registro de Organizaciones Políticas en el JNE" (page 7).
Chiaramonti 2000: "Electores inscritos y votantes (1931) (sufragio directo)" (page 251).
Hunefeldt 2004: "Between February and December 1931, there were 18 military mini coups all over the country" (page 197).
Klarén 2000: "Decentralists in Arequipa, long a hotbed of regionalist sentiment, opposed Leguía's centralism in administrative and fiscal affairs and began forming the Decentralist Party, which was founded shortly after the coup in 1931. Composed mainly of elements from the middle sectors, the Decentralist Party sought greater provincial autonomy from Lima and a larger emphasis on regional development" (page 268).
Valdés 2000: "1931: Feminismo Peruano hace público un manifiesto a favor del sufragio, con ocasión de las elecciones para la asamblea constituyente. El APRA presenta un proyecto de ciudadanía que incluía el voto al analfabeto, a los menores de 21 años y a las mujeres que trabajan" (Anexo: La lucha por la ciudadanía femenina: Perú).
Valdés 2000: "1931: En su Primer Congreso Nacional, el APRA aboga por la igualdad de los derechos políticos, el voto femenino desde los 18 años de edad y su derecho a desempeñar cargos públicos. Sin embargo, esta postura no se mantendría" (Anexo: Participación política femenina hasta la década del 60: Perú).
Klaiber 1992: "(I)n January 1931, the [Popular Union Party] was formally founded and Carlos Arenas y Loayza was elected president" (page 214).
Masterson 1991: "By the first week of January, 1931, a wide range of civilian political groups had demonstrated their open hostility to Sánchez Cerro's plans and voiced their desire for open elections in which only civilian candidates would be allowed to seek the presidency. These demands were backed by many army officers" (page 44).
Davies 1974: Sánchez Cerro "encountered opposition from ambitious army officers, and in February, 1931, there were uprisings in several parts of the nation" (page 99).
Masterson 1991: "(I)n early February the chief executive announced his intention to hold elections at the end of March in which he would be a candidate for president. Within two weeks Peru was in open rebellion. Sánchez Cerro's attempt to calm the opposition by withdrawing his candidacy on 23 February failed" (page 44).
Astiz 1969: "(T)he Peruvian political arm [of APRA] was and is the Partido Aprista Peruano (in theory only one of the Latin American members of APRA), founded in 1931 in order to participate in that year's presidential election, with Haya as the standard-bearer" (page 96). "The party was...officially founded in Peru in March, 1931...At approximately the same time the new administration began blocking its political activities, and a number of electoral irregularities followed" (page 97).
Basadre 1980: "El 13 de marzo de 1931 el Ministro de Gobierno de la Junta Nacional de Gobierno presidida por David Samanez Ocampo, Francisco Tamayo, suscribió una resolución por la cual fue designada una comisión ‘ad-honorem' para que formulase un proyecto de ley de elecciones" (page 141). Gives details (pages 141-142).
Chávez López 2002: Sánchez Cerro "dimitió el 1o de marzo de 1931 y entrega el mando al Arzobispo de Lima, Monseñor Holguín. Este entrega igualmente el mando al Presidente de la Junta de Gobierno Provisional, Dr. Ricardo Elías, Presidente de la Corte Suprema, mientras que en el Sur se constituye la Junta Revolucionaria Civil encabezada por David Samanez Ocampo...El 05 de marzo de 1931 Elías recibe un ultimátum del Comandante Gustavo Jiménez para que deje Palacio de Gobierno. Inmediatamente, Jiménez invita a Samanez Ocampo a venir a Lima...(E)l 11 de marzo de 1931 [Jiménez le] entrega el mando al nuevo Presidente de la Junta de Gobierno" (page 8).
Davies 1974: "On March 1, Sánchez Cerro resigned and went to Europe, leaving the civilian leader David Samánez Ocampo, the man most acceptable to the Arequipa insurgents, as the titular head of government" (page 99). "The junta called elections for October, 1931, to select a president and a Constituent Congress" (page 103).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 1-5/3: "Ricardo Leoncio Elías es elegido presidente de la Junta Militar de Gobierno, que reemplaza a la del comandante Sánchez Cerro" (page 520). 5-11/3: "El teniente coronel Gustavo A. Jiménez reemplaza a Ricardo Leoncio Elías en la Presidencia de la Junta Militar de Gobierno" (page 521). 11/3: "David Samanez Ocampo es eligido Presidente de la Junta de Gobierno, que convoca a nuevas elecciones" (page 521).
Klarén 2000: "(A) series of military revolts broke out throughout the country...Unable to control the situation, the president suddenly resigned from the junta on March 1 and announced that he would go into voluntary exile. This announcement threw the government into turmoil as to who would govern" (page 269).
Masterson 1991: "(W)ith the nation on the verge of civil war, [Sánchez Cerro] resigned as provisional president on 1 March...After a turbulent ten days, a civilian political leader from Arequipa, David Samanez Ocampo, was named head of a new provisional ‘Junta,' which ruled Peru from 10 March to 8 December 1931...The government was...soon able to announce its plans to hold national elections for a new president and a constituent congress in which all parties except the communists would be allowed to participate" (page 44).
Werlich 1978: "A series of army revolts and a naval mutiny brought Sánchez Cerro's resignation on March 1, 1931. Before departing for diplomatic exile in France, [he] promised that he would return for the next presidential election...The anti-Sánchez Cerro forces installed a new provisional government under the civilian presidency of David Samánez Ocampo, an old Piérolista...The interim regime immediately began preparations for elections in October to choose a constitutional president and a national assembly" (page 190).
Chávez López 2002: "El 13 de mayo de 1931 el Ministro de la Junta Nacional de Gobierno, Francisco Tamayo nombra una Comisión para que elabore un anteproyecto de ley electoral" (page 8). "La Junta Nacional de Gobierno aceptó el anteproyecto elaborado por la Comisión con pequeñas enmiendas y fue convertido el 26 de mayo de 1931 en el ‘Estatuto Electoral' Decreto Ley No 7177" (pages 9-10). Gives details of electoral law. El decreto "estableció el voto directo para la elección de Presidente de la República, diputados y senadores, bajo la vigilancia del Jurado Nacional de Elecciones" (page 14).
Klarén 2000: "One important measure undertaken by the new junta headed by Samanez Ocampo was a revised electoral law decreed in May 1931. The law removed property qualifications on voting and instituted the secret ballot, so that now all literate men over age twenty-one could take part in forth-coming elections. As a result, the size of the electorate rose 59 percent, from 203,882 in 1919 to 323,623 in 1931. This increase in eligible voters served as the basis for the organization of mass-based political parties for the first time in Peruvian history" (page 269).
López Jiménez 2005: "(E)l estatuto electoral de 1931...introdujo importantes innovaciones en el sistema electoral: la creación de un organismo electoral autónomo, la representación de las minorías, el voto secreto y obligatorio y la tecnificación del registro electoral...Respecto al sistema electoral, el Estatuto de 1931 sentó las bases para un sistema proporcional" (page 118). Gives additional details.
Masterson 1991: "(A) new electoral law was promulgated on 27 May that instituted the secret ballot and removed property qualifications for voting. These measures, while significantly increasing the size of the electorate, still did not grant the vote to the vast majority of Peru's impoverished Indian population. Most Indians were barred from the ballot box by the law's literacy requirement" (page 44). "Sánchez Cerro's backers received a temporary setback on 17 May, when the government announced its intention to prevent the army colonel's return to campaign for president. This decision was primarily the work of Lietuenant Colonel Jiménez, who was now Sánchez Cerro's chief political rival. Jiménez viewed his fellow officer's candidacy as a serious threat to the internal stability of the armed forces and for personal as well as ideological reasons favored the PAP in the upcoming elections" (page 45).
Paniagua Corazao 2003: "El Estatuto Electoral de 1931...creó...casi todas las instituciones ahora vigentes en materia electoral: sufragio secreto obligatorio; participación de minorías por lista incompleta; distritos electorales (departamentales); [y] órganos especificos de registro, administración y justicia electorales (jurados nacional y departamentales)" (page 46).
Pike 1967: The new "electoral law...removed property qualifications and awarded suffrage rights to all literate male citizens of twenty-one years of age or over. For the the first time in the country's history, moreover, the use of the secret ballot was provided by law" (page 256).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2008: "Desde 1931, las elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias se realizan el mismo día. Gracias a que el Parlamento se elige en su totalidad...y no parcialmente, existe un mayor grado de ‘simultaneidad electoral'" (page 836).
Werlich 1978: "A commission of prominent jurists and representatives of various political parties prepared a model electoral code, the most democratic in the nation's history. The law made voting compulsory for all literate males aged twenty-one to sixty. It provided for the careful registration and identification of voters, the secret ballot, and guarantees for the honest and open canvassing of returns, free from government influence. Although the code banned the Communist party, it established very liberal rules for the participation of other parties and the nomination of candidates" (page 190).
Masterson 1991: "The ‘Junta' was unable to block Sánchez Cerro's presidential bid because of his substantial popularity and in early June lifted its ban on the military leader's return" (page 45).
Klarén 2000: "(T)he election campaign...heated up in July 1931 with Sánchez Cerro's return from a four-month exile to run in the October elections for the presidency. The political vehicles for his campaign were the newly organized Partido Unión Revolucionario (UR) and the daily newspaper ‘La Opinión'" (page 271). "(A) network of 100 to 150 loosely organized Sanchezcerrista neighborhood clubs spontaneously sprang up in Lima's lower-class barrios..., perhaps numbering 20,000 members at the height of the electoral campaign" (page 272).
Masterson 1991: "Sánchez Cerro arrived in Peru on 7 July and began his campaign immediately. Ten days later, Haya de la Torre ended nearly nine years of exile with his return to Talara in northern Peru. The stage was now set for the most volatile campaign in Peruvian history. The elections, scheduled for early October, were preceded by a bitter campaign that intensified the already polarized political climate" (page 45). "During the 1931 campaign APRA experienced little success in gaining significant support from the armed forces...APRA's successful subversion of many armed forces personnel added immeasurably to the hostility of loyal military officers who sought to maintain military unity" (page 46). "(C)onservative politicians formed the ‘Partido Union Revolucionaría'...as the vehicle for Sánchez Cerro's presidential bid shortly after the colonel's return to Peru in July 1931" (page 47).
Peralta Ruiz 2005: "En julio de 1931, la Junta de Gobierno presidida por el general David Samanez Ocampo conformó la comisión de reforma electoral presidida por César Antonio Ugarte que se impuso crear un poder electoral autónomo, garantizar en el Parlamento la representación de las minorías, organizar un centro de estadística y censo electoral e introducir el voto secreto y obligatorio" (page 107).
Chávez López 2002: El estatuto electoral es "parcialmente modificado por el Decreto Ley No 7287, también de la Junta Nacional de Gobierno, de 4 de agosto de 1931" (page 9).
Klarén 2000: "Haya de la Torre...returned to Peru in August after seven years in exile to organize his fledgling APRA Party and to oppose Sánchez Cerro with his own bid for the presidency" (page 272).
Chávez López 2002: "(E)l 22 de septiembre de 1931...se instaló el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones" (page 11).
October 11: election (Sánchez Cerro)
Alexander 1957: "Sánchez Cerro...had been elected President in the August [October?], 1931, poll, in which Haya de la Torre had been the Aprista nominee. The Communists apparently had nominated no candidate in this election, and are alleged by the Apristas to have supported Sánchez Cerro" (page 227).
Astiz 1969: "When the election was finally held and the results announced, the incumbent was given 155,378 votes and Haya de la Torre, APRA's presidential candidate, 106,551" (page 97).
Chávez López 2002: Discusses the 1931 election and gives results (pages 18-19). "(L)a elección del Congreso de la República no fue completa, por ello el 05 de junio de 1932 se llevó a cabo las elecciones parciales" (page 18).
Davies 1974: Discusses the election and gives selected statistics (pages 105-106, 112). "A total of 392,363 men were registered to vote in 1931, with a racial breakdown as follows: mestizos, 234,546; Indians, 97,940; whites, 56,135; and Negroes, 3,736. The great mass of Indians were illiterate and thus disqualified, as seen in the low number of registrations in the heavily Indian departments of the southern sierra" (page 106).
García Belaúnde 1986: "Proceso electoral de 1931" (page 64).
García Montero 2001: "Las elecciones de 1931 fueron las primeras en las que el PAP participó. En ellas, jugando como abanderado de las clases populares, tuvo amplio poder de convocatoria, alcanzando el segundo puesto. Sin embargo, entre sus simpatizantes hubo proclamaciones de un triunfo, alegando la existencia de fraude en los comicios, los que llevó a los apristas a desencadenar conductas poco democráticas" (page 415).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: "Elecciones nacionales en las cuales compiten el comandante Luis M. Sánchez Cerro y el líder aprista Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Los comicios son ganados por el candidato militar, pero estos resultados no son aceptados por el APRA" (page 521).
Kantor 1969: "The election of 1931 was Peru's golden opportunity to reform its archaic political and social institutions. The ‘Apristas' program called for democracy in government, the assimilation of the Indians into the mainstream of the nation's life by means of education and an end to their exploitation by the semifeudal land-tenure system, the abolition of illiteracy by reorganizing the educational system, an attack upon alcoholism and coca chewing, agrarian reform, industrialization, and the improvement of public health...The ‘Apristas' had elected twenty-seven members of the Congress, and they decided to support constitutional government in the hope of winning the next election" (page 471).
Klaiber 1992: "(T)he Popular Union (UP) was but one of twenty-seven parties that entered the presidential contest. And in the final stretch it entered into an alliance with other parties to stop the advance of the two big blocs APRA and Sánchez Cerro" (pages 214-215). "For the constitutional congress Sánchez Cerro's Revolutionary Union party won eight-three seats; APRA, twenty-nine; the Decentralists and independents, thirty-three. The UP's candidates were included in the latter group" (page 220). "After the elections the UP ceased to exist" (page 221).
Klarén 2000: "Sánchez Cerro defeated Haya for president by a margin of 152,062 (50.7 percent) to 106,007 (35.4 percent) in the October 1931 elections. Nationwide, Sánchez Cerro won in his home department of Piura in the north; in the south, where he had launched his ‘revolution' against Leguía; and in the center, including populous Lima-Callao. Haya had a majority in his native north-coast region and in the Amazonian department of Loreto" (page 274).
Masterson 1991: "With the arrival of national election day on 11 October 1931, a thoroughly polarized political climate existed in Peru. Attempts by moderate centrist groups to have Sánchez Cerro and Haya de la Torre withdraw in favor of a compromise candidate were rejected by both men. Despite fears of possible election day violence, the voting was peaceful" (page 47).
McClintock 1998: "(I)n 1931 Sánchez Cerro won a relatively open and fair election. Sánchez Cerro defeated the political party APRA..., Peru's first mass political party, which at this time perceived itself and was perceived as a militantly leftist party. Without substantiation, APRA leaders (Apristas) denounced the 1931 electoral outcome as fraudulent" (pages 99-100).
Pike 1967: "Because Gustavo Jiménez and the military junta enforced the new regulations, resisting what undoubtedly was a serious temptation to intervene, the elections provided an honest reflection of the will of the enfranchised citizens. Sánchez Cerro received 152,062 votes, and Haya de la Torre 106,007. Two minor candidates between them garnered some forty thousand ballots" (page 256).
Stein 1980: "(I)n the October 1931 presidential election the urban masses clearly took advantage of a new electoral law that eased enfranchisement and provided for the secret ballot to give the Sánchezcerrista and Aprista movements a virtual monopoly of national politics" (page 20). "Not unexpectedly, individuals belonging to Peru's traditional elites were most alarmed by this first substantial massification of politics in Peruvian history" (page 21). "The election" (pages 188-202).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Congreso constituyente 1931-1936" (pages 123-124). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres." "Elecciones congreso constituyente 1931. Resultado departamental" (page 589). Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones congreso constituyente 1931. Resultado nacional" (page 607). Gives votes for four candidates, "votos válidos," "votos nulos y blancos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones congreso constituyente 1931. Resultado departamental" (page 608). Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos miles," and "inscritos miles."
Werlich 1978: "Because of strict security measures, the election of October 11, 1931, was surprisingly peaceful. The early returns placed Haya de la Torre in the lead, and his partisans complimented the government" (page 194).
Werlich 1978: "In late November...the National Election Board announced the official results of the balloting. Sánchez Cerro had won the presidency with 152,000 votes, Haya de la Torre had received 106,000 ballots, and the candidates of the two moderate coalitions had polled a combined total of 41,000...The 1931 electoral census indicates that APRA was rejected by large segments of the very sectors toward which it had directed its strongest appeal...Peru's poorest folk, including the bulk of the native population, did not vote" (page 195). Gives additional details.
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 8/12: "Asume la Presidencia Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, candidato de la Unión Revolucionaria, en un ambiente de tensión provocado por la declaratoria de Haya de la Torre como Presidente Moral del Perú" (page 521).
Kantor 1969: "Sánchez Cerro refused to govern constitutionally. By December of 1931, two months after the election, the ‘Aprista' headquarters were closed by the army" (page 471).
Klarén 2000: "Sánchez Cerro was inaugurated president on December 8" (page 274).
Masterson 1991: "Haya de la Torre solicited the help of sympathetic army officers and ‘Guardia Civil' personnel in planned civil-military insurrections aimed at blocking the president-elect's inauguration on 8 December. Due to a lack of coordination among APRA and dissident army and police units, however, small-scale uprising throughout Peru were easily quelled by government troops during the first week of December. Almost immediately after donning the presidential sash, Sánchez Cerro moved to deal with the APRA-subverted military elements...Most importantly, the chief executive also made changes in the command assignments of the nation's top army officers. He promoted his most trusted comrades and eliminated troublesome rivals. The most prominent victim of these purges was Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez, who was placed on inactive duty soon after Sánchez Cerro took office" (pages 47-48).
Pike 1967: "On the very day of Sánchez Cerro's inauguration and of the ‘Aprista' rally in Trujillo the constituent assembly, elected at the same time as the President, began its sessions" (page 263).
Werlich 1978: "The constituent assembly installed in December 1931 had 64 supporters of Sánchez Cerro and 23 Apristas. Members of nearly a score of other parties divided the remaining seats in the 145-man, unicameral legislature" (page 196).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: "Se reúne una Asamblea Constituyente para cambiar la Constitución de 1920" (page 522).
Masterson 1991: "An emergency law forced through congress in early January 1932 established virtual martial law" (page 48).
Kantor 1969: "(B)y February 1932 the ‘Aprista' congressmen had been deported and most of the ‘Aprista' leaders were jailed, among them Haya de la Torre" (page 471)
Masterson 1991: "By mid-February the president had arrested and exiled all twenty-three of the ‘Aprista' deputies elected to congress in October. Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez was also deported to Chile and charged with engaging in political subversion" (page 48).
McClintock 1994: "In February 1932, a young Aprista made an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Sánchez Cerro" (page 369).
Pike 1967: "Following this the mutilated assembly, in which the rightists denied a significant role even to the centrists, lost the confidence of the people, who viewed with indifference the constitution that it completed in 1932 and that the government promulgated in January of the following year" (page 263).
Werlich 1978: "In February 1932, the government announced the discovery of an Aprista plot to overthrow the regime. Violating the constitutional immunity of legislators from arrest, police invaded the chambers of the national assembly and seized the Aprista congressmen. A staccato of violent events now began" (page 196).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 6/3: "José Melgar Márquez, joven afiliado al APRA, atenta contra la vida del presidente Sánchez Cerro" (page 522).
Masterson 1991: "Political tensions intensified on 6 March when a young ‘Aprista' wounded Sánchez Cerro in a Miraflores church in an abortive assassination attempt" (page 48).
Masterson 1991: "(O)rders were issued for the arrest of Haya de la Torre on charges of subverting public order. The APRA leader was finally captured on 6 May" (page 48).
June: partial congressional election
Chávez López 2002: "(L)a elección del Congreso de la República [de 1931] no fue completa, por ello el 05 de junio de 1932 se llevó a cabo las elecciones parciales de representantes al Congreso de la República por Ancash, Cajamarca y Loreto. El JNE se instaló el 09 de junio de 1932" (page 18).
Alexander 1957: "In July, 1932, the Apristas had staged a revolt in the northern city of Trujillo. The rebellion had lasted for seven days, and had been followed by one of the bloodiest massacres which has occurred in Latin America in this century" (page 228).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 7-13/7: "Se produce la Revolución de Trujillo...De Lima se envían refuerzos por aire, mar y tierra" (page 522).
Hunefeldt 2004: "On July 7 Trujillo took up arms. In response the national government sent out troops and planes to quell the rebellion, then summarily executed 5,000 ‘apristas' by a firing squad...These events became the basis for a long-lasting, hate-filled, bitter fight between ‘apristas' and Peru's military that lasted the next 50 years" (page 200).
Masterson 1991: "Once Trujillo had been taken, Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez was slated to assume command of the revolt as it spread to other parts of Peru" (page 49). "Responsibility for the massacre has never been accurately fixed, but Sánchez Cerro's troops indulged in massive executions of suspected APRA revolutionaries in the nearby ruins of Chan Chan" (page 50).
McClintock 1998: "Sánchez Cerro arrested APRA's leaders. In turn, Aprista activists rebelled in Trujillo, capturing the local army garrison and executing about sixty soldiers and officers. In retaliation, when the army regained control of the city, they rounded up and shot more than one thousand suspected Apristas" (page 100).
Werlich 1978: "The premature uprising at Trujillo doomed the national conspiracy" (page 197). "The tragic events at Trujillo poisoned Peru's political atmosphere...In succeeding years, anti-Aprismo became entrenched within the armed services...The deep hostility between Peru's largest political party and the nation's most powerful institution would stifle the country's democratic aspirations for many years" (page 198).
Werlich 1978: "Startling news that reached Lima on September 1, 1932, diverted the country's attention from the bloodshed at Trujillo. The previous evening 300 armed Peruvian civilians had seized the town of Leticia in the Amazonian territory recently ceded to Colombia" (page 198).
Adelman 2006: "In the 1930s...an old guard hung on to power while the economic order collapsed and the new one slowed in emerging. After a massacre of ‘apristas'...in 1932, a succession of generals occupied the presidency, vowing to maintain stability at all costs...(T)he absence of a thriving industrial base meant that manufacturing did not generate social classes, manufacturers, or industrial workers interested in or capable of becoming the core of a new social alignment" (page 56).
Klarén 2000: "(T)he Assembly...formally became the Congress after promulgating the new constitution in 1933...The Assembly...confirmed once again that only literate male citizens aged twenty-one or older (and not serving in the armed forces) could vote and reaffirmed the sacred union of Church and state" (page 275).
Pike 1967: "One result of the rightist strength in the assembly after the arrest of its ‘Aprista' members was that the constitution which it produced called for a senate that would be elected by corporations representing the country's various functional groups. In actual practice, however, this feature of the constitution was never applied and the senate continued to be elected according to geographic regions and on the basis of non-weighted votes...The president...was to be elected for a five-year term by the direct secret vote of all literate male citizens twenty-one years of age or over and not in the armed forces" (pages 263-264).
Valdés 2000: "1933: La Asamblea Constituyente, que había sido conformada después de la Revolución de Arequipa, promulga este año una nueva Constitución...No se concede el voto a las mujeres...Sin embargo, se otorga constitucionalmente el derecho femenino al voto municipal, el que nunca llegó a ejercerse" (Anexo: La lucha por la ciudadanía femenina: Perú).
Werlich 1978: "In February 1933, Peruvian and Colombian forces clashed on the Amazon and the two countries broke diplomatic relations...A major war seemed imminent" (page 199).
Masterson 1991: "On 11 March, [Lieutenant Colonel] Jiménez led about three hundred men into revolt. But expected ‘Aprista' support from the surrounding areas failed to materialize, and the rebel leader's forces were swiftly defeated by government troops on...14 March. Rather than surrender, Jiménez shot himself. The insurrection further convinced APRA's military enemies of the party's subversive potential" (pages 51-52).
Alcántara Sáez 1989: La constitución de 1933 "formalmente estuvo vigente hasta 1979" (page 127).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 9/4: "La Asamblea Constituyente aprueba la nueva Constitución" (page 523).
Levitt 2002: "This document formalized Peru's bicameral legislative structure, consisting of a Chamber of Deputies (lower house) and a Senate (upper house)" (page 63). "And rather than holding new legislative elections, the constituent assembly that had drafted the 1933 charter proclaimed, even before the murder of Sánchez Cerro, that it would assume the role of congress until the 1936 elections" (page 64).
López Jiménez 2005: "La Constitución de 1933 mantenía excluidos del derecho de sufragio a las mujeres, a los analfabetos y a los jóvenes menores de 21 años. Aunque reconocía los principios del sufragio directo, igual, secreto y obligatorio, permitió la exclusión...del Apra y el Partido Comunista como partidos de filiación internacional" (pages 117-118).
Masterson 1991: "(A) previously named Constituent Assembly promulgated a new constitution on 9 April 1933, which clearly sanctioned the prominent role of the armed forces in national affairs" (page 52).
Vargas 1994: "(T)he 1933 constitution incorporated neither women nor peasants' right to vote" (page 579).
Werlich 1978: "The president, under the 1933 document, was to be elected by the direct, compulsory vote of literate males aged twenty-one or older for a term of five (later extended to six) years. He could not be reelected before the intervention of another full term. With the consent of the legislature, the chief executive appointed a cabinet that had its own presiding officer, called a prime minister or premier...The legislative branch of government...was bicameral. As in the past, the chamber of deputies represented regional constituencies and was apportioned on the basis of population" (pages 199-200).
Alexander 1957: "On April 30, 1933, Colonel Sánchez Cerro had been assassinated...(T)he government of General Benavides, which took over when Sánchez Cerro was killed, had given the country a brief period of political respite. Haya de la Torre had been released, and the political parties had been allowed to function once again" (page 228).
Chávez López 2002: "El Congreso designó como Presidente de la República al General Oscar R. Benavides, hasta 1936" (page 19).
Davies 1974: Benavides "came from an upper-class background and sought above all to maintain peace in the country, imposing a tight dictatorship in the process. Upon taking power, he released all political prisoners, including Apristas, and allowed political exiles to return. However, when Apra requested new congressional elections, Benavides refused and again suppressed the party" (page 121).
Levitt 2002: "In lieu of a vice-president, the chain of presidential succession required that congress elect a successor to serve out the duration of the deceased president's term. The assembly voted overwhelmingly for General Oscar Benavides-despite the fact that the twelve-day-old constitution explicitly barred military officers in active service from serving as president" (page 64).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 30/4: "Luis M. Sánchez Cerro es asesinado...Asume el poder el general Óscar R. Benavides, presidente provisorio por designación del Congreso Constituyente" (page 523).
Masterson 1991: "Standing aloof from the intense populist politics and violence of the Sánchez Cerro years was General Oscar R. Benavides. Nevertheless, it would be Benavides, the army's most prestigious officer, who would dominate Peruvian civil-military affairs from Sánchez Cerro's death until the end of the decade" (page 41). "From the suppression of the Trujillo insurrection in July, 1932 until his death at the hands of an ‘Aprista' assassin in April, 1933, Sánchez Cerro's attention was drawn from internal political affairs to a deepening border crisis with neighboring Colombia" (page 51). The assassin's "'Aprista' affiliation added to the party's growing reputation as a violently radical organization, and thus the continued proscription of APRA for nearly all of the period until 1945 was more easily justified by the party's enemies. Within hours after the assassin struck, the Constituent Assembly met and selected General Benavides as president for the remainder of the slain executive's term. The assembly acted in direct violation of the new constitution, which prohibited active members of the armed forces from assuming the presidency" (page 52).
McClintock 1994: "The 1933 constitution did not yet provide for a vice presidency; rather, in the event of vacancy in the presidential office, the congress was to elect a successor within three days. Upon the assassination of Sánchez Cerro, the congress chose General Oscar Benavides as the new president. The congress was influenced by the general's effective performance as provisional president during a political crisis in 1914 and pragmatically disregarded the fact that, as an active member of the armed forces, Benavides was ineligible" (page 369).
McClintock 1998: "(I)n 1933, Sánchez Cerro was assassinated by an Aprista. The conflict between the Peruvian military and APRA established a strong mutual interest between the military and Peru's traditional elites: the exclusion of APRA from power" (page 100).
McClintock 2003: "Benavides had served in various military and diplomatic posts in Europe, and he was friendly toward Italy in particular. In part as a result of Benavides's interest in cooperation with Italy, his government was cool toward the United States" (page 16).
Pike 1967: "Oscar R. Benavides (1876-1945), who nearly twenty years earlier had ousted Guillero Billinghurst from power succeeded Sánchez Cerro in the presidency, chosen by congress to serve out the unexpired term of the assassinated executive" (page 268).
Werlich 1978: "The Constitution of 1933, unfortunately, had not provided for a vice-president. In the event of a vacancy in the office of president, the charter required congress to elect a successor within three days. A few hours after the assassination of Sánchez Cerro a nearly unanimous vote of the national assembly gave Gen. Oscar R. Benavides, the former provisional president, a mandate to complete the term of the fallen chief of state...Ironically, the general legally was ineligible to succeed Sánchez Cerro. The constitution barred active members of the armed forces from election to the presidency. The political realities of the moment, however, were far more compelling than the dictates of the twelve-day-old charter. As commander of the army, de facto power already rested with the officer. But more importantly, the general was a respected national figure with strong ties to prominent Civilista families and he had governed the country creditably during a similar crisis in 1914" (page 201).
Masterson 1991: "During early May, martial law was lifted, and many political prisoners were released...As Benavides drew further away from the politics of his predecessor, the ‘Sánchez-Cerristas' grew violent" (page 53).
Werlich 1978: "Benavides's moderate approach to his country's internal and external conflicts quickly brought him the hostility of powerful right-wing and nationalist groups...The administration's foreign and domestic policies were denounced by Sánchez Cerro's Revolutionary Union, which became increasingly fascist in its orientation. Now under the leadership of Luis A. Flores..the party organized several antigovernment demonstrations during the next three years" (pages 202-203).
Masterson 1991: "Benavides also announced elections to fill the vacated congressional seats [APRA] had lost in February, 1932" (page 53).
Werlich 1978: "Benavides retained Sánchez Cerro's cabinet until he had secured his position. Then, at the end of June 1933, he installed a new, conciliatory panel of ministers under the premiership of Jorge Prado y Ugarteche. A few days later, Prado announced that elections would be scheduled to fill the vacant congressional seats formerly held by APRA" (page 202).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 9/8: "Mediante la Ley de Amnistía, el aprismo, que había estado proscrito, vuelve legalmente a emprender sus actividades políticas" (page 523).
Hunefeldt 2004: "At the beginning of his presidency, Benavides attempted to negotiate with ‘apristas,' and a general amnesty allowed Haya de la Torre out of jail and into exile, after which popular protests subsided. Oligarchic reaction to these initial negotiations was to stifle any government acquiescence to popular demands" (page 201).
Kantor 1969: "In August 1933 Benavides had two laws passed by his rump Congress: one was an amnesty freeing political prisoners; the other was a law barring persons affiliated with international organizations from running for office. The latter measure was a new attempt to suppress the ‘Apristas,' but it did not succeed" (page 472).
Werlich 1978: "Benavides proclaimed a partial political amnesty on August 10, and Premier Prado personally released Haya de la Torre and many other Apristas from prison" (page 202).
Masterson 1991: "(I)n November [APRA] became the dominant member of a newly formed political coalition, the ‘Alianza Nacional'...The ‘Alianza' demanded that the president call elections to select an entirely new congress, not simply fill the relatively small number of vacated seats. The demand was rejected by Benavides" (page 54).
Werlich 1978: APRA "demanded the reinstallation of the twenty-three Apristas who had been ousted from the legislature in 1932. Following that, APRA wanted congressional elections to replace the entire national assembly whose mandate, the party claimed, had expired with the promulgation of the new constitution" (page 203). "The rejuvenated APRA made its public debut on November 12, 1933" (page 206). "(F)our democratic, centrist parties announced the formation of the National Alliance...(T)he new coalition pledged to work for the restoration of APRA's twenty-three congressmen to the national assembly" (page 207).
Werlich 1978: "(A)s the regime came under attack from both the right and left, the president became increasingly reluctant to see an influx of either Apristas or Flores's fascists into congress...Benavides repeatedly postponed the promised congressional elections" (pages 203-204).
Werlich 1978: "APRA's youth arm, the Federación Aprista Juvenil (FAJ) [was formally] inaugurated in January 1934, it sought to develop boys aged twelve to twenty-one into future party leaders" (page 205).
Werlich 1978: "A preliminary agreement on the Leticia dispute in early May 1934 brought an abrupt shift in Benavides's domestic political strategy...It seemed certain to encounter strong opposition in congress and throughout the nation...Citing the need for tranquillity until the ratification of the protocol with Colombia, the regime postponed the congressional election until September" (page 208).
Werlich 1978: "As the September election date approached, congress had not yet approved the Leticia settlement and the government delayed the balloting until November" (page 208).
Kantor 1969: "Elections had been scheduled to complete the Congress, but now the government canceled them and abolished all civil liberty. The ‘Apristas' were driven underground. This was to be the continuing pattern for the next decades. Whenever liberty was permitted, the ‘Aprista' Party flourished, whereupon dictatorship was reintroduced. When the dictator slackened his grip, the ‘Apristas' revived and grew stronger until they were driven underground again" (page 472).
Masterson 1991: "In the year following the formation of the ‘Alianza Nacional,' the government defaulted on its promise to hold congressional elections. Mistrusting APRA and clearly fearing the renewed internal discord that elections might produce, Benavides canceled the elections in early November, 1934 without announcing a new date for the voting" (page 54).
Werlich 1978: "The national assembly ratified the protocol on November 2. But the preceding day the regime had announced the sixth postponement of the election-ostensibly to purge 4,000 fraudulent registrations (about 1 percent of the total) from the voting lists. The predicted Aprista revolt began on November 26, 1934" (page 208).
Masterson 1991: "After a year of frustration, the ‘Alianza Nacional' collapsed, and APRA leaders once again decided to employ force to attain national power. During the latter part of November and early December, 1934, APRA instigated a series of minor insurrections throughout Peru" (page 54).
Werlich 1978: "Attacks on Cuzco in early December, and Cajamarca a month later also failed and troops quashed general strikes in several southern cities. The regime arrested nearly 1,000 Apristas, including many top leaders, but Haya de la Torre eluded capture" (page 208).
Masterson 1991: "(C)ontinued ‘Aprista' subversive activity was met by a strengthened National Emergency Law enacted in February, 1935" (page 54).
Werlich 1978: "Shortly after the suppression of the rebellion, Benavides secured new legislation that greatly increased his emergency powers and provided harsher penalties for political agitators and persons bearing arms against the government. The regime outlawed both the Aprista and Communist labor federations. Still, Benavides hoped to avoid the severity of the Sánchez Cerro dictatorship. Within a month after the uprising, all imprisoned Apristas had been exiled" (page 209).
Davies 1974: "By supreme decree of July 8, 1935, [Benavides] created the...Consejo Superior de Asuntos Indígenas" (page 122).
McClintock 1994: "The 1936 constitutional breakdown" (pages 368-369).
Werlich 1978: "Benavides's mandate was to expire in December 1936, at the end of Sánchez Cerro's legal term. The president declared that he had no desire to remain in office beyond that time and scheduled elections for October 11 to choose a new chief executive and a parliament to replace the national assembly" (page 209).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 13/5: "José de la Riva-Agüero funda en Lima la agrupación política Acción Patriótica" (page 526).
Gardiner 1975: "The Peruvian immigration law of June 1936 became the harbinger of troubles for the Japanese...Some Japanese-Peruvians...hastened to be naturalized, something previously done by very few Japanese. Peruvian officials, in turn, concluded that this amounted to a loophole in the legislation" (pages 38-39). Gives details of the law.
Masterson 1991: "By June the presidential campaign was in full swing, with four candidates announcing their intention to seek office" (page 55). Gives details.
Werlich 1978: "To embarrass the regime, APRA had its friends submit nominating petitions for its presidential and vice-presidential candidates-Haya de la Torre and Col. César E. Pardo" (page 209).
Gardiner 1975: "(A) new decree, that of July 11, 1936, temporarily suspended the authorization of letters of naturalization...By midsummer 1936, Japanese relations with Peru were approaching a shambles. More important to Japan than the emigration of additional Japanese to Peru was the maintenance of unrestricted opportunity for those already there" (page 39).
Masterson 1991: "Undoubtedly responding to APRA's revolutionary scheme, the National Election Board on 5 September disbarred APRA and Haya de la Torre from participation in the national elections scheduled for 11 October...With the party out of the running, Luis Antonio Eguiguren, candidate of the ‘Frente Democrático,' joined the presidential race" (page 56). Gives details.
Werlich 1978: "As expected, the National Election Board disqualified the Aprista slate, citing Article 53 of the constitution which outlawed ‘international parties.' Less than a month before the election APRA approached Luis Antonio Eguigueren, the highly respected leader of the moderately leftist Social Democratic party, and persuaded him to abandon Prado's National Front. Eguiguren hastily organized his own Democratic Front coalition and APRA instructed its members to vote for him" (pages 209-210).
October 11: presidential election
Baldeón Gutiérrez 2005: "Resultados en el ámbito nacional" (pages 479-481). Table gives "Cómputo de los votos escrutados para Presidente de la República y cuadro comparativo de los porcentajes de las fuerzas de derecha e izquierda en las elecciones generales de 1936" (page 481).
Chávez López 2002: Discusses the election and its aftermath (pages 19-23). "Resultado de las elecciones politicas generales de 1931" (page 23). Gives votes for four presidential candidates by department.
Davies 1974: "(E)lections [are] held on October 11. At that time, there were approximately eighteen political parties in Peru, but most of them combined to form fronts for the election" (page 125). Gives details.
García Montero 2001: "El APRA pretendió competir pero Óscar Benavides, el nuevo presidente tras el asesinato de Sánchez Cerro, valiéndose del artículo 53 de la Constitución de 1933, que prohibía la participación en la política de partidos de naturaleza internacional, le negó este derecho. De ahí que la organización optara por dar su voto a Luis Antonio Eguiguren, con lo que éste obtuvo mayoría" (page 415).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 11/10: "Gana las elecciones presidenciales Luis Antonio Eguiguren, quien derrota a Luis A. Flores (UR) y a Jorge Prado (Partido Civil)" (page 527).
Hunefeldt 2004: "In the 1936 presidential election Lima's former mayor, Luis Antonio Eguiguren, won with the support of APRA" (page 202).
Kantor 1969: "On October 11, 1936, Benavides arranged to hold a new presidential election after banning the ‘Apristas' from the ballot. The ‘Apristas' therefore supported an unknown candidate, Dr. Luis Antonio Eguiguren" (page 472).
Pike 1967: Describes the presidential campaign and the election (pages 273-274).
Werlich 1978: "Peruvians cast their ballots without incident on October 11, 1936. With three candidates appealing to the political right and only one man representing the left, the outcome of the contest was predictable" (page 210).
Alexander 1957: "An election had been held in 1936. Although the government had not permitted the Apristas to name a candidate at this time, a nominee backed by the Apristas was winning when General Benavides suddenly suspended further counting of the ballots, and had Congress elect him for an additional period of three years" (page 229).
Baldeón Gutiérrez 2005: "Vistos los resultados parciales, el gobierno decide anular todo el proceso electoral...Cuando Benavides se da cuenta que el fraude no puede impedir el triunfo de Eguiguren, aún tiene la esperanza de apelar al desprestigio de la representatividad de Eguiguren (el candidato de la izquierda) frente a una derecha que, aunque dividida, era ampliamente mayoritaria...El 22 de octubre, Benavides cambia su gabinete electoral por uno militar. Ese mismo día el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones suspende el escrutinio en toda la república. La etapa más oscura de la dictadura de Benavides comenzaba así, y duraría hasta 1939" (page 482).
Kantor 1969: "When the votes were counted, to General Benavides' surprise, Dr. Eguiguren had been elected. Benavides immediately canceled the election, had his term extended, and abolished what was left of the Congress" (page 472).
Klarén 2000: "When [Luis Antonio] Eguiguren took an early lead in the October voting, Benavides suspended the count and replaced his cabinet with an all-military one. Under pressure from the president, Congress, on the pretext that Apristas had indeed voted for Eguiguren, annulled the election and extended Benavides's term to December 8, 1939. Benavides then disbanded the Congress and assumed full dictatorial powers for the next three years" (page 28).
Masterson 1991: "With APRA's voting support, Eguiguren moved into an early lead and appeared headed for an electoral victory until Benavides ordered the National Election Board to suspend the vote tabulation on 21 October" (page 56).
McClintock 1994: "Victory for an Aprista-backed candidate was unacceptable to Peru's elites...and the congress nullifed the election" (page 369).
Werlich 1978: "After two weeks of counting votes, Eguiguren apparently held a plurality sufficient for election, perhaps 40 percent of the ballots. Flores, Prado, and Villarán-in that order-divided the remaining 60 percent of the votes. Probably under orders from the president, the National Election Board suspended its canvass before the count had been completed. The tribunal then disqualified Eguiguren and the congressional candidates of his coalition on the grounds that they had received the votes of the proscribed APRA party" (page 210).
Baldeón Gutiérrez 2005: "(E)l Congreso Constituyente, en sesiones extraordinarias, declara ilegales los votos a favor del Partido Social Demócrata; el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones anula las elecciones generales; y el Congreso, finalmente, prorroga el mandato de Benavides hasta 1939" (page 482).
Davies 1974: "Immediately after annulling the 1936 elections, Benavides forced the Constituent Congress to approve a law extending his term to December, 1939. Following the passage of this law, Benavides declared that the Congress had completed its work and dissolved it. All subsequent legislation took the form of executive laws and decrees" (page 126).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 3/11: "El presidente Óscar R. Benavides anula las elecciones, alegando el apoyo aprista al candidato vencedor Luis A. Eguiguren" (page 527).
Masterson 1991: "As most Peruvians anticipated, the National Congress then met on 4 November and annulled the election on the basis of illegal ‘Aprista' participation in support of Eguiguren...After gaining the assurance of support from most of Lima's senior military officers, on 14 November Benavides had the congress extend his presidential term until 8 December 1939. He thus assumed full dictatorial powers; no congress would serve for the remainder of his term since the elections to replace that body had been voided" (page 56).
McClintock 1994: "At Benavides's urging, the legislature agreed to extend his term for another three years, provide him dictatorial powers, and dissolve itself. In other words, Benavides staged his own coup" (page 369).
Werlich 1978: Benavides "called an emergency session of the national assembly, whose term was about to expire. The president presented that body with his formula for resolving the crisis: 1) the nullification of the entire election; 2) the extension of Benavides's term for an additional three years; and 3) the amplification of the President's powers, enabling him to legislate by decree...In mid-November...the national assembly assented to Benavides's wishes and dissolved itself" (page 210).
Werlich 1978: "On December 8, 1936, the day on which Peru was to have inaugurated a new president, Benavides issued a message to the nation. As in 1933, he denied any personal ambition in retaining power and asserted that he had acted only to save the country from anarchy...Armed with dictatorial powers, the general faced no major threat to his rule until the last year of his extended term" (page 211).
Alexander 1957: "During the election campaign of 1939, a Democratic Front was formed around Prado's candidacy. The Front was composed of a number of small parties and personal friends and followers of Prado, and was backed by the still illegal Communist Party" (page 229).
Haworth 1992: "Manuel Prado was successfully elected in 1939 with the backing of Benavides, the explicit constraining of a more conservative oligarchic candidate, José Quesadas Larrea, and the continuing exclusion of APRA from the political process" (page 173).
López Jiménez 2005: "La transición liberal dirigida de 1939" (pages 123-127). Describes the political campaign for the presidency. "Las candidaturas en 1939" (pages 151-153). "La campaña electoral de 1939" (pages 163-169).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 19/2: "El ministro de Gobierno, general Antonio Rodríguez, se subleva contra el presidente Óscar R. Benavides" (page 530).
Masterson 1991: "In a broad-based conspiracy Rodríguez allied with APRA and its chief political rival, the ‘Partido Union Revolucionaria,' in his plot against the Benavides regime...The stated goals of the Rodríguez movement were twofold: to restore full participation for all political parties and to guarantee complete amnesty as a prelude to national elections scheduled six months after the general's seizure of power" (page 58). "The Rodríguez conspiracy represented APRA's best chance to overthrow Benavides, but the movement lacked the critical support of junior army officers who had conspired with the party throughout the 1930s" (page 59).
Werlich 1978: "The minister of government, Gen. Antonio Rodríguez...proclaimed himself provisional chief of state...[He] had brought both APRA and the Revolutionary Union, mortal enemies, into the conspiracy...The Benavides regime appeared lost. But in the morning of February 19, Maj. Luis Rizo Patrón, the leader of the civil guard unit assigned to protect the president, confronted Rodríguez in the courtyard of the presidential residence and killed him...Although Benavides had been saved, his confidence was shaken badly. One month later, the general announced that he had no intention of remianing in power and that elections would be held in October" (page 218).
Masterson 1991: "During the last week of March, 1939, Benavides declared that he would leave office as scheduled on 8 December. He also announced that national elections for president and a National Congress would be held in late October" (page 66).
Pike 1967: In March 1939, Benavides "announced that presidential elections would shortly be held and that a new administration would be installed on 8 December. At the same time that they chose a new president, proclaimed Benavides, Peruvians would elect a congress" (page 275).
Levitt 2002: "(S)ince Benavides had dissolved the legislature, in 1939 he decided to submit a list of the constitutional ‘reforms' to a national plebiscite" (page 65). "These ‘reforms' weakened the legislature and strengthened the executive...The presidency...received an extended term of office" (page 66).
Masterson 1991: "(D)uring May the chief executive announced plans to conduct a plebiscite in order to lengthen the presidential term from four to six years and the congressional tenure from five to six" (page 67).
Werlich 1978: "Before leaving office Benavides wanted to alter the constitution for the benefit of his successors. Under the 1933 charter, however, amendments required the approval of a majority of both chambers of parliament during two regular sessions. No legislature existed in 1939, so the president submitted ten ‘constitutional reforms' to the public in an extralegal national plebiscite. The proposed changes increased the power of the executive at the expense of the legislature" (page 218). Gives details.
Chávez López 2002: Se expidió la "Ley No. 8901 del 14 de junio de 1939 que constituye el Estatuto Electoral, que norma el Registro Electoral Nacional y la obligatoriedad del voto, los Jurados Electorales" (page 26).
June 18: plebiscite
Masterson 1991: "Despite opposition from APRA and some junior army officers, by mid-June the longer terms of office had been approved and Manuel Prado's campaign was in full swing" (page 67).
Werlich 1978: "The plebiscite, held on June 18, was compulsory and carefully supervised by the government to insure the desired result. The regime reported that almost 90 percent of the voters favored the reforms" (pages 218-219).
Chávez López 2002: "Se expidió la Ley No. 8932 del 09 de agosto de 1939 que constituye la continuación del Estatuto Electoral. Nulidad de elecciones, personeros, escrutinio, proclamación, garantías electorales y penas" (page 30).
October 22: general election (Prado / Frente Patriótico)
Chávez López 2002: "Los candidatos fueron: José Quesada, representante de los propietarios exportadores; y Manuel Prado Ugarteche, representante de la burguesía nacional progresista; estos candidatos no contaron con el respaldo de los partidos políticos propios, pues agrupaciones como el Partido Civil no se había recompuesto y las nuevas organizaciones políticas enfrentaban graves problemas...El triunfo coronó a Manuel Prado, con una votación abrumadora de 271 mil 306 votos contra 76 mil 376 de su rival. Los votos en blanco y viciados alcanzaron un altísimo porcentaje sobrepasando el 40%" (page 26). "Resultado parcial de las Elecciones Políticas Generales de 1939 al 03 de noviembre" (page 28). Gives votes by department for president and two vice-presidents. "Resultado de las elecciones políticas generales de 1939" (page 29). Gives votes for the two candidates by department.
García Belaúnde 1986: "Proceso electoral de 1939" (page 65).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 22/10: "Se celebran elecciones generales en las que resulta elegido Manuel Prado Ugarteche" (page 530).
Hunefeldt 2004: "Prado won the 1939 elections with the support of the Communists, the silence of ‘apristas,' and a collective forgetfulness of his father Mariano I. Prado's cowardly abandonment of the country during the War of the Pacific...Prado and his Frente Patriótico, which was an umbrella party for many different political and social interest groups, won with 262,971 votes. His opponent, José Quesada, the leader of the profascist Unión Revolucionaria got only 76,000 votes" (page 205).
Kantor 1969: "In 1939 the government organized a controlled election that put Manuel Prado Ugarteche in the presidency" (page 472).
Klarén 2000: "When his term ended in 1939, [Benavides] then maneuvered in behalf of Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, who headed a moderate electoral alliance called the ‘Concentración Nacional...With the government counting the votes and many Apristas voting for him as the ‘lesser of two evils,' Prado easily won the election with 187,000 out of the 339,000 (55%) ballots cast'" (page 281).
Masterson 1991: Discusses the election (page 67).
Pike 1967: "Manuel Prado triumphed easily in elections that were by no means a model of the proper functioning of democratic processes. At the same time the proposed constitutional amendments were overwhelmingly approved" (page 276).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Congreso 1939-1945. Senadores" (page 120). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres." "Congreso 1939-1945. Diputados" (pages 121-122). Gives "dpto./provincia" and "apellidos y nombres." "Elecciones generales 1939. Resultado nacional" (page 606). Gives number of votes for each presidential candidate, "votos válidos," "votos nulos, blancos y ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones generales 1939. Resultado departamental" (page 606). Gives by department the number of votes for each party and "válidos miles."
Werlich 1978: Discusses the election (page 219).
Adelman 2006: "When the aristocratic banker Manuel Prado won the elections of 1939, he vowed to keep the country on its track. Luckily for him, World War II revived the prices of Peru's old export staples, and the Peruvian Communist party rallied to his side as Peru's savior from fascism (and as an ally in keeping the party's main rival for rank-and-file support, APRA, from power). The Left, therefore, split deeply, and lost its democratizing potential" (pages 56-57).
Alexander 1957: "During the Prado administration, which lasted from 1939 to 1945, the Communist Party gave full backing to the administration" (page 230).
Clayton 1999: "With the election to the presidency of Manuel Prado y Ugarteche (1939-45), a close friend of the United States and democracy, the United States could count on friendship from Peru during the war years rather than the coolness of a Benavides" (page 161).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 8/12: "Asume la Presidencia del Perú Manuel Prado Ugarteche" (page 531).
Masterson 1991: "During most of Prado's first twenty months in office many observers speculated that his government would not survive its full six-year term. But due largely to the unifying influence of the border war with Ecuador and World War II, his administration demonstrated greater stability than any civilian government up to that time" (page 67).
McClintock 2003: Prado "was supportive of the Allies in general and the United States in particular" (page 16).
Gardiner 1975: "The climax of the consistently worsening position of the Japanese came on May 13, 1940, in the form of anti-Japanese demonstrations in Lima. Numerous Japanese business establishments came under attack by Peruvian mobs" (page 39). "(T)he social, economic, and diplomatic aftermath of this lawlessness of May 13, 1940, eventually resulted in the rupture of Peruvian-Japanese relations during World War Two" (page 55).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 24/5: "Lima y poblaciones cercanas sufren un terremoto de magnitud 7-8 en la escala de Mercalli" (page 531).
Gardiner 1975: "The census of June 1940 afforded an unusually clear and multifaceted glimpse of the Japanese in Peru...That total of 17,598 Japanese in Peru...was considerably below estimates that had long been and would continue to be bruited about in the Peruvian and world press" (page 39).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 9/6: "Se realiza el Censo General de Población...que arroja un total de 7'023.111 habitantes, 520.528 de ellos registrados en Lima y distribuidos en doce distritos" (page 531).
Klarén 2000: "An important milestone of the Prado government was the 1940 national census, the first in three-quarters of a century...The 1940 census, the last one to classify the population by race, registered 52.89 percent of the population as white and mestizo, 45.86 percent as Indian, 0.47 percent black, and 0.68 percent as oriental" (page 285).
López Jiménez 2005: "(D)e acuerdo al censo de 1940 más de la mitad (57.3%) de la población mayor de 15 años era analfabeta, el 5% había estudiado secundaria y sólo el 1% tenía educación universitaria" (page 115).
McClintock 1998: "In 1941, Peru won its first military victory against a neighbor: in the first-ever use of airborne troops in a Latin American conflict, the Peruvians advanced far into Ecuadorean territory in a five-week war and then secured a favorable peace treaty" (page 100).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: "El Perú y la China firman un protocolo que perpetúa todos los reglamentos existentes y añade procedimientos más rigurosos para la expedición y control de pasaportes" (page 532).
Clayton 1999: "In July 1941 Ecuadorian and Peruvian troops exchanged fire in the Zarumilla sector of the border. Instead of a simple spate, the conflict spread as Ecuadorian forces invaded" (page 149).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 5/7: "Tropas ecuatorianas atacan...puestos fronterizos" (page 532).
Werlich 1978: "Prado gained great popularity and considerable personal satisfaction from a brief war with Ecuador" (page 222).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 2/10: "Los delegados militares del Perú y el Ecuador firman el Armisticio de Talara, que detiene las hostilidades entre ambos países y establece una zona desmilitarizada en el norte" (page 533).
McClintock 2003: "When the U.S. entered World War II in 1941, Prado broke diplomatic relations with the Axis powers and cooperated militarily, politically, and economically with Washington. Peru also participated enthusiastically in the U.S. program for the deportation of Japanese Latin Americans to internment camps in the United States" (pages 16-17).
Hunefeldt 2004: "Eudocio Ravines, previously the Communist Party's leader, was expelled from the party during its first congress in 1942" (page 207).
Klarén 2000: "(T)he U.S. pressed for a quick settlement of the conflict at the meeting of hemispheric foreign ministers in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942. In the subsequent Rio Protocol, Ecuador agreed to cede some 13,500 square kilometers to Peru in the Oriente...The favorable outcome of the war boosted public support for the Prado administration, but also made a hero and potential political rival out of General Ureta. A young officer and future president Manuel Odría also made a reputation for himself in the war. Temporarily unified during the war, the armed forces experienced renewed factionalism at its conclusion, accentuated by the presidential aspirations of both Ureta, the war hero, and former president Benavides, who remained popular within the institution" (page 286).
Werlich 1978: "In accordance with a resolution adopted at the Rio Conference, Peru broke diplomatic relations with the Axis countries in January 1942" (page 225). "Like other nations of the hemisphere, Peru seized the assets of Axis nationals within its boundaries. The government, however, reserved special treatment for citizens and residents of Japanese extraction" (page 226). Gives details.
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 26/2: "Los congresos del Perú y el Ecuador ratifican el Protocolo de Río de Janeiro" (page 533).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 3-31/5: "El Consejo de Ministros...asume la Presidencia de la República por viaje del presidente Manuel Prado a los Estados Unidos para consolidar la amistad con ese país" (page 534).
Gardiner 1975: "In the spring of 1943 a series of Peruvian laws further affected the 90 percent of the Japanese population that remained in Peru. One cancelled the naturalization of former Axis subjects who had engaged in subversive activities" (page 90).
Clayton 1999: "In one of its most controversial acts, Prado's government cooperated very closely with the United States in controlling Peru's sizable Japanese-Peruvian colony by arrests, deportations, and confiscation of properties. Nearly two thousand Japanese-Peruvians were deported to the United States...Internal Peruvian realities-nationalism, jealousy of the successful Japanese-Peruvians, simple greed for the properties-combined with the desire to maintain good relations with the United States to produce the tragic persecution of the Japanese-Peruvian population" (page 161).
Gardiner 1975: "Between April 1942 and June 1943 numerous American ships transported Japanese-Peruvians, among others, to the United States...Although it was only one of the twelve Latin American countries that cooperated with the United States, Peru, by deporting 1,771 Japanese, contributed more than 83 percent of the total" (page 87).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: "A comienzos de mes se realizan las primeras reuniones de la agrupación que será el Frente Democrático Nacional" (page 535).
Klarén 2000: Prado in 1944 permits "APRA and the CP to organize the...Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú-CTP" (page 286).
Klarén 2000: "In late 1944 APRA called a successful general strike that, among other things, helped it gain control of the CTP from the Communists the following year. However, with the approach of elections, the party then urged greater restraint on labor militancy as its own prospects in the elections brightened" (page 286).
Alexander 1957: "In 1944 a Democratic Front was launched in Arequipa, which included the Apristas, the Communists, and certain independent elements. The Prado government was anxious to break up this coalition" (page 231).
Kantor 1969: "In 1944 the ‘Apristas' had organized the National Democratic Front (FDN), which combined everyone active in Peruvian politics who favored constitutional government. The two chief engineers of the FDN were ex-President Benavides and Haya de la Torre. Their nominee for the presidency was a conservative university professor, José Bustamante y Rivero. They were so eager to establish constitutional government that they were willing to help elect a conservative when he promised to govern constitutionally. This, as future events proved, was a mistake" (pages 472-473).
Klarén 2000: "To counter the right, a reformist, cross-class alliance-the ‘Frente Democrático Nacional' (FDN)-representing new industrial and middle-sector groups that had emerged during the war years, was formed in Arequipa" (page 287).
Masterson 1991: "(I)n Arequipa on 3 June, a coalition of centrist and leftist civilian political leaders formed the ‘Frente Democrático Nacional'...to select a civilian alternative to [the] military men. Twenty-six political figures representing a wide variety of political views formed the FDN, which soon expanded from a regional organization to a viable national political movement. APRA was instrumental in the formation of the Arequipa group, which called for the establishment of a genuinely representative and democratically elected regime capable of guaranteeing fundamental freedoms for all Peruvians" (page 78).
Werlich 1978: "The FDN labored to mobilize public opinion in support of honest elections and provide a vehicle for a consensus candidate who would restore unrestricted democracy" (page 229).
Masterson 1991: "With the creation of the...'Comité Revolucionario de Oficiales del Ejército'...in July, 1944, the army officer corps was effectively divided into three factions: the Benavides and Ureta groups and the CROE" (pages 76-77).
Alexander 1957: "As the election campaign progressed, two candidates appeared. The government's nominee was General Ureta; the opposition candidate was José Luis Bustamante. The latter was backed by a National Democratic Front which included the Aprista Party and various independent groups and which the Communists were allowed to join just a few weeks before the election. In preparation for the election both the Aprista and Communist Parties were given legal recognition (though not allowed to register under their customary names), and were allowed to participate openly in the campaign. The Apristas took the name ‘Partido del Pueblo' for the purpose of the election; the Communists selected the name ‘Vanguardia Socialista del Perú'" (page 231).
Dietz 2002: "Lima has always been Peru's most important and largest city. However, in 1945 Lima was home to only 10 percent of Peru's total population (450,000 out of 4.5 million). The end of the war brought unprecedented change in the form of huge numbers of rural-origin migrants who moved toward Lima in search of jobs, education, progress, change, and overall improvements in their well-being" (page 202).
García Montero 2001: "En 1944 comenzaron los preparativos electorales para los comicios que debían llevarse a cabo el año siguiente. El general Benavides, pretendió reelegirse, una vez más, con el apoyo del ejército, pero los nuevos aires democráticos que sucedían a la derrota del fascismo, la promesa de los aliados de constituir un régimen basado en las libertades públicas, y la creciente movilización política popular y de las clases medias aglutinadas por el APRA, le impidieron cumplir su propósito" (page 416).
Hunefeldt 2004: "Bustamante's intellectual prestige, his defense of national sovereignty, and his deeply rooted Catholicism made him an acceptable candidate among the oligarchy, APRA, the army, and the church" (page 211).
Klarén 2000: "After thirteen years of almost continuous official persecution and clandestine operation from 1932 to 1945, APRA (now renamed the Partido Aprista Peruano, PAP, to avoid the constitutional ban on ‘international' parties) finally emerged from the ‘catacombs' and presented a slate of candidates for Congress in the elections...The ensuing campaign between the FDN's Bustamante and Ureta, the candidate of the ‘Unión Nacional Democrática' (UND), was relatively uneventful" (page 287). "In the election of 1945, APRA...made extravagant promises to tenants to gain their votes, such as the elimination of rent payments and even the distribution of estate lands to them" (page 293).
Masterson 1991: "(O)n 7 January 1945, Benavides released a manifesto declaring that he would not be a presidential candidate and urging the election of a civilian government that could achieve national unity. The marshal warned of serious divisions within the armed forces dangerous to the national well-being should a military man be elected president. This warning was aimed directly at General Ureta, who was at the time finalizing his candidacy with the backing of the Miró-Quesadas, elements of the ‘Partido Union Revolucionaria,' and a number of minor parties" (pages 78-79).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 19/3: "El Frente Democrático lanza la candidatura de José Luis Bustamante y Rivero a la Presidencia de la República" (page 537).
Masterson 1991: "By the first week of March, Benavides and APRA had offered their support to José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, then Peruvian ambassador to Bolivia, if he would run for president as the choice of the FDN...On 17 March, General Ureta made the formal announcement of his presidential candidacy" (page 79). "Bustamante announced his presidential candidacy on 19 March after formally accepting APRA's support in return for a promise of legalization and electoral opportunities for ‘Aprista' congressional candidates" (page 80).
Werlich 1978: "Dr. José Luis Bustamante i Rivero, Peru's ambassador to Bolivia, agreed to accept the presidential nomination of the FDN in March 1945, with the condition that APRA be legalized and invited to join the ‘frente'" (page 230).
Kantor 1969: "(O)n May 20, 1945, forty days before the election, the ‘Apristas' were legalized and permitted to vote" (page 472).
Masterson 1991: "General Ureta's presidential hopes suffered a severe jolt on 15 May, when after two months of negotiations the Prado government finally legalized APRA. After registering the party under the title ‘Partido Aprista Peruano,'...leaders were free, following nearly thirteen years of political proscription, to present congressional candidates for national elections scheduled for 10 June" (page 81). Discusses Aprista negotiations with candidate Bustamante.
Werlich 1978: "In mid-May, the National Election Board granted legal recognition to APRA, which had adopted the name Partido del Pueblo...in deference to the constitutional proscription of ‘international' parties" (page 230).
June 10: general election (Bustamante y Rivero / FDN)
Alexander 1957: "The Communists won a number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 1945 election. However, in spite of these victories, they fared badly as a result of Bustamante's election as President. The biggest winners in the election were the Apristas, who gained control of one house of parliament and came within a few seats of a majority in the other and for a while were the most important element in the government of President Bustamante" (page 232).
Astiz 1969: Fernando Belaúnde Terry "was elected to the House in 1945 on the coalition ticket headed by another Catholic intellectual from Arequipa, Bustamante y Rivero" (page 112). "President Bustamante y Rivero, a provincial intellectual with strong Catholic leanings, was elected in 1945 with APRA votes in exchange for APRA's participation in the legislature and in patronage appointments" (pages 137-138).
Chávez López 2002: "Las elecciones del 10 de junio de 1945" (pages 34-36). "Proceso electoral de 1945" (page 35). Gives by department the votes for two presidential candidates.
Davies 1974: "With the support of the Apristas and those elements who were tired of the fifteen-year rule of the oligarchy, Bustamante won the June 30, 1945, elections with 305,590 votes to Ureta's 150,720. The Apristas, running openly for the first time since 1931, won 18 of 46 seats in the Senate and 48 of 101 in the Chamber of Deputies and sought to dominate the Congress" (page 139).
García Belaúnde 1986: "Proceso electoral de 1945" (page 66).
Haworth 1992: "In June 1945 José Luis Bustamante Rivero, the candidate of the Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN) (a broad popular front formed in 1944) was elected president in Peru's first free elections with the support of the [APRA], Peru's one large, popular, mass-based political party, which had been forced to operate illegally for more than a decade" (page 170).
Hunefeldt 2004: "The FDN won the elections against the official candidate, Marshall Eloy Ureta, victorious commander in the war with Ecuador, with 300,000 (67 percent) against 150,000 votes. APRA gained a parliamentary majority" (page 211).
Kantor 1969: "(W)hen the general enthusiasm for democracy generated by the victory of the Allies came to Peru, President Prado organized the first free election the country had ever had. This is not to say it was a democratic election, for the ‘Apristas' were not permitted to run a candidate and the majority of the population was not permitted to vote, but the votes were counted fairly" (page 472). "Bustamante y Rivero won over his opponent by two to one and the FDN elected a majority of both houses of Congress, with the majority of the FDN congressmen ‘Apristas'" (page 473).
Klarén 2000: "The results of this relatively open and fair election gave Bustamante and the FDN an overwhelming two to one margin of victory (305,590 to 150,720). Also elected under the FDN umbrella were 18 Aprista senators and 46 deputies out of a total of 46 senators and 101 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies" (page 288). "Fernando Belaúnde Terry...had been elected to Congress in 1945 as a member of the FDN" (page 307).
Masterson 1991: "Bustamante, with the support of APRA and most of the nation's centrist and leftist groups, garnered 305,590 votes as opposed to Ureta's total of 150,720. Bustamante's resounding victory resulted from the critical support of APRA and Benavides as well as the serious divisions within the armed forces, which weakened Ureta's candidacy" (page 82). "Elected with Bustamante were thirty-five senators and seventy-three deputies running under the banner of the Democratic Front. Within the group were eighteen ‘Aprista' senators and forty-six deputies from a total of forty-six senators and 101 seats in the Chamber of Deputies" (page 83).
McDonald 1989: "By 1945, when free elections were held for the first time in fourteen years, APRA formed the most important part of presidential candidate José Bustamante's winning Democratic Popular Front (FDP). APRA nominees running under a People's party (PP) label also won a majority in the Senate and a plurality in the Chamber of Deputies" (pages 210-211).
Pike 1967: Discusses the election (page 280).
Saba 1986: Fernando Belaúnde Terry "was elected to the House of Deputies in 1945 on an Apra supported coalition ticket headed by José Luis Bustamante y Rivero" (page 43).
Statistical abstract of Latin America volume 12 1968: In the June 10, 1945 presidential election José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, FDN, is elected president (page 159).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Congreso 1945-1948. Senadores suplentes" (page 115). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres." "Congreso 1945-1948. Senadores titulares" (page 116). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres." "Congreso 1945-1948. Diputados" (pages 117-119). Gives "dpto./provincia" and "apellidos y nombres." "Elecciones generales 1945. Resultado nacional" (page 601). Gives votes for each presidential candidate, "votos válidos," "votos nulos, blancos y ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones generales 1945. Resultado departamental" (page 601). Gives by department the percent of vote for each party and "válidos miles." "Elecciones generales 1945. Resultado provincial" (pages 602-605). Gives by province the percent of vote for each party and "válidos miles."
Werlich 1978: "On June 10, 1945, Peru enjoyed its first relatively free and fair election in almost a decade and a half. Bustamante i Rivero won about 300,000 votes, twice the number polled by Ureta" (page 230).
Adelman 2006: "In 1945 Peruvian elections, as elsewhere in much of Latin America, gave way to a new electoral coalition. The victory of an alliance of parties around APRA (temporarily renamed the People's Party) appeared to poise Peru for a transformation. But the structural impediments would not give way so easily. The flirtation with open elections and pluralist politics was short-lived...In the end, APRA seceded from the coalition to become a spoiler, mounting a succession of insurrections against the government. ‘Apristas,' instead of inscribing popular power, weakened a civilian administration and set the stage for coup plotters" (page 57).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 28/7: "José Luis Bustamante y Rivero asume la Presidencia de la República" (page 537).
Klarén 2000: "President Bustamante's goals at the outset of his regime were to democratize the country, carry out social reform, and integrate APRA into the political system. His primary hope was to replace the oligarchical-military rule of the past two decades with a genuinely democratic government...(U)nlike the unity and cohesiveness of APRA, Bustamante was a political independent without a party. He led a fragile, loose-knit array of parties and groupings-the Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN)-that were united only in their opposition to continued military-oligarchical rule and the need for change. So while Bustamante's FDN had a clear majority (55 percent) in Congress, APRA dominated the alliance with 74 of its 108 delegates (69 percent)" (page 289). "(O)n the national level, [APRA] was unwilling to jeopardize its hard-won legality to mount a full-scale challenge to the Andean seignorial system. Indeed, such a challenge would have constituted an attack on the sierra landholding (‘gamonal') class, which still maintained a disproportionate representation in Congress and inordinate power on the local level (part of its long-standing quid pro quo with the state)" (pages 294-295).
Masterson 1991: "On 28 July 1945, Manuel Prado transferred the reins of government to José Bustamante y Rivero. Marshall Benavides, who had been instrumental in the election of the president, did not witness the culmination of his labors as he died of a heart attack on 5 July. The armed forces, following his lead and that of General Ureta, accepted the constitutional transfer of the presidency without protest" (page 83). "During the first eighteen months of the Bustamante regime the political bipartisanship characterizing the formation of the ‘Frente Democrático' collapsed as a result of a number of developments. Rightist civilian and military opponents of APRA opposed the party's efforts to dominate the government" (page 89).
McClintock 2003: "The electoral result pleased the U.S. government, which had encouraged the Prado administration to accommodate Haya de la Torre and APRA" (page 17). "With strong support from the APRA party in the legislature, the Bustamante government adopted new economic policies that favored labor...While these policies were not sufficiently radical to satisfy the militant wing of the APRA party, they outraged Peru's oligarchical families" (page 18).
Pike 1967: "(W)hen congress...convened on 28 July 1945, its ‘Aprista' majority proceeded at once to revoke the constitutional amendments suggested by Benavides and approved by the electorate in 1939" (page 283). "Already the APRA strategy was becoming clear: the party would claim that Peru should be governed by congress and that the President was little more than a figurehead" (page 284).
Werlich 1978: "President José Luis Bustamante i Rivero was a distinguished legal scholar from Arequipa. Fifty-one years old at the time of his inauguration in July 1945, he came from a staunchly Catholic, middle-class family" (page 234). "While the president desired to prepare APRA for the future exercise of power, the Partido del Pueblo assumed that it already had reached that objective. The party claimed that its votes had provided Bustamante's electoral landslide and that he should act as their agent in carrying out the Aprista program" (page 235).
Chávez López 2002: "(E)l 15 de diciembre de 1945 se expidió la Ley No. 10316 que disponía la realización de elecciones complementarias y señalando el procedimiento que se observará al respecto" (page 45).
June: congressional election
Kantor 1969: "When the ‘Apristas' gained more congressional seats in the 1946 by-elections, the oligarchy became fearful of completely losing its power" (page 473).
Masterson 1991: The president "assigned the armed forces the task of supervising the upcoming congressional by-elections scheduled for 30 June...[There were] four senate and fifteen Chamber of Deputies seats at stake in the elections...(T)he elections were conducted without any major incidents. ‘Apristas' won nine seats in the Chamber of Deputies and two in the senate" (page 97).
Kantor 1969: "Conservative political leaders abandoned all pretense of supporting constitutional government and organized a boycott of the congressional session due to open on July 28, 1947" (page 473).
Kantor 1969: "The ‘Apristas' tried to pressure the minority by organizing a strike in Lima and Callao on August 28, 1947. When the strike seriously interfered with commerce and industry, the President proclaimed a state of siege, suspended the constitutional guarantees of civil liberty, and arrested forty-eight trade-union leaders. In this deadlock, Bustamante ruled by decree" (pages 473-474).
Chávez López 2002: "(S)e expidió la Ley No. 10733 del 05 de diciembre de 1946 que norma la ley de Elecciones Municipales" (page 42).
Masterson 1991: "The Peruvian Communist Party, which numbered only two thousand members in 1942, had grown to approximately twenty-five thousand by December, 1946" (page 97).
Alexander 1957: "During the three years of the Bustamante regime, the Communists enjoyed the same freedom as other political parties. They gained a good deal in terms of membership from this new-found freedom. Their membership increased from an estimated 1500 in 1945 to 35,000, which they claimed in 1947" (page 232).
Klarén 2000: "The ascendancy of the Right and its concerted political counterattack on the APRA/Bustamante cogovernment culminated in mid-1947 with a boycott of Congress by conservative and leftist legislators. The walkout prevented a quorum and effectively paralyzed the government" (page 297). "(T)he country entered a downward spiral of political polarization, military conspiracy, and violence. APRA responded to the congressional boycott by calling a general strike that, in turn, caused Bustamante to suspend constitutional guarantees for thirty days. At the same time, APRA conspired to bring the government down forcibly when militants hatched a military plot, including the navy, designed to trigger a popular revolt in February 1948" (page 298).
Van Cott 2005: "(T)he Communist Party-linked Campesino Confederation of Peru (CCP) [is] formed in 1947" (page 146).
Chávez López 2002: "El 31 de enero de 1947 se expide la Ley No. 10768 modificando algunos artículos de la Ley No. 10733 respecto al ejercicio del derecho de sufragio en las elecciones municipales, de los requisitos para ser candidatos y respecto al derecho de inscribirse en el Registro Electoral Municipal de los varones, las mujeres, los peruanos por nacionalización y los extranjeros" (page 46).
Chávez López 2002: "El 13 de febrero de 1947, la Dirección General de Gobierno invitó a representantes de la prensa para informar sobre las labores preparatorias del proceso electoral municipal a llevarse a cabo el 04 de mayo de 1947. La población electoral era de 782,310 hombres, 220,076 mujeres y 36,145 extranjeros. Hacían un total de 1'038,531 electores" (page 48).
Chávez López 2002: "(P)or Decreto Supremo del 14 de marzo de 1947 el Presidente de la República decreta prorrogar el período de inscripción en los Registros Electorales Municipales hasta el sábado 31 de mayo de 1947...Las elecciones municipales se debían realizar el domingo 06 de julio de 1947 y los Concejos elegidos por voto directo se instalarían el lunes 28 de julio de 1947" (page 49).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 27/3: "Se funda el Movimiento Cívico Independiente" (page 538).
Chávez López 2002: "El 31 de mayo de 1947 Bustamante y Rivero decreta extender el período de inscripción en los Registros Electorales Municipales hasta el 20 de setiembre de 1947. Las elecciones municipales se realizarían en todo el territorio de la República en uno de los domingos de noviembre o diciembre de 1947... Esta disposición se dio debido al considerable abstencionismo de los ciudadanos para su inscripción electoral...Finalmente estas elecciones municipales no se llevaron a cabo" (page 50).
Hunefeldt 2004: "In July 1947 the congress was unable to reopen its doors due to a boycott from its independent representatives...With no congress Bustamante continued his term using ad hoc decrees to govern the country" (page 213).
Masterson 1991: "(A) bloc of twenty-two conservative senators opposed to APRA...organized a boycott of the senate session beginning on 28 July 1947...The conservative senators were...aiming to use the senate boycott to cripple the principal source of APRA's national power. This tactic proved effective, but it plunged the Bustamante regime into a political crisis from which it never recovered" (page 102).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 28/8: "Huelga general de trabajadores en Lima" (page 538).
Werlich 1978: "With parliament inoperative after July, 1947, Peru's partisan struggle intensified in the streets. APRA called a general strike in August to protest the senate boycott. Bustamante responded by declaring martial law and postponing special congressional elections scheduled for the next month" (page 241).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 1/9: "Se suspenden las garantías constitucionales debido al estado de agitación por las huelgas declaradas en Lima y Callao" (page 538).
Hunefeldt 2004: "In a last attempt at survival APRA sponsored an unsuccessful strike, which was followed by governmental repression, the abolition of constitutional guarantees, and the jailing of 57 union leaders" (pages 213-214).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 1/11: "Ocurre un terremoto de magnitud 8-9 en la escala de Mercalli, en la zona central del Perú" (page 538).
Hunefeldt 2004: "In November 1947 Haya de la Torre ordered Major Víctor Villanueva to organize APRA brigades to bring down Bustamante's ‘dictatorship'" (page 214).
Masterson 1991: "By mid-November, 1947 APRA leaders, facing a primarily hostile cabinet, a congressional impasse that effectively negated their national political power, and the prospect of President Bustamante's ruling by decree in the absence of a functioning legislature, began laying plans for the overthrow of the president" (page 104).
McClintock 1994: "The 1948 constitutional breakdown" (pages 370-372).
Masterson 1991: "Throughout January, 1948, dissident armed forces personnel and ‘Aprista' militants led by Villanueva consolidated support for a proposed civil-military insurrection they hoped would ignite a popular revolution against the Bustamante government" (page 111). "On 31 January Villanueva reported to members of the Action Committee that the civil-military units under his command were ready to initiate the revolt...APRA leaders rejected Villanueva's argument that the revolt had to be launched with a week if it were to have any chance of success...(T)he conspirators decided to lead the revolt on their own" (page 112).
Hunefeldt 2004: "In February 1948 Bustamante appointed an entirely military cabinet, only to find out later that his ministers had conspired with conservatives to overthrow his government" (page 214).
Klarén 2000: "(T)he APRA plot centered on naval units in Callao, but the authorities, supported by air force and army units, uncovered and quickly suppressed it in February 1948" (page 298).
Masterson 1991: "On the night of 6 February the planned revolt was initiated, but almost immediately APRA leaders learned of the move and issued counterorders temporarily immobilizing key rebel units...The insurrection was thus quickly aborted in its initial stage with no loss of life and few arrests" (page 112). "Although Bustamante remained firm in his refusal to declare APRA illegal, the anti-APRA faction of the armed forces leadership unquestionably dominated a new all-military cabinet named by the president on 27 February...Odría was retained as minister of government and police, and Admiral Saldías was named prime minister in a government now almost totally dominated by rightist armed forces officers" (page 113).
Werlich 1978: "In February 1948, Bustamante announced that he had uncovered an Aprista plot to overthrow the government...A few days later, the regime ousted the APRA-dominated muncipal juntas and replaced them with city officials appointed from Lima" (page 241).
Masterson 1991: In March "the president abolished the local municipal councils that had been established at the beginning of his term and had come under the control of APRA in many areas throughout the nation" (page 114).
Masterson 1991: "(T)he political situation by 1 April found APRA isolated and the government dominated by Odría and Saldías, with Bustamante desperately holding on to power" (page 114).
Werlich 1978: "Haya de la Torre returned to Peru in May 1948 for the Aprista national convention. Again, he ordered preparations for a revolution" (page 244).
Masterson 1991: "On 17 June, after Bustamante once again rejected the proposal by a majority of his ministers that APRA be outlawed, the entire cabinet resigned...Soon after General Odría lost the showdown with Bustamante over the question of outlawing APRA, he made plans to lead a revolt and establish a military government with himself as provisional president" (pages 114-115).
Werlich 1978: "The anti-Aprista senators again failed to appear for the opening session of parliament on July 28, 1948, and Peru's congressional strike entered its second year" (page 242). "Peru's legalistic president...announced that a special election would be held the following March for 107 representatives. These men would sit with the regular members of parliament in a constituent assembly which could assume legislative functions. At the same time, Bustamante urged the nation's anti-Apristas to unite in a coalition for the special election and friends of the president quickly organized the Popular Democratic Movement" (page 242).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 6/8: "El Gobierno convoca a una asamblea nacional para reanudar el funcionamiento del Poder Legislativo y reformar la Constitución vigente" (page 539).
Werlich 1978: "(I)n August, high-ranking army officers who had discovered the plot informed Víctor Raúl that the military was planning an institutional coup against Bustamante. The armed forces would topple the regime without bloodshed and promptly hold elections in which all political groups could participate. Haya agreed to delay the Aprista uprising and await the generals' revolt scheduled for late September. APRA's own plotters did not trust the military, however, and their suspicions increased when the generals postponed the coup until October 8...(T)he young militants decided to strike on October 3, without the knowledge of Haya and the cautious politicians around him" (page 244).
Alexander 1957: On "October 3, 1948, a dissident element of the Aprista Party led a mutiny of the naval garrison at Callao. Although the Aprista Party leadership did not support this revolt, President Bustamante took advantage of the uprising to outlaw the Aprista Party once again" (page 232).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 3/10: "Movimiento aprista en el Callao, en el cual participan marinos, militares y civiles, contra el Gobierno del presidente José Luis Bustamante y Rivero" (page 539). 4/10: "El Gobierno declara al APRA fuera de la ley" (page 539).
Hunefeldt 2004: "In October 1948 APRA civil and military followers in Callao began an uprising. Bustamante responded with force and declared APRA illegal, a step that allowed him to hound ‘aprista' leaders and followers. Bustamante's uneasy coexistence with his ‘aprista' and oligarchic tormentors was coming to an end" (page 214).
Klarén 2000: "Bustamante responded by authorizing a wholesale crackdown on those who were suspected of involvement in the Callao revolt and belatedly, issuing a decree outlawing the APRA. Over a thousand civilians, along with 800 naval personnel...were arrested and interrogated in the revolt's aftermath. Overall sentiment among the officer corps now swung heavily against the APRA" (page 299).
Masterson 1991: "By the morning of 4 October all fighting had ceased, and government troops were in complete control of Lima and Callao. The most serious insurrection in Peru since the Trujillo revolt of July, 1932 cost the lives of approximately sixty government and rebel troops and 175 civilians" (page 119). "President Bustamante finally outlawed [APRA] on 4 October...By 14 October, the government issued indictments against ninety-four ‘Aprista' party leaders, including Haya de la Torre" (page 120).
Adelman 2006: "(W)ithout a viable social bloc to support it, the regime wobbled until the military stepped in and toppled it in 1948...Odría...tried to modify the structure of Peruvian society while stanching political unrest. Populists were banished...Odría's package aimed to prevent Peru from sliding into APRA hands" (page 57).
Alexander 1957: "Bustamante...was overthrown by an armed uprising led by General Manuel Odria. Soon after seizing power, Odria officially outlawed the Communist Party" (page 232).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 28/10: "Se produce la ‘Revolución Restauradora' de la guarnición de Arequipa, y el día 29 se une a éste la de Lima, lo que lleva al triunfo del movimiento acaudillado por el general Manuel A. Odría" (pages 539-540). 29/10: "El general Manuel A. Odría derroca al presidente José Luis Bustamante y Rivero" (page 540). 30/10: "El general Manuel A. Odría jura su cargo como Presidente de una Junta Militar de Gobierno" (page 540).
Kantor 1969: "With the political party that had supplied the votes to elect him outlawed, Bustamante had no substantial support in the country. Three weeks after the Callao revolt, the army, under the leadership of General Manuel Odría, an unknown colonel whom Bustamante had promoted and named Minister of the Interior, deposed Bustamante and exiled him from the country" (page 474).
Klarén 2000: "Against a backdrop of worsening inflation and food shortages, as well as student disorders in Lima, Odría and the armed forces high command carried out a successful coup against the government on October 29. The following day,...Odría, who had organized the coup from Arequipa, arrived in Lima to assume the provisional presidency" (page 299). "Odría cracked down hard on APRA and the Left (CP), which were both proscribed. Over a thousand Apristas were arrested, including party leaders Ramiro Prialé and Armando Villanueva, although Haya de la Torre eluded capture" (page 300).
McClintock 1994: "The reason for the 1948 coup was the same as the 1936 constitutional rupture: the refusal of Peru's elites and military to allow APRA to exercise a significant share of political power. Relative to the 1930s, the positions of both Peruvian elites and the APRA party had mellowed, but not enough to enable the continuity of constitutional order" (page 370).
McClintock 2003: "Amid political polarization and economic deterioration and with strong oligarchical support, General Manuel Odría (a hero of Peru's 1941 war with Ecuador) led a successful coup in October 1948" (page 18). "The Odría government (1948-1956) forged a highly cooperative relationship with the United States" (page 18).
Werlich 1978: "On October 29, 1948, José Luis Bustamante i Rivero was placed on board an airplane bound for Argentina" (page 245). "Immediately after assuming the provisional presidency on October 30, 1948, Odría instituted a harshly authoritarian regime. The government proclaimed a state of emergency and suspended all constitutional guarantees for the maximum thirty-day period permitted by the national charter" (page 248). "For two years Odría presided over a military junta that exercised both executive and legislative powers" (page 249).
Masterson 1991: "(D)uring early November, the government extended the state of siege originally imposed by Bustamante on 4 October. The government soon employed its sweeping powers to arrest nearly one thousand ‘Apristas.'...The government also outlawed the Communist Party on 2 November...Stern measures aimed at preventing organized military opposition to the ‘Junta' were adopted during November" (page 130).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 3/1: "El fundador del APRA, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, se asila en la Embajada de Colombia. El Gobierno peruano le niega el salvoconducto acusándolo de ser delincuente común y no perseguido político" (page 540).
Klarén 2000: "(I)n January 1949, Haya came out of hiding and sought diplomatic asylum in the Colombian Embassy, where he would remain for the next five years because the government refused to grant him safe passage out of the country. Haya's prolonged confinement...deprived the now-clandestine APRA of his leadership, which was assumed by his close lieutenants Manuel Seoane and Luis Alberto Sánchez" (page 300).
Masterson 1991: "Between January and July, 1949, Odría tried to suppress remaining resistance to his regime by enacting tough new measures to deal with acts of political subversion" (page 133).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: "Al no llegar a acuerdos, la Junta de Gobierno presidida por el general Manuel A. Odría disuelve el Parlamento" (page 540).
Hunefeldt 2004: "Odría and his military junta did not see any need to reopen the adjourned congress. Constitutional guarantees were suspended, and the 1949 Law of Internal Security gave the government free rein to do as it pleased" (page 216).
Masterson 1991: "On 11 March 1949, pay raises ranging from 15 to 25 percent were ordered for army officers and police" (page 131). "In late March the penal code was modified, sanctioning the death penalty for political terrorism" (page 133).
Masterson 1991: "In mid-April, the government announced that it had aborted a plot by fugitive ‘Apristas' and a small number of armed forces and police personnel to assassinate Odría and other members of the military ‘Junta'" (page 133).
Werlich 1978: "The Internal Security Law of June 1949 permitted the forcible entrance by police into the homes of suspected political criminals and the search of these premises without warrants. Opponents of the regime could be summarily imprisoned or exiled, and the death penalty was restored for persons convicted of rebellion, sedition, or conspiracy against the government" (page 249).
Masterson 1991: "The arrest and imprisonment of the alleged [April] plotters was followed on 5 July by the declaration of the comprehensive Internal Security Law. This law, which remained in force throughout Odría's rule, granted government agents sweeping powers of search and seizure, in addition to suspending the right of habeas corpus for persons suspected of committing political crimes. APRA was the immediate target of this measure, but it was soon used to deal with all forms of political opposition" (page 133).