Alexander 1957: In "the elections held late in 1950 [Luna] headed a ticket put up by the Workers Independent Electoral Committee, organized with the backing of the Odria government, and consisting of members of the Luna faction of the Communists. He was elected to the Senate, and several others on the ticket became members of the Chamber of Deputies" (page 233).
Cleaves 1983: "In the 1950s, peasants had a significant impact on the political scene by invading land, forming unions, and demanding more humane working conditions; in response, the state provided social services to divert lower-class pressures" (page 215).
Dietz 1998: "Acción Popular...was founded in the 1950s by Fernando Belaúnde Terry, for whom it has been a vehicle ever since, a fact that is simultaneously its strength and its weakness" (page 204).
Hunefeldt 2004: "By 1950 all ‘apristas' and Communists had been forced underground and often when their hiding places were found, the government did not hesitate to shoot them. Odría's only opponent, General Ernesto Montagne, soon found himself in prison as well" (page 216).
López Jiménez 2005: "La continuidad autoritaria, 1950" (pages 128-130). Describes the political campaign of 1950. "El candidato único de 1950" (pages 153-159). "La campaña de 1950" (pages 169-172).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 4/1: "Se promulga el nuevo Estatuto Electoral para las elecciones generales del 2 de julio" (page 541).
Kantor 1969: "Odría scheduled a presidential election for July 1950" (page 474).
Masterson 1991: "In early January, 1950, the chief executive announced plans to hold elections for president and a National Congress on 2 July. Odría soon established the electoral framework for his almost certain election. The electoral statute was issued by the ‘Junta Militar,' which he controlled, and the National Election Jury, which monitored the balloting, was handpicked by the general and included two of his relatives" (pages 135-136).
Werlich 1978: "Once secure in his position, Odría announced that ‘free elections' for president and parliament would be held in July 1950" (page 249).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 6/4: "Eudocio Ravines es deportado. Así, mediante la represión de su principal estratega político, el régimen rompe relaciones con la Alianza Nacional" (page 541).
Masterson 1991: "Five weeks before the ‘Junta' chief announced his intention to run [May 19], another political coalition calling itself the ‘Liga Nacional Democrática'...organized a campaign to present an alternative candidate" (page 136).
Gow 1981: "On 21 May 1950 Cuzco was destroyed in one of the worst earthquakes in its history" (page 173). "Out of the destruction of Cuzco emerged Emiliano Huamantica...as the most important Indian leader in the second half of the 20th century" (page 174).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 30/5: "Para postular su candidatura a la Presidencia dentro de términos constitucionales, el presidente Odría renuncia a su cargo y deja el poder al general Zenón Noriega, ministro de Guerra" (page 542).
Kantor 1969: "Two other candidates had declared their candidacy, but Odría's hand-picked electoral jury ruled their nominations void. The jury did not hesitate to rule Odría's name eligible for the ballot, however, even though Article 137 of the Peruvian constitution declares that members of the armed forces on active service and any citizen exercising the presidency, by any title, are ineligible. Odría was disqualified on both grounds. He ‘resigned' as acting president one month before the July 2 ‘election,' and simply disregarded the military clause" (page 474).
Masterson 1991: "Despite his nomination for president by a coalition of six minor conservative parties under the title ‘Partido Union Democrática'..., Odría refused to make formal his candidacy until 19 May" (page 136). "During the first week of May the ‘Liga' named army general (R) Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz and Dr. Francisco Mostajo presidential and vice-presidential candidates, respectively. The ‘caudillo, however, fearing any substantive opposition, had the National Election Jury invalidate General Montagne's candidacy" (page 136).
Pike 1967: "In 1950 with both the APRA and the Communist Party forced underground, and with Bustamante and many of his more influential supporters in exile, Odría decided to stand for election to a regular six-year term" (page 291).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 1/6: "El general Zenón Noriega Agüero asume el mando de la nación" (page 542).
Kantor 1969: "The news that Odría had barred all names but his from the ballot caused a revolt in Arequipa, which Odría's troops crushed ruthlessly; hundreds were killed and wounded" (page 474).
Masterson 1991: "Odría's opponents...rebelled in protest in Arequipa in mid-June [against the invalidation of Montagne's candidacy]. The military leader had Montagne arrested and deported to Argentina, and the uprising was quickly put down" (page 136).
Werlich 1978: "Receiving endorsements from a half-dozen political parties, the dictator expected little opposition in his bid for a regular six-year term...Less than a month before the balloting, the Odriísta-dominated National Election Board disqualified Montagne, charging that his nominating petition contained forged signatures. This action produced a revolt in Arequipa by the thwarted candidate's supporters, which the army suppressed with the loss of more than 200 lives. The government accused the Apristas and Communists of inspiring the uprising and imprisoned Montagne" (page 249).
July 2: general election (Odría)
Chávez López 2002: Discusses the elections (pages 52-55). "Proceso electoral de 1950" (page 55). Gives the votes for Odría in each department.
García Belaúnde 1986: "Proceso electoral de 1950" (page 67).
García Montero 2001: "En 1950 Odría convocó elecciones para legitimar el golpe que había dado en 1948 pero él fue el único candidato" (page 417).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 2/7: "En unas elecciones polémicas, el general Manuel A. Odría, candidato único, es electo Presidente de la República" (page 542). 28/7: "El general Manuel Arturo Odría Amoretti jura su cargo de Presidente Constitucional de la República" (page 542).
Hunefeldt 2004: "Having cleared the political grounds Odría decided to run as sole candidate for election in 1950 to a regular six-year term. Not surprisingly he gathered 500,000 votes" (page 216).
Kantor 1969: "With troops patrolling the polling places, Odría was then ‘elected' as constitutional president" (page 474).
Klarén 2000: "The government...invalidated the opposition candidate, and Odría easily won reelection" (page 301).
Levitt 2002: "Only by barring all three of the main challengers from running for office did Odría win the presidential election of 1950" (pages 66-67).
Masterson 1991: "After suppressing the Arequipa rebellion, Odría felt secure enough on 2 July to proceed with the formality of holding national elections as scheduled. Without opposition, he was ‘elected' as constitutional president for a six-year term, along with a subservient congress containing some token opposition members from the Socialist Party. The circumstances surrounding Odría's election further alienated officers who questioned his seizure of power in 1948" (page 136).
Pike 1967: "Running unopposed, [Odría] received some 500,000 votes. At the same time a new congress was elected and the military junta permitted several members of the Socialist Party to win seats despite their avowed Marxian orientation" (page 291).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Congreso 1950-1956. Senadores" (page 111). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres." "Congreso 1950-1956. Diputados" (pages 112-114). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres." "Elecciones generales 1950. Resultado nacional" (page 600). Gives candidate with list, number of votes, and percent of total vote. "El general Manuel A. Odría fue candidato único luego de la eliminación de...general Ernesto Montagne, de la Liga Democrática" (page 600). "Elecciones generales 1950. Resultado departamental" (page 600). Gives by department the number and percent of total votes for the Partido Restaurador.
Werlich 1978: "On July 2, Peru's electorate exercised the privilege of voting yes or no for General Odría. The regime reported that more than 80 percent of the voters answered affirmatively while giving the administration a comfortable majority in parliament" (pages 249-250).
Pike 1967: "On 28 July 1950...Odría was duly installed as constitutional President" (page 291).
Masterson 1991: "(A)rmy officers supporting General José del Carmen Marín...finally succeeded in securing the establishment of the ‘Centro de Altos Estudios del Ejército'...in July, 1950" (page 137).
Masterson 1991: "Three months later the [Centro de Altos Estudios del Ejército's] name was changed to the ‘Centro de Altos Estudios Militares' (CAEM)" (page 137).
Gardiner 1975: A "Japanese effort [in 1952] to circumvent the immigration regulations of Peru led President Manuel Odría to decree that in the future any Japanese-Peruvian who left the country would forfeit his right to return. At the same time more of the first-generation Japanese in Peru, realizing that their destinies lay there, began to apply for naturalization, only to have their applications returned with the notation ‘not assimilable.' Three years passed before Peru lifted the prohibition on the exit and reentry privileges of the Japanese community" (pages 103-104).
Clayton 1999: "The Military Assistance Program (MAP) signed between Peru and the United States on February 22, 1952, was the linchpin of the modern relationship between the two forces from then until the early 1970s...The MAP raised the level of military aid, loans, and outright grants from thousands to millions of dollars. In 1952, for example, military aid was $100,000; in 1956, it totaled $9.1 million" (page 179). "That Peru received so much can be ascribed to a number of factors: to continue support of the strong anti-Communist stance of President Odría's regime; as a recognition of the high rate of U.S. investments in Peru...; and, equally important, to preclude the deployment of U.S. troops to the region as had been necessary during the Second World War" (page 180).
Masterson 1991: "The Eisenhower administration looked with favor on the Odría regime because of its public anticommunist stance...As a result of these close ties, a bilateral military assistance pact between the United States and Peru was signed on 22 February 1952, giving a substantial boost to Odría's military programs" (page 140).
Masterson 1991: "For the most part, the military leadership under Odría ignored the work being done at the CAEM during its first three years. But as the president became increasingly occupied with growing civil-military opposition to his regime after 1953, the prestige of the center increased concomitantly" (page 139).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 7/4: "Mediante un acuerdo diplomático se permite a Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre abandonar el país tras su asilo en el local de la Embajada de Colombia" (page 550).
Masterson 1991: "In the final two years of Odría's regime, opposition from conservative political leaders and army commanders reached [its] peak. The minister of war, General Zenón Noriega, led the first serious attempted military ‘coup' in August, 1954. Fearing that Odría would not step down as president after his constitutional mandate expired in July, 1956, Noriega made plans with army units in Lima to depose him...Despite his seemingly powerful role as minister of war, Noriega's movement had no active support beyond the confines of Lima" (page 144).
Werlich 1978: "Rumors that the dictator planned to seek an unconstitutional, second successive term generated much anxiety...even among the favored armed forces. In August 1954, Odría quashed an army plot and exiled a dozen senior officers, including Gen. Zenón Noriega, his prime minister and heretofore most trusted collaborator" (page 255).
Astiz 1969: "By 1955 the break between the Odría government and the coastal sector of the traditional upper class, which ‘guided' him to power, was complete" (page 140).
Werlich 1978: "In February 1955, the president announced that elections would be held in June of the next year and that he would relinquish power to the choice of the people. Odría permitted the formation of political parties and eased his censorship of the press" (page 255).
Masterson 1991: "(T)he president made the first public announcements of his intentions to retire from the presidency when his term expired. In mid-April, 1955, Odría claimed that he was prepared to step down" (page 145).
Klarén 2000: Juan Landázuri Ricketts "was named archbishop of Lima in 1955 and became the virtual patriarch of the Church until he vacated the position in 1990" (page 316).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 5/8: "El Frente Nacional de Juventudes Democráticas, liderado por Fernando Belaunde Terry, exige la derogatoria de la Ley de Expresión, la amnistía política y la modificación de la Ley Electoral para garantizar comicios limpios en 1956" (page 552).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 7/9: "El Congreso publica una ley que otorga derecho al voto a las mujeres mayores de edad que sepan leer y escribir. Las mujeres pudieron votar por primera vez en los comicios de mayo de 1956" (page 552). 10/9: "Por iniciativa de un grupo de simpatizantes, se funda el Movimiento Democrático Pradista para lanzar la candidatura del ex presidente Manuel Prado y Ugarteche a la Presidencia de la República en las elecciones de 1956" (page 552).
Klaiber 1992: "(I)n September 1955 a group of professionals..., university professors and students, and a few workers founded the ‘Christian Democratic Movement...In October of that year another group was formed in Lima'" (page 250).
Valdés 2000: "1955: Una ley otorga el derecho a voto a las mujeres mayores de 21 años y a las casadas mayores de 18 años, siempre y cuando supieran leer y escribir" (Anexo: La lucha por la ciudadanía femenina: Perú).
Vargas 1994: "Women eventually received the right to vote in 1955, a right that undoubtedly opened channels for greater participation among women. Such participation did not occur automatically, however, as the right to vote was not a result of women's pressure but of the efforts of a military leader, Gen. [Manuel] A. Odría, to obtain women's votes" (page 579).
Masterson 1991: "In early November the government did announce that elections for all national offices were scheduled for 3 June 1956...Civilian pressure for Odría to honor the constitutional process was also supported by important elements within the armed forces. Many officers continually questioned the military's support for Odría, and their role in the enforcement of the Internal Security Law disturbed many of them. In late 1955, opposition to Odría's attempt to remain in power or name his successor was forming in the army's senior ranks" (page 146).
Masterson 1991: "(O)n 3 December a political amnesty for all political prisoners except ‘Apristas' and Communist Party members was decreed by the regime" (page 146).
Werlich 1978: "(I)n December 1955 [Odría] issued a general amnesty. Many exiles, including several prominent Apristas, began returning to Peru" (page 255).
Astiz 1969: APRA's "1956 deal with the coastal sector of the traditional upper class [was in] exchange for legalization, a share of patronage, and the possibility of participating fully in the 1962 election" (page 101).
Astiz 1969: The "Frente Nacional de Juventudes Democráticas...was organized in 1956 to serve as the vehicle for Fernando Belaúnde Terry's election to the presidency" (pages 111-112).
Kantor 1969: "General Odría never succeeded in stabilizing his regime, and in 1956 the pressure for constitutional government became so great that he permitted a fair election and handed over his office to the victor" (page 476).
Klarén 2000: "(A) few days before the elections, the experienced Prado struck a deal with APRA in the so-called Pact of Monterrico. In return for APRA's support, Prado agreed to legalize the party and to allow Haya to run for president in 1962" (page 307).
López Jiménez 2005: "En 1956 aparecieron los nuevos partidos políticos de clase media (Acción Popular, la Democracia Cristiana y el Social Progresista) dispuestos a competir electoralmente, a canalizar las demands ciudadanas y a encuadrar las lealtades políticas en sus ideologías reformistas" (page 119). "La transición semi competitiva de 1956" (pages 130-135). Describes the political campaign of 1956. "Las candidaturas de 1956" (pages 159-161). "La campaña de 1956" (pages 172-176).
Pike 1967: "As the time approached for the mid-1956 elections a hastily-formed National Coalition Party announced the candidacy of Manuel Prado" (page 293).
Saba 1986: "In 1956 [Belaúnde] ran for president of the Republic under the banner of the National Front of Democratic Youth. This mixed coalition of young people, university students, intellectuals, and professionals appealed to the political left and campaigned on an Aprista-style reformist platform emphasizing decentralization and assimilation of the Indian" (page 43).
Sanborn 1991: "Hoping to regain the political space and power it had lost in 1945-1948, Haya de la Torre turned his back on the new reform currents and accepted this offer [of co-government]. This political alliance came to be known as the ‘Convivencia' (coexistence), and it was the beginning of a tactical alliance between APRA and the oligarchy which lasted for the next twelve years" (page 76).
Werlich 1978: "(C)lose associates of the dictator organized the Restoration party, rekindling fears that Odría planned to extend his stay in office" (page 255). "The electoral pact between the Partido del Pueblo and Manuel Prado in 1956 surprised many rank and file Apristas" (page 267).
Astiz 1969: "The Christian Democratic party of Peru became a reality in 1956 when a group of Catholic laymen decided to enter the political struggle directly, with the avowed intention of altering the established role of the Peruvian Catholic Church as supplier of the conservative ideology which supported the privileges of the traditional upper class" (page 125).
Fleet 1997: The PDC "never got off the ground. Its bland, and mostly provincial, middle-class leaders were overshadowed by APRA's Haya de la Torre and the elegant ‘reformer' Fernando Belaúnde" (page 90).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 10/1: "Nace formalmente en Lima el Partido Demócrata Cristiano. Éste se inspira en la doctrina social de la Iglesia y tiene como líderes fundadores a Héctor Cornejo Chávez y Luis Bedoya Reyes" (page 553).
Klaiber 1992: "In January 1956 the two groups [of the Christian Democratic Movement] coalesced and formed a single national party" (page 250).
Klarén 2000: "(T)he Partido Democrático Cristiano (PDC)...was founded in 1956" (page 316).
Planas 2000: "El Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), fundado en enero de 1956, fue fruto de la exitosa convergencia de los movimientos demócratas cristianos surgidos paralela y espontáneamente en algunas importantes provincias, como el Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano de Arequipa y el Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano de Lima" (page 37).
Masterson 1991: "(S)ome top army commanders remained intensely suspicious of the president's political ambitions. One of these officers was General Marcial Merino Pereyra...(O)n 16 February 1956, Merino rose against the government" (page 146). "In Lima the government responded immediately to the crisis by declaring martial law and arresting leading members of the ‘Coalición Nacional,' who were charged with complicity in the Merino revolt" (page 147).
Masterson 1991: "The government had...allowed the [APRA] party to convene its Third National Congress in Lima during March, thus granting the APRA de facto legality. But as the president hesitated in his endorsement of his own presidential choice, APRA leaders began negotiations with the leading candidates to obtain a commitment for the legalization of the party after the June elections" (page 147).
Masterson 1991: "On 19 April, Odría gave his endorsement of Hernando de Lavalle, a conservative lawyer of little political appeal, who was running as the candidate of the ‘Unificación Nacional'" (page 147).
Werlich 1978: "In April 1956, [former President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche] entered the race under the banner of his own Pradist Democratic Movement (MDP)" (page 256).
Masterson 1991: "Three candidates remained in contention for the presidency by 5 May" (page 147). These were Hernando de Lavalle (Unificación Nacional), Fernando Belaúnde Terry (Frente Nacional de Juventudes Democráticas), and Manuel Prado y Ugarteche (Movimiento Democrático Pradista) (pages 147-148). "These three political leaders realized that APRA support would be the critical factor in deciding the national elections. Despite the party's proscription during the first seven years of Odría's rule, it still claimed the largest single following of any political group in Peru" (page 148).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 8/6: "Ante la negativa del Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE) de inscribir la candidatura de Fernando Belaunde Terry a la Presidencia, Acción Popular organiza un mitin de protesta en la Plaza San Martín" (page 553).
Hunefeldt 2004: "The Odría regime saw Belaúnde Terry as a threat to its continued hold on power even before his party had been officially registered. To forestall its registration Odría and his advisers exerted great pressure on the...Jurado Nacional de Elecciones. Belaúnde Terry...called for a mass rally in the Plaza San Martín" (page 217).
Masterson 1991: "Belaúnde's political strength was uncertain until Odría made the tactical error of ordering the National Election jury to invalidate his electoral petitions-the same procedure he employed against General Montagne in 1950. This time the strategy backfired as the aggressive Belaúnde challenged Odría to reinstate his candidacy or face violent resistance. The president backed down, and the jury reversed its decision on 1 June" (page 148). "The postponement of elections from 3 June to 16 June allowed [APRA secretary general] Ramiro Prialé more time to reach an accommodation with Manuel Prado...Prado satisfied APRA leaders of his commitment to legalize APRA, and instructions were given to the party's followers to vote for the sixty-seven-year-old representative of Peru's conservative upper-class interests" (page 149).
Pike 1967: "Concerned that Belaúnde and the Front represented a genuine menace to the established order, Odría and his advisers brought pressure to bear upon the National Electoral Jury which as a result refused to inscribe the new party on the electoral list" (page 294). Following a mass rally led by Belaúnde, Odría "backed down, the Jury reversed its decision and the Front was duly inscribed as a legal political party" (page 295).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: La Frente de Juventudes Democráticas (1956) fue el "grupo que promovió y lanzó la candidatura del arquitecto Fernando Belaúnde Terry en 1956. Fue la base de la formación de Acción Popular ese mismo año" (page 675).
Werlich 1978: "Less than three weeks before the election, the regime induced the National Election Board to disallow [Belaúnde's] candidacy...Belaúnde warned that his followers would overthrow the dictatorship if his name were not placed on the ballot. A short time later, the election panel reversed its earlier decision and approved the architect's candidacy" (page 256). "During the first week of June, Aprista leaders met with Prado and Odría at the dictator's home and entered into the ‘Monterrico Pact.' The president unofficially transferred his support from Lavalle to Prado...APRA agreed to endorse Prado and instruct its partisans to vote for the MDP parliamentary slate. The former president promised to legalize the Partido del Pueblo following his victory. To weaken Belaúnde, several Apristas were permitted to run for congress as independents in four important departments" (page 257).
June 16: general election (Prado)
Alexander 1957: "During the election of 1956 the official Communist Party supported the candidacy of Fernando Belaunde Terry, while the Luna faction supported General Odria's candidate, Hernan Lavalle. The election was won by a third nominee, ex-president Manuel Prado, to whom the Apristas gave their support at the last moment" (page 233).
Alexander 1973: "The Christian Democrats had their first electoral experience in 1956, when they won 4 seats in the Senate and 13 in the Chamber of Deputies. The majority of these were from Arequipa" (page 357).
Astiz 1969: "Manuel Prado received the APRA vote and defeated Hernando de Lavalle, who was preferred by Odría. The armed forces supervised the elections and saw to it that the incumbent administration did nothing to perpetuate itself in power" (page 140).
Chávez López 2002: Discusses the 1956 election (pages 59-66). "Proceso electoral de 1956" (page 66). Gives by department the votes for three candidates.
García Belaúnde 1986: "Proceso electoral de 1956" (page 68).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 10/6: "Elecciones generales. Los resultados de la votación fueron los siguientes: Manuel Prado, 580.057 votos; Fernando Belaunde, 485.248 votos; y Hernando de Lavalle 224.618 votos" (page 554).
Kantor 1969: "The ‘Apristas' asked each of the candidates to promise them freedom to function, and threw their support to ex-President Prado when he promised to govern constitutionally with liberty for all. With the support of the ‘Apristas,' Prado was elected (Prado, 568,057 votes; Belaúnde, 458,248; Lavalle, 222,618), and he kept his promise" (page 476).
Klarén 2000: "Significantly, the size of the electorate had tripled since 1950 to 1.25 million voters (with the addition of women, although illiterates, and therefore more than two-thirds of the total voting-age population were still excluded)" (page 307).
Masterson 1991: "With women voting for the first time, Prado polled 568,057 or 45 percent of the vote. Belaúnde made a very impressive showing with 458,248 or 36 percent, identifying him as a definite future political force. Lavalle, whom Odría had all but abandoned in his last-minute dealings with Prado and APRA, trailed badly with 222,618 votes" (page 149).
Pike 1967: Describes the election and gives results (page 295). "In the departments in which it had presented slates for the 1956 elections the APRA won some 27 per cent of the ballots...On the other hand, the Front that backed Belaúnde had made a remarkable showing" (page 295).
Saba 1986: "With nearly 37 percent of the popular vote, [Belaúnde] emerged second in a three man contest for president in 1956 in which Manuel Prado was elected with Apra support. He established himself as a credible political figure with national recognition and broad-based support from diverse groups on the center and left of the political spectrum" (page 43).
Statistical abstract of Latin America volume 12 1968: In the June 18, 1956 general elections Dr. Manuel Prado is reelected president (page 160).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Congreso 1956-1962. Senadores" (pages 107-108). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres" and "voto pref." "Congreso 1956-1962. Diputados" (pages 108-110). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres" and "partido."
"Elecciones generales 1956. Resultado nacional" (page 595). Gives votes for each presidential candidate, "votos válidos," "votos nulos y blancos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones generales 1956. Resultado departamental" (page 595). Gives by department the percentage of vote for each list, "válidos miles," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones generales 1956. Resultado provincial" (pages 596-599). Gives by province the percentage of vote for each list, "válidos miles," and "inscritos miles."
Valdés 2000: "1956: Las peruanas participan por primera vez en un proceso eleccionario" (Anexo: La lucha por la ciudadanía femenina: Perú).
Werlich 1978: "The election's unpredictability was compounded by the fact that for the first time Peruvian women would exercise the franchise at the national level...(T)he National Election Board proclaimed Manuel Prado the victor with 586,000 votes. Belaúnde polled 457,000 ballots, and Lavalle, 222,000. The MDP candidate also won comfortable majorities in both chambers of parliament" (page 257).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 7/7: "El arquitecto Fernando Belaunde Terry funda el Partido Acción Popular sobre la base del Frente de Juventudes Democráticas" (page 554).
Saba 1986: "Immediately after the election, Belaúnde formed his own party, Acción Popular (AP)...Along with other center-left parties established in 1956, like the [PDC] and the Social Progressive Movement, Belaúnde's [AP] helped to fill a political vacuum on the left created by Apra's participation in the ‘Convivencia' with the Prado administration. Emerging as the strongest of the new reformist parties, [AP] became Apra's first serious political rival" (page 43).
Masterson 1991: "Prado was declared president on 13 July" (page 149).
Alexander 1957: "With the inauguration of Prado, the Aprista Party was made legal once again. There began a period of cooperation between the Apristas, still the country's majority party (though not directly represented in the new Congress, which was elected before the legalization of the Aprista Party), and the Prado administration" (page 233).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 28/7: "Manuel Prado y Ugarteche asume por segunda vez la Presidencia ante el Congreso de la República. El nuevo Gobierno legaliza al APRA" (page 554).
Kantor 1969: "To the ‘Apristas,' the Prado administration was a transitional regime that would govern until 1962, when they expected to win power in a free election. They therefore supported the Prado government against those who wanted to overthrow it, claiming that Peru's great need was constitutional government" (page 476).
Klarén 2000: "The inauguration of Prado as president in 1956 represented the final apogee of direct oligarchical rule in the twentieth century. Prado's term was characterized by relative stability and, after eight years of dictatorship, a return to democratic government" (page 307).
Werlich 1978: "During the five-week interval between the election and the inauguration fears arose anew that Odría would not abide by the results of the contest" (page 257). "(S)keptics charged that Odría relinquished power only because the dictator had broken his leg shortly before the inauguration. Immediately after taking the oath of office, Manuel Prado began to dismantle the oppressive instruments of the Odría dictatorship and fulfill his election promise to the Apristas" (page 258).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 30/8: "El Movimiento Democrático Pradista se transforma en Movimiento Democrático Peruano" (page 554).
Planas 2000: "El Partido Acción Popular (AP), fue la conversión oficial, en 1957, del Frente de Juventudes Democráticas, movimiento ciudadano que lanzó la candidatura presidencial de Fernando Belaunde Terry para las elecciones de 1956" (page 37).
Masterson 1991: "At ‘Acción Popular's' first party congress on 1 June 1957, Belaúnde set his party machinery in motion for a concerted bid for the presidency in the 1962 elections" (page 167).
Astiz 1969: "(T)he Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) [is] created in 1958 to prepare the high military command for national defense" (page 141).
Marett 1969: "In 1958 a young ‘mestizo' from Cuzco, Hugo Blanco, began organizing rural syndicates...in the valley of La Convención, near Cuzco...Starting more or less from scratch in 1958, Blanco in three years succeeded in forming no less than 148 rural syndicates" (page 222).
Clayton 1999: "(T)he vice president of the United States prepared a trip to Latin America in 1958 that included Peru. Richard M. Nixon was greeted in Lima with rocks and epithets, symbolizing another face of Peruvian-U.S. relations, one marked by discord and anger that presaged the role the United States was destined to follow in the revolution ten years later" (page 224).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 15/12: "La Democracia Cristiana rechaza un proyecto para otorgar el derecho de sufragio a los militares en actividad" (page 558).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 7/7: "Fernando Belaunde Terry es puesto en libertad tras su reclusión en la isla de El Frontón por razones políticas" (page 558).
Masterson 1991: "Prado silenced his most vocal conservative political critic, Pedro Beltrán, by shrewdly offering him the post of prime minister in July, 1959" (page 168).
Astiz 1969: "Beginning in the mid-1950's many of the most distinguished elements in the Aprista youth movement developed a growing alienation from the party, which culminated when the party's 1959 National Plenary Meeting refused to adopt their proposed program of almost complete structural change. At that time, under the leadership of Ezequiel Ramírez Novoa and Luis de la Puente Uceda, they left APRA and organized what they successively called the Movimiento Veintiocho de Julio, APRA Rebelde, and Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)" (page 108).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 12/10: "En la IV Convención del Partido Aprista Peruano, celebrada en Lima, los dirigentes nacionales critican a la cúpula del partido por haberse aliado con la ‘oligarquía' representada por Manuel Prado" (page 559).
Klarén 2000: "(T)he ‘convivencia' [coexistence agreement of 1956] had already cost APRA its extreme leftwing faction when a splinter group, called APRA Rebelde, was formed in 1959" (page 318).
Werlich 1978: "At its fourth national congress in 1959, [APRA] purged eight leaders who expressed opposition to the Convivencia with Prado" (paage 267).
Cleaves 1983: "After 1960, the oligarchy was less able to control the working class movement" (page 215).
Klarén 2000: "APRA's Left wing, frustrated by Haya's turn to the Right and inspired by the Cuban Revolution, broke from the party in 1960 to form APRA Rebelde...Its leader was Luis de la Puente Uceda" (page 329).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: El "Ejército de Liberación Nacional...se forma [en 1960] con parte de la juventud del PCP...Más tarde, en 1963, inició las guerrillas en la zona de Ayacucho" (page 676).
Masterson 1991: "On 30 September 1960, the draft of a limited agrarian reform law was submitted to Prado...The structure of the law made it highly unlikely that land reform would be carried out with any vigor by the government" (page 168).
Masterson 1991: "In 1959, another group of APRA activists rejected the party's new ideological position, and in November, 1960 they formed a political splinter group called ‘APRA Rebelde'...They devoted most of their efforts after November, 1960 to espousing radical land reform" (page 166).
Masterson 1991: "The most charismatic and successful radical figure during the early 1960s was the peasant organizer Hugo Blanco...By 1962 Blanco had created 148 individual peasant unions in the La Convención Valley and had led a number of successful strikes by the tenants of the large haciendas of the region" (page 189).
Statistical abstract of Latin America volume 12 1968: In March 1961 Gen. Odrías returns and forms his personal party, Unión Nacional Odriísta (page 160).
McClintock 2003: "(I)n March 1961, only two months after his inauguration, U.S. president John F. Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress...Also, amid a general recovery of the U.S. and Peruvian economies, Washington transferred part of Cuba's sugar quota to Peru" (page 20).
Marett 1969: Prime minister Pedro "Beltrán resigned on 3 November 1961, being succeeded by Moreyra y Paz Soldán as Prime Minister of a caretaker government before the new presidential election" (page 182).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 26/12: "Se forma la Unión Nacional Odriísta, que tiene como base al Partido Restaurador" (page 562).
Masterson 1991: "(S)hortly after returning to Peru in March, 1961, former president Manuel Odría formed the ‘Union Nacional Odriísta' [UNO]...Odría sought the support of the urban working classes, who were the prime beneficiaries of the social assistance programs of his administration" (page 169).
Astiz 1969: "APRA's traditional ‘caudillo' and founder of the party, Haya de la Torre, became once again presidential candidate. Former dictator Odría was, of course, the Odriista party's hopeful, and Belaúnde Terry led the Acción Popular ticket. There were four other candidates from minor parties, of whom only Cornejo Chávez of the Christian Democrats was running in earnest. The military were frankly unhappy about the organization of the election...(T)he armed forces' involvement in the electoral process...began with their investigation of irregularities in voter registration, including electoral surveys, and ended with the rejection of the results and the overthrow of the Prado government, which had accepted them" (page 147).
Kantor 1969: "The election of 1962 was...of great importance. By then it was clear to everyone in Peru that something drastic had to be done or the masses of Indians would rise up in violent rebellion. All of the seven candidates for the presidency, therefore, talked about reform" (page 476). Discusses candidates (page 476-477).
Klarén 2000: "In late 1962, the MIR established contact with Hugo Blanco and began preparing for a guerrilla campaign in the sierra" (page 319).
Masterson 1991: "The 1962 national elections loomed as one of the most critical in Peru's history. For the first time, two parties with broad support, APRA and ‘Acción Popular,' would be contending for control of the presidency and the congress...Although their support was very limited, the remaining parties of the left gave progressives, Marxists, and socialists their best representation in any twentieth-century presidential election" (page 169). "The involvement of the military in the 1962 election process was mandated under the Peruvian law. The supervision of election officials and voters at the polling booths was constitutionally delegated to the armed forces. Public statements by armed forces leaders indicated that they assumed the entire responsibility for the supervision of almost all phases of the election procedure. This interpretation put the military at odds with the National Election Jury, which was dominated by Prado's appointees" (page 171).
McClintock 1994: "The 1962 constitutional breakdown" (pages 372-374).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: La "Frente de Izquierda Revolucionaria (1962) [es] conformado por la fusión de la Agrupación Unificación de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, sectores del Partido Comunista Agrario Revolucionario y Partido Obrero Revolucionario. Sus líderes fueron Hugo Blanco, Antonio Aragón, Vladimiro Valer, Juan Pablo Chang y Gorky Tapia" (page 676).
Werlich 1978: "An enthusiastic crowd of 150,000 persons greeted the Supreme Chief [Haya de la Torre] at the Limatambo Airport when he returned home in January 1962 to accept his party's nomination" (page 268).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 22/5: "El Jurado Nacional de Elecciones declara que garantiza la limpieza de las elecciones del 10 junio; afirma que no había irregularidades en las inscripciones de ciudadanos en el registro electoral" (page 563).
Masterson 1991: "(T)he communiqué of the armed forces' joint command issued on 26 May...claimed that of the 3,697 male voter registration cards the armed forces had examined, 1,697 had been illegally issued, with most of the irregularities attributed to the APRA-Prado coalition. Prior to the issuance of the communiqué, Belaúnde had charged fraud in the registration process, and on 20 May he threatened not to recognize the results of the coming elections unless the armed forces approved the final decision of the National Election Jury" (page 172).
Werlich 1978: "Several weeks prior to the election, Acción Popular accused the National Election Jury of favoritism toward Haya de la Torre. Several candidates of small rightist parties that would have drawn votes away from the Aprista leader were disqualified because their nominating petitions lacked the valid signatures of 20,000 qualified voters as the law required. Leftist competitors of Belaúnde, however, remained on the ballot even though at least two of these probably did not meet this test" (pages 270-271).
June 10: general election
Astiz 1969: "Results of the 1962 presidential election, by party" (page 103). "Distribution of congressional seats, by party, 1962 election" (page 103). "In exchange for the electoral support given to Manuel Prado in 1956, APRA was permitted to participate without limitations in the elections of 1962" (page 146). "Since none of the candidates had been able to obtain one-third of all valid votes cast, as required by the Peruvian constitution (Article 138), the election was to be thrown into Congress, which has the constitutional authority to choose the president from among the three candidates with the largest number of votes...(N)o party could have its candidate elected by Congress without assistance, a fact which was compounded by the armed forces' veto of Haya de la Torre, who had obtained the largest number of votes and controlled the largest bloc in both chambers" (page 147).
Chávez López 2002: "Las elecciones del 10 de junio de 1962" (pages 36-38). "Proceso electoral de 1962" (page 38). Gives results by department for seven presidential candidates.
García Belaúnde 1986: "Proceso electoral de 1962" (page 69).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 10/6: "Se llevan a cabo elecciones generales. Los candidatos con más fuerza son Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre por el APRA, Manuel A. Odría por la Unión Nacional Odriísta y Fernando Belaunde Terry por Acción Popular. Haya de la Torre logra el triunfo por estrecho margen, sin alcanzar el 36% de los votos exigidos por la Constitución vigente (la de 1933). Los resultados finales son: Haya de la Torre, 557.047 votos; Belaunde, 554.180 votos; y Odría, 480.798 votos" (pages 563-564).
Kantor 1969: Gives official results with the number of votes and percent of total vote for each candidate and the numbers of blank, void, and null votes (page 477).
Klarén 2000: "As the votes were tabulated after the election on June 10, Belaúnde took a narrow lead, but he was overtaken in unofficial returns as the count continued. The final official results gave Haya 558,237 votes (32.98 percent); Belaúnde, 543,828 (32.13 percent); and Odría, 481,404 (28.44 percent). Since Haya's percentage was slightly less than the constitutionally mandated 33.33 percent necessary for victory, the selection process was turned over to Congress" (page 320).
Marett 1969: Discusses the election (pages 182-187).
Masterson 1991: "The seven candidates in the 1962 elections represented one of the largest fields of presidential aspirants in the history of Peru" (page 173). Gives details.
McClintock 2003: "The 1962 elections in Peru were inconclusive. While a plurality was gained by APRA's Haya de la Torre, his 32.9 percent tally was below the 33.3 percent threshold necessary to avoid the selection of the president by Peru's congress. Also, Haya's share was less than 1 percent more than that of the second-place candidate, Acción Popular's Fernando Belaúnde Terry; because Peru's voting rolls were in disarray, this margin was insufficient to yield a result that would be accepted by all parties. Further exacerbating electoral tensions was enduring opposition to APRA among significant sectors of Peru's military" (page 20).
McDonald 1989: "APRA's declining popularity was evident in the 1962 elections. Although finishing first, Haya De la Torre failed to collect the necessary one-third of the vote to be declared president in a race with Belaúnde's AP and the right-wing populist National Odriist Union (UNO) of former dictator Odría. With the presidential selection constitutionally transferred to Congress, Haya negotiated a power-sharing deal with Odría, but the army intervened before it could be consummated" (page 211).
Pike 1967: Describes the election and gives results (pages 299-300).
Statistical abstract of Latin America volume 12 1968: In the June 10, 1962 presidential election Haya de la Torre, returned from exile, wins but does not receive the constitutionally-required 33 percent of the vote, sending the election decision to congress (page 160).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Elecciones generales 1962. Resultado nacional" (page 588). Gives votes for each presidential candidate, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones generales 1962. Resultado provincial" (pages 591-594). Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party and "válidos miles."
Werlich 1978: "In the end, the presence of four minor parties in the presidential race-the Christian Democratic party, the Peruvian Socialist party, the Social Progressive Movement, and the National Liberation Front, a Castroite group-determined the outcome of the 1962 election...On June 10, 1962, 1.7 million of Peru's 2.2 million registered voters went to the polls. Early returns gave the lead to Belaúnde, who hastily claimed victory. Later returns, however, put Haya de la Torre in front and Belaúnde's euphoria faded" (page 271).
Masterson 1991: "In June, 1962, ‘APRA Rebelde' leaders decided to disassociate themselves completely from the parent party and changed the name of their organization to the ‘Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria' [MIR]" (page 166).
Masterson 1991: "The armed forces' leadership...brought its campaign against the election process into the open on 28 June when it issued a communiqué charging that fraudulent voting had occurred in seven of the nation's twenty-four departments" (page 174).
Masterson 1991: "On 3 July military leaders issued another ultimatum to Prado that stated that the armed forces would act if Haya de la Torre did not withdraw his candidacy within one week" (page 174).
Masterson 1991: "(O)n 4 July the APRA chief announced that the military had vetoed his candidacy" (page 174).
Masterson 1991: On July 14 "the senior commanders insisted that the entire election process be annulled and that Prado establish the framework for new elections. This path was the only way, the armed forces' leaders declared, that Prado could finish his constitutional term. The president held out against these demands and claimed that the National Election Jury was constitutionally independent and that he had no authority to annul the elections...On 14 July Odría, Haya de la Torre and General Pérez Godoy met together, and Pérez Godoy informed both men that because of the election fraud the armed forces could not accept an APRA president" (page 175).
Masterson 1991: "Prado's cabinet resigned en masse on 16 July in the face of the armed forces' demands that the elections be annulled" (page 175).
Masterson 1991: "Negotiations between the three leading candidates and government representatives...commenced with the aim of finding a solution to the election impasse which was confirmed by the National Election Jury on 17 July. The final results released by the jury had Haya de la Torre leading Belaúnde by slightly less than thirteen thousand votes but gaining only 32.98 percent of the total ballots cast. Since the presidential decision was constitutionally mandated to the new congress, in which APRA controlled 40 percent of the seats, Belaúnde's or Odría's only chance for the presidency was an electoral pact with Haya de la Torre" (page 174). "In the late afternoon of 17 July events drew closer to a climax with the announcement by General Odría that he had finally reached an accord with the APRA. The agreement would give Odría the presidency. ‘Aprista' leader Manual Seoane would assume the first vice president's post, and APRA would become the dominant party in the National Congress" (page 175).
Werlich 1978: "The Lima press reported the final tallies of the National Election Jury on July 17. Haya de la Torre led the field with 557,047 votes (32.98 percent); Belaúnde received 544,180 ballots (32.1 percent); Odría won 480,798 votes (28.45 percent); and the four minor party candidates had a combined total of 108,593 ballots (6.47 percent). Haya de la Torre, the popular choice by a margin of almost 13,000 ballots over Belaúnde, had not received the 33.3 percent of the votes required for direct election. Under the constitution, the contest would be decided among the top three candidates by a majority of the combined membership of the newly elected parliament, whose total of 241 senators and deputies was divided as follows: Democratic Alliance (Haya's coalition), 114; Acción Popular, 78; Unión Nacional Odriísta, 42; others, 7" (page 271). "Desperate to finish his term and transfer power to a constitutional successor, Manuel Prado worked feverishly to arrange a compromise that would place any one of the tnree contenders in the presidency. The major candidates also negotiated directly with each other" (page 272).
Astiz 1969: "The military takeover took place on July 18, 1962, ten days before Prado was to have turned the presidency over to the victorious candidate; obviously the coup was not directed against Prado, but against his successor-Odría, according to an agreement reached the day before...The [armed forces] veto [of Haya de la Torre] was made explicit at the beginning of July...and after conversations between the three leading candidates, the leader of APRA instructed the party senators and representatives to vote for former dictator Odría, a decision which insured the latter's election" (page 147).
Clayton 1999: "In 1962 the Kennedy administration did not recognize the military junta that ousted President Prado on July 18...The military refused to countenance the possibility that their old nemesis, the APRA party, would come to share political power after a tight presidential election held earlier that year...The military favored the reformist Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who would be blocked from the presidency by the accord between Odría and the ‘Apristas'" (page 235).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 4/7: "Las Fuerzas Armadas comunican al presidente Prado que no aceptarían a Haya de la Torre como Presidente" (page 564). 7/7: "Fernando Belaunde Terry desconoce los resultados de los comicios y prohíbe que sus partidarios se incorporen al Congreso" (page 564). 16/7: "En pleno régimen democrático, las Fuerzas Armadas exigen la nulidad de los comicios" (page 564). 18/7: "Un golpe militar pone fin al Gobierno de Manuel Prado. Asume la Presidencia de la Junta de Gobierno el general Ricardo Pérez Godoy. El presidente Prado es exiliado del país" (page 564). 28/7: "El Partido Aprista Peruano condena el golpe pero asegura su participación en la campaña electoral de 1963 a través de un ‘centro cívico nacional'" (page 564).
Kantor 1969: "Under the Peruvian constitution, if no candidate receives at least one-third of the votes cast, the Congress elects the president from among the three candidates receiving the most votes. The ‘Apristas' had elected more members of the Congress than any other party, and they attempted to come to an understanding with Belaúnde Terry and Odría to organize a coalition government...When the agreement was made known, the officers in control of the armed forces accused the ‘Apristas' of fraud and asked President Prado to cancel the elections. When he refused, the generals and admirals used tanks to break down the gate of the Presidential Palace, overthrew the government, and set up a military junta to rule Peru...(T)he reaction of the Peruvian people and most foreign governments, including that of the United States, apparently convinced the generals it was impossible to go back to the old ways, and they promised to permit another election in June 1963, to remove their troops from ‘Aprista' headquarters, and to permit the party to function again...Since no party had won a majority in the election, this arrangement was accepted and peace returned to Peru. From July 1962 to June 1963 the country was involved in a continuous electoral campaign" (page 477).
Klarén 2000: Haya "reached an accord with Odría on July 17 in which the former dictator would assume the presidency and Aprista leader Manuel Seoane would become first vice president, with APRA taking control of Congress. This ‘superconvivencia' proved too much for the armed forces, which removed Prado from office the next day, ten days before the end of his term, and announced the formation of a new Junta de Gobierno...(A)n ‘institutional' military government was installed, with each branch of the armed forces represented on the junta. Led by General Ricardo Pérez Godoy, chairman of the joint command of the armed forces, the new junta declared the June 10 elections annulled...and declared a one-year limit on its rule, after which it would hold new elections and return to the barracks" (page 320).
Masterson 1991: "(B)y mid-morning on 18 July the joint command had established itself as the new ‘Junta de Gobierno'...without loss of life and with only minor street disturbances. APRA leaders called a general strike in protest, but it failed completely. The 18 July movement differed significantly from past armed forces' ‘coups' in that the military acted as a unit and not as the instrument of a single ‘caudillo' such as Sánchez Cerro or Odría. The four members of the joint command, including its chairman, General Pérez Godoy, army commander general Nicholas Lindley López, air force chief general Pedro Vargas Prada, and navy commander vice admiral Juan Francisco Torres Matos, assumed posts as joint presidents of the new military government. The ‘Junta' quickly issued three decrees (cosigned by all four members) annulling the elections of 19 June 1962 and suspending constitutional guarantees for thirty days" (page 176). "The United States broke diplomatic relations with the military government and suspended all but humanitarian assistance programs the same day the ‘coup' occurred" (page 177).
McClintock 2003: "The coup was denounced by the Kennedy administration. For almost a month, the new regime was not recognized by the Kennedy administration; economic aid was suspended for two months, and military aid for three...The Kennedy administration's policy angered Peruvians in general and Peruvian military officers in particular. The interim government criticized the policy as intervention in Peru's internal affairs, and declared that its foreign policy would become more independent" (page 21).
Saba 1986: "On July 18, 1962, following a virtual three way split of the vote for president...and charges that electoral fraud had given Haya de la Torre his slight edge over Belaúnde, the Armed Forces High Command announced suspension of the constitution and its assumption of the executive and legislative functions of government" (page 39).
Werlich 1978: Discusses the reasons for the coup (page 273). "A communique from the armed forces' high command on July 18, 1962, announced that the constitution had been suspended for an indefinite period, that the recent elections for both president and parliament had been canceled, and that a military government had assumed executive and legislative functions. The soldiers pledged that theirs would be a caretaker regime. New elections already were scheduled for June 9, 1963...Instead of a single dominant officer seizing power for himself or a small clique, a junta of four men had assumed control of the nation on behalf of the three military services. Each officer held a cabinet post and all were designated equal ‘co-presidents'...After one week in office General Pérez Godoy, the senior officer of the junta, relinquished his portfolio as finance minister and assumed the traditional ceremonial functions of Peru's chief of state" (page 274).
Werlich 1978: "On July 28, the 141st anniversary of Peru's independence and the day on which a new president was to have been inaugurated, the junta proclaimed the restoration of all constitutional guarantees" (page 275).
Clayton 1999: "On August 17, 1962, the United States recognized the junta" (page 236).
Werlich 1978: "Diplomatic recognition of the military government came quickly from the major nations of Europe and most of Latin America. But the United States, which had applied pressure to forestall the coup, severed all formal ties with Peru and suspended military and financial aid to the regime...Washington's gesture on behalf of the Alliance for Progress's commitment to democracy ended in August with the appointment of a new ambassador" (page 275).
Werlich 1978: "Soon after taking power, the junta appointed a commission of prominent jurists and professional politicians to draft a new election code. This law, submitted to the government in late September 1962, made several important changes in Peru's electoral processes" (page 278). Gives details of the law (pages 278-279).
Masterson 1991: "After establishing contact with the peasant organizer, Hugo Blanco, in October, 1962, the MIR began slowly preparing for the guerrilla campaign it would launch in 1965" (pages 166-167).
Saba 1986: "The reformist orientation of the new regime was clearly spelled out in an October 1962 document issued by military intelligence...The most important reforms promised in the document included the initiation of a technical and scientific agrarian reform program for some of the areas of tension and guerrilla activity in the central and southern sierra [and] the extension of citizenship...to the illiterate masses in practice as well as theory" (page 40).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 16/11: "La Junta Militar promulga la Ley de Bases de la Reforma Agraria...Fue la primera Ley de Reforma Agraria y la primera aplicación efectiva; adoptó un carácter de respuesta al movimiento campesino" (page 565).
Masterson 1991: "During mid-November the ‘Junta' also established the platform for the first substantive agrarian reform program in Peru's history. On 13 November the military government gave permanent legal status to the ‘Instituto de Reforma Agraria y Colonización'...(IRAC), the organization charged with implementing agrarian reform" (page 186).
Masterson 1991: "The new election law was promulgated on 5 December. It contained important revisions of existing election regulations. The multiple ballot system, wherein each political party printed its own list of candidates for the national elections, was scrapped and replaced by a single ballot form. More significantly, the number of deputies and senators was reduced from 241 to 180 because the government stated that it wanted to avoid the splintering of political representation in congress...The measure also included tighter restrictions on voting and registration" (page 185). "In December, 1962 bloody riots at the copper mines at La Oroya in central Peru and the large commercial sugar plantations near the northern coastal town of Chiclayo resulted in the ‘Junta's' mass roundup of communist labor leaders and other leftists during the first week of January, 1963. Prior to these arrests, the ‘Junta' had allowed communist labor organizers a relatively free hand in gaining new adherents" (page 190). "The government attributed the rioting to the communist ‘Frente de Liberación Nacional'" (page 191).
Saba 1986: "(A) new election law, designed to reduce fraud and intimidation, was decreed" (pages 41-42).
Astiz 1969: "It was...evident that the only candidate acceptable to the officers who led the coup was Belaúnde Terry, whose electoral tactics paralleled those of the military. Even before the election Belaúnde Terry had openly recognized the military's role as election arbitrator by stating that he would accept defeat at the polls only if the armed forces accepted the result" (pages 148-149). "One promise that the military did fulfill was the holding of free elections within a year of its take-over. The voting registration procedure was improved, and the number of registered voters dropped...A new electoral law was passed, and the total number of Senate and House seats was reduced, with some redistribution among departments" (page 154).
Fleet 1997: "Neither the bishops nor the military took sides in the 1963 election, although both were sympathetic to Belaúnde. His program of agrarian reform, national planning, expanded social services, and national integration was the closest to the thinking of reformist elements in both institutions" (page 91).
Gow 1981: "The massive land invasions in the southern Andes in the early 1960's, of which the most famous was the invasion of ‘hacienda' lands in the La Convencion Valley in the department of Cuzco in 1963, made land reform imperative" (page 49). "The militant protests of the 1960's were the culmination of nearly one hundred years of Indian struggle to recuperate and control Indian lands, resources and labor" (page 139).
Van Cott 2005: "By 1963, enough Indians had become literate and gained the right to vote to constitute a distinct constituency worthy of presidential candidates' attention and appeals" (page 147).
Hunefeldt 2004: In January 1963 "the military junta staged a roundup and imprisonment of some 1,000 people accused of being Communists or having communist affiliations" (page 221).
Masterson 1991: "After the government suspended constitutional guarantees in the wake of the mass arrests on 5 January, General Pagador Blondet claimed that the ‘Junta' had acted to destroy a communist conspiracy that was directed through Havana with headquarters in Prague" (page 191). "The ‘Junta's' anticommunist campaign was a direct shift from its policy of maintaining an open political climate with the continuance of full constitutional liberties" (page 192).
Werlich 1978: "(A) ‘Red scare' in January 1963 marred the administration's record for tolerance. Announcing the discovery of a plot to assassinate key leaders and overthrow the government, the generals suspended the constitution for one month and jailed many suspected Communists and other leftists...(T)he regime used this opportunity to invoke Article 53 of the constitution outlawing ‘international' parties. The generals declared that the Communist party, the Castroite National Liberation Front, and other ‘communistic' groups would not be permitted to participate in the forthcoming election" (page 276).
Masterson 1991: "In late February, 1963 Belaúnde's ‘Acción Popular' consummated an agreement with the ‘Partido Democrático Cristiano.' PDC leaders pledged their badly needed support in Lima and Arequipa. Also aiding Belaúnde's cause was the absence of all but one candidate from the extreme left in the presidential field. The left had been dispersed and its key leaders imprisoned after the January, 1963 roundup by the ‘Junta'" (page 196).
Astiz 1969: "No individual ‘caudillo' appeared, and when Pérez Godoy showed an inclination to become one, he was abruptly dismissed from the junta" (page 149).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 3/3: "El general Ricardo Pérez Godoy, acusado de ‘personalista', es retirado de la Junta y pasa al retiro. Es reemplazado por el general Nicolás Lindley" (page 565).
Klarén 2000: "In the early hours of March 3, Pérez Godoy, the head of the junta, was forcibly ousted from the Presidential Palace on the pretext of ‘caudillismo.' He was replaced by General Nicolás Lindley López, a more conservative member of the junta...The country now prepared for the upcoming June elections that shaped up as a replay of 1962, with Haya, Odría, and Belaúnde once again the major candidates" (page 322).
Werlich 1978: "Pérez Godoy's colleagues forced his retirement in March 1963, and General Lindley López became titular head of state" (page 275).
Marett 1969: "The land invasions reached their apogee in the middle of 1963...[Hugo] Blanco was captured in May 1963" (page 223). "Hated by the oligarchy, Hugo Blanco...was never very popular either in left-wing circles in Peru" (page 224).
June 10: general election (Belaúnde / AP)
Astiz 1969: "Electoral participation in selected departments, 1963 election" (page 50). Gives for six departments the estimated total population, estimated voting-age population, qualified voters, and total number of votes. "Qualified voters and congressional representation in selected departments, 1963 election" (page 51). Gives for six departments the number of qualified voters, the numbers of seats in the senate and the house, and the ratio of votes per senator and representative. "Results of the 1963 presidential election, by party" (page 104). "Distribution of electoral seats, by party, 1963 election" (page 104). "Acción Popular succeeded in 1963 as an electoral machine with the help of the military, which evidently felt that Belaúnde Terry's reforms were acceptable to them; the Church, which probably considered that his victory would prevent the type of cleavages within its ranks evolving elsewhere in Latin America; and the Christian Democratic party, which, convinced of its inability to go it alone, joined forces with AP in exchange for the country's Second Vice-Presidency and certain places in the congressional lists and provided the margin of victory" (page 114).
Chávez López 2002: Discusses the 1963 election (pages 72-74). "Proceso electoral de 1963" (page 73).
Fleet 1997: "In the end, Belaúnde captured 39 percent of the vote, more than the one-third necessary to become president" (page 91).
García Belaúnde 1986: "Proceso electoral de 1963" (page 70).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: "Se celebran las elecciones generales. Los resultados son: Belaunde, 708.931 votos; Haya de la Torre, 623.532 votos; y Odría, 463.325 votos" (page 566).
Kantor 1969: Discusses the election and gives results (pages 477-478).
Klarén 2000: "With over 100,000 new votes from the PDC, the Left, and peasant strongholds in the south, Belaúnde won a narrow victory, gaining 36.2 percent of the vote, as opposed to 34.4 percent for Haya and 25.5 percent of Odría. His party Acción Popular, however, failed to gain a majority in Congress, which opened the way for an alliance between APRA and Odría's Unión Nacional Odriísta" (page 322).
Marett 1969: Discusses the election (pages 188-189).
Masterson 1991: "With the passage of the new election statute and the close supervision of the registration process by the ‘Junta' during 1963, the military assumed almost complete responsibility for the conduct of the elections" (page 196). Discusses the election and gives results (pages 196-197).
McClintock 2003: "When Acción Popular's Belaúnde was elected in June 1963 with 36.2 percent of the vote, expectations were high for a constructive relationship between Peru and the United States...However, the expectations for Peruvian-U.S. collaboration were not met" (page 21).
McDonald 1989: "In a military-supervised election in 1963, Belaúnde, strengthened by support from the small Christian Democratic party (PDC) and the Communists (PCP), won the presidency with 39 percent of the vote over Haya (34 percent) and Odría (24 percent). The congressional plurality APRA managed to garner was small consolation to party militants, many of whom were disillusioned by the cynical APRA-UNO alliance" (page 211).
Saba 1986: "Forming an alliance with the small [PDC], Belaúnde won the presidency in 1963. He received 39 percent of the vote, surpassing the one third necessary to be elected president; Haya received 34.3 percent; and General Odria, the only one to suffer a decline in popularity, obtained 25.5 percent" (page 44).
Statistical abstract of Latin America volume 12 1968: In the general elections of June 10, 1963 "F. Belaunde Terry, Acción Popular-Demócrata Cristiano (AP-DC) alliance, [is] elected president. [The] Partido Aprista Peruano, in alliance with [the] Unión Nacional Odriísta, dominates lower chamber" (page 160).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Congreso 1963-1968. Senadores" (page 104). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres" and "partido." "Congreso 1963-1968. Diputados" (pages 105-106). Gives "departamento/apellidos y nombres" and "partido." "Elecciones generales 1963. Resultado nacional (page 581). Gives votes for each presidential candidate, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones generales 1963. Resultado departamental" (page 581). Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."
Valdés 2000: "1963: Es solo a partir de este año que se ejerce el voto femenino municipal" (Anexo: La lucha por la ciudadanía femenina: Perú).
Werlich 1978: "Although reregistration had trimmed 300,000 names from the voting lists, 100,000 more citizens cast ballots in 1963 than in the previous year. Odría alone among the major candidates suffered an absolute decline in popularity. Victor Raúl increased his vote by 75,000, but this was insufficient to offset the even larger gains made by Belaúnde. The final returns awarded Belaúnde 708,000 votes (39 percent); Haya de la Torre, 623,000 (34.3 percent); and Odría 463,000 (25.5 percent)...(T)he composition of the new parliament, elected for a six-year term concurrent with that of the president, indicated that Belaúnde's task would be difficult. The administration AP-PDC alliance controlled only 20 of the 45 senate seats and 50 of 140 posts in the chamber of deputies" (page 280).
Astiz 1969: "The day after the election, Belaúnde Terry, on the basis of early returns, thanked the Peruvian population by radio and television for their votes and the National Electoral Jury and other authorities for having conducted a clean election. As later returns changed the picture, he denounced the electoral process and openly encouraged the military to intervene" (page 149).
Adelman 2006: "On Belaúnde's inauguration day (July 23, 1963) thirty-five hundred ‘comuneros' (rural workers) seized an estate in Junín, sparking a wave of invasions and pitched battles between peasants and hacendados" (page 58).
Astiz 1969: "The military turned power over to Belaúnde Terry; but it is important to recognize that the individuals who performed the ceremony of July 28, 1963, had moved substantially away from the mandate which produced the 1962 coup d'état" (pages 154-155). "After Belaúnde won the 1963 election and assumed the presidency, the organized peasantry, either because it felt that he was going to redistribute the land forthwith or because it wanted to force his hand, increased the tempo of land occupations" (page 200).
Clayton 1999: "When Belaúnde was inaugurated in July 1963, Kennedy's coordinator for the Alliance for Progress...flew to Lima to offer the new president generous assistance and aid" (page 236).
Cleaves 1983: "Great national enthusiasm accompanied the inauguration of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry in 1963. The political alliance between the Acción Popular and Christian Democratic parties was a new attempt to satisfy the most pressing demands of the popular sectors...(D)uring the Belaúnde presidency, the oligarchic sectors firmly and systematically resisted reform. In alliance with the old Aprista party and supporters of ex-dictator Manuel Odría, they controlled parliament and were able to turn back Belaúnde's reformist initiatives" (page 215).
Cotler 1993: "APRA systematically opposed the AP administration (1963-1968), effectively blocking all attempts at reform. The result was governmental paralysis, a worsening of social and economic contradictions and a general spread of the climate of conflict" (page 210).
Dietz 2002: Belaúnde's "term in office was important because he implemented municipal elections in 1963 and 1966" (page 199).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 28/7: "Asume la Presidencia por primera vez el arquitecto Fernando Belaunde Terry. El APRA y la Unión Nacional Odriísta pactan una coalición en el Congreso y forman la mayoría parlamentaria (Coalición APRA-UNO). Por su parte, Acción Popular establece una alianza con el Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Alianza AP-DC)" (page 566).
Hunefeldt 2004: "One of [Belaúnde's] first steps was to call for municipal elections. Municipal authorities, following a pattern established by Leguía (1919-30), had been arbitrarily designated" (page 222).
Masterson 1991: "After Belaúnde's efforts to construct a legislative coalition fell through, APRA and the UNO arrived at an agreement on 26 July to control the election of congressional officers in the voting of the following day. Thus, when Belaúnde took the oath of office on 28 July, he faced a presidential tenure with a hostile congress" (page 197).
McClintock 1994: "In 1963, in one of the most endorsed measures of his first administration, President Belaúnde restored the right of citizens to elect their municipal governments, which for almost fifty years previously had been appointed by the executive. Held once every three years in November, rather than once every five years in April like the presidential and congressional elections, the municipal elections are the only ones to provide midterm leadership opportunities to the political opposition as well as a barometer of citizens' political opinions" (page 367).
Werlich 1978: "Shortly before taking the oath of office on July 28, the president-elect approached General Odría and Haya de la Torre with an offer of a few cabinet posts in exhange for legislative support. The two opposition leaders rejected this overture. Instead, they formed a pact, called ‘La Coalición,' which gave them comfortable majorities in both houses of congress. APRA and the Uno claimed that their coalition was arranged only to elect parliamentary officers and that they would pursue their own legislative programs. Nevertheless, the two parties consistently united in their efforts to frustrate the administration...The new link between APRA and the ultraconservative UNO...appalled many party members" (page 280).
Werlich 1978: "In August 1963, the two-week-old administration submitted its agrarian reform proposal to parliament...Belaúnde's bill attempted to satiate the land hunger of the peasants without seriously disrupting the economy...Surprised by the swiftness of the administration's initiative, the APRA-UNO opposition stalled the agrarian reform bill while it labored to formulate alternatives" (pages 283-284).
Klarén 2000: "In September, [Belaunde] introduced a new agrarian reform law to the Congress...The proposed land reform was not well received by the Congress, dominated by APRA and the [UNO]. La Coalición countered with its own heavily watered-down bill...Over the next eight months, the Congress wrangled over the course of the reform" (page 327).
Clayton 1999: U.S. president "John Kennedy was assassinated November 22, 1963" (page 236). With "his successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson,...there came a reversal of U.S. policy toward Peru and I.P.C...[A]ssistance was frozen for almost two years as Belaúnde's government contined to negotiate, unsuccessfully, with I.P.C." (page 237).
Werlich 1978: "When parliament adjourned in late November 1963, without enacting agrarian reform, the president called the lawmakers into special session" (page 284). "The diplomatic intervention of the United States government complicated negotiations between Peru and the International Petroleum Company...The policy of the State Department concerning the IPC affair became increasingly rigid after the succession of Lyndon Johnson in November 1963. Washington failed to provide Belaúnde with the generous funding that it had promised at the time of his inauguration" (pages 293-294).
December: municipal election
Alexander 1973: "The first municipal elections in 40 years were held in December 1963. In these the Christian Democrats and Acción Popular put up joint tickets in most municipalities" (page 358).
Astiz 1969: "Municipal election results, by party, December 1963" (page 110).
Chávez López 2002: "El 15 de noviembre de 1963 se llevó a cabo las elecciones municipales generales" (page 75). "Elecciones municipales del año de 1963" (page 75).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 16/12: "Por primera vez se realizan elecciones municipales en todo el país. En Lima es elegido alcalde Luis Bedoya Reyes, quien es apoyado por Acción Popular y la Democracia Cristiana" (page 566).
Hunefeldt 2004: "In the first municipal elections in 1963 and 1966, most mayors came from the ranks of Belaúnde Terry's renamed party, the governing Acción Popular (AP), and the Democracia Cristiana (DC), led by Héctor Cornejo Chávez. To the chagrin of the APRA-UNO, which had hoped to score a victory with María Delgado de Odría as their candidate for Lima's mayoralty, Luis Bedoya Reyes, a close friend of Belaúnde Terry, won overwhelmingly" (pages 222-223).
Kantor 1969: "In December 1963 the first municipal elections ever held introduced local self-government to the cities" (page 478).
Marett 1969: Belaúnde's "supporters in ‘Acción Popular' and among the Christian Democrats won a stunning victory even in the north, where the position of the ‘Apristas' was supposed to be impregnable" (page 189).
Saba 1986: "(M)unicipal elections [are restored] in December 1963 after a forty-five year lapse. The AP-PDC alliance gained control over more municipalities than did their Apra-UNO rivals, and the alliance candidate, Luis Bedoya Reyes, a Christian Democratic leader, easily won the mayorship of Lima. Overall, Belaúnde's supporters received 46.6 percent of the total vote, while the Coalición had 44.4 percent" (page 50).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Elecciones municipales 1963. Resultado provincial" (pages 583-587). Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones municipales 1963. Resultado distrital - Lima metropolitana" (page 587). Gives by district the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," and "emitidos miles."
Werlich 1978: "In fulfillment of a campaign pledge, Belaúnde ordered municipal elections, a privilege that most cities had not exercised in more than four decades. With APRA's legendary grass-roots organization, La Coalición seemed certain of adding control of local government to its domination of parliament. Nevertheless, AP-PDC candidates won most of these contests, scoring several victories even in APRA's ‘solid north.' In the race for mayor of Lima, Christian Democrat Luis Bedoya Reyes defeated Señora María Delgado de Odría" (page 281).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 18-19/1: "IV Conferencia Nacional del Partido Comunista Peruano (PCP). Se produce la división entre la tendencia pro soviética (Partido Comunista-Unidad) y la tendencia pro china (Partido Comunista-Bandera Roja)" (page 567).
McClintock 1998: "In the early 1960s, [Abimael] Guzmán became an important communist leader in Ayacucho; in part due to an intransigent Guzmán demand, the original pro-Soviet communist party fragmented into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions in 1964. The pro-Peking group was called the Red Flag (Bandera Roja)" (page 64).
Werlich 1978: "In January 1964...the first major [land] invasion took place on the coast" (page 284).
Gow 1981: "In 1964, President Belaunde attempted to implement a land reform but failed since he never received the backing of the Senate. The impasse between landowners and ‘colonos' continued" (page 49).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 19/5: "El Gobierno promulga una Ley de Reforma Agraria parcial y la ley 15037...Con la promulgación de esta ley se tuvo la intención de desarrollar, por lo menos, la reforma en la sierra, donde se ubicaban los sectores más pobres del campesinado" (page 567).
Saba 1986: "An initially well-meaning but ultimately ‘watered-down' and vaguely-worded Agrarian Reform Law [was] passed and signed into law on May 21, 1964...(T)he program may have looked good on paper, but within a year it was recognized as a failure, even by key members of Acción Popular's left-wing" (page 50).
Seligmann 1995: Belaúnde "crafted a comprehensive reform law, Legislative Decree 15037, in response to land invasions and uprisings in the southern and central highlands. The violence and extent of these uprisings alarmed landlords and urban residents alike...Despite the severity of the crisis, the reform measures Belaúnde took remained primarily symbolic" (page 57).
Clayton 1999: "In 1965 a combination of Cuban and Communist-inspired revolutionaries in Peru led by Luis de la Puente Uceda and Héctor Béjar declared a Cuban model revolutionary ‘foco' (band or cadre of revolutionaries) in existence to prosecute a people's war, and, additionally, to end the influence of the ‘Great Monster of the North' (i.e., the United States) in Peru" (page 180).
Hunefeldt 2004: "In Cuzco, ‘aprista' militant Luis de la Puente Uceda and Trotskyist Hugo Blanco organized a guerrilla group, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in 1965, and Guillermo Lobatón did something similar in the central highlands, founding the Tupac Amaru group" (page 227).
Klarén 2000: In 1965, "de la Puente's MIR was joined by guerrilla leaders to plan joint operations [with] two other guerrilla groups, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), founded by Héctor Béjar and with ties to the PCP, and Túpac Amaru, a faction of MIR led by Guillermo Lobatón" (pages 329-330).
Marett 1969: The "M.I.R. in 1965 launched a series of guerrilla offensives designed to create a new and militant mass movement of the extreme left. At one time in that year there were no less than five small guerrilla groups operating in widely separated parts of the Peruvian ‘sierra.' But although each group adopted romantic Inca names, such as Tupac Amarú, Pachacutec, and Atahualpa, they failed to attract the support of the peasants. Even so, this outbreak of guerrilla fighting was enough to shake Belaúnde's government to its foundations and to cause the army to mobilize a large part of its effective strength for the difficult task of hunting down an elusive enemy" (pages 225-226).
Clayton 1999: "The revolutionary effort lasted about seven months and was largely confined to the Sierra before being suppressed by the army in a campaign that claimed perhaps as many as eight thousand peasants killed and thousands of acres scorched by napalm" (pages 180-181).
Klarén 2000: "(W)hen the guerrillas inaugurated their first action in June 1965, the armed forces reacted quickly and effectively to the challenge. Within six months, the three guerrilla ‘focos' had been routed in a massive campaign that cost the lives not only of de la Puente and Lobatón, but upward of 8,000 Indian peasants who were victims" (page 330).
Werlich 1978: In June 1965, "Luis de la Puente Uceda, who had transformed his APRA Rebelde into the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), began guerrilla operations in isolated pockets of the departments of Cuzco and Junín" (page 285).
Astiz 1969: "The Belaúnde administration, for reasons of prestige, refused to recognize the existence of guerrillas" (page 156). "In July of 1965, the Joint General Staff presented an ultimatum to the Belaúnde Terry government, demanding that all constitutional guarantees be suspended and that the military be put in charge of the repression, with authorization to do whatever they considered necessary" (page 157).
Werlich 1978: "In September, Héctor Béjar's National Liberation Army (ELN) undertook a similar task in the mountains and jungles of northern Ayacucho. Composed primarily of students, these armed bands used the promise of land to attract peasant volunteers. The local farmers, however, rejected the appeals of the revolutionaries" (pages 285-286).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 23/10: "Muere en Mesa Pelada, Cusco, el guerrillero Luis de la Puente Uceda" (page 569).
Astiz 1969: "By early 1966 the guerrillas had been almost completely wiped out...The appearance of guerrillas, who constituted a threat to the established order and whose objective was to bring about the Peruvian version of the Cuban revolution, provided a new link between the traditional upper class and the military establishment" (page 158).
Clayton 1999: "By the mid- to late 1960s, Peruvian military officers, many of them trained in the United States, had been moving away from their traditional roles as defenders of the nation (from external threats) and defenders of the status quo (in league with the old oligarchy), to a more progressive, interventionary role in the nation. This stressed new solutions to a society still divided by race, geography, and class" (page 181). "(E)arly in 1966...U.S. policy again switched [after] assurances from Belaúnde that Peru never intended to take I.P.C. Aid was resumed, but by now Belaúnde's domestic economy...was beginning to erode his political power" (page 241).
Werlich 1978: "(B)y January 1966 both the MIR and the ELN had been suppressed" (page 286).
November 13: municipal election
Astiz 1969: "Municipal election results, by party, November, 1966" (page 111).
Chávez López 2002: "El 13 de noviembre de 1966, se llevó a cabo las elecciones municipales generales" (page 77). "Elecciones municipales del año de 1966" (page 77). Gives results by department.
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 13/11: "Se realizan elecciones complementarias para el Congreso" (page 569).
Planas 2000: "Elecciones municipales de 1966. Resultado nacional" (page 237).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Elecciones municipales 1966. Resultado nacional" (page 575). Gives number of votes for each party, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones municipales 1966. Resultado departamental" (page 575). Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones municipales 1966. Resultado provincial" (pages 576-579). Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones municipales 1966. Lima metropolitana - resultado distrital" (page 580). Gives by district the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," and "inscritos miles."
Dietz 1998: "In 1966, Luis Bedoya Reyes, a well-liked former mayor of Lima, founded the PPC...both to serve as his own party and to represent the Peruvian business community" (page 205).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 18/12: "Un grupo de disidentes del Partido Demócrata Cristiano funda en Lima el Partido Popular Cristiano bajo el liderazgo de Luis Bedoya Reyes" (page 570).
Clayton 1999: "The Peruvian purchase of French-made Mirage jets in 1967...once again tripped the wire on U.S. aid. U.S. assistance and loans were drastically cut in response to Peru's rejection of U.S.-made jet aircraft" (page 242).
Werlich 1978: "The rift within Belaúnde's own Acción Popular became almost complete schism. The party's national convention in late 1967 elected Edgardo Seoane secretary general, rejecting the president's personal choice" (page 288).
Astiz 1969: "In 1967...the strain between the conservative and reformist wings of [the Christian Democrats] produced a division, which can be traced back to the party congress held in November, 1966. In February of 1967, the conservative elements, led by the mayor of Lima, decided to break away and organize the Christian Popular party, which announced its opposition to redistribution of privately-owned land and nationalization of the oil fields and mines" (page 127).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Partido Popular Cristiano (1967)...[es] formado por un sector de la DC dirigido por Luis Bedoya Reyes" (page 677).
November: congressional and municipal election
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 12/11: "Nuevamente se realizan elecciones complementarías para el Congreso" (page 571).
Statistical abstract of Latin America volume 12 1968: In November 1967, AP loses seats in the congressional elections and DC withdraws from the government coalition (page 160).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Elecciones municipales complementarias 1967. Resultado departamental - Lima" (page 574). Gives votes for each party, "votos válidos," "votos nulos," "votos blancos," and "votos emitidos."
Masterson 1991: "Belaúnde's political fortunes suffered...when in an election on 12 November 1967, which was viewed as a mandate for the president's economic policy, the ‘Acción Popular' candidate was defeated in his effort to win a vacant seat in the Chamber of Deputies for the Lima district" (page 223).
Werlich 1978: "In November 1967, the administration suffered a defeat in an important special election and the PDC withdrew its support from the regime" (page 288).
Adelman 2006: "By 1968, civilian rulers were incapable of handling Peru's mounting problems, while the military and conservative elites refused to accommodate the only sort of reforms that would rekindle the relations between civilian rulers and the ruled" (page 59).
Haworth 1993: "In 1968, the Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú-broadly linked to the pro-Moscow Partido Comunista Peruano-successfully challenged the pro-APRA labor organization, the Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú. The political impact of the emergence of a strong leftist union bloc combined with the opportunity presented by the Velasco reforms to radicalize union organization...Thus the 1970s saw the consolidation of left-wing revolutionary political groups and their union and community followings" (pages 42-43).
McClintock 1994: "The 1968 constitutional breakdown" (pages 375-377).
Nickson 1995: Municipal elections took place in 1968, "but were abolished once again by the military regime in power from 1968 to 1980" (page 238).
Clayton 1999: "Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado...became the army chief of staff in March 1968" (page 243).
Werlich 1978: "The next June, AP nominated Seoane to run for the presidency in 1969" (page 288).
Clayton 1999: "The storm with I.P.C....escalated the growing frustration of the military with Belaúnde's inability to deal with the perceived problems of the nation. In effect the I.P.C. affair was the accelerator of the revolution. But the military was almost deprived of its favorite whipping boy at the last minute. In July 1968 nationalist rhetoric heated up, and rumors of an impending coup to be followed by the swift expropriation of I.P.C. deominated the ‘limeño' imagination. Right then I.P.C. gave in to virtually all Belaúnde's demands" (page 243).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 28/7: "El presidente Fernando Belaunde Terry anuncia que se ha llegado a un arreglo con la International Petroleum Company (IPC)" (page 572).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 12/8: "El Gobierno firma con la IPC el ‘Acta de Talara,' donde se formaliza lo acordado sobre los yacimientos de la Brea y Pariñas" (page 572).
Clayton 1999: "Jungle concessions, continuing rights to operate and expand the refinery, and other real or perceived flaws in the contract were magnified by the missing page controversy" (pages 245-246).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 20/9: "Un importante sector de Acción Popular rompe relaciones con Belaunde debido al ‘Escándalo de la Página 11,' página que desapareció del contrato con la International Petroleum Company" (page 572).
Werlich 1978: "Edgardo Seoane denounced the IPC settlement in a televised address September 20 and disassociated Acción Popular from the actions of the president. Invoking his prerogative as founder of the party, Belaúnde declared a ‘reorganization' of AP and revoked Seoane's presidential nomination" (page 296).
Adelman 2006: "Within days, the generals seized the vast possessions of the International Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey. Then they turned on the mining companies. In part, the idea was to assert symbolically the autonomy of the regime from foreign capital. Another motive was to take over the ground rents directly and plough them into the costs of social change" (page 59).
Burt 2007: "It was not until the military intervention of 1968 that the power of the oligarchic state was broken with the implementation of a broad reformist program under the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975)" (page 26).
Clayton 1999: "On October 4, a decree nullified the Act of Talara, and on October 9, another decree followed, expropriating not only La Brea and Pariñas but I.P.C.'s refinery at Talara as well" (page 246).
Cleaves 1983: "The 1968 military coup was the culmination of the crisis of Peru's so-called oligarchic state, a form of domination that traces its origins to the nineteenth century and reached its peak in the 1950s" (page 214). "The Velasco government was not an accidental detour in the evolution of Peruvian politics, however, but rather a crucial link between one period and another...The military reform program reassembled the country's main power contenders and stimulated the emergence of a new dominant class" (page 219).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 3/10: "Golpe de Estado de las Fuerzas Armadas dirigido por el general Juan Velasco Alvarado contra el Gobierno Constitucional del arquitecto Fernando Belaunde Terry. Se inicia la Primera Fase del Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas. Belaunde es deportado del país" (page 573). 9/10: "Expropiación del complejo petrolero de la Brea y Pariñas (Talara), hasta el momento manejado por la IPC" (page 573).
Hunefeldt 2004: "Velasco's military government...designed a government program called the Plan Inca. By it the government intended to find a route of development for the country that would be neither communist nor capitalist, a sort of state capitalism with social redistribution to benefit the poorest in the country...While mobilizing the masses Velasco also silenced opposition voices. Congress remained closed...and political parties and the free press were suppressed...Following his economic plan Velasco began extensive expropriations of what the government considered strategic resources" (page 231). "Possibly Velasco's most important success was the opening of political opportunity for all Peruvians by expanding political participation" (page 232).
Klaiber 1998: "(T)he Peruvian military leaders who overthrew the government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-68) were reformists who proposed to foster national capitalism and conscienticize the lower classes" (page 143).
Klarén 2000: "In the early morning hours of October 3, 1968, the presidential palace was surrounded by tanks, and the president was unceremoniously escorted to the airport, where he was placed on a flight bound for Buenos Aires and exile. The...Gobierno Revolucionario de las [Fuerzas] Armadas-GRFA...now embarked on a radical experiment" (page 336). "(T)he announcement of Velasco six days after the coup of the expropriation of the IPC's holdings conferred widespread immediate popularity on the new military regime and Velasco, in particular" (page 345).
Masterson 1991: "Beginning with the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company's holdings in Peru less than a week after the 3 October 1968 ‘golpe de estado,' the Velasco government during the next seven years initiated more than forty-two hundred laws and 150,000 executive decisions aimed at substantially altering Peruvian society and the country's relations with the international community" (pages 243-244).
McClintock 1998: "The reformist concerns of the Peruvian military were evident in the 1968 coup against Belaúnde led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado. The junta did not deem the previous political order ‘democratic' but rather a ‘sellout of the national interest' by ‘bad politicians,' who ‘acted only to defend the interests of the powerful' and who kowtowed to the United States" (pages 101-102).
Schönwälder 2002: "The reformist military regime under General Juan Velasco Alvarado, which was Peru's first and only experience with institutionalized military rule, differed substantially from previous military dictatorships in the country itself, as well as other, more repressive military regimes in the Southern Cone...(W)hile they could hardly be accused of communist leanings, the new military rulers were opposed to the strong presence of mostly U.S. multinational companies in the country...and the alliance between these companies and the traditional oligarchies...In order to implement its reformist agenda, the new military regime needed to curtail the might wielded by foreign capital and, even more importantly, to break the back of the traditional oligarchies, which up to that point had held a stranglehold on political and economic power, often with the help of repressive military dictatorships" (page 63).
Van Cott 2005: "The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (RGAF) (1968-79), which presided over a period of intense autonomous indigenous mobilization, incorporated indigenous symbols into its identity, recognized Quechua as an official language, promoted bilingual education, and issued legislation protecting the rights of native and campesino communities" (pages 143-144).
Clayton 1999: "In November Richard M. Nixon was elected [president of the United States]" (page 257).
Schönwälder 2002: "Urban popular movements in Peru truly came into their own only after 1968, but their emergence can be traced as far back as the early 1940s. It was intimately related to the onset of mass migrations from the Andean highlands to the cities on the coast and in the interior of the country, following the long-term decline of Andean agriculture. The arrival of ever-increasing numbers of migrants from the ‘sierra' was viewed with abhorrence by the urban-based political and economic elites" (page 61). "The military coup d'état of 1968 and the following reformist military regime...[ushered] in a period of unprecedented popular movement activity that ultimately led to the transformation of urban popular movements into social and political actors in their own right" (page 62).
Clayton 1999: "(O)n January 20, 1969, the former vice president [Nixon] was inaugurated the thirty-seventh president of the United States" (page 257).
Marett 1969: "In January 1969 the Roman Catholic bishops of Peru, stimulated no doubt by the Pope's visit to Latin America in August 1968, announced [a] new policy in the most uncompromising terms. They put the blame for the ills of the country firmly upon the shoulders of ‘a privileged minority of rich Peruvians acting in complicity with an imperialistic economic system'" (page 257).
Clayton 1999: "On February 6 the revolutionary government presented I.P.C. with a bill for almost $700 million, a figure fixed as the value of petroleum extracted from La Brea and Pariñas since 1924. The remainder of I.P.C.'s assets were seized that same day and were held until I.P.C. settled the bill. The expropriation was complete" (pages 246-247). "On February 17 Peru also signed its first trade agreement with the Soviet Union, one of many new initiatives in this direction that signaled a further degradation of the old relationship between Peru and the United States" (page 258).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 6/2: "El general Velasco anuncia que, según los estudios practicados, la IPC debe al Perú 690 millones de dólares por concepto de extracciones irregulares en los yacimientos de la Brea y Pariñas durante 45 años" (page 574).
Klarén 2000: "Peru's navy vigorously enforced the [200-mile territorial] limit by seizing U.S. tuna boats fishing in ‘its waters.' These incidents provoked the so-called Tuna War in February 1969, when the United States responded to a particularly controversial seizure by suspending military aid to Peru, which, in response, expelled the U.S. military mission from the country. As a result, a half century of cooperation between the two countries' armed forces was ended, diplomatic relations cooled, and Peru intensified its turn to the Soviet Union and elsewhere for military and other assistance" (page 345).
Schönwälder 2002: "(T)he new regime embarked on a series of large-scale nationalizations within days of the military coup, the most spectacular being the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company" (page 63).
Adelman 2006: "By far the most aggressive and important of social reforms was the redistribution of land, seen at the time as a synonym for agrarian reform. In what was dubbed by its authors Plan Inca, officers and agronomists fanned out across the sierra to reshuffle the land tenure system" (page 59).
Gow 1981: "(T)he military junta which came to power in 1968...passed a land reform bill which gave the land back to the Indian people, abolished abusive labor conditions and promised financial assistance for the newly-formed cooperatives" (page 51).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 24/6: "Se inicia la reforma agraria (decreto ley 17716) con la ocupación de las haciendas azucareras. La ley liquida definitivamente el latifundio y el minifundio" (page 575).
Klarén 2000: "Velasco decreed a radical agrarian reform law that became the cornerstone of his revolution...(T)he president announced decree law 17716 eliminating the hacienda on June 24, 1969" (page 346).
Schönwälder 2002: "(T)he agrarian reform of 1969 stands out as one of the most sweeping land reforms ever to be carried out in Latin America, leading to the expropriation of the large agricultural estates on the coast and in the Andean highlands and transforming many of them into agricultural cooperatives" (page 63).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 3/10: "Con motivo del primer aniversario de la revolución, el general Velasco ataca duramente a la oligarquía y a sus órganos de expresión" (page 575).