Elections and Events 1980-1989

1980

Booth 2006:  “By late 1980, guerrilla troops had seized effective control of much of Morazán, La Unión, and Chalatenango provinces” (page 104).

Brockett 2005:  “As state violence skyrocketed in 1980, thousands of peasants in El Salvador…flocked to the guerrilla organizations, expanding them into largely peasant armies.  A much larger number of peasants gave the guerrillas their support, often at considerable personal risk” (page 148).

Dunkerley 1988:  “(I)t was during 1980 that the political ‘centre’ was effectively liquidated and its constituent parties obliged to side with the military forces of either the left or the right” (page 381).

Johnson 1993:  The “’Alianza Productiva’ (AP) [is] created [to] unite business opposition to reform in 1980” (page 185).

Krauss 1991:  “While the right-wing militarists set up death squads, paramilitary militias and safe houses around the country, like-minded wealthy landowners and industrialists formed a public political support group called the Broad National Front (FAN)—the first step toward the founding of a political party [ARENA]” (page 73).

Ladutke 2004:  “Despite the coup leaders’ promise to dissolve ORDEN, its structures remained intact under a new name—the Broad National Front (FAN).  D’Aubuisson then used the FAN to build a new political party, the National Republican Alliance (ARENA)” (page 28).

Schroeder 1995:  “As the left aimed at overthrowing the regime, the extreme right also increased its violence towards both the government and the left.  Roberto D’Aubuisson, a former military intelligence officer removed from the military for his brutality, became the most visible spokesman for the extreme right…D’Aubuisson represented those on the right who wanted to end the new regime and return to the authoritarian model of the pre-1979 coup era…He was at the center of three planned coup attempts in 1980” (page 45).

Wade 2003:  “More than 13,000 people were murdered or disappeared in 1980 alone, most of them peasants, workers and students” (page 48).

January:  government changed (second junta—January 10, 1980-March 3, 1980)

Crónica del mes.  Enero 1980 1980:  “El mes de enero de 1980 se va a caracterizar por tres grandes variables:  la crisis política nacional, la unidad de la izquierda, y la intensificación de la represión” (page 101).

Dunkerley 1988:  “The PCS, MNR and dissident Christian Democrats allied themselves with the radical left within a matter of weeks of the collapse of the junta established in October 1979” (page 382). “Civilian members of junta and cabinet resign [on January 1] after military reject ultimatum.  PDC joins military in new junta [on January 9].  FPL, FARN, PCS declare coordination of guerrilla activity [on January 10].  Popular organizations (BPR; FAPU; LP-28; UDN) unite to form CRM [on January 11].  San Salvador demonstration [on January 22] of at least 100,000 to mark anniversary of 1932 revolt and celebrate formation of CRM; many marchers killed by military” (page 383).  “On 1 January 1980 [the December 27] ultimatum was unambiguously rejected by COPEFA and over the next few days Ungo and Mayorga resigned from the junta (followed a little later by Andino) and thirty-seven ministers quit office, leaving only two colonels to represent the brave new democracy.  In line with its traditions since 1932, the military rejected all restrictions placed by civilians upon its operational independence, and this rejection was especially decisive when these controls were seen as directly prejudicial to the mission of liquidating the left” (page 388). 

January 2

Crónica del mes.  Enero 1980 1980:  “El día 2 de enero, fecha fijada para la respuesta de la Fuerza Armada al ultimátum de la mayoría del gobierno, Mons. Romero, Arzobispo de San Salvador, convocó a una reunión dialogal y mediadora entre el Alto Mando militar y los miembros de la Junta y del Gabinete.  El intento de mediación y entendimiento, extendido por largas horas, resultó infructuoso y tardío, pues muchas de las posiciones ya estaban tomadas de antemano…[El equipo gobernante tenía] otra alternativa ya que el 31 de diciembre la Democracia Cristiana había presentado un proyecto de gobierno a la Fuerza Armada, y tal solución parece que era más aceptable al Alto Mando y al gobierno de los Estados Unidos.  En la misma tarde del día 2 de enero un grupo de funcionarios considerados independientes—los ministros de Agricultura [Enrique Alvarez] y de Educación [Salvador Samayoa], y tres altos funcionarios—leyeron una carta de renuncia” (page 101).

January 3

Baires Martínez 1994:  “(E)l 3 de enero de 1980 se produjo la renuncia de [Guillermo] Ungo y [Roman] Mayorga ([Mario] Andino lo hizo al día siguiente)” (page 31).

Crónica del mes.  Enero 1980 1980:  “Unicamente no renunciaron los titulares de Defensa y los dos militares de la Junta…Lo que más extrañó fue que los titulares de defensa permanecieran en sus puestos, y no los pusieran a disponibilidad, lo que indicaba dónde estaba realmente el poder político en esos momentos” (page 101).

January 9

Baires Martínez 1994:  “(E)l 9 de enero de 1980 se integraron a la junta dos representantes de [el PDC]; el ingeniero Héctor Dada Hirezi y el doctor Antonio Morales Erlich; se incorporó también un miembro independiente, el doctor José Ramón Avalos Navarrette” (page 31).

Crónica del mes.  Enero 1980 1980:  “La Democracia Cristiana, entre acusaciones de oportunismo y de traición, puso sus condiciones a la Fuerza Armada para hacerse cargo del gobierno a una con los militares y algunos independientes” (page 101).

Motley 1983: “On January 9, 1980, the ‘Pact Between the Armed Forces and the Christian Democratic Party’ announced the formation of a new government” (page 2). The pact cites as its first political objective: “To create the conditions necessary for the implementation of the structural reforms (and) at the same time lead the nation toward a democratic solution in which it is the people who decide their own destiny.”

Ribera Sala 1996: “Para el Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC, la década de los ochenta se inicia con un cambio trascendental: después de haber sido un partido opositor durante casi veinte años--desde su fundación en 1960--pasaba ahora a ser partido de gobierno” (page 33). 

Schroeder 1995:  “Abandoned by the majority of the center-left, the military chose to ask the Christian Democrats to join the new junta.  In fact, secret negotiations for an alliance between the PDC and the military had begun prior to the fall of the first junta…The fall of the first junta and its replacement by a second junta made up of the military and the PDC has been characterized by some as the restoration of the military-oligarchy alliance.  Evidence seems to suggest otherwise…The second junta chose to address the Salvadoran crisis through reform accompanied by a state of siege.  The reform program focused on agrarian reform and nationalization of the banking system and coffee and sugar export” (page 38).  “Overall, the actions of the second junta were successful only at isolating itself from Salvadoran society.  The modest agrarian reform and nationalization of banking and export had alienated the extreme right, while the increasing repression in the name of anti-communism alienated the entire left” (page 41).

Williams 2003:  “Although the 1979 coup provided a historic opportunity to implement far-reaching reforms and to avoid a civil war, within weeks, the young reformist officers were displaced by a group of conservative officers only superficially committed to the reform program.  Because of the military’s unwillingness to halt the repression against groups on the left, civilian members of the government resigned en masse in early January 1980.  Completely isolated, the military turned to the PDC for support.  In exchange for PDC’s participation in a new junta and cabinet, the military agreed to go forward with the program of social and economic reforms” (pages 309-310).

January 10-11

Baloyra 1982:  “On 11 January the three popular organizations—the BPR, the RAPU, and the LP-28—and the UDN issued a joint communiqué calling for unity and armed insurrection” (page 98).

Dunkerley 1988:  “On 10 January RN, the FPL and the PCS agreed to coordinate guerrilla activity and combine their mass organizations in the new ‘Coordinadora Revolucionaria de Masas’ (CRM)” (page 389).

Lindo-Fuentes 2007:  “The first major step toward what would become the united guerrilla army of the FMLN occurred on January 10, 1980, when most of the factions, including the Communist Party, formed the [CRM]” (page 213).

López Vallecillos 1980:  “El 11 de enero de 1980, en el auditorio de la Facultad de Jurisprudencia y Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de El Salvador, miembros de la alta dirigencia de las organizaciones político-populares:  Frente de Acción Popular Unificada (FAPU), Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero (LP-28), Partido Unión Democrática Nacionalista (UDN) y Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR), convocaron a periodistas nacionales y extranjeros y a numerosos simpatizantes, a una conferencia de prensa en la cual anunciaron los planteamientos y conceptos fundamentales de un amplio acuerdo de unidad que se sustentaría en la Coordinadora Revolucionaria de Masas (CRM)” (page 183).

Schroeder 1995:  “The rise in repression directed at the left resulted in the creation of a unified left intent on overthrowing the PDC-military junta.  The first step began on January 11, 1980…The leaders of three popular organizations, the [BPR], the [FAPU], and the [UDN]—which had all become front organizations for the guerrilla groups the FPL, the RN and the PCS respectively—formed the [CRM], a coordinating committee to plan joint political and military strategy” (page 41).

January 22

Brockett 2005:  “The nonviolent movement’s emotional peak came on January 22, 1980, when the biggest demonstration in the country’s history occupied the streets of the capital.  Somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 people marched—peasants, professionals, labor, students” (page 300).

Crónica del mes.  Enero 1980 1980:  “La Coordinadora convoca a una gigantesca manifestación para el día 22 de enero, aniversario del levantamiento campesino de hace 48 años, y que se convertirá en la mayor concentración popular de la historia posiblemente, en una demonstración de unidad, de apoyo multitudinario, de fiesta y alegría popular, pero que terminará en un baño de sangre en el centro de la capital” (page 103).

Dunkerley 1988:  “On 22 January the left as a whole held a march to celebrate the anniversary of the 1932 rebellion…(T)he decision of the military to open fire upon the marchers as they passed through the centre of the capital transformed it into a peculiarly bitter occasion which for many wiped out the possibility of reaching a truce with the military and conducting opposition through ‘open’ politics” (page 389).

Gould 2008:  “On 22 January 1980 an estimated 250,000 backers of the revolutionary left took to the streets of San Salvador in probably the largest demonstration in the country’s history.  Soldiers opened fire on the demonstrators, killing twenty and wounding two hundred.  These killings of unarmed protesters marked the beginning of a period of unbridled violent repression” (page 264).

Ladutke 2004:  “Another one of many attacks on freedom of expression took place on January 22, 1980, as a quarter of a million Salvadorans marched in the capital to protest the weakness of the civilian members of the junta.  State forces responded by shooting into the crowd and killing forty-nine people” (page 28).

Lindo-Fuentes 2007:  “Shortly after the formation of the CRM, the popular movements organized a mass demonstration on January 22, the forty-eighth anniversary of the 1932 uprising…When the marchers reached San Salvador’s central square, military units opened fire.  El Salvador’s human rights commission estimated the number of dead at sixty-seven and the wounded at two hundred fifty” (page 214).

February

Baloyra 1982:  “The extreme Right saw things differently.  On 8 February, Chele Medrano issued his own version of what constituted the gravest aspect of the crisis:  Communist subversion…Joined by the rising star of the Salvadoran Right, former intelligence chief Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, who had strong ties to the UGB paramilitary group, Medrano organized the Frente Democrático Nacionalista (FDN) and presented himself as the champion of the small agricultural proprietor” (pages 98-99).  “On 25 February, Attorney General Mario Zamora, a PDC member and the brother of the recently resigned minister of the presidency, Rubén Zamora, was assassinated by right-wing terrorists.  Major D’Aubuisson had accused Zamora of being a member of the FPL.  Zamora had been trying to get the stalled inquiry into the disappeared moving again.  His assassination worsened an internal crisis which had been brewing within the PDC concerning the party’s collaboration with the military, the proper attitude toward the Left, and the pace and substance of the reform program” (page 99).  “In late February Decree No. 153 was announced…(T)his statute for agrarian reform affected only holdings above five hundred hectares” (page 101).  “(I)n February 1980, Monsignor Romero asked the Christian Democrats not to participate in the government so that their presence would not contribute to the masking of repression” (page 112).

Brockett 2005:  “(I)n mid-February 1980 fifty ANDES militants seized the Education Ministry, taking one hundred to two hundred hostages” (page 10).

Caldera T. 1983: On February 23, 1980, Dr. Mario Zamora Rivas, “Procurador General de Pobres y miembro del Comité Político del PDC” is assassinated (page 32).

Dunkerley 1988:  In February 1980 “LP-28 occupies PDC office peacefully—military executes leading protesters.  D’Aubuissón/Medrano coup plan halted by US diplomats.  Attorney General Mario Zamora assassinated by death squad after D’Aubuissón accuses him of ‘subversion’... Repression increases---600 killed in first two months of year” (page 383).

Krauss 1991:  “D’Aubuisson identified Mario Zamora, the Christian Democratic attorney general, as a clandestine guerrilla during one broadcast in February 1980.  A couple of days later, gunmen burst into Zamora’s home…Zamora’s killing nearly destroyed the government.  The Christian Democratic party pledged to quit the junta unless those responsible for the assassination were brought to justice…The left-wing group in the government was outraged.  As much as a third of the Christian Democratic leadership, including Mario’s brother Rubén, the junta’s chief of staff, resigned from the government and the party” (page 73).

Ladutke 2004:  “In February, a death squad assassinated Mario Zamora, a Christian Democrat leader whom D’Aubuisson had just denounced on television.  A week later, the head of the second junta, Hector Dada, resigned and fled into exile” (page 29).

March 5-8

Baloyra 1982:  “On 8 March Decree No. 158 nationalized the banking industry.  This new package of reforms, however, was accompanied by the declaration of a state of siege, on 7 March, which made the undeclared civil war official” (page 101).

Castro Morán 2005:  “El Decreto 153 que promulga y sanciona la Ley Básica de la Reforma Agraria, fue aprobado el 5 de marzo de 1980…El Decreto 153 solamente afectaba las propiedades mayores de 500 hectáreas, es decir, el 25% de la tierra, controlada por 244 terratenientes” (page 216).  “La reforma agraria salvadoreña fue planificada en función de contra-insurgencia por el experto agrícola estadounidense, profesor Roy Prosterman, arquitecto del modelo de pacificación rural puesto en práctica en Vietnam” (page 218).

Krauss 1991:  “What was left of the Christian Democratic party threatened to leave the government unless the army finally fulfilled its pledge to promulgate sweeping reforms.  On March 6, 1980, the army complied; they occupied more than two hundred large estates and handed them over to peasant committees representing more than 150,000 farmhands.  It was a decision that cost the country’s forty top families several hundred million dollars” (pages 73-74).

McElhinny 2006:  “Rural insurgency from below and political pressure from above by the United States induced the Salvadoran oligarchy to announce a major set of land reform programs and begin the forced expropriation of farms in March of 1980” (pages 53-54).

Paige 1997:  “On March 6 and 8, 1980, the military officers initiated a land reform which, if carried out fully, would have eliminated the land holdings of most of the coffee elite, and nationalized the banking system, controlled by coffee capital since the beginning of the century…The outraged coffee elite found itself without even a political party to defend it…They turned, as they had in the past, to their allies in the military in an effort to reverse the policies of the junta and crush the upsurge of the left with a wave of violence” (page 34).

Williams 2003:  “On March 6, 1980, the new junta issued the Basic Law of Agrarian Reform” (page 310).

Wood 2003:  “The implementation of the agrarian reform left a legacy of extreme violence in its wake.  A state of emergency was announced the day after the agrarian reform, and was renewed monthly.  Under the cover of the state of siege and the turmoil occasioned by the expropriation of properties, violence escalated as government forces targeted ‘campesino’ activists” (page 108).

March—Government changed (third junta--March 9, 1980-December 7, 1980)

Baloyra 1982:  “Before Zamora was murdered, Archbishop Romero had urged the Christian Democrats to withdraw from the government.  The murder and the exhortations of Romero led to the resignation of several leaders from the government and the party and to the formation of a splinter group, the Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano (MPSC)…The resignation of Héctor Dada brought Duarte into the junta” (page 99).

Dunkerley 1988:  “Héctor Dada (PDC) resigns from junta [March 3, 1980] denouncing repression.  José Napoleón Duarte enters junta [March 5].  Agrarian reform introduced and state of siege declared [March 6].  PDC splits [March 10]; dissidents form MPSC.  CRM calls general strike [March 17].  Archbishop Romero assassinated [March 24].  Further PDC resignations from cabinet [March 26].  General strike; some 100,000 attend Romero’s funeral, which is attacked by military [March 30]” (pages 383-384).

Klaiber 1998:  “By March 1980 all hope of real change had dissipated.  The provisional president of the third junta created that month was José Napoleón Duarte, the same man who had been deported by the military in 1972.  He tried to carry forward the reformist torch and even managed to proclaim an agrarian reform, which in practice did little for the peasants” (page 169).

Latin American regional reports.  Caribbean & Central America report March 21, 1980:  “The crisis in El Salvador deepened with the resignation of the leading Christian Democrat, Hector Dada, from the ruling junta.  His place was taken by Napoleon Duarte, but more evidence came of the split between the party’s right and left over continued participation in the government when Ruben Zamora, of the party’s radical wing, later announced his resignation…The archbishop attacked the ‘repressive’ nature of the regime, drawing attention to the fact that 600 people had been killed in the first two months of the year.  The regime, he said, could ‘count only on the support of a few foreign powers’; he wrote to the US government requesting that it withdraw its US$7m military aid proposal, but Cyrus Vance wrote back reaffirming US support for ‘moderate’ government” (electronic edition).

Wade 2003:  “Under pressure from the United States, the military offered to share the government with the PDC in March 1980, a tactical move to ensure legitimacy at home and military funds from the United States.  The PDC agreed to join the junta on the condition that human rights violations improve and that the reforms proffered by the junta, including agrarian reform, would proceed” (page 48).

Williams 2003:  “The second junta collapsed in early March 1980, when junta member and PDC leader Héctor Dada resigned in protest over the military’s continuing repression…Duarte’s decision to replace Dada on the junta a few days later provoked a split in the party…Duarte’s decision to remain on the junta through 1982 provided the military and its U.S. sponsors the political cover they needed as they searched for a way out of the crisis” (page 310).

March 10

Dunkerley 1988:  “PDC dissidents split to form the ‘Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano’  (MPSC), led by Rubén Zamora (brother of the slain attorney general) and Héctor Dada” (page 395).

Schroeder 1995:  “With the nomination of PDC leader Duarte to the junta in a convention in March, 1980, almost one fifth of the members of the PDC resigned…These dissident PDC members formed the [MPSC]” (page 43).

March 11

Baloyra 1982:  “Shortly after Ambassador Robert White presented his credentials, on 11 March 1980, the Carter administration sent an unequivocal warning to D’Aubuisson and Chele Medrano to refrain from conspiratorial activities, since the United States would not tolerate a rightist coup” (page 106).

March 24

Dunkerley 1988:  “The only institution that now stood between the two polarized camps was the Church, although by this stage Archbishop Romero no longer felt able to modulate his frequent political statements and condemnations of violence.  He was, as a result, seen by the right as a partisan of the radical cause and an especially dangerous figure” (page 395). 

Klaiber 1998:  “Official repression of popular organizations grew more severe, and the death squads acted at will.  The murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero on March 24, 1980, was the most widely known example of this state of lawlessness and institutionalized violence” (page 170).

Ladutke 2004:  Archbishop Romero “became one of the most prominent Salvadoran figures to denounce human rights violations...While Romero criticized violations by both the right and the left, his accounts reflected the reality that the state and its allies committed the majority of the abuses.  The Archbishop also encouraged family members of victims to organize and demand justice” (page 26). 

Lindo-Fuentes 2007:  “Two months after the formation of the CRM, the Communist Party officially founded its military wing, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación…(FAL), marking a growing belief within the party that armed conflict was becoming inevitable.  Coincidentally, on the same day Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated by a paramilitary death squad while saying mass in San Salvador, elevating the level of social conflict to unprecedented heights” (page 213).

Schroeder 1995:  “The most visible victim of the right wing death squads was the archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Romero, an outspoken advocate of social justice.  On March 24, 1980, Romero was gunned down in the chapel where he was saying the mass.  D’Aubuisson was again directly implicated in ordering the murder” (page 46).

Williams 1997a:  “In the wake of Romero’s death, the church leadership in the archdiocese began to distance itself from the popular movements with which he had sought a relationship of solidarity” (page 184).  “At the same time that the Catholic church was losing its institutional presence among poor Salvadorans through either tactical retreat or pastoral neglect, the Pentecostal churches were launching an offensive to win over converts…Churches like the Asambleas de Dios were well positioned to take advantage of the Catholic Church’s tactical retreat…Unlike members of Catholic base communities, Pentecostals rarely faced persecution by the regime, which looked favorably upon the growth of Pentecostal churches.  Contrary to some Catholic leaders who spoke against the regime, Pentecostal leaders were careful to maintain congenial relations with the government” (page 186).

Wood 2003:  “It was in this context of extreme state violence that Archbishop Romero called for soldiers to refuse to obey orders; he was assassinated the next day on the orders of Roberto d’Aubuisson by a death squad that included two Armed Forces captains” (page 109).

March 26

Schroeder 1995:  “Realizing that the military was using the state of siege to repress the left instead of using it to guarantee compliance with reform, a number of PDC resignations from the cabinet resulted.  PDC member Jorge Villacorta…resigned on March 26” (page 40).

March 27

Baloyra 1982:  “On 27 March three members of the PDC resigned their portfolios in protest over the government’s inability to prevent rightist violence.  PDC leaders tried to maintain their composure and denounced the oligarchy for complicity in subversion and indiscriminate killings, but they exonerated the armed forces” (page 112).

March 30

Dunkerley 1988:  “(T)he military attacked the archbishop’s funeral procession and killed 40 of the 80,000 mourners in front of foreign dignitaries and TV cameras” (page 396).

Ladutke 2004:  “Roughly fifty thousand mourners attended Archbishop Romero’s funeral in March 1980.  Machine-gun fire killed somewhere between twenty-seven and forty individuals in the crowd and wounded over two hundred others” (page 28).

April 1

Baloyra 1982:  “The Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR) was created on 1 April 1980 by the Coordinadora Revolucionaria de Masas (CRM)—an alliance that included the FAPU, the LP-28, the UDN, and the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR)—plus the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), the Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano (MPSC), the Movimiento de Liberación Popular (MLP), and forty-nine labor unions…Interest associations like MIPTES (professionals) and AGEUS (students), as well as the University of El Salvador, were also represented” (page 154).  “In essence, the FDR is dominated by the Social and Christian Democrats and Marxist independents who abandoned the government in December 1979” (page 161).

Crónica del mes.  Abril 1980 1980:  “La unidad de la izquierda se amplía y robustece en el mes de abril.  El día primero del mes se constituye el Frente Democrático, integrado por doce agrupaciones” (page 504).  Lists names of organizations.

Dunkerley 1988:  “US Congress approves $5.7 million in military aid [April 1, 1980]” (page 384).

April 4

Dunkerley 1988:  “On 4 April the MNR combined with the MPSC and a number of unions and professional associations to form the ‘Frente Democrático Salvadoreño’ (FDS) as a fleeting preamble to complete fusion with the CRM” (page 397).

Schroeder 1995:  “By early April the MPSC and the moderate leftist MNR formed an alliance with nine trade union organizations and the two Salvadoran universities to form the Democratic Front” (page 43).

April 18

Crónica del mes.  Abril 1980 1980:  “(E)l 18…de abril, se constituía el Frente Democrático Revolucionario, al unirse el Frente Democrático y la Coordinadora en una sola unidad orgánica…Nuevamente es elegido Presidente Enrique Álvarez Córdova, quien días después sería capturado, bajo la excusa de portación de armas, pero gracias a las múltiples presiones es puesto en libertad el mismo día” (page 504).

Dunkerley 1988:  The FDS joins the CRM “in the new ‘Frente Democrático Revolucionario’ (FDR)” (page 397).

McClintock 1998:  “The FDR was established in April 1980, at the height of the death squad activity that had included the assassination of Archbishop Romero.  The FDR’s formation signified the rupture between the Salvadoran government and its social democratic sector…(T)he FDR’s essential objective was to unite left and center-left groups, both political parties and social organizations” (page 52).

Schroeder 1995:  “On April 18, the FD and the CRM…merged to create the [FDR]” (page 43).

Wade 2003:  “Opposition parties, the popular organizations, and labor unions coalesced in April 1980 to form the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR).  The FDR included three center-left parties, the [MNR, the UDN, and the MPSC]” (page 49).

April 22

Schroeder 1995:  “On April 22, 1980, the unification of guerrilla groups began with the creation of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU).  Leaders of the FPL, RN, ERP and PCS created the DRU as a body to coordinate the initiatives of the various guerrilla organizations, although it fell short of creating a unified command” (page 42).

April 28 (29?)

Crónica del mes.  Abril 1980 1980:  “(E)l decreto 20, del 29 de abril, elimina el sistema de arrendamiento de tierras, y se las otorga a los arrendatarios que las estaban cultivando” (page 506). 

El Salvador:  background to the crisis 1982:  “Decree 207 of 28 April 1980…empowers renters to take over the lands they work…It has been claimed that this third phase of the agrarian reform program, often referred to as ‘Land to the Tiller,’ can benefit 150,000 families” (page 98).  “Decree 207 was rushed through without consultations with local experts or personnel of the agrarian reform agency” (page 99).

May 7

Baires Martínez 1994:  D’Aubuisson fue “liberado el 13 de mayo y en una conferencia de prensa semi-clandestina volvió a acusar a Majano y al embajador norteamericano Robert White de ser partes de una conspiración comunista” (page 47).

Baloyra 1982:  “On the night of 7 May troops loyal to Majano surrounded an isolated farmhouse near Santa Tecla and captured D’Aubuisson as he was trying to destroy the contents of a briefcase which included documents describing the blueprint for the conspiracy.  About a dozen officers in active service and some prominent members of the FAN were linked to the cabal and were detained for questioning.  A serious split developed within the military about what to do with the conspirators” (page 107).

May 14

Central America report December 18, 1992: “Some 600 campesinos murdered in the Sumpul massacre, attributed to government armed forces” (page 378).

Dunkerley 1988:  “(T)he army leadership signaled its own determination to inflict a physical defeat upon the left at any price when some 600 ‘campesinos’ fleeing a ‘search and destroy’ operation in Chalatenango were killed on the banks of the Río Sumpul in an appalling bloodbath of innocents facilitated by the Honduran army, with which agreements over collaboration had been made by the high command several days earlier” (page 398).

May 22

Allison 2006:  “In May 1980, the Salvadoran guerrilla groups began to coordinate their activities in the form of the ‘Dirección Revolucionario Unificada’ (DRU)” (page 55).

Baloyra 1982:  “The DRU helped coordinate the political initiatives of the guerrillas and ease their collaboration with the moderate leftists who controlled the FDR.  Yet the DRU fell short of becoming the unified command that would provide better military coordination between the guerrillas” (page 161).

Crónica del mes.  Mayo 1980 1980:  “El 22 de mayo…se publica el ‘Manifiesto de la Dirección Revolucionaria Unificada de las Organizaciones Político-Militares, al Pueblo Salvadoreño y a los Pueblos Centroamericanos y del Mundo’” (page 513).

Zamora 2003:  “El 22 de Mayo de 1980, las cuatro organizaciones [ERP, FPL, RN, PCS] anunciaron que habían constituido la ‘Dirección Revolucionaria Unificada’, (DRU)” (page 51).

June

Baloyra 1982:  PDC “party activists were subjected to such a rightist onslaught that in June 1980 PDC Secretary General Juan Ramírez Rauda would state that more of its members had been killed during that year than during the Molina and Romero governments combined” (pages 112-113).

August

Baloyra 1982:  “The Frente suffered a serious setback with its unsuccessful attempt to organize a general strike in August 1980” (page 154).

Dunkerley 1988:  “3-day general strike called by FDR fails to prompt urban insurrection [August 13]…FARN quits DRU in dispute over strike tactics [August 21]” (page 384).

September

Dunkerley 1988:  “Majano loses battle over military postings; army reformists removed from major troop commands.  FARN leader Ernesto Jovel dies” (page 384).

October 10

Baloyra 1982:  “(T)he FMLN is controlled by the Marxist-Leninist leadership of the guerrilla organizations” (page 161).

Crónica del mes.  Septiembre-octubre 1980 1980:  “La izquierda se reunifica y robustece.  Se crea el [FMLN], unidad orgánica y ejército unido de las organizaciones político-militares, como paso previo a la insurrección, y en su nombre comienzan a intensificarse las acciones” (page 1071).  “Mientras tanto, el FDR retoma liderazgo y mayor fuerza, al regresar al país sus máximos dirigentes, incluidos Enrique Álvarez y Juan Chacón” (page 1072).

Eguizábal 1982?: “La Dirección Revolucionaria Unificada toma la dirección de la lucha armada y, el 10 de octubre de 1980, se procede a la fusión de las diferentes fuerzas, en el Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional, FMLN” (page 90).

Klaiber 1998:  “In this increasingly tense atmosphere the different leftist groups coalesced in 1980 to create the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).  They also founded the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), which acted as a legal branch of the FMLN” (page 169).

Lindo-Fuentes 2007:  “(I)n October 1980, all five of the left-wing factions united for combat by forming the FMLN…and declaring themselves to be a singular guerrilla army under collective leadership” (page 213).

McClintock 1998:  “Established in 1980, the FMLN was a coalition of five guerrilla groups that had been active previously; each group maintained its own leaders, internal practices, and ideological perspectives.  There was no single leader of the organization; for key decisions, agreement was supposed to be reached among the commanders of the five groups.  Although the leftist orientations within the FMLN were diverse, none of the groups extolled political violence for its own sake; terrorism was reserved primarily for military targets…(T)he FMLN maintained numerous important alliances:  domestically, with the civilian opposition the [FDR] and internationally, with the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments and with social democratic movements in the United States and Europe” (page 48).

Schroeder 1995:  “(O)n October 10, 1980…the four guerrilla groups, joined by the small [PRTC], created the [FMLN] to supercede the DRU” (page 42).

Wade 2003:  “Ideologies, affiliations, and strategies of guerrilla organizations comprising the FMLN” (page 49).

Zamora 2003:  “(E)l 10 de Octubre, las 3 organizaciones [ERP, FPL, PCS] transformaron la DRU en el Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)” (page 51).

October 15

Crónica del mes.  Septiembre-octubre 1980 1980:  “El 15 de octubre hacía un año del golpe de Estado que puso fin al régimen del general Romero…En el acto oficial hubo discursos de Majano, Duarte y Abdul…El más importante estaba reservado al Coronel Abdul Gutiérrez, quien anunció que en 1982 se reuniría una Asamblea Constituyente, para tener elecciones en 1983, que antes de fin de año se reabriría la Universidad Nacional, y que se darían garantías a los que desertaran de la guerrilla y se entregaran…El punto de las elecciones y de la Constituyente dejó un sabor amargo y de escepticismo, ya que faltan todas las condiciones para una libertad política y la oposición es sistemáticamente perseguida y aniquilada” (page 1070).

October 29

Crónica del mes.  Septiembre-octubre 1980 1980:  “(P)ocos días más tarde sería asesinado el Rector de la Universidad (y su chofer), el ingeniero Félix Antonio Ulloa, como siempre, por ‘desconocidos vestidos de civil’” (page 1070).

Dunkerley 1988:  “Félix Ulloa, rector of National University, killed by death squad [October 29]” (page 384).

October 30

Crónica del mes.  Septiembre-octubre 1980 1980:  “(L)a firma del Tratado de Paz con Honduras [toma lugar] el día 30 de octubre en Lima…ante la presión de los Estado Unidos, que quieren unificar esfuerzos contrainsurgentes” (page 1070).

November

Baloyra 1982:  “(T)he PDC had the support of the American embassy in its attempt to remove the major [D’Aubuisson] from the scene and to neutralize the actions of the rightist military.  But the embassy had little influence on the rightists, and this evaporated during the period following the election of Ronald Reagan.  The Salvadoran Right was convinced that the new administration’s decision to de-emphasize human rights implied an endorsement of its tactics.  An alarmed Ambassador White flew to Washington in mid-November to urge the Reagan transition team to clarify its position and to restrain the Right” (page 113).

Dunkerley 1988:  “Reagan wins US elections” (page 384).

McElhinny 2006:  “The election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980 ushered in a conservative shift in U.S. politics that would coincide with the beginning and end of formal civil war in El Salvador” (page 54).

Schroeder 1995:  “The unification of the democratic left with the revolutionary left occurred in November 1980 when the FDR and the FMLN joined in a grand front to oppose the ruling junta” (page 43).

Zamora 2003:  “El 3 de Noviembre la RN se reintegró al nuevo acuerdo, y unos días después lo hizo el PRTC” (page 51).

November 27

Baires Martínez 1994:  “(E)l 27 de noviembre los escuadrones de la muerte secuestran y asesinan a toda la dirigencia del FDR” (page 47).

Baloyra 1982:  PDC party “leaders were convinced that the initiative to assassinate these opposition leaders had come from the military hierarchy itself, although they would not say so in public” (page 113).

Brockett 2005:  “Soon after the FDR’s leadership was tortured and murdered by security forces in November 1980, the FDR went into exile, allied publicly with the [FMLN], and served throughout the 1980s as the FMLN’s international voice” (page 308).

Dunkerley 1988:  “Leadership of FDR assassinated by death squad [November 27]” (page 384).

Klaiber 1998:  “In November [1980] security forces captured five leaders of the Revolutionary Democratic Front…All were summarily executed” (page 175).

Lamperti 2006:  On November 27, 1980, “Enrique Alvarez Córdova, Juan Chacón, Enrique Escobar Barrera, Manuel de Jesús Franco Ramírez, Humberto Mendoza, and Doroteo Hernández,…directors of the [FDR]” are kidnapped and murdered (pages 243-244).

McClintock 1998:  “After the original leaders of the FDR were assassinated in November 1980, the MNR’s Guillermo Ungo became the group’s president.  One of the group’s leaders best known in the United States, and a member of its Political-Diplomatic Commission, was the MPSC’s Rubén Zamora” (page 52).

Schroeder 1995:  “A further blow to the left came on November 27, 1980, as the left was consolidating.  Leaders of the FDR were kidnapped from a press conference in broad daylight and later found murdered.  Although D’Aubuisson allegedly boasted he masterminded the murders, he publically blamed the murders on the extreme left acting under the orders of Colonel Majano, the sole remaining progressive officer in the junta” (pages 46-47).

December

Brockett 2005:  “Decree 507 issued in December 1980 permitted detentions without charges or recourse to legal counsel…and so broadened the definition of subversion as to virtually eliminate rights of association and dissent” (page 237).

December 3

Anderson 1988:  “Three North American nuns and a female Catholic lay worker were murdered on their way back to the city from Cuscatlán Airport, on 3 December 1980” (page 103).

Haggerty 1990: “The murders themselves drew the ire of the United States government and public and prompted the administration of Jimmy Carter to suspend a program of limited military aid it had granted to the junta government” (page 38).

Klaiber 1998:  “In December [1980] security forces, clearly acting on orders from above, captured four American women.  The four were raped, murdered, and buried…The murder of these four women had a major impact on public opinion in the United States.  President Carter immediately suspended military aid to El Salvador” (page 175).

December 5

Baloyra 1982:  “On 5 December the Carter administration suspended all new military aid to El Salvador pending clarification of the murder of the four women” (page 114).

December 13:  Government changed (fourth junta--December 13, 1980-March 28, 1982)

Baires Martínez 1994:  “(E)l conflicto entre el sector más decidamente reformista encabezado por Majano y los sectores más conservadores se resuelve en diciembre de 1980 con la caída del coronel Majano y el afianzamiento del coronel García como ministro de defensa y del coronel Abdul Gutiérrez quien fue nombrado vicepresidente” (page 34).  “D’Aubuisson intenta colocar en la junta revolucionaria de gobierno al director de la Guardia nacional, coronel Vides Casanova y al subsecretario de defensa, coronel Carranza.  Pero el intento fracasó debido en gran parte a las presiones norteamericanas” (pages 47-48).

Baloyra 1982:  “The ‘government reorganization’ that produced the fourth junta was, at best, a modest victory for the Christian Democrats.  The reorganization was announced on 13 December.  Duarte and Colonel Gutiérrez disclosed at a press conference that they would become president and vice-president of the junta, respectively.  Duarte would assume legislative functions, and Gutiérrez would remain as commander in chief of the Armed Force…(T)he reorganization did produce a neutralization of the new D’Aubuisson conspiracy” (page 115).

Dunkerley 1988:  “Majano ousted from junta; Duarte named president of junta, Gutiérrez vice-president [December 13]” (page 384). “PRTC joins FMLN, which increases attacks in Chalatenango and Morazán.  14,173 people killed in 1980 according to archbishopric of San Salvador” (page 385).

December 31

Baires Martínez 1994:  “La reorganización militar culmina el 31 de diciembre cuando los colaboradores más fervientes de D’Aubuisson son retirados del servicio activo” (page 48).

Baloyra 1982:  “(A) battle order of 31 December 1981 removed the nucleus of hard-core supporters of D’Aubuisson from active service” (page 116).

1981

Dunkerley 1988:  “17,303 people killed in 1981” (page 385).

Schroeder 1995:  D’Aubuisson “was at the center of [a coup attempt] in early 1981 by a group of ultra-right military officers and members of the oligarchy…The coup attempts were unsuccessful and provoked an American response of threatening to cut off military aid in the event of a rightist coup” (page 45).

Walter 2000b:  “(S)e organizaron los llamados batallones de reacción inmediata (BIRIs) en 1981.  El primero de éstos, el Atlacatl, se vio envuelto en múltiples combates” (page 579).

Whitfield 1994:  “(T)he original Atlacatl Battalion…was created by U.S. Special Forces in 1981 and led by the legendary Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa…Since 1981 the Atlacatl was reliably reported to have carried out a series of massacres and human rights abuses” (page 169).  “Throughout the war, army officers, U.S. officials, and FMLN combatants would confirm that the Atlacatl was, if not the ‘best,’ then certainly the most efficient killing machine that the Salvadoran army had to offer” (page 170).

January 3

Baloyra 1982:  “American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) officials Michael P. Hammer and Mark D. Pearlman and José Rodolfo Viera, president of the ISTA, were gunned down by rightist terrorists in the coffee shop of the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador” (page 117).

Haggerty 1990: “This action alarmed not only the White House but also the United States Congress, and it added fuel to the effort to disburse aid based on improvements in the Salvadoran human rights situation” (page 42).

Schroeder 1995:  “The murders were ordered and observed by a combination of businessmen and conservative military officers” (page 46).

January 10

Allison 2006:  “The offensive failed as the various insurgent groups did not coordinate with each other and the intended mass insurrection never materialized.  Following the offensive, the FMLN would pull back from the capital to the rural areas of the country from where it would fight for the next decade” (pages 55-56).

Artiga-González 2008:  “Su intención [FMLN] inicial era instaurar un régimen revolucionario de corte socialista, por lo cual rechazó la reforma política iniciada con el golpe de 1979.  Desde su perspectiva, el contexto regional centroamericano parecía favorable, pues desde julio de 1979 Nicaragua era gobernada por el…FSLN y la…URNG se enfrentaba al régimen militar guatemalteco…Sin embargo, por su cercanía, Estados Unidos hizo de la región centroamericana una zona para implantar una geopolítica contrainsurgente en el contexto global de la ‘guerra fría’ contra la Unión Soviética” (pages 525-526).

Central America report December 18, 1992: “FMLN launches its first large-scale armed action in the midst of social unrest and military repression” (page 378).

McClintock 1998:  “The differences among the groups [in the FMLN] seriously weakened the ‘final offensive’ of January 1981” (page 53).  “One of the reasons for the failure of the offensive was division among the FMLN commanders.  Neither the FPL nor the RN favored the offensive, and the RN apparently failed to attack.  The ERP declined to share arms with the other groups” (page 54).

Schroeder 1995:  “Although this ‘final offensive’ resulted in some spectacular gains for the guerrillas—96 cities and towns were taken with 583 military actions throughout the country, leaving large portions of the country under guerrilla control—it failed to incite a mass insurrection to overthrow the junta…The offensive also drove the U.S. deeper into Salvadoran affairs” (page 44).

Wade 2003:  The divisions between guerrilla organizations “were a major factor in the FMLN’s failed ‘final offensive’ in January 1981, which was intended to take advantage of widespread popular discontent.  Significantly, the ERP refused to share arms with other groups during the offensive.  The lack of a unified plan and poor coordination among FMLN leadership spelled disaster for the rebels, who were soundly trounced by the Salvadoran military” (page 51).

January 14

Haggerty 1990: “The launching of the ‘final offensive’ lent a new urgency to Washington’s approach.  On January 14, 1981, four days after the offensive began, Carter announced the approval of US$5 million in ‘nonlethal’ military aid; an additional US$5 was authorized four days later" (pages 42-43).

Rosenberg 1982: “The Carter administration’s eleventh hour decision to resume arms sales to the junta in January 1981 signaled an ominous change in Salvadoran and U.S. strategy concerning the ongoing violence and civil war” (page 412).

January 20

Haggerty 1990:  “(T)he renewal of military aid...established a trend that President Reagan would build on when he assumed office on January 20, 1981" (pages 42-43).

Lamperti 2006:  “The Reagan team came into office with the intention of using El Salvador to demonstrate an easy victory over what it called ‘international communism’” (page 256).

February

Baloyra 1982:  “On 1 February [U.S. secretary of state Alexander] Haig fired Ambassador White…White’s removal produced consternation within Christian Democratic circles in the junta and rejoicing among those who had characterized him as a ‘guerrilla sympathizer’” (page 117).

Crónica del mes.  Febrero 1981 1981:  “(E)l mes de febrero se va a caracterizar básicamente por la guerra diplomática en la que la iniciativa es llevada por el gobierno de los Estados Unidos…La ayuda militar y técnica de Estados Unidos al gobierno de El Salvador, reiniciada en el mes de enero, se mantiene e incrementa en febrero, a la vez que se suspende la ayuda económica a Nicaragua…Acompañando a esta ayuda e intervención militar de los Estados Unidos en El Salvador, el gobierno USA emprende una ofensiva diplomática por toda Europa y América…El objetivo de esta campaña es justificar a la Junta y gobierno salvadoreños, a las acciones y posturas gubernamentales norteamericanas en el conflicto, y a descalificar a la oposición salvadoreña como instrumento de la conspiración comunista internacional…Esta política de los Estados Unidos para con El Salvador hace que se piense que este país se puede convertir en el ‘nuevo Vietnam’” (page 202).  “El mes de febrero nos evidencia que el conflicto salvadoreño ha sido llevado al plano internacional, mientras que al interior del país las condiciones de vida se deterioran progresivamente, todo lo cual exige que se busque afanosamente una salida racional” (page 206).

Krauss 1991:  “The [U.S.] administration outlined its view of the El Salvador crisis on February 23, 1981, with the release of its White Paper entitled ‘Communist Interference in El Salvador’…The White Paper concluded that El Salvador represented a ‘textbook case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers.’  In response to the findings, the [U.S. National Security Council] developed an aid program for El Salvador that included $91 million in fresh military and economic aid and the deployment of fifty-six Green Beret advisers” (page 82).

Rosenberg 1982: The change in U.S. strategy “was confirmed with the U.S. State Department issuance in February 1981 of its now famous ‘White Paper’ citing direct communist interference and support for the Salvadoran guerrillas” (page 412).

Schroeder 1995:   “Faced with what was perceived as a Soviet inspired communist takeover bid, the Reagan administration initiated a counterinsurgency program in El Salvador.  The counterinsurgency program used military force to achieve two objectives:  first, military force would stop a successful revolution, second, while preventing revolution, military force would also buy time to allow democratic roots to take hold in El Salvador.  This second objective was to be achieved through elections, moderate reforms and the promotion of human rights” (page 44).

March

Baires Martínez 1994:  “El 5 de marzo de 1981 se derogó la ley electoral de 1961 y se constituyó el Consejo central de elecciones con la tarea específica de elaborar un proyecto para una nueva ley electoral.  El Consejo quedó integrado por el doctor Jorge Bustamante como presidente, el doctor Guillermo Guevara Lacayo y el ingeniero Ramón Ernesto Rodríguez Rivas como miembros propietarios” (page 38).  “El último intento golpista ocurrió en marzo de 1981 pero no tuvo mayores consecuencias; el Departamento de Estado primero, y el propio presidente Reagan después, declararon con firmeza que apoyaban a Duarte y que rechazaban cualquier intento de golpe derechista.  Se emite una orden de captura contra el mayor D’Aubuisson, quien pasa a la clandestinidad” (page 48).

Baloyra 1982:  “Finding itself unable to attract the support of the bourgeoisie, to control or discipline the armed forces, or to initiate a dialogue with the opposition, the Christian Democratic government issued a call for a constituent assembly election, through which it hoped to increase its legitimacy and neutralize some of its opponents” (page  105).

Dunkerley 1988:  In March 1981 “US sends military aid worth $25 million; number of advisers increased to 54; Duarte freezes reform programme.  Major military operations in north and east” (page 385).

Williams 2003:  “Progress toward electing a civilian government picked up steam during 1981.  In March, the junta announced a timetable for elections of a constituent assembly in 1982, to be followed by presidential and legislative elections in 1983” (page 310).

April

Crónica del mes.  Marzo-abril 1981 1981:   “La batalla por la solución política para El Salvador, que se iniciara en el mes anterior, va a ser una de las actividades más importantes en abril, tanto en el nivel nacional como en el internacional.  La solución preconizada por el gobierno, las elecciones, sigue siendo sostenida fuertemente por la Junta y por la Fuerza Armada, así como por los partidos de derechas (PCN, POP y Movilización Democrática Salvadoreña) que no pierden oportunidad de atacar al PDC, e indirectamente por la gran empresa privada al atacar a la izquierda y a la ‘conspiración extranjera’ por la mediación, al tiempo que manifiesta su total apoyo a la Fuerza Armada y le pide que intensifique la contrainsurgencia.  En cambio, el FDR sostiene su incredulidad frente a la medida, basado en la historia de fraudes” (page 434).

Wade 2003:  “The Reagan era signaled a dramatic shift in policies toward the region…In March and April 1981, the FDR-FMLN expressed a willingness to negotiate an end to the conflict.  The offer was rejected by the new administration.  Instead, the Reagan administration favored a military strategy coupled with economic and political programs designed to decrease any popular support for the FMLN” (page 52).

May

Crónica del mes.  Mayo 1981 1981:  “(E)n los Estados Unidos se sigue librando una batalla intensa por la ayuda a El Salvador.  Al comienzo del mes se realiza en Washington la mayor manifestación desde los años de Vietnam (unas 25,000 personas, según cifras dadas por el Pentágono), que se opone a la política de la Administración para El Salvador” (page 571).  “El Presidente del Consejo Central de Elecciones, Dr. Bustamante, declaró que no se podrían tener elecciones bajo Estado de Sitio y Ley Marcial, que el FDR sí podría participar en ellas si deponía las armas y su apoyo a la guerrilla, y que los partidos políticos, para inscribirse, tenían que presentar sus estatutos, las firmas de 25 directivos y de 3,000 personas que los respaldaran” (page 572).  Discusses responses to this statement.

López Vallecillos 1983:  “Desde mayo de 1981 los grupos adversos al proyecto reformista militar del 15 de octubre comenzaron a presionar para que se convocara a elecciones de constituyente.  El argumento principal era que las reformas se estaban haciendo al margen de la Carta Magna de 1962 y había que retornar a un Estado de derecho” (page 462).

July

Baires Martínez 1994:  “El 7 de julio de 1981 mediante el decreto 743, la junta de gobierno aprobó la ley transitoria sobre constitución e inscripción de partidos políticos.  Según esta legislación se reconocía la existencia legal de los partidos inscritos de acuerdo a la ley anterior y se permitía el establecimiento de nuevas agrupaciones si así lo decidían al menos veinticinco ciudadanos hábiles, a lo que debería agregarse más tarde la presentación de un libro de afiliación de al menos tres mil adherentes” (page 38).

Cáceres P. 1990:  “El 7 de julio de 1981 la Junta emitió el Decreto 743 promulgando la Ley Transitoria sobre Constitución e Inscripción de Partidos Políticos, y el 19 del mismo mes el mayor D’Aubuisson anunció que se estaba constituyendo el partido ARENA.  Coincide también en ese mes, el día 29, un Simposio Nacional de la Empresa Privada en el que la totalidad de los organismos de la misma apoyan el proceso electoral…A partir de ese momento sigue el proceso de constitución de nuevos partidos y la revitalización de otros” (page 339).

August

Crónica del mes.  Agosto 1981 1981:  “El Presidente del CCE, Dr. Bustamante, viajó a Washington, donde hizo declaraciones sobre las elecciones en El Salvador, y afirmó que el FDR podría participar en las mismas si aceptaba las reglas del juego.  Pero el Dr. Ungo…negó que el MNR o el UDN vayan a participar…, por las mismas razones ya anteriormente sustentadas:  los que hoy las garantizan son los mismos que propiciaron los fraudes en ocasiones anteriores.  Sin embargo, nuevos partidos políticos se van creando e inscribiendo.  El POP logra ser aceptado en el CCE, pero condiciona su participación a que se den las condiciones y garantías mínimas para unas elecciones libres.  Acción Democrática es el partido político surgido del mismo grupo que propiciaba ‘Movilización Democrática’” (page 905).

Dunkerley 1988:  “ERP seizes town of Perquín, Morazán [in August 1981]” (page 385).

September

Baires Martínez 1994:  “El 18 de setiembre se reunieron representantes de los partidos políticos con el Consejo central de elecciones a fin de discutir sobre el registro de votantes y otros temas del proceso electoral.  A dicha reunión asistieron los representantes del PDC, ARENA, POP, PPS y AD” (page 39).  “D’Aubuisson reaparece el 17 de septiembre acogiéndose a una amnistía con vistas a las elecciones.  Ofrece una conferencia de prensa en la que manifiesta que está organizando un partido político y que nada tiene que ver con los escuadrones de la muerte” (page 48).

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “Duarte enfatizó que no negociaría con los sectores armados del FDR-FMLN.  No obstante, invitó al Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) y a la Unión Democrática Nacionalista (UDN) a participar en el proceso electoral” (page 771).

Dunkerley 1988:  “ARENA, established by Roberto D’Aubuissón in September 1981, can be viewed as the first serious and openly partisan political vehicle of the oligarchy since the early 1930s despite the fact that small rightist organizations challenged the officialist party of the military in elections from the 1940s onwards” (page 351).

Johnson 1993:  “Having been effectively shut out of government decision-making since 1979, some of the most conservative elements of the business elite, under the charismatic leadership of Roberto d’Aubuisson, formed a political party, [ARENA] to compete in the March 1982 elections for a Constituent Assembly.  This marked the first time that the economic elites formed an authentically mass-based party to compete for power” (page 184).  “There is clear ideological continuity between ARENA and the AP and FARO, suggesting that the leadership of all three were dominated by large landowning interests” (page 185).

Klaiber 1998:  “Founded in 1981, ARENA…was initially built around its founder, Roberto D’Aubuisson.  It was anticommunist, anti-social democrat and anti-North American” (page 186).

Paige 1997:  “At its official founding on September 30, 1981, ARENA was a coalition of D’Aubuisson and his backers on the hard right and the Alianza Productiva…, itself a coalition of conservative industrialists and businessmen that included much of the traditional oligarchy” (page 35).

Schroeder 1995:  ARENA “was organized around a conglomeration of paramilitary groups, a nationalist youth organization, a women’s association and the Broad National Front” (page 49).

Williams 2003:  “Not trusting the PCN nor the PDC to represent its interests, the agroexport elite, along with hard-line elements in the military and security forces, founded its own party in 1981—the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista” (page 310).

October

Baires Martínez 1994:  “El 9 de octubre el Consejo central de elecciones propuso convocar a la elección de sesenta diputados para el 28 de marzo de 1982.  El 18 de octubre dicho Consejo entregó a los partidos políticos el ante-proyecto de ley electoral transitoria con el fin de que se produjera una amplia discusión” (page 39).

Baloyra 1982:  “During October the Salvadoran Right changed its stance and began to talk about participating in the constituent assembly elections, but only if all the Christian Democrats were removed from the Central Electoral Council (CCE).  Four rightist parties made this demand, including the always pliable PCN, the minuscule Partido Popular Salvadoreño (PPS),…Fortín Magaña’s AD,…and D’Aubuisson’s ARENA.  Chele Medrano’s Partido de Orientación Popular (POP), representing primarily those agricultural sectors not yet affected by agrarian reform, was the only one that did not insist on this precondition for its participation.  On 31 October the government legitimated what had been taking place for weeks by lifting the ban on political parties, whose activities had been forbidden since the imposition of the state of siege in March 1980” (page 150).

Crónica del mes.  Octubre 1981 1981:  “(E)n el ámbito nacional se continúa con la lucha planteada entre los partidos políticos inscritos y el sector político del gobierno.  Según el secretario general del PDC, Rey Prendes, los sectores de extrema derecha que trataron de evitar las elecciones ahora se han constituido en partidos, por lo que ‘tenemos una gama de partidos políticos que va de la extrema derecha a un centro moderado de derecha’; fórmula feliz para describir el espectro político salvadoreño anuente a participar en las elecciones…(P)ara ‘ayudar’ en todo el proceso electoral, también en el Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE) hay asesores norteamericanos, según declaró el embajador Hinton…Por su parte el CCE trata de dar buena imagen de honestidad:  entrega a los partidos políticos el anteproyecto de Ley Electoral, los convoca a un Foro de discusión, invita nuevamente a todos a participar, incluso los del FDR si se prestan al juego electoral, ofrece garantías de limpieza bajo observadores extranjeros, pide la abolición del Toque de Queda y Estado de Sitio, reconoce que de los documentos escrutados hay por lo menos un 3 o/o de personas que poseen entre dos y seis cédulas distintas y que no hay datos exactos de personas fallecidas” (page 1034).

November

Baloyra 1982:  “On 5 November, during a meeting of the Political Forum, a conference including all six legal parties contesting the election, the Christian Democratic members of the CCE were ousted by a 4-2 vote” (pages 150-151).

Crónica del mes.  Noviembre de 1981 1981:  “En el mes de noviembre, mientras la guerra civil y el accionar militar de ambas partes se mantienen en toda su crudeza, la actividad política se centra en la alternativa elecciones-negociación, en torno a la cual se agrupan las diversas fuerzas políticas salvadoreñas” (page 1143).  “Consecuente con la política de elecciones, el Consejo Central convocó a un Foro Político Interpartidario, al que asistieron los seis partidos que han aceptado participar (PDC, PCN, PAD, POP, PPS y ARENA), para realizar las condiciones socio-políticas que permitan su realización, y para discutir los anteproyectos de Ley Electoral y Ley de Partidos Políticos” (page 1145).  “La acrecentada actividad política dio oportunidad de oír voces distintas a las oficiales o a las interesadas en el reparto.  El Socorro Jurídico del Arzobispado en primer lugar, luego el MNR, la UPD, y una serie de asociaciones sindicales y gremiales…mostraron su profundo desacuerdo con las elecciones y con las declaraciones de los partidos anuentes” (page 1146).

December

Baires Martínez 1994:  “La ley [electoral] fue finalmente promulgada el 18 de diciembre (decreto 914) y recibió críticas de todos los partidos…Uno de los aspectos más resistidos fue la composición del Consejo central de elecciones que quedó constituido por tres miembros designados por la junta; ello impedía, a todas luces, una representación clara de todos los partidos tal como éstos lo habían solicitado en el curso de las discusiones de consulta…La ley estableció que votarían los mayores de 18 años con la sola presentación de la cédula de identidad y el Consejo central de elecciones quedó facultado para nombrar tanto a las juntas electorales departamentales como a las juntas electorales municipales” (pages 39-40).

Crónica del mes.  Diciembre de 1981 1982:  “En el ámbito político nacional hay dos hechos de especial relevancia.  El primero consistió en la aprobación, por la Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, de la Ley Electoral Transitoria…El otro hecho importante lo constituye la convocatoria a elecciones, de parte del Consejo Central de Elecciones, hecha el día 28 de diciembre, para que la contienda electoral se realice el 28 de marzo de 1982.  Simultáneamente se renovaba por otro mes el Estado de Sitio, pero con exclusión de los partidos políticos, que no verán limitadas sus acciones por la restricción de las garantías constitucionales” (page 101).

Rosenberg 1982: “Voter turnout possibilities were buoyed considerably when in late December 1981 the Episcopal Conference of the Salvadoran Catholic Church publicly supported the elections as a way in which Salvadorans could express themselves” (page 413).

Walter 2000b:  “En diciembre de 1981, la Junta convocó a elecciones para Asamblea Constituyente, a realizarse en marzo de 1982.  Además de redactar una nueva constitución política, la Asamblea tendría la potestad de nombrar a un presidente interino que conduciría al país hasta que se realizaran nuevas elecciones por sufragio directo para escoger al primer mandatario” (page 583).

December 11: El Mozote massacre

Central America report December 18, 1992: “Mozote massacre in the department of Morazán of more than 1,000 campesinos, allegedly by government army forces” (page 378).

Crónica del mes.  Diciembre de 1981 1982:  “En el campo militar siguieron las acciones de ambas partes contendientes.  La Fuerza Armada realizó un operativo gigantesco en el Departamento de Morazán entre los días 7 y 17 del mes.  Si los resultados estrictamente militares no parecen haber sido del todo exitosos para el gobierno, la represión en la zona fue una de las más violentas hasta el presente.  Lo que primero no eran más que rumores y denuncias, poco a poco se fue conociendo por informes nacionales e internacionales.  Parece ser que en el operativo se asesinó a sangre fría a más de mil humildes e indefensos campesinos, en su mayoría ancianos, mujeres y niños, muchos de ellos pertenecientes a comunidades religiosas protestantes, que no se quisieron retirar de la zona confiados en que por su abstención política en la lucha serían respetados en sus vidas” (page 101).

Ladutke 2004:  “In perhaps the most infamous single human rights incident during the war, the Atlacatl Battalion seized control of several villages in the area surrounding El Mozote in the department of Morazán.  Many local residents had fled their villages and congregated in El Mozote on the basis of a rumor that the military would not kill anyone in that town.  The rumor proved to be false as the soldiers proceeded to kill everyone they encountered in El Mozote proper” (page 31).

Lamperti 2006:  “In December 1981 the ‘Atlacatl Battalion’ committed an atrocity of historic proportions by murdering more than one thousand unarmed and defenseless women, children, and old people in and around the village called ‘El Mozote’ in Morazán department.  The killers were an elite unit recently trained and equipped by the United States” (page 257).

1982

Klaiber 1998:  “In 1980 the Salvadoran government received from the United States the rather modest sum of $5,900,000 in military aid.  But by 1982 that sum had jumped to $82,000,000.  Thanks to this powerful injection of money, the military and other special forces were able to expand rapidly, from seventeen thousand in 1980 to fifty thousand in 1987.  Rebel forces numbered around four to five thousand” (page 170).

López Vallecillos 1983:  “Nuestro análisis, a fines de 1981 y principios de 1982, definió que el llamado a votar, sin la participación de las izquierdas, era una propuesta de solución formal entre las derechas y para las derechas.  Con el término ‘derecha’ caracterizamos a grupos, sectores y partidos políticos que se niegan a reconocer la necesidad de transformar la realidad económica, social política y militar de El Salvador, en forma integral” (page 460).

January

Baires Martínez 1994:  “La convocatoria oficial a elecciones fue emitida el 3 de enero de 1982 y se abrió un plazo hasta el 28 de febrero para la inscripción de candidatos.  El presidente del Consejo, doctor Bustamante estimó en 800.000 el número total de electores” (page 40).

Crónica del mes. [enero-febrero 1982] 1982:  “El hecho más destacado en la vida nacional durante el mes de enero sería el inicio de la última etapa del proceso electoral para la Asamblea Constituyente…El Consejo Central de Elecciones, tal como había previsto y anunciado, emitió el decreto No. 1, por el que se convoca a las elecciones para el día 28 de marzo.  Como no hay listados de votantes, se ha optado por manchar un dedo del elector—que podrá depositar su papeleta en cualquier lugar y mesa del país—con tinta indeleble…Como novedad importante, hay que destacar que los canales oficiales y comerciales de TV han concedido espacios gratuitos a todos los partidos, así como la radio nacional.  En la fecha indicada, se inició la campaña electoral, precedida la noche anterior por el asesinato del máximo dirigente del PCN, Lic. Rafael Rodríguez González…(L)a realidad es que pocas veces se habrá visto en el país una campaña más indigna, en la que los partidos se reducen a atacarse unos a otros con una tasa muy elevada de agresividad…En una cosa coinciden todos los contendientes:  todos se manifiestan anticomunistas y todos también tratan de halagar a la institución armada” (page 207).

Cronología de sucesos relacionados con la crisis política de El Salvador 1982:  Enero 6 “El Consejo Central de Elecciones convocó oficialmente a comicios para elegir diputados para la Constituyente.  Las elecciones se efectuarán el próximo 28 de marzo en todo el país.  Se elegirán 60 representantes por voto directo del pueblo.  Participarán 8 partidos políticos.  El 28 de Enero se iniciará la propaganda partidarista y se abrirá la inscripción de candidaturas a diputados.  Un mes antes de la fecha de elecciones, se cerrará la aceptación de documentos para ese propósito.  Todos los ciudadanos mayores de 18 años votarán donde deseen, bajo el único requisito de presentar su cédula de identidad personal.  El CCE ha logrado que los partidos políticos tengan espacio gratis en los canales de televisión comercial y en los canales de televisión educativa, todo ello regulado por un reglamento especial” (page 366).

February

Crónica del mes. [enero-febrero 1982] 1982:  “Durante el mes de febrero el foco de atención internacional sobre El Salvador adquirió una luminosidad y relevancia desusadas, hasta el punto de que casi opacó la actividad política interna, que también se incrementó en el período, dada la proximidad de las elecciones y la intensificación de campaña; el destino del país se está jugando no en las elecciones sino en el ámbito internacional” (page 211).  “(C)ada vez parece verse más claro que las elecciones no son la solución ni para el enfrentamiento armado ni para los problemas nacionales, como lo ha manifestado el embajador Hinton y el propio general García; solamente parecen estar convencidos de la panacea electoral algunos partidos políticos, principalmente ARENA, la ANEP y la CEDES” (page 213).

Cronología de sucesos relacionados con la crisis política de El Salvador 1982:  Febrero 17 “El Dr. Jorge Bustamante, Presidente del Consejo Central de Elecciones, declaró a la prensa que solamente concurrirán a las elecciones unos 800 mil votantes en razón de las condiciones sociales prevalecientes.  La emigración y la guerra que se vive no permiten un estimado mayor” (page 367).

March 28: constituent assembly election

Acevedo 1991: Gives total votes cast, valid votes, and votes for PDC, ARENA, and PCN (page 24).  Gives number of polling places in San Salvador and number of potential voters.  “A study carried out by the Centre of Documentation & Information (CUDI) of the Catholic Central American University (UCA), estimated that the turnout had been inflated by 40 or 50 per cent” (page 25).  Gives number of seats won by ARENA and PCN (page 26). 

Alcántara Sáez 1999:  “Las elecciones de marzo de 1982, convocadas por la Ley Transitoria sobre Constitución e Inscripción de Partidos Políticos, consensuada por los componentes de la Junta Cívico-Militar en julio de 1981, llevaron a conformar una Asamblea Legislativa de carácter constituyente.  En la cita electoral, la embajada de los Estados Unidos, las fuerzas reformistas y la extrema derecha, por un lado, deseando legitimar el estado de las cosas, y el FDR-FMLN, por otro, buscando desesperadamente la abstención, hicieron vertebrar de forma decisiva su proyecto para el futuro del país.  Los resultados supusieron un descalabro para el PDC y una insospechada popularidad a favor de ARENA, así como un relativo mantenimiento del PCN” (pages 141-142).

Anderson 1988:  Discusses the election (pages 113-114).

Armstrong 1982: “The final official count was 1,551,680—out of a voting population estimated by the State Department at 1.5 million” (page 8).  “(T)he Christian Democrats won a plurality of the votes, with 35.5% of the total; the rightist parties together won 52.3% and formed an alliance at whose head is the ARENA party, led by Roberto D’Aubuisson” (page 10).

Arriaza Melendez 1989: “Elecciones de diputados a Asamblea Constituyente: resultados por departamento. 28 de marzo de 1982” (page 28).  Gives by department the votes for each party, the valid and null votes, the abstentions, contested votes, and total votes cast.

Baloyra 1982:  “The Salvadoran election of 1982” (pages  167-182).  “Final results of the Constituent Assembly election of 28 March 1982" (page 192).  Gives by party number of votes, percent of valid votes and total votes, and seats won.  Gives total valid votes, null votes, blank votes, and total votes cast.  “Approximate distribution of the vote in the Constituent Assembly election of 28 March 1982, by department” (page 193).  Gives percent of vote for six parties in the fourteen departments.

Baloyra 1993: Gives the number of ballot boxes and precincts (page 9).

Baloyra-Herp 1995:  Discusses the March 1982 election (page 51).

Benítez Manaut 1990: “Elecciones del 28/III/1982: porcentajes de votos por partido” (page 77).  “Composición de la asamblea constituyente” (page 77).  Gives seats won by each party.

Castro Morán 2005:  “Las elecciones del 28 de marzo de 1982 y sus resultados” (pages 224-230).

CCE 1982: Reprints all information submitted by parties registering for the election (pages 31-95).  “Actas departamentales y cómputo. Cuadro final” (pages 151-163).  Transcription of reports from electoral boards of each department.  “Distribución de diputados por departamento y partido politico” (unpaged, follows page 163).  Summarizes in table form the information presented in the reports.  Gives for each department the number of votes, seats won, and residual votes for each party, total valid votes, null votes, abstentions, contested ballots, unused ballots, misplaced ballots, and total votes cast.  Gives the total seats for each department and the number of votes needed to win a seat in each department.  “Diputados electos a la asamblea constituyente” (pages 165-168).  Gives the names and parties of each delegate and alternate elected to the constituent assembly.  “Cómputo por actas de juntas receptoras de votos de las elecciones del 28 de marzo de 1982" (page 193).  Gives by department the valid votes for each party, the null votes, abstentions, contested votes, and total votes cast.

Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 16 1982:  For the March 28, 1982 elections for the Legislative Assembly gives the purpose of elections, the characteristics of parliament, the electoral system, the general political considerations and conduct of the elections, and statistics (pages 59-60). 

Córdova M. 1988: “El Salvador: Elecciones del 28 de marzo de 1982.  Porcentaje de votos por partido, según su posición político-ideológica” (page 89).  “Composición de la Asamblea Constituyente. Partidos.  No. Diputados” (page 90).

Crónica del mes.  Marzo de 1982 1982:  “El acontecimiento más importante sin duda, a nivel nacional, y que concentraría la atención ante, durante y después del 28 de marzo, fueron las elecciones para representantes a la Asamblea Constituyente, que se tuvieron en esa fecha.  El compromiso de tener elecciones aunque fuera ‘bajo las balas’, se vio amenazado hasta el último momento, y se movilizaron todas las fuerzas socio-políticas, unas para propiciarlas y otras para impedirlas” (page 291).  “Sólo en 65 (24.9%) municipios, de los 261 del país no se pudo votar, pero en cambio sí se pudo votar en 4.076 (89.46%) de las 4.556 urnas preparadas, pues en los municipios más populosos se pudo emitir el voto” (pages 292-293).

CUDI 1982: Gives CCE’s estimate of registered voters and number they calculated would vote in the 1982 election (page 581).   “Población electoral, según la embajada de Estados Unidos en El Salvador” (page 582).  Subtracts those in exile, those without the voting credential, those who had been killed, and those in the armed forces from the estimated electoral population.  Gives number of voting boxes and precincts, and ballots per box.  Gives number of boxes and precincts in selected municipalities.  Gives number of election workers needed to supervise all the voting boxes.  “Estimado de electores potenciales reales” (page 585).  “Municipios en los que no se votó, según el CCE, el 14.04.82" (page 586).  Gives name of municipality, number of voting locations, and potential voters.  “Municipios que no habían reportado resultados al 13.04.82 y resultados reportados por el CCE 3 14.04.82" (page 586).  “Promedio de votantes por mesa y tiempo ininterrumpido de votación requerido” (page 588).  Gives by department the number of polling stations, ballots distributed, voters, average number of voters per station, and time it would have taken that many voters to vote.  “Cronología de resultados oficiales dados a conocer por el CCE” (page 590).   Gives the varying statistics released by the CCE in seven different announcements.  “Consejo Central de Elecciones: resultados por departamento” (page 591).  Final results as announced April 14, 1982.  “Consejo Central de Elecciones: resultado por junta receptora de votos” (page 593).  Gives results for the municipalities of Aguilares, El Paisnal, and Jucuaran.   The conclusion of the authors is that the official count was inflated by at least 450,000 votes (page 594).

Danby 1982: “The March 28, 1982 elections: deputies elected by department and party” (page 13).  “The March 28, 1982 elections: final results” (page 20).  Gives total votes by department for top five parties, total valid votes, null votes, abstentions, questioned votes, and total votes.  “Estimate of real potential voters” (page 38).  “Municipalities in which there was no voting according to the CCE, April 14, 1982" (page 39).  “Average of voters by table and uninterrupted time required for voting” (page 41).  Gives by department the number of polls that reported figures on April 14, 1982, the ballots allotted, voters, average voters by table, and uninterrupted time needed for voting.

Dunkerley 1985:  “The elections were for a constituent assembly which would itself elect a president until full congressional and presidential polls were held in 1983…There was no electoral register, and the poll was being boycotted by all parties to the left of the rightist [PDC]…because, amongst a multitude of other reasons, the names of all their leaders had for over a year been at the top of the death lists drawn up by the rightist terror squads” (pages 200-201).  Discusses the campaign and the election (pages 200-205).

Dunkerley 1988:  “The election for a constituent assembly held in March 1982 did produce a genuine if far from clean contest between the right (PDC) and the extreme right (ARENA; PCN; POP; PPS; AD).  This fact relieved Washington of much of the burden of explaining the notable absence of parties to the left of the PDC, all of which boycotted the poll on the grounds that participation could only lead to the killing of their supporters and candidates” (page 405).  Describes the results. 

Eguizábal 1982?: “Cuadro II” (page 94).  Gives number of votes and number of seats won by ARENA, PAD, PCN, PDC, POP, and PPS; null votes; blank votes; and total votes.

Eguizábal 1992: Gives percent of vote and number of seats won by PDC and rightist coalition (page 139).

Eguizábal 1992a: Gives number of voting booths and percent of vote and number of seats won by PDC, ARENA, PCN, AD, and POP (page 50).

García 1989: “1982 election results” (page 71).  Gives party, votes received, percent of total valid votes, and seats won.  Also gives turnout, number of persons who voted, number of valid votes, and percent that were blank.

Haggerty 1990: Gives percent of vote and seats won by PDC, ARENA, and PCN (page 44).

Johnson 1993:  “No party representing the left chose to participate in the elections, not only because they did not want to confer legitimacy upon the target of their opposition, but also because their candidates’ safety could scarcely be guaranteed.  Thus the choices available to the electorate were limited in terms of policy and ideology.  Nonetheless, in order to guarantee as large a turnout as possible, the government made voting mandatory and waived voter registration; all one was required to do in order to vote was show an identification card” (page 186).  Describes the election and gives results (pages 186-190).

Karl 1986: “The decision to hold elections in El Salvador in 1982 during a civil war was rooted primarily in a foreign policy crisis in the United States and only secondarily in events taking place within El Salvador.  These elections were thus qualitatively different from those which had periodically legitimated military rule in the past.  Following the classic model of ‘demonstration’ elections, the 1982 contests were imposed by the U.S. in order to improve the international image of the ruling Salvadoran junta as well as to avoid strong pressures for a negotiated settlement between domestic power contenders” (page 13).  “The unexpected victory of the right threatened to undo the planned ‘demonstration’ effect of the elections, particularly since the ultra-right, headed by D’Aubuisson, announced that it would form a governing alliance which would exclude the Christian Democratic party” (page 19).

Kassebaum 1982: Gives number who voted (page 1).  “Final vote in El Salvador constituent assembly elections” (page 2).  Gives for each party the total votes, percent of votes, and seats won.  “Central election commission results of voting on March 28, by department” (page 19).  Gives for each department the votes for each party, total valid votes, nullified ballots, abstention ballots, ballots challenged, ballots not utilized, ballots destroyed, and total ballots.  “Voting sites and number of voter tables” (pages 20-29).  Gives for each municipality in each district the location and number of voting sites and the number of voting tables at each.  “Criticism of the El Salvador elections” (pages 34-42).  Reproduces letters and articles from the New York Times (June 3-14, 1982) discussing the alleged inflation of votes cast.

López Vallecillos 1983:  “Las elecciones de marzo de 1982 en el contexto de guerra, fueron para el centro-derecha una manera de consolidar el poder a favor de la estabilidad nacional” (page 460).

McClintock 1998:  “The 1982 Constituent Assembly election was probably the least fair of all Salvadoran elections during this period.  Voter turnout was inflated not only by double-voting but also by ballot stuffing and even manipulating tallies forwarded from municipalities by the military-controlled communications company.  All these practices led to inflation of the official turnout figures” (page 125).

Montgomery 1995: Gives final vote tally and percent of vote won by the PDC and ARENA (page 160).

1984 presidential elections in El Salvador 1984: “The result of the election was that the reformist and center-left Christian Democratic Party (PDC) received 40 percent of the valid votes; the far right ARENA received 29 percent; the right-of-center, establishment, and pro-armed forces PCN received 19 percent; while the moderate, modernist AD took 7.5 percent of the vote” (pages 16-17).

Ramos 1997: This is ARENA’s first participation in elections.  “Obtuvo el 29.3% de los votos válidos, con lo que pudo acceder a 19 escaños legislativos y se ubicó como la segunda fuerza electoral del país, después del PDC que obtuvo el 40% de los votos y 24 escaños” (page 66).

The PCN wins 14 seats and the PPS one seat.

Resultados electorales por departamento 1982:  Gives results.

Ribera Sala 1996: El PDC no “pudo asegura la pureza de las elecciones de 1982, cuando la mayoría de los jefes militares locales simpatizaban con el PCN y ARENA, y helicópteros militares trasladaban las urnas.  Pese a que el PDC fue el partido con mayor número de votos, la alianza de ARENA con el PCN le impidió formar gobierno” (page 36).

Rosenberg 1982: The elections in March 1982 are “for a constituent assembly, which would designate a provisional president of the country (to replace the junta), write a new constitution to replace the 1966 Constitution, and prepare the country for presidential elections” (page 412).  “1982 Salvadoran constituent assembly election” (page 414).  Gives by party the number of votes received, percent of valid vote, percent of total vote, and seats won.

Schooley 1987: Gives seats won by major parties (page 62).

Schroeder 1995:  “The election in 1982 was contested by six parties [PDC, PCN, PPS, POP, AD, ARENA].  Significantly, the left was not represented in the election, while the five parties contesting the election in addition to the PDC were all right of the PDC” (page 48).  “1982 Constituent Assembly election results” (page 48).  “Reports of irregularities were quite numerous:  numbered ballots, transparent ballot boxes, military harassment, the declaration by the Minister of Defense that not voting was tantamount to treason, and the official number of votes being inflated by 25%...The most significant shortcoming of the election was the absence of any representation from the left.  The left had been invited to participate as long as it submitted the names and addresses of at least 3,000 of its members, the equivalent of a death list in the context of the brutal civil war” (pages 49-50).

Torres Rivas 1987: “El Salvador.  Elecciones a asamblea general constituyente en 1982" (page 185).  Gives by party the total votes, percent of valid votes, percent of total votes, and percent of registered voters.  Gives the same information for valid, null, and invalid votes, total votes, number and percent of electorate who abstained, and total registered voters.

Wade 2003:  “Percentage of valid vote by party, 1982 Constituent Assembly elections” (page 54).

Walter 2000b:  Discusses the election (pages 583-584).

Whitfield 1994:  “(I)t was difficult for those inside El Salvador to see how the elections held on March 28, boycotted and sabotaged by the FMLN, conducted during a civil war and under a two-year-old state of siege, could contribute much to ‘democracy’ in El Salvador” (page 154).  Discusses the election (pages 154-156).

Williams 2003:  “Given the levels of U.S. overt and covert assistance to the PDC, Reagan administration officials were convinced that the Christian Democrats would score a major victory in the 1982 elections.  However, although the PDC won a plurality of the vote, its 40% was not enough to secure a controlling majority in the new assembly” (page 311).

April 14

Cronología de sucesos relacionados con la crisis política de El Salvador 1982:  Abril 14 “El CCE da a conocer los resultados finales de las elecciones, luego de peticiones de nulidad y revisiones solicitadas por la Democracia Cristiana” (page 367).

April 29:  president chosen by Constituent Assembly (Magaña)

Brockett 1998:  “Pressure from the Reagan administration in 1982 prevented the selection of D’Aubuisson as provisional president” (page 145).

McClintock 1998:  “The U.S. government played a determining role in the selection of the provisional president for El Salvador after the 1982 elections.  When it appeared that the Salvadoran rightist parties would ally to choose death squad mastermind Roberto D’Aubuisson as provisional president, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Vernon Walters, a retired U.S. general with a very high profile in Latin American military circles, travelled to El Salvador.  Political party leaders and military leaders were invited to meet with him and were reminded that U.S. aid was contingent upon the emergence of a moderate government” (page 225).

Motley 1983: “The president, Alvaro Magaña, a political independent, was selected as a consensus candidate.  There are also three vice presidents, each representing one of the three major democratic parties” (page 2).

Schooley 1987: Gives assembly votes for winning candidate (page 63).

Schroeder 1995:  “Concerned with how the growing power of ARENA would affect the massive American military aid now flowing to El Salvador that allowed the military to block a leftist takeover, the military was successful in having moderate Alvaro Magaña of the AD, an acceptable candidate to the United States, named Provisional President despite ARENA resistance” (page 52).

Williams 2003:  “When it appeared that ARENA and the PCN would ally to elect Roberto D’Aubuisson as provisional president, the PDC decided to boycott the proceedings.  Given D’Aubuisson’s unsavory past, U.S. officials were adamantly opposed to his selection…(T)he Reagan administration and the defense minister…successfully lobbied for a compromise choice:  the independent and longtime friend of the military, Alvaro Magaña” (page 312).

May

Cáceres P. 1990:  En mayo la Asamblea “por medio del decreto 9 había definido la situación de los gobiernos municipales, que serían designados por el Ejecutivo hasta que se realizaran las elecciones correspondientes” (page 341).

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “El presidente Alvaro Magaña, recién electo, rechazó negociar” (page 771).

August 3:  Pact of Apaneca

Acevedo 1991: “The Pact of Apaneca envisaged an electoral process which would transfer Magaña’s temporary power to a properly elected government” (page 27).

Cáceres P. 1990:  El Pacto, “celebrado el 8 de agosto de 1982 entre el presidente Magaña y los partidos PDC, ARENA, PCN y PPS, definió una ‘plataforma básica de gobierno’ para un período de transición que debería culminar con la elección presidencial de 1984” (page 343).

Caldera T. 1983: Gives full text of the “Pacto de Apaneca” (pages 34-37).

Campos 1982:  “El tres de agosto, a las doce del mediodía, en la ciudad de Apaneca, departamento de Ahuachapán, el Presidente de la República, Álvaro Magaña, Morales Ehrlich por el Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Roberto D’Aubisson por la Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, Raúl Molina por el Partido de Conciliación Nacional y Francisco Quiñónez por el Partido Popular Salvadoreño, firmaron lo que se ha venido en llamar ‘Pacto de Apaneca’ (PA).  De los partidos con diputados en la Asamblea Constituyente faltó representante de Acción Democrática” (page 865).

Karl 1986: “On August 3, 1982, the political parties which had participated in the 1982 elections signed the ‘Pact of Apaneca,’ an agreement modeled after Venezuela’s 1958 ‘Pact of Punto Fijo’ which marked the instauration of a democratic regime in Venezuela” (page 21).

Motley 1983: “The pact called for a multiparty Political Commission...to oversee the appointment of a new Central Elections Council, to draft the guidelines for the electoral process, and to work on municipal and presidential elections...(It) also led to the establishment of a Peace Commission...with the mandate to bring all Salvadoran sectors...into the electoral process” (page 2).

Schroeder 1995:  “The Pact of Apaneca was an agreement between the PDC, ARENA, PCN and PPS that committed the parties to a series of principles dealing with ending the war, human rights, democratization, economic recovery, security measures and international support” (page 52).  “The signing of the pact led to a split in the PCN.  The more conservative sector formed [PAISA] while the remaining PCN deputies forged an alliance with the PDC” (page 53).

Williams 2003:  “Magaña’s provisional government was largely ineffective despite the ‘Pact of National Unity’ signed by the PDC, ARENA, and PCN in August 1982.  Disagreements between the parties over the agrarian reform, economic policy, and the provisions of the new constitution left the government immobilized through most of 1983” (page 312).

August 6

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “El Papa Juan Pablo II dirigió al episcopado salvadoreño una carta en la cual instaba a los obispos a respaldar una solución política al conflicto a través del diálogo” (page 771).

October

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “El FDR-FMLN dio a conocer en México una nueva propuesta de diálogo, que una semana antes había hecho llegar al gobierno salvadoreño, la Fuerza Armada y los partidos políticos.  Pocos días después, tanto el gobierno como el ejército rechazaron la propuesta” (page 771).

1983

Foley 1996:  “The ‘Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social’ (FUSADES) was created in 1983 by a group of wealthy Salvadoran business people.  The United States Agency for International Development (US-AID)…played an important role in FUSADES’ rapid growth” (page 71).  “Over the next 10 years, FUSADES became the main outlet for AID monies in the civil sector…FUSADES grew rapidly, becoming the most influential think-tank in El Salvador” (page 72).  “The most remarkable aspect of the AID strategy is the extent to which it involved itself in building the political power and influence of a segment of the Salvadoran business class to accomplish its purposes” (page 73).

Ladutke 2004:  “In 1983, [death squads] killed up to eight hundred victims per month” (page 30).  “The government and its allies decapitated the popular movement by arresting or murdering its most experienced leaders.  Many members of opposition groups abandoned their political work in San Salvador to join the guerrillas in the countryside” (page 31).  “The military succeeded in driving large numbers of civilians out of the countryside.  By the end of 1983, there were four hundred thousand internally displaced persons.  The United Nations High Commission on Refugees reported that roughly seven hundred thousand Salvadorans had fled the country by this time” (page 32).

McElhinny 2006:  “The FMLN successfully established zones of popular control covering close to a third of the national territory by 1983” (page 57).

Radical women in Latin America:  left and right 2001:  “1983:  The Association of Salvadoran Women (ASMUSA) and the Organization of Salvadoran Women for Peace (ORMUSA) are formed” (page 34).

Wood 2003:  “Between 1980 and 1983, approximately 260 local and national leaders of the Christian Democratic Party were killed, including thirty-five mayors, most by ORDEN members” (page 110).  “By the end of 1983, the FMLN’s military capacity was sufficient to control about a fifth of the national territory” (page 131).

March

Krauss 1991:  “(T)he FPL’s second-in-command, Melida Anaya Montes (alias ‘Ana María’), formerly the teachers’ union leader, challenged Marcial.  In March 1983, Comandante Ana María requested a vote of the FPL political bureau on a number of issues, including unity with other rebel groups and negotiations.  The leaders supported Ana María over Marcial, effectively marginalizing his power” (page 91).

Montgomery 1984: “On 6 March 1983, as the time for another election drew near, Pope John Paul II visited El Salvador.  President Reagan’s soon-to-be special envoy to Central America, Richard Stone, was sent to tell President Magaña to announce the next election that day” (page 538).

April

Brockett 2005:  The deaths of Mélida Anaya Montes and Salvador Cayetano Carpio end “a period of severe leadership conflict within the coalition of the five revolutionary organizations constituting the [FMLN]” (page 73).

McClintock 1998:  “Gradually the FMLN became more cohesive.  FMLN unity was advanced by the death of Carpio, the long-term leader of the FPL.  As it became clear that Carpio would not be number one in the FMLN hierarchy, he became skeptical that the FPL should participate in the FMLN at all.  The FPL’s second-in-command ‘Comandante Ana María’ (Melida Anaya Montes), was an advocate of FMLN unity…Carpio ordered the assassination of Ana María, hoping that his deed would remain a secret.  When Carpio was questioned by Sandinista leaders about the assassination, he apparently realized that his order would be revealed, and he committed suicide.  The bloodshed shook the FPL and its supporters outside of El Salvador” (page 55).  “Vides Casanova, who had been commander of the National Guard during the years of intense death squad activity after the October 1979 coup, had become minister of defense upon the exit of General García in April 1983” (page 137).

Wade 2003:  “While Castro’s role in unifying the guerrillas was important, the greater impetus for unification came from within.  It is commonly attributed to the assassination of FPL Comandante Mélida Anaya Montes [who had supported unification] and the subsequent suicide of Salvador Cayetano Carpio, the head of the FPL, who had resisted unification…Montes was murdered on April 6, 1983 in Managua on orders from Carpio.  Carpio committed suicide after his orders became known” (page 51).

May

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “El gobierno norteamericano buscó contactos con el FDR-FMLN para convencerlo de participar en los comicios de 1984” (page 771).

June

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “A su regreso de Estados Unidos, tras entrevistarse con Reagan, el presidente Magaña declaró que estaba dispuesto a rechazar la ayuda económica y militar norteamericana si ésta era condicionada a la realización de una negociación con el FDR-FMLN para compartir el poder” (pages 771-772).

López Vallecillos 1983:  “La situación política de El Salvador de abril de 1982 a junio de 1983 no puede juzgarse únicamente en base al resultado electoral del 28 de marzo de 1982 y a las distintas alianzas y recomposiciones de los grupos que constituyen actualmente el bloque de poder…En una situación insurreccional en la que están claramente identificados los sujetos del conflicto, es difícil resolver las diferencias por la vía electoral…En el caso de El Salvador se ha ignorado que la lucha es expresión insurgente de la clase dominada, frente a condiciones económicas y sociales intolerables” (page 459).

July

Motley 1983: On July 11 the U.S. Department of State designates $3.4 million “for El Salvador in fiscal year 1983 to assist the development of the Salvadoran elections process” (page 1).  States that “our opposition to power-sharing negotiations between the far-left guerrilla groups and the government springs not from a desire to pursue a military solution but from our conviction that El Salvador has had enough of backroom bargains among powerful elites, be they economic, political or military, far right or far left.”

September

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “17 de septiembre.  El presidente Magaña reiteró que ‘cualquier negociación para repartir el poder sería contraria al mandato de los electores y es definitivamente lo único que mi gobierno no puede hacer por la paz’…29 de septiembre.  Representantes del FDR-FMLN y de la comisión de paz se reunieron por segunda vez en Bogotá.  A su retorno a El Salvador, la comisión anunció que daba por interrumpido el proceso de diálogo con el FDR-FMLN, hasta que éstos aceptaran participar en las elecciones de 1984” (page 772).

McClintock 1998:  “In September 1983, an ERP brigade held San Miguel, El Salvador’s third largest city, for the better part of a day” (page 83).

December

Ladutke 2004:  “In December 1983, Vice President George Bush traveled to El Salvador, where he warned that U.S. aid would be jeopardized if the murders continued and death squad leaders were not punished.  At the same time, he promised the military increased materials support in exchange for cooperation” (page 34).

December 15

Cáceres P. 1990:  “(L)a Constituyente había pasado a ser Legislativa después del 15 de diciembre del 83” (page 347).

Crónica del mes.  Noviembre y diciembre [1983] 1984:  “El día 15 todos los diputados firmaron la Constitución Política” (page 62).

December 20

Crónica del mes.  Noviembre y diciembre [1983] 1984:  “El día 20 se tuvo el acto solemne de juramentación de todos los poderes bajo la nueva Constitución, tras el que D’Aubuisson anunció su renuncia prometida a la presidencia de la Asamblea.  Como los diputados no van a elecciones, la Asamblea pasa de ser constituyente a legislativa, con los mismos representantes” (page 62).

December 23: new constitution promulgated

Acevedo 1991: “The Assembly restructured the Central Election Commission so that members of all parties participating in the elections were represented.  The commission was then assigned the task of setting up a proper electoral register and drafting an electoral law under which presidential elections would take place in 1984" (page 27).

Artiga-González 2008:  “La Asamblea Constituyente de 1982, controlada mayoritariamente por partidos de derecha, estableció que el presidente y vicepresidente de la República fueran elegidos para un periodo de cinco años, mientras que diputados y miembros de los concejos municipales fueran elegidos cada tres años” (page 529).

Bird 2001:  “In 1983 the Salvadoran Constituent Assembly passed a set of constitutional reforms, one of which mandated that for the first time mayors were to be popularly elected” (page 163).

Constitución política de la República de El Salvador 1984:  Official publication of the new constitution.

Country profile.  Guatemala, El Salvador 1994-95: “El Salvador’s current constitution came into effect on December 23, 1983.  It describes El Salvador as a representative democracy headed by a president and vice-president, elected every five years…The constitution also establishes an 84-member legislative assembly, elected every three years" (page 39).   

Gamero Q. 2000:  “La Constitución [de] 1983…establece que los miembros de la Asamblea Legislativa se renovarán cada tres años y podrán ser reelegidos” (page 125).

Johnson 1993:  “Article 211 of the 1983 Constitution gave the Salvadoran Armed Forces considerable power beyond the roles conventionally ascribed such as defending the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the nation.  The Salvadoran Constitution also called upon the military to keep [and] maintain order, ensure domestic tranquility, defend a republican form of government, defend democratic principles, ensure the norm of presidential succession and guarantee suffrage and free and fair elections” (page 289).

Motley 1983: The constitution sets the presidential term at 5 years and legislators’ terms at 3 years (page 3).  “In presidential elections, if no candidate receives an absolute majority, a runoff between the front runners will be held within 30 days.”

Nickson 1995:  “The 1983 Constitution formally recognized municipal autonomy.  It also abolished the districts and ended the supervisory powers of departmental governors over local government” (page 178).

Primer informe centroamericano de gobernabilidad jurídica e institucional 2007: El Salvador 2007:  “La Constitución Política de 1983 estableció el Consejo Central de Elecciones como una autoridad suprema en materia electoral” (page 127).

Wood 2000:  “(T)he 1983 constitution institutionalized a new party system that reflected some commitment to the right to electoral competition.  New features of Salvadoran electoral laws included multiparty competition and participation in the electoral commission, secret and voluntary voting, a new electoral register, and an institutionalized balance of power” (page 242).

1984

Brockett 2005:  In 1984 “the site of confrontation between the government and guerrillas changed from the larger San Salvador area to the countryside.  Indeed, once urban repression dropped after 1983, life in San Salvador returned to a degree of normalcy for most inhabitants.  Although the civil war continued through 1991, it was largely absent in the capital until the guerrilla offensive of November 1989” (page 304).

Ladutke 2004:  “The Reagan Administration...needed someone with a democratic image to become the next president of El Salvador.  Continued congressional support would have been seriously undermined if death squad leader and ARENA party founder D’Aubuisson had won the election.  As a result, the U.S. government secretly spent eleven million dollars to ensure Duarte’s victory.  Furthermore, the U.S. even imposed its own balloting plan on the elections” (pages 34-35).

Latin American regional reports.  Caribbean & Central America report February 17, 1984:  Discusses the upcoming March elections and the issues involved (electronic edition).  “The smaller parties, and particularly [AD]…, are going along only half-heartedly with the elections.  They see the whole process as engineered by the two major parties to limit the contest to Duarte and D’Aubuisson without risking their present strength in the assembly.  El Salvador will be holding presidential, not general elections, and the present constituent assembly will continue as the new legislature for another three years.  AD argues that the same two parties tacitly agree not to question either the absence of a specific electoral law or the grave deficiencies of the electoral register…The Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE), afflicted by a spate of resignations in late 1983, admits that the electoral register will be less than perfect.”

McClintock 1998:  “For the 1984 election, a master list of potential voters was compiled by the CCE, based on birth, identity card, and death records” (page 125).  “U.S. officials in El Salvador were deeply involved in the mechanics of the electoral process…U.S. officials actively supported Duarte’s candidacy.  The Central Intelligence Agency channeled approximately $1-$3 million in covert assistance to the Christian Democratic Party for its campaign” (page 226).

January

Crónica del mes.  Enero de 1984 1984:  “En la arena política la campaña electoral fue la que concentró los mayores esfuerzos y atención, saturando progresivamente los medios de comunicación, a pesar de que no hay ley electoral, ni registro, el Consejo Central de Elecciones está en profunda crisis tras la renuncia de varios de sus miembros y por la escasez de recursos económicos.  Sin embargo, los diversos partidos van presentando a sus candidatos y dirigen la campaña a intensos ataques:  todos contra Duarte y la DC, mientras ésta acusa y se defiende de ARENA; hasta tal punto llega la ‘altura’ política que Mons. Aparicio se atrevió a hacer acres declaraciones contra la campaña y los políticos, negándoles a todos por igual la autoridad moral, el patriotismo y el interés por el bien del país, por lo que ninguno merece el voto, en su opinión” (page 169).

February

Brockett 2005:  “In February 1984, the UPD formalized its alliance with the PDC, signing a Social Pact that pledged UPD support for Duarte’s presidential campaign and both sides to their mutual reform objectives” (page 307).

Crónica del mes.  Febrero, marzo y abril 1984:  “La atención nacional, durante el mes de febrero, se concentró en las elecciones, como queriendo olvidar por un tiempo los graves problemas que están al fondo de la crisis salvadoreña; aunque el mismo resquicio abierto por la contienda electoral deja aflorar otro tipo de conflictos, principalmente económicos y laborales.  La asamblea legislativa al fin logró aprobar la Ley Electoral Transitoria, que tiene sus incoherencias con la misma Constitución recién aprobada, pero que llenará los objetivos que se han trazado para el evento electoral.  Sin embargo, el Consejo Central de Elecciones, además de haber quedado un tanto al margen de la convocatoria a elecciones y a la elaboración de la Ley, se manifestó restringido en su capacidad económica y técnica para tener listos todos los requisitos del sufragio; a las más de 300.000 cédulas repetidas agregó más de medio millón de salvadoreños que no podrán emitir su voto por estar desplazados y/o indocumentados en el interior o en el exterior del país, lo que dejó un máximo posible de poco más de millón y medio de votantes” (page 438).

Gamero Q. 2000:  “La Ley Electoral de 1984 aumentó a sesenta el número total de diputados” (page 126).

Montgomery  1984: “The Electoral Law went into effect on 13 February...The last week in February, the Christian Democrats signed a ‘social pact’ with the Popular Democratic Union (UPD) in which the latter pledged support in exchange for PDC promises to name rural and urban labor representatives to the ministries responsible for the agrarian reform and labor relations.  UPD support was important to the PDC because of its ability to mobilize tens of thousands of ‘campesinos’ to vote...In a bombshell announcement, the CCE president asserted that there was substantial fraud in the 1982 election.  ‘More than twenty-five percent of the votes,’ he said, were false.  Other CCE members gave lower estimates of 15-25 percent.  In 1982 there had been charges of fraud, but U.S. ambassador Deane Hinton convinced all the parties to agree not to charge each other since the outcome would not be affected” (page 533).

Primer informe centroamericano de gobernabilidad jurídica e institucional 2007: El Salvador 2007:  “(D)esde 1983 la Constitución Política contempló la promulgación de una Ley Electoral, la cual entró en vigencia en 1984” (page 127).

March

Ladutke 2004:  “At the same time as the Reagan Administration was putting pressure on the death squads in late 1983, the Salvadoran Air Force increased bombing in conflicted zones.  It then stepped up these strikes just prior to the elections in March of 1984, resulting in the death of two hundred and thirty five civilians between March 16th and March 29th” (page 36).

March 25: presidential election--first round

Acevedo 1991: Gives number of votes cast, number of valid votes, and number of votes for Duarte and for D’Aubuisson (page 28).

Anderson 1988: Gives percent of vote for top four candidates (page 115).

Arriaza Meléndez 1989: “Elecciones para presidente y vice presidente de la republica del 20 de marzo de 1984: resultados parciales por departamento y por partido, primera vuelta” (page 32).

Baloyra-Herp 1995:  Discusses the election (page 49).

Benítez Manaut 1990: “Elecciones para presidente y vicepresidente, 25/III/84" (page 80).  Gives total vote and percent of vote for each party; numbers of votes that were valid, null, contested, unused, or lost; number of abstentions; and total votes cast.

Brockett 1998:  “D’Aubuisson was an effective organizer and campaigner but also a great liability to ARENA as its leader because of his infamy.  If he were to have won the presidency, the U.S. Congress clearly would have cut off the funds vital to the operation of the Salvadoran government…When he ran for that office in 1984, substantial U.S. financial support went to the victorious campaign of Duarte” (page 145).

Castello 1989:  “Las contiendas preelectorales del 25 de marzo de 1984…se caracterizan por una derecha dividida; una marcada oposición de los partidos de derecha contra el PDC; amenazas e insultos interpartidarios y un evidente condicionamiento poblacional con las promesas de justicia social, trabajo y paz…La primera ronda electoral estuvo representada por 8 partidos políticos” (page 13).  Lists parties.

Chitnis 1984: “Results of the first round, 25 March 1984" (page 980).  Gives by party the number and percent of vote won.

CIDAI 1984: “Número y tipos de puestos de votación primera y segunda vueltas electorales, 1984" (page 208).  For each round gives by department the number of municipal, departmental, national, and regional voting stations.  “Municipios en los que no hubo votación: primera y segunda rondas” (page 213).  Gives municipalities by department for each round.  “Elecciones presidenciales de El Salvador 25 de marzo de 1984" (page 214).  Gives by department the registered voters, votes cast, total ballot boxes, boxes used, boxes nullified “por desorden,” boxes nullified because no one voted, municipalities in which votes were recorded or not recorded, and estimates of votes not cast “por desorden” or because of abstention.

Córdova M. 1988: “El Salvador.  Elecciones del 25 de marzo de 1984.  Porcentaje de votos por partido, según su posición político-ideológico” (page 93).  “El Salvador: resultados elecciones para presidente y vicepresidente de la republica.  25 de marzo de 1984" (“anexo no. 1," follows end of article).  Gives for each department the votes for eight parties, number of valid votes, null votes, abstentions, contested votes, blank votes, misplaced votes, and total votes.

Crónica del mes.  Febrero, marzo y abril 1984:  “El día 25 de marzo el pueblo se volcó a las calles masivamente, pese a la cada vez más evidente organización insuficiente, pese al apagón eléctrico provocado desde la noche anterior por sabotajes de la guerrilla, pese a la ausencia casi absoluta de transporte público, pese a la tardanza—e incluso desaparición en algunos casos—de los integrantes de las mesas receptoras o la confusión de listados y de instrumentos de votación o la carencia de algunos de éstos por los sucesos de la noche anterior, el temor de algunos representantes oficiales, o tal vez la intencionada irresponsabilidad de otros.  Todo ello condujo al congestionamiento en los lugares de votación, a la movilización forzada de los votantes de uno a otro lugar, o a la imposibilidad de emitir el voto para un número considerable, que en un principio se dijo habría llegado al medio millón, cifra demasiado abultada.  Sin embargo, el mismo CCE reconoció que las urnas y papeletas de 800 mesas se habían extraviado y pidió a la fiscalía su búsqueda y sanciones pertinentes; anuló los resultados de 760 urnas, y reconoció que en 58 municipios no se había podido votar (contra los 91 que afirmó la guerrilla)” (page 441).  “El tedioso conteo y revisión de las urnas y votos, fiscalizado por los partidos, terminó muy pronto dados los mecanismos, arrojando un resultado del 43.41 por ciento a favor del PDC, el 29.76 por ciento para ARENA, y el 19.31 por ciento para el PCN, mientras que los demás partidos no alcanzaron cifras significativas, especialmente PAISA (1.21%), lo cual mostró la carencia de base social y la polarización del electorado tras el tipo de campaña desarrollada.  Si se suman los imposibilitados de votar, los lugares controlados por la guerrilla, los votos nulos, etc., más de la mitad de los posibles votantes no depositaron su voto por distintas razones, o no les fueron computados.  Como conclusión del 25 de marzo, ningún partido obtuvo la mayoría y se tuvo que ir a una segunda votación popular entre el PDC y ARENA en el plazo de un mes a partir de la consolidación de los resultados” (page 442).

Eguizábal 1984: “El Salvador: elecciones presidenciales de 1984" (page 32).  For the first round election gives for each party the number of votes received and percent this constitutes of total vote.

Eguizábal 1992: Gives first round votes for top three candidates (page 141).

Eguizábal 1992a: Gives percent of vote for top three candidates (page 54).  “En la Constitución de 1983 se había abandonado la práctica de que fuera la Asamblea Legislativa la que, a falta de una mayoría de votos, escogiera al presidente y se instituyó una segunda vuelta electoral.”

Ellacuría 1984: For PDC gives votes won in first round, percent of valid votes, and compares this to the number and percent of votes won in 1982, and gives municipalities in which the party won or lost (pages 310-311).  For ARENA gives votes won in first round, percent of valid votes, and compares this to the number of votes won in 1982 (page 311).  For the PCN gives votes won in 1982 and 1984 (page 312).

García 1989: “March 1984 presidential elections results, first round” (page 77).  Gives party, votes, and percent of valid votes.  Also gives turnout, number of persons who voted, number of valid votes, percent that were invalid, percent that were spoiled, and percent that were blank. 

Haggerty 1990: Gives turnout and percent of vote for PDC, PCN, and ARENA (page 162).

Johnson 1993:  “The 1984 and 1985 elections were basically a repeat of the 1982 contest between the Christian Democrats on the one hand and conservative business elites on the other.  The PDC candidate for president was Duarte; ARENA’s candidate was retired Major Roberto D’Aubuisson; and the PCN’s candidate was Francisco José Guerrero…Like the 1982 elections for a Constituent Assembly, the 1984 elections for president played a crucial role in the counter-insurgency policy of the United States government…Elections were also needed to legitimize U.S. involvement and its two-track strategy of low intensity conflict combined with political and socio-economic reform.  The importance that the U.S. government attached to the electoral process is evident from the amount of money its agencies spent on it:  $8.75 million in local currency derived from AID Economic Support Funds, and another $3.4 million on its elections project launched in 1983” (pages 234-235).  “The U.S. government also funneled an estimated $2 million to the PDC campaign via the Venezuelan Christian Democrat foundation, IVEPO, and the West German counterpart, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.  The CIA also reportedly provided money to the major union confederation, the ‘Unidad Popular Democrática’ (UPD) to encourage its alliance with the PDC” (page 236).  “(O)nly 48.9% of the electorate went to the polls, and of those that did go, only 88.6% voted for one of the parties, the other 12% choosing to abstain or destroy their ballots” (page 237).  “1984 presidential elections” (page 238).  Gives number of votes for each party in the 1984 and run-off elections.

McElhinny 2006:  “The March 1984 presidential election of the center-right government of Napoleon Duarte…dealt a decisive blow to the FMLN strategy of promoting popular insurrection and fended off complete political control by the extreme right under Roberto D’Aubuisson.  Despite irregularities that severely challenged the legitimacy of the result, Duarte’s victory reflected the majority preference for peaceful social change that severely conditioned the political-military strategies of the FMLN” (page 55).

Montgomery 1984: “The 1984 elections, like those in 1982, took place in a context fundamentally different from the past in two important respects.  First, the elections occurred in a country at war with itself.  Second, the elections were held, not on the initiative of the Salvadorans, but at the behest of a U.S. administration anxious to demonstrate to the Congress and the people that El Salvador is in transition to ‘democracy’” (page 532).  Gives number of ballot boxes in the country at the municipal, departmental, national, and regional levels (page 533) (Also discussed in Montgomery 1985 page 473).  “1984 Salvadoran presidential elections” (page 536) (Also reproduced in Montgomery 1985 page 475). “First round, 25 March 1984" gives for all parties the number and percent of valid votes received; gives numbers of null votes, abstentions, and defaced ballots; and total votes.

Montgomery 1995: Gives percent of vote won by top three parties and their candidates (page 182).

1984 presidential elections in El Salvador 1984: “(A) little over 1,400,000 people voted...Voting totals in 1984 were decreased significantly in the departments in which the war was most active...Results by party totals paralleled the 1982 results.  The ARENA percentage was almost exactly what it had been, just under 30 percent of the valid votes.  PDC increased its percentage to 43 percent, while PCN went up slightly to a little over 19 percent.  The most notable fall-off was for AD” (page 19). 

Pickering 1984: Describes voter registration process and procedures to be followed in the upcoming election (page 1).

Resultados oficiales 1984: “Cómputos oficiales, 25 de marzo de 1984, elecciones para presidente y vice-presidente de la república” (page 365).   Gives for each department the votes for eight parties, total valid votes, null votes, abstentions, contested votes, unused ballots, lost ballots, and total votes for the department and country in each category.

Ribera Sala 1996: “No sería sino hasta las elecciones de 1984, en que el PDC, con un gran apoyo para su campaña por parte de una superpotencia extranjera (Estados Unidos), tuvo un claro y rotundo triunfo con el que, aparentemente, podría implementar sus políticas” (page 36).

Schroeder 1995:  “The 1984 election occurred with massive financial support from the United States for a computerized voting list, advertising and expense for the Central Election Council.  As was the case in 1982, many irregularities were evident during the first round vote:  late arrival of ballot boxes or officials, destroyed ballot boxes, no voting in FMLN held areas and a confusing new computer generated voting list…The fairness of the election was further undermined by the massive American funding of the Christian Democrats in order to prevent an ARENA victory…(T)he left again did not participate” (page 55).

Torres Rivas 1987: “El Salvador.  Elecciones presidenciales en 1984--marzo 1984" (page 185). 

Gives by party the total votes, percent of valid votes, percent of total votes, and percent of registered voters.  Gives the same information for valid, null, blank, and invalid votes, total votes,  number and percent of electorate who abstained, and total registered voters.

Walter 2000b:  Discusses the election and gives results (pages 584-585).

April

Baloyra-Herp 1995:  Discusses April 1984 efforts of the conservative majority in the legislative assembly to change voting eligibility (page 49).

Crónica del mes.  Febrero, marzo y abril 1984:  “La campaña electoral para la segunda ronda, entre los dos partidos que obtuvieron mayor número de votos el 25 de marzo (PDC y ARENA), polarizó la atención durante el mes de abril, sobre todo por la saturación de los medios de comunicación y por una serie de acontecimientos que fueron indicando la cerrada lucha por el poder librada el 6 de mayo…(E)l bloque ARENA-PAISA-PCN-PPS logró una apretada victoria (31 votos de 60) por la cual se modificó la ley electoral, principalmente en la eliminación de listados de votantes para la segunda ronda, lo cual propiciaría mayores facilidades al partido contendiente de ultraderecha para obtener una mayoría que de otro modo era casi imposible de alcanzar” (page 444).

McClintock 1998:  “The most dramatic shifts in counterinsurgency policy in El Salvador were occasioned not by Duarte’s presidency but in April 1983, when Defense Minister General José Guillermo García, after a rebellion by Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa in Cabañas, was replaced by Vides Casanova…Vides Casanova was more partial to the policies advanced by U.S. officials than his predecessor” (page 152).

May

Crónica del mes.  Mayo-junio 1984 1984:  “El suceso que concentró la atención nacional e internacional durante el mes de mayo fue la segunda ronda de elecciones presidenciales de El Salvador, entre Duarte y D’Aubuisson, o entre el PDC y ARENA.  La primera vuela había mostrado una clara superioridad del primero sobre el segundo, pero una segunda vuelta podía modificar sustancialmente los resultados si la campaña iba dirigida inteligentemente, y si ARENA y su candidato no sólo tomaban la iniciativa con agresividad, sino que además lograban aunar fuerzas contra el supuesto enemigo común:  el comunitarismo-comunismo.  El primer paso fue conformar la Unidad Patriótica Salvadoreña (UPS), por la alianza de ARENA, PAISA y PPS, a fin de aglutinar esfuerzos en la campaña de la segunda vuelta, a la cual correspondió poco después un pacto político del PDC y AD, mientras el PCN mantuvo su identidad y autonomía frente a las ofertas de ambos bloques, dejando en libertad a sus seguidores” (page 581).

May 6: Presidential election--second round (Duarte / PDC)

Anderson 1988: Gives number of votes for each candidate (page 116).

Arriaza Meléndez 1989: “Elecciones para presidente y vicepresidente de la republica del 7 de mayo de 1984: resultados parciales por departamento y por partido, segunda vuelta” (page 34).

Benítez Manaut 1990: “Elecciones para presidente y vicepresidente, 6/V/84" (page 80).    Gives total vote and percent of vote for ARENA and PDC; numbers of votes that were valid, null, contested, unused, or lost; number of abstentions; and total votes cast.

Castello 1989:  “Los partidos conservadores forman una coalición denominada Unidad Patriótica Nacionalista (UPN)” (page 13).  “La propaganda de estas elecciones se caracteriza por pretender crear un sentimiento anticomunista en la población, a través de mutuas acusaciones e insultos interpartidarios:  mientras ARENA acusa a Duarte de ser comunista por haber impulsado ciertas reformas contenidas en la proclama de la Fuerza Armada de 1979, el PDC acusa a D’aubuissón de ser miembro de los Escuadrones de la Muerte…Las votaciones de la 2da. Ronda…se realizan en medio de una serie de sabotajes por parte del FMLN, quien evitó la emisión del voto en 43 municipios…Los resultados de estas elecciones son:  para el PDC:  752,625 (53.59%); ARENA:  651,741 (46.40%) observándose un ligero aumento de 138,060 respecto a la primera ronda” (page 14).

Chitnis 1984: “Results of the second round, 6 May 1984" (page 980).  Gives number of votes and percent of vote for each candidate.

CIDAI 1984:   “Elecciones presidenciales de El Salvador 6 de mayo de 1984" (page 215).  Gives by department the difference in votes cast between the first and second rounds,  votes cast, total ballot boxes, boxes used, boxes nullified “por desorden,” boxes nullified because no one voted, municipalities in which votes were recorded or not recorded, and estimates of votes not cast “por desorden” or because of abstention.

Córdova M. 1988:  “El Salvador: resultados elecciones para presidente y vicepresidente de la republica.  6 de mayo de 1984" (“anexo no. 2," follows end of article).  Gives for each department the votes for PDC and ARENA, number of valid votes, null votes, abstentions, contested votes, blank votes, misplaced votes, and total votes.

Crónica del mes.  Mayo-junio 1984 1984:  “El día 6 de mayo las elecciones transcurrieron con relativa calma, a pesar de que la guerrilla incursionó profundamente en la ciudad de San Miguel y en otras poblaciones, e impidió que se votara (según ella) en 94 municipios de 9 departamentos, o en 41, de 6 departamentos (según el CCE:  22 de ellos ya previstos y otros 19 no previstos).  La experiencia anterior había obligado a corregir muchos de los errores, con lo cual el procedimiento fue mucho más fluido y tranquilo, dando la impresión de menor concurrencia de votantes, si bien el total de votos superó la cifra de la primera vuelta” (page 581).  “El escrutinio oficial de los votos dio pie a graves conflictos y acusaciones:  los representantes de ARENA acusaron a los miembros del CCE, especialmente al representante del PDC, de haber infringido las normas establecidas para el recuento y no haber esperado la presencia de los representantes de ARENA, de haberse arrogado atribuciones que no le correspondían, etc.  Todo ello fue transmitido en directo por televisión.  El tono fue subiendo, hasta que el CCE decidió continuar el escrutinio como lo venía haciendo…El CCE desoyó las denuncias de ARENA y proclamó vencedor al PDC por 53.59 por ciento de los votos válidos emitidos” (page 582).

Eguizábal 1992: Gives percent of vote won by Duarte in the second round (page 141).

Haggerty 1990: Gives percent of vote for each candidate (page 162). 

García 1989: “Geographic breakdown of 1984 runoff election” (page 77).  Gives by department the number of votes for each candidate.

Johnson 1993:  “While the victory of the PDC certainly owed a debt to U.S. manipulations, especially given a relatively small margin of victory, the party itself deserves credit for responding to the desires of most Salvadorans for a negotiated settlement to the war” (page 238).  “The PDC victory can also be explained in part by the division among conservatives produced by the presence of seven competing rightist parties.  In the run-off election held two months after the primary, the PDC benefitted from the support of more moderate rightist parties, AD, POP and MERECEN, while the PPS and PAISA threw their weight behind ARENA” (page 239).

Karl 1986: “The chief result of the 1984 election...was a major escalation of the war...Duarte’s victory marked a shift of government power from the extreme right...to the center right.  This shift...created a new image of the Salvadoran government, one which could justify growing U.S. involvement” (page 26).

Montes 1985:  “Votos válidos en urnas no municipales por departamentos 6 de mayo de 1985” (page 220).

Montgomery 1984:    “1984 Salvadoran presidential elections” (page 536) (Also reproduced in Montgomery 1985 page 475). “Second round, 6 May 1984" gives for two candidates the number and percent of valid votes received; gives numbers of null votes, abstentions, and defaced ballots; and total votes.

Montgomery 1995: Gives percent of vote won by each candidate (page 182).

1984 presidential elections in El Salvador 1984: “(A)lmost as many people voted in May as in March.  Duarte won as expected, but with less than 54 percent of the vote” (page 20).

Resultados oficiales 1984: “Cómputos oficiales, 6 de mayo de 1984, elecciones para presidente y vice-presidente de la república” (page 366).   Gives for each department the votes for two parties, total valid votes, null votes, abstentions, contested votes, unused ballots, lost ballots, and total votes for the department and country in each category.

Torres Rivas 1987: “El Salvador.  Elecciones presidenciales en 1984--mayo 1984" (page 186). 

Gives by party the total votes, percent of valid votes, percent of total votes, and percent of registered voters.  Gives the same information for valid, null, blank, and invalid votes, total votes,  number and percent of electorate who abstained, and total registered voters.

Williams 2003:  “Duarte went on to win the second round by a less than overwhelming margin (53.6% to 46.4%)” (page 312).

Wood 2000:  “ARENA candidate D’Aubuisson lost the 1984 presidential election in a second round of voting to the PDC’s José Napoleón Duarte, who enjoyed considerable U.S. financing for his campaign” (page 243).

May 25

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “Con ocasión de la victoria de Duarte en las elecciones presidenciales, el FDR-FMLN replanteó su propuesta de diálogo y negociación política sin condiciones como inicio de solución al conflicto, y sugirió la posibilidad de que Duarte pudiera ser un ‘interlocutor válido,’ cosa que no había ocurrido con Magaña” (page 772).

June

Castello 1989:  “El 1 de junio de 1984, con motivo de la toma de posesión, el presidente José Napoleón Duarte accedió a dialogar con el FDR-FMLN” (page 14).

Crónica del mes.  Mayo-junio 1984 1984:  “El mes de junio se inauguró con la toma de posesión de Duarte como presidente de la República y se cerró con la toma del Cerrón Grande por parte del FMLN.  Ambos acontecimientos son de especial relevancia, no sólo por los hechos en sí mismos, sino por lo que representan:  el proyecto norteamericano de ‘democratización del país,’ frente a la realidad de una guerra que no se modifica por esas ‘medidas políticas’ superficiales.  La toma de posesión de Duarte, el día primero de junio, estuvo revestida de la mayor solemnidad, con asistencia de numerosas y preclaras representaciones internacionales, pero con la marcada e inexcusable ausencia de ARENA” (pages 584-585).

Johnson 1993:  “The 1984 presidential election produced a divided government, since the 1982 legislature, dominated by ARENA and the PCN, remained seated until the 1985 elections the following year.  Likewise, the municipal and departmental governments, many dominated by the right, would remain within the same party hands until the 1985 elections, as agreed to in the 1982 Pact of Apaneca” (page 239).

McClintock 1998:  “In 1984…the FMLN…adopted a Salvadoran version of the Vietnamese ‘prolonged popular war’ strategy, the strategy originally advocated by the FPL.  A key reason for this change was that, in the wake of the election of Napoleon Duarte to the presidency, the U.S. government provided even more substantial support to the Salvadoran military, in particular enhancing the Salvadoran military’s air attack capability…The strategy was no longer conventional military confrontation, but a war of attrition…The election of Duarte signified important changes not only on the battlefield but also in the political arena.  The opening of political space enabled the FMLN to carry out political work in Salvadoran cities again” (page 83).  “Vides Casanova remained [as minister of defense] after Duarte’s election…Under Vides Casanova, the ‘tanda’ system endured.  In general, the first member of a class to be promoted sought the promotions of his classmates as soon as possible…Changes in top ministerial positions reflected the passage of power to a new ‘tanda’ rather than to a new president” (page 138).  “(W)hen Duarte assumed the presidency in 1984, the Salvadoran military’s human rights record improved dramatically.  Military/paramilitary violence against politically salient civilian groups as recorded by international human rights organizations declined sharply” (page 150).

Williams 2003:  “On the eve of his inauguration, Duarte signed a secret pact with the defense minister, General Eugenio Vides Casanova, which preserved the military’s institutional autonomy and overall direction of the war effort in exchange for its allegiance to the new government” (page 312).

September

Brockett 2005:  “(B)y September the UPD was publicly denouncing the PDC administration’s failure to follow through on the reform agenda” (page 308).

October

Castello 1989:  “Después de algunas reuniones previas, el 15 de octubre de 1984 se realizó en La Palma, departamento de Chalatenango, el primer diálogo Gobierno/FDR-FMLN” (page 14).

Crónica del mes.  Octubre y noviembre 1984:   “El acontecimiento nacional que centró la atención durante el mes de octubre fue el primer encuentro en la ciudad de La Palma (Chalatenango) entre los máximos representantes del poder político oficial y de los frentes insurgentes…La Palma está en una zona controlada desde hace muchos meses por el FMLN, lo cual a la vez que constituía una garantía para los frentes, presentaba obstáculos…Esos insignificantes inconvenientes no pudieron deslucir la fiesta del pueblo que se congregó  por millares, conviviendo con los guerrilleros, compartiendo la espera y la esperanza, uniéndose en los aplausos tanto a Duarte como a Ungo y Zamora, a Vides como a Cienfuegos, o a los jerarcas de la Iglesia quienes actuaban de moderadores y mediadores.  El acto fue un encuentro, una fiesta, una inauguración, un pábulo a la esperanza, una confirmación masiva de que el pueblo quiere la paz y no la destrucción y la guerra…Para muchos el día fue una ilusión que se tornó en decepción al ponerse el sol” (pages 928-929).  “(E)l CCE anunció elecciones de diputados y alcaldes para el 17 de marzo de 1985, y luego salió casi en pleno para Estados Unidos, supuestamente para adquirir experiencia en el proceso de votación, pero también para recabar una significativa ayuda de AID” (page 930).

Karl 1986: “Pushed from all sides the [PDC] party leadership began to insist that negotiating with the opposition was the only viable means of consolidating future electoral support...Duarte understood that the Salvadoran military and the Reagan administration--the two leading forces historically opposed to negotiations--needed him in order to extract aid from a skeptical U.S. Congress...After surprisingly little consultation with the U.S., Duarte gambled on his own indispensability; in a dramatic speech to the United Nations, he invited the FDR-FMLN to the town of La Palma to dialogue with his government” (page 30).  “Besides refusing to support negotiations, the [U.S.] administration encouraged an escalation of the war in the days following the La Palma talks and sought to weaken the political forces calling for dialogue” (page 31).

Krauss 1991:  “By the time the participants arrived that morning, thousands of guerrilla and government supporters had gathered and mixed not as enemies but as fellow countrymen, hoping against hope that the war would finally end…The prospects for peace appeared to have improved substantially” (page 96).  “From his stronghold in far-off Morazán province, [Joaquín] Villalobos had hoped to participate in the La Palma talks.  But Duarte would not meet his condition, that an army helicopter ferry him to the site of the talks…So Villalobos tried to undo whatever was accomplished in his absence.  Within twenty-four hours of the talks, Radio Venceremos, which is run by forces commanded by Villalobos, played the role of the spoiler by raising a shopping list of demands…A week later, guerrilla forces in Villalobos’s region of command placed a bomb aboard a helicopter carrying several ranking officers, killing the army’s most popular and effective leader, Col. Domingo Monterrosa” (page 97).

McClintock 1998:  “Duarte apparently favored a negotiated end to the war in El Salvador.  However, his preference did not prevail over the expectation of an outright military victory, held by many Salvadoran officers and by the Reagan administration.  It was expected that negotiations would involve major reform of the military institution, and such reform by definition threatened military prerogatives, in particular the long-standing principle of impunity” (page 152).

Williams 2003:  “(A)lthough Duarte met with the guerrillas in October 1984, pressure from the Reagan administration and Salvadoran military placed strict parameters on Duarte’s freedom to negotiate” (page 312).

November

Brockett 2005:  “By the end of November, [UPD] was threatening to break the alliance [with PDC] altogether.  In office Duarte’s reform and peace objectives were constrained both by an economic crisis that plagued his tenure to its very end and by pressures from those to his right within both the Salvadoran military and the Reagan administration.  Consequently, Duarte continued the war and moved to the right on socioeconomic policy” (page 308).

Castro Morán 2005:  “A finales de noviembre, el Consejo Central de Elecciones convocó a la ciudadanía para elecciones de diputados que tendrán verificativo el 17 de marzo de 1985, volviendo a cometer el error de hacer esta convocatoria sin antes estar aprobada la Ley Electoral definitiva, pues la que había regido para los comicios anteriores era una ley transitoria” (page 236).

Crónica del mes.  Octubre y noviembre 1984:   “Las futuras elecciones también marcaron su imprenta en la vida nacional.  Se aprobó el presupuesto para el CCE y se prorrogó la validez de la cédula de identidad hasta mediados de 1985.  Se concedió una deuda política a los partidos, a razón de tres colones por voto recibido.  Se comenzó a nombrar candidatos, lo cual originó pleitos en diversos pueblos” (page 932).

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “30 de noviembre…Apenas 2 horas después de finalizado el encuentro, Duarte convocó a una cadena de radio y televisión la cual calificó de ‘inaceptable’ la propuesta rebelde, en tanto ‘rompe el fundamento de la Constitución y de la legalidad de la nación’” (pages 774-775). 

Krauss 1991:  “The two sides returned to the bargaining table for one more peace conference in November.  The rebels made new, more recalcitrant demands that amounted to a government surrender and integration of the two armies.  Duarte was forced to cut off the talks, otherwise risking a military coup” (page 97).

December

Cáceres P. 1990: “La aprobación de una nueva Ley Electoral fue el punto de apoyo para que la oposición se uniera contra la DC, que no sólo vio derrotada su versión de la ley sino que en el camino, por un torpe manejo legal, entró en conflicto con la Corte Suprema de Justicia.  La oposición aprovechó su presencia mayoritaria en la Asamblea para boicotear por diversos medios al Ejecutivo” (page 348).

Castro Morán 2005:  “El 5 de diciembre, la Asamblea Legislativa aprobó el proyecto de Ley Electoral, basada en la que se recibió del Consejo Central de Elecciones, haciéndole algunas modificaciones, principalmente en cuanto a señalar ciertos requisitos o condiciones a las personas propuestas como candidatos a alcalde de las diferentes municipalidades” (page 236).  Gives details.  “El 26 de diciembre, la Asamblea Legislativa, por mayoría de votos, anuló la Ley Electoral que fue publicada en el Diario Oficial el 18 del mismo mes” (page 237).

A propósito del veto a la ley electoral 1984:  “Como es del conocimiento público, la asamblea legislativa aprobó por treinta y cuatro votos, de los sesenta posibles, un proyecto de ley electoral; el cual, al ser recibido por el ejecutivo, fue vetado por el presidente de la República” (page 921).

1985

Foley 1996:  The “repopulation movement…commenced in 1985 with resettlement of 187 internal refugees at Tenancingo…Although this effort received widespread support, from the Archdiocese of San Salvador across a broad array of civic organizations and international donors, it had to overcome serious resistance from the Salvadoran government, which viewed resettlement as an effort to restore to the FMLN a population base in areas which government forces had previously ‘cleansed,’ ‘via’ saturation bombing and terrifying military sweeps, over the preceding 5 years” (pages 75-76).

McClintock 1998:  “Duarte himself became personally indebted to the Salvadoran military…(I)n 1984 and then to an even greater degree in 1985, the apparent electoral victories of the Christian Democrats were upheld against the right’s charges of fraud only by a clear endorsement of the elections by El Salvador’s military leaders, obligating Duarte to these officers” (page 153).  “Historically, U.S. aid to El Salvador had been low:  in no year between 1965 and 1979 did U.S. aid surpass $14 million.  But in 1985, U.S. aid rocketed to a whopping $570 million.  This amount was an unprecedented expenditure for the United States in Latin America” (page 221).

Williams 2003:  “After a second meeting in 1985, Duarte announced that he was suspending the talks indefinitely.  Moreover, the Reagan administration’s dramatic increase in military assistance in 1984 led to a major escalation of the war.  Far from achieving the peace he had promised, Duarte was trapped inside the agreements made with the military and the U.S. government” (pages 312-313).

January

Cáceres P. 1990:  “El [acuerdo interpartidario] más importante se logró en el mes de enero del 85, entre el PCN y ARENA, que acordaron participar coaligados tanto en la elección de diputados como en la de alcaldes, manteniendo una proporcionalidad casi total en la distribución de los cargos.  Un pacto especial se celebró entre estos dos partidos y PAISA, con el objeto de presentar una sola candidatura para la alcaldía de la capital” (page 349).

Crónica del mes.  Enero-febrero 1985:  “En el marco de un recrudecimiento de los operativos de contrainsurgencia, descontinuados temporalmente por la tregua de fin de año, así como de un progresivo desgaste político del PDC, manifiesto en el terreno cedido ante la derecha en el caso de la ley electoral, el 17 de enero quedó formalmente abierta la campaña electoral…Por su parte,…la derecha aprovechó su control sobre el Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE) para consolidar sus mayores posibilidades electorales y solicitar, a través de una petición firmada por el mayor D’Aubuisson (ARENA), Raúl Molina Martínez (PCN) y el coronel y doctor Roberto Escobar García (PAISA), ‘esperar un tiempo prudencial mientras se resuelven los 2 recursos de inconstitucionalidad’ y trasladar los comicios, originalmente programados para el 17 de marzo, al último día de dicho mes” (page 277).

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “30 de enero.  Carta abierta del FDR-FMLN a Duarte, en la cual lo exhorta a liberarse de las presiones ‘de la oligarquía y de los sectores más reaccionarios del ejército,’ ya que, de ceder a ellas, quedaría demostrado ‘que la estructura de poder en nuestro país no ha cambiado.’  El ministro de la presidencia descartó que el gobierno estuviera cediendo a las presiones de la derecha, pero admitió que requería de ‘más respaldo democrático’ para proseguir el diálogo, y ello no se obtendría sino hasta después de las elecciones para diputados y alcaldes del 31 de marzo” (pages 775-776).

February

Crónica del mes.  Enero-febrero 1985:  “(E)l mes de febrero representó políticamente una mayor consolidación de las posibilidades electorales de la derecha sobre el PDC.  En acto celebrado el 4 en el hotel ‘El Salvador Sheraton,’ los secretarios generales de ARENA y PCN, Roberto D’Aubuisson y Raúl Molina Martínez, anunciaron oficialmente que, después de 3 meses de negociaciones, ambos partidos habían decidido suscribir un pacto de coalición a nivel nacional para participar en las elecciones de diputados y alcaldes del 31 de marzo” (page 280).  “Tres días después, quedó por fin formalmente resuelto el problema de la ley electoral suscitado el mes anterior, al responder la corte suprema de justicia positivamente al recurso de inconstitucionalidad interpuesto por Ricardo Fuentes Castellanos contra la ley electoral publicada por el presidente Duarte en el ‘Diario Oficial’ del 18 de diciembre…Mientras tanto, en el aspecto propiamente electoral, el Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE) concluyó el 14 la recepción de la documentación de los candidatos propietarios y suplentes de los 9 partidos participantes (PDC, AD, ARENA, PCN, PAISA, PPS, POP, MERECEN y PAR)” (page 281).

Johnson 1993:  “Unlike the preceding presidential campaign which produced increased division among the rightist parties, the 1985 elections saw increased cooperation between the two largest opposition parties, ARENA and the PCN.  They formed an anti-PDC coalition in order to pool their votes and maximize their chances for representation at the municipal level…This was purely a tactical move on the part of these two parties and did not signal ideological or programmatic convergence but simply a common desire to limit the influence of the PDC” (page 242).

March 31:  congressional and municipal election

Acevedo 1991: Gives votes cast; valid votes; percent of vote for PDC, ARENA, and PCN; seats won by PDC, ARENA, PCN, PAISA, and AD; and fact that PDC won a strong majority of town councils (page 29). 

Anderson 1988:  Discusses the election (pages 116-117).

Arriaza Meléndez 1989: “Elecciones de diputados a Asamblea Legislativa: resultados por departamento” (page 36). Gives by department the votes for each party and the total votes.  “Diputados electos” (page 39) gives the total seats won by each party.  “Elecciones para concejos municipales: resultados por departamento” (page 37).  Gives by department the votes for each party, the valid and null votes, the abstentions, contested votes,  and total votes cast.  “Concejos municipales electos” (page 41) gives total won by each party.

Benítez Manaut 1990: “Resultados elecciones para diputados, 31/III/85" (page 81).    Gives total vote and percent of vote for all parties; numbers of votes that were valid, null, contested, unused, or lost; number of abstentions; and total votes cast.

Cáceres P. 1990: “(L)os concejos municipales…se elegirían por primera vez en 7 años” (page 349).  Discusses the election (pages 349-350).

Central America report February 5, 1988: Gives seats won by PDC, ARENA, PCN, PAISA, and the “Democratic Action Party” (page 36).

Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 19 1985:  For the March 31, 1985  elections for the Legislative Assembly gives the purpose of elections, the characteristics of parliament, the electoral system, the general political considerations and conduct of the elections, and statistics (pages 39-40). 

Córdova M. 1988: “El Salvador.  Elecciones del 31 de marzo de 1985.  Resultados por partido o coaliciones” (page 94).  “El Salvador: resultados elecciones para diputados.  31 de marzo de 1985" (“anexo no. 3," follows end of article).  Gives for each department the votes for nine parties, number of valid votes, null votes, abstentions, contested votes, misplaced ballots, unused ballots, and total votes.

Dunkerley 1988:  “In the congressional and municipal elections of March 1985 the PDC won a working majority in parliament and seemed finally to have secured a decisive advantage over ARENA…However, the turnout of less than 40 per cent reflected a distinct lack of popular enthusiasm for seemingly incessant elections held while the civil war continued unabated and the economic crisis deepened” (page 410).

Eguizábal 1992: “PDC won a majority of the mayoralties, as well as an absolute majority (thirty-three seats out of sixty) in the Legislative Assembly” (page 141).  Gives number of seats won by ARENA, PCN, PAISA, and AD.

Las elecciones de 1985.  Un paso adelante en el proceso de democratización? 1985:  “Las elecciones de marzo de 1985 que ponían en juego todos los diputados de la asamblea legislativa y todas las autoridades municipales tienen dos características importantes.  Por un lado, culmina en ellas un proceso electoral que pretende conducir a una normalidad democrática en la cual los puestos constitucionalmente elegibles sean efectivamente electos por voto popular directo; por otro lado, abren un período no electoral de tres años que permite concentrarse en acciones reales de gobierno sin distracciones electoralistas” (page 205).

El Salvador: elections 1994: Calderón Sol elected to the Assembly (page 18).

Eguizábal 1992: “PDC won a majority of the mayoralties, as well as an absolute majority (thirty-three seats out of sixty) in the Legislative Assembly” (page 141).  Gives number of seats won by ARENA, PCN, PAISA, and AD.

García 1989: Gives voter turnout and number of municipal governments elected by Christian Democratic party (page 78).  “1985 legislative election results” (page 79).  Gives party, number of votes, percent of votes, and number of seats won.

Haggerty 1990: Gives seats won by each party (page 163).  “Arena and the PCN joined as a two-party coalition for these elections in an effort to secure a conservative majority in the assembly.  The terms of the coalition, whereby Arena agreed to split evenly the total number of seats won, resulted in a political embarrassment for D’Aubuisson’s party, which took 29 percent of the total vote but was awarded only one more seat (thirteen to twelve) than the PCN, which had drawn only 8 percent of the vote” (page 163).

Johnson 1993:  “(T)he 1985 Legislative and municipal elections had double importance:  as a plebiscite on Duarte’s year in office and in establishing whether the PDC would be given a more complete mandate to govern for the next three years” (page 239).  “The 1985 elections saw further changes in the electoral procedure.  Whereas in the 1984 presidential contest, the electoral law permitted voters to cast ballots anywhere in the country (in order to maximize turnout), for the 1985 elections voters were required to vote in their district since they were voting for local representatives” (page 242).  “1985 legislative and municipal elections” (page 243).  Gives results by party.  “(T)he voters gave the PDC an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly with 33 out of 60 seats, several more than even the most optimistic Christian Democrats expected.  The PDC won most of the municipalities, including San Salvador, and twelve out of fourteen departments, nine of them by an absolute majority.  The PDC’s margin of victory surprised everyone, especially since the PDC did not benefit from U.S. assistance in this election” (page 243).  Gives additional information on the election (pages 243-247).

Karl 1986: The PDC “gained a small majority in the 60-seat legislature, thus overturning the right-wing’s veto power, and it won control of over 200 of El Salvador’s 262 municipalities” (page 32).

Latin American regional reports.  Caribbean & Central America report May 3, 1985:  “The recent electoral bout in El Salvador brought an unexpected reshuffle of political forces.  [The PDC] swept 33 seats in the national assembly, while Arena limped in second with 25.  In the mayoral elections, the PDC won 200 of 262 posts…Indeed, Arena was the main casualty of the 31 March vote.  Hugo Barrera, Roberto d’Aubuisson’s vice-presidential candidate in 1984, is leaving Arena and setting up a new [party], reportedly called Patria Libre” (electronic edition). 

Lungo Uclés 1996: “The PDC won a clear victory in the elections of March 1985" (page 128).  Gives number of seats and percent of municipalities won.

Montes 1985:  “Con las elecciones del 31 de marzo de 1985 se cierra un período de irregularidad, retornando totalmente a la estructura democrática de asignación del poder legitimado por el voto directo de los electores” (page 215).  Discusses many aspects of the elections.  “Los resultados de la votación” (pages 222-226).  “Análisis complexivo y provisorio” (pages 227-228).

Montes 1988: “Diputados por partido y departamento, elecciones de 1985" (page 182).  Gives by department the valid votes, total seats representing that department, electoral quotient, and votes and seats won by PDC, ARENA, and PCN.  “Elecciones para diputados, por departamentos, 1985" (page 184).  Gives by department valid votes and percent they constitute of total vote, total of abstentions, null votes, contested votes, and missing ballots and percent they constitute of total vote, total who voted, and percent the departmental vote constitutes of the country vote.

Montgomery 1985: “Nonetheless, following a lackluster campaign, and with a significantly lower voter turnout than in 1984, the Christian Democrats on 31 March 1985 confounded all predictions by winning 52 percent of the vote and an absolute majority of 33 seats in the National Assembly.   The PDC also took 153 of 262 mayoral races” (page 479).

Montgomery 1995: Gives for the PDC the percent of the vote received, seats won, and mayoralities won (page 196).

Proceso electoral 1985:  “Resultados” (pages 305-307).  Lists the names of all “diputados propietarios” and “diputados suplentes” elected by department and by party.

Schroeder 1995:  “The 1985 Legislative Assembly and municipal elections were contested by nine parties with the addition [of PAR].  ARENA and the PCN ran as a coalition, although they appeared separately on the ballot.  No significant irregularities occurred during the voting, although the left still remained outside of the electoral process” (page 56).

Sharpe 1986: “To the surprise of many foreign observers, the Christian Democrats, and a small allied party, won an overwhelming victory, increasing their representation from 26 to 34 in the 60-seat Assembly and winning in over 75 percent of the mayoral elections” (page B281).

Walter 2000b:  “No fue sino hasta las elecciones legislativas y municipales de 1985 que el presidente Duarte tuvo una oportunidad para lograr una correlación de fuerzas más favorables para su gobierno” (page 585).  Discusses the election and gives results (pages 585-586).

Wood 2000:  “Despite ARENA’s accusations of electoral fraud, the military backed the PDC in its broad victory in the 1985 legislative elections” (page 243).

April

Johnson 1993:  “The immediate response of the right to its failure to capture power through the polls was to challenge the electoral process and charge the PDC with fraud.  Two days after the elections, the leaders of the coalition petitioned the ‘Consejo Central de Elecciones’ (CCE) to nullify the results on the basis of an extensive catalogue of purported violations by officials of the PDC and government agencies.  This effort failed, however, because this time the business elites did not have the support of the military” (page 246).  Describes the military’s response (pages 246-247).

May

Castello 1989:  “(L)a captura de la comandante Nidia Díaz [es] divulgada por el Ministerio de Cultura y Comunicaciones el 11 de mayo de 1985” (page 15).

Crónica del mes.  Mayo-junio 1985:  “En medio de una incrementada campaña de sabotaje del FMLN contra los gobiernos municipales, el 1 de mayo asumieron la vara edilicia los nuevos alcaldes, 153 de ellos demócrata cristianos, y fueron juramentados los 120 diputados propietarios y suplentes electos el 31 de marzo” (page 545).

June

Crónica del mes.  Mayo-junio 1985:  “(E)l 19…a pocos metros de las instalaciones del estado mayor...unidades del comando urbano ‘Mardoqueo Cruz,’ del Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRTC), miembro del FMLN, atacaron sorpresivamente a un grupo de ‘marines’ norteamericanos…en la llamada zona rosa” (page 553).

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “19 de junio.  El ataque de un comando urbano del PRTC a un grupo de marines en un restaurante de la Zona Rosa devino en una balacera…La Fuerza Armada interpretó el ataque como ‘un acto desesperado de la guerrilla ante la imposibilidad de ganar la guerra militarmente’” (page 778).

Julio

Crónica del mes.  Julio-septiembre 1985:  “(E)l mes de julio pareció dominado masivamente por la incapacidad gubernamental para aminorar el ritmo de deterioro de la situación económica y propiciar una atmósfera de estabilidad política” (page 718).

September

Cáceres P. 1990:  En septiembre “se produjo un escisión en ARENA, constituyéndose el partido Patria Libre que logró su inscripción en enero de 1987, luego de una larga lucha de ARENA para impedírselo” (page 350).

Castello 1989:  Es secuestrada “la hija del presidente, Inés Duarte, por el FMLN (10 de septiembre de 1985)” (page 15).

Crónica del mes.  Julio-septiembre 1985:  “(E)n un intento de superar la inercia política manifestada a lo largo de la coyuntura postelectoral, también ARENA se esforzó por renovar su estructura de partido y su imagen pública.   En la asamblea general ordinaria realizada el 29 de septiembre en el Hotel Sheraton con la asistencia de más de 1.200 delegados, el partido decidió reestructurar el Consejo Ejecutivo Nacional (COENA) y sustituir al mayor D’Aubuisson por el Lic. Alfredo Cristiani en el cargo de presidente” (page 727).

Cronología del proceso de diálogo entre el gobierno salvadoreño y el FDR-FMLN 1986:  “10 de septiembre.  El FMLN secuestró a Inés Guadalupe Duarte, hija del presidente, y a su amiga Ana Cecilia Villeda.  El suceso desencadenó una inmediata ola de solidaridad moral con el mandatario, incluso de parte de sus principales adversarios políticos de la derecha.  Como ocurriera con el ataque a la Zona Rosa, todas las fuerzas de la derecha adujeron el secuestro como pretexto para descontinuar de una vez por todas el proceso de diálogo” (page 779).

Guía de elecciones 2003:  “En septiembre de 1985…representantes de Organismos Electorales de Centroamérica y el Caribe, se reunieron con el fin de constituir la Asociación de Organismos Electorales de Centroamérica y el Caribe, denomina Protocolo de Tikal” (page 24).

Johnson 1993:  “While the electoral victory of Duarte and the PDC failed to change appreciably the course of Salvadoran history in the short-term, it did provide the business elite with incentive to change its political behavior.  Two successive electoral defeats forced both ARENA and the PCN to re-evaluate party tactics, programs and leadership” (page 249).

Schroeder 1995:  “Faced with electoral defeat, internal divisions and the flight of many moderate conservatives to the newly formed PL, ARENA moderated its image and policies.  In September 1985, the ARENA national convention voted to oust D’Aubuisson as leader and installed moderate Alfredo Cristiani.  D’Aubuisson remained a powerful figure in the party until his death in 1991, but the ascendancy of Cristiani decisively marked the partial displacement within ARENA of the landed and paramilitary sector by more moderate business leaders and civilian professionals” (page 59).

Whitfield 1994:  The president’s daughter, Inés Guadalupe Duarte, is kidnapped on September 10th (page 298).  Describes negotiations for her release (pages 298-303).  “In September 1985, D’Aubuisson relinquished the post of general secretary to a little known businessman from a wealthy coffee-growing family:  Alfredo Cristiani.  The move was a tacit acknowledgement of D’Aubuisson’s own unacceptability to the United States and had marked the beginning of ARENA’s steady progress to power” (page 316).

Wood 2000:  “In September 1985, Alfredo Cristiani replaced D’Aubuisson as party president, and the party’s rhetoric began to shift from ‘the communists’ to ‘a change for the better.’  Cristiani was a wealthy coffee grower and processor with a wide range of economic interests” (page 244).

October

Krauss 1991:  “The army high command wanted Duarte to refuse to bargain with terrorists…Duarte broke down:  he agreed to guerrilla demands that he free twenty-two political prisoners and transfer ninety-six wounded rebels out of the country for medical treatment.  In return, the guerrillas handed over Inés and thirty-three small-town mayors they had kidnapped over the previous months.  The army was furious, and Duarte’s space to operate narrowed even more” (page 99).

McClintock 1998:  “Duarte’s daughter Inés was kidnapped by the guerrillas, and the traumatic event embittered the president against the FMLN and further indebted him to the military.  By the mid-1980s, Duarte was a much more cautious, conservative man than he had been in the 1970s” (page 153).

Whitfield 1994:  “It was agreed that on October 24 there would be a simultaneous exchange of Inés Guadalupe…and political prisoners” (page 302).

1986

Baloyra-Herp 1995:  “In 1986 the Democratic Popular Union (UPD), a coalition of peasant and labor organizations that had subscribed a ‘social pact’ with Mr. Duarte in 1984, moved into opposition” (pages 51-52).

Brockett 1998:  “Acknowledging [the] political reality, ARENA’s leadership moved to moderate the party’s image and to broaden its base of support.  Crucial to its efforts was the selection in 1986 of Alfredo Cristiani as the party’s president.  A wealthy businessman, coffee cultivator, and graduate of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., Cristiani had no known connection to the death squads” (page 145).

Krauss 1991:  “Reinforced with the tripling of military aid, the expanded armed forces—now 57,000 strong—went on the offensive.  In the 1986 Operation Phoenix, the military succeeded in sweeping the rebels off Guazapa volcano, a key guerrilla strongpoint less than twenty miles north of the capital” (page 98).

Nickson 1995:  “(A) new municipal code in 1986, Código Municipal No. 274, replaced legislation that had been in existence since 1908” (page 178).

Villalobos 1986:  “La revista ECA pidió al comandante Joaquín Villalobos que expusiera desde su punto de vista lo que han sido estos cinco años de guerra.  El invitado ha respondido con un largo estudio, que enfoca el problema de la guerra en toda su amplitud.  Con él, los lectores de ECA y los estudiosos de la realidad nacional tendrán un documento excepcional para conocer los puntos de vista, no meramente personales, de uno de los líderes del movimiento revolucionario.  Se trata, en efecto, no de un escrito panfletario, sino de un escrito analítico, más preocupado por describir e interpretar los hechos y sus causas que por calificar las actitudes de las personas o de los agentes políticos” (page 169).

February

Castello 1989:  “(E)l 8 de febrero de 1986 se integra la Unidad de los Trabajadores Salvadoreños (UNTS).  La UNTS aglutina a sectores laborales, estudiantiles y humanitarios; logrando influir en más de 500,000 personas pertenecientes a distintas agrupaciones gremiales” (page 15).

Crónica del mes.  Enero-febrero 1986:  “En febrero, la dinámica de confrontación entre el PDC y los partidos opositores de derecha abrió un nuevo frente de debates en torno al proyecto de reformas a la ley electoral presentado a la asamblea legislativa por la bancada democristiana.  Según explicó el ministro de cultura, Julio Adolfo Rey Prendes, el proyecto apuntaba a otorgar al presidente del Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE) ‘atribuciones ejecutivas y administrativas que antes no tenía,’ pero ‘las decisiones de tipo político seguirían siendo siempre incumbencia de los tres consejales.’  Los partidos de oposición protestaron, sin embargo, que la intencionalidad de las reformas era muy otra” (page 111).  

October 10

Alvarado 1986: “El 10 de octubre El Salvador sufrió tal vez el mayor terremoto de su historia no sólo por la intensidad del sismo, sino porque sus efectos se sintieron en el área metropolitana, donde se concentra más de una quinta parte de la población nacional.  Los más de mil muertos, diez mil heridos de distinta consideración, los doscientos mil damnificados en sus casas y en sus propiedades, las pérdidas que superan con mucho, aun antes de cerrar la cuenta, todo lo que es el presupuesto nacional de 2 años, constituyen un durísimo golpe sobre una población y un país ya golpeados secularmente por una pobreza masiva y, en los últimos años, por la guerra” (pages 930-931).

Brockett 2005:  “(T)he earthquake that hit on October 10, 1986 was centered right in the capital.  Over 1,200 people were killed, more than 10,000 injured, and total damages were estimated at more than a billion dollars.  Tens of thousands of homes were destroyed, leaving some 200,000 homeless people, primarily among the poor” (pages 60-61).

Dunkerley 1988:  “The Duarte regime had already become widely discredited by October 1986, when a major earthquake struck San Salvador” (page 411).

Krauss 1991:  “The Salvadoran people began to take notice of the rampant corruption following an October 1986 earthquake that devastated San Salvador; local officials skimmed off so much international assistance, U.S. embassy officials later admitted, that the residents of entire barrios were needlessly left homeless for more than a year” (page 100).

Whitfield 1994:  “(O)n October 10, 1986, even the war was reduced to a secondary place in the national consciousness as El Salvador suffered the most devastating earthquake of its history” (page 312).

December

Crónica del mes.  Octubre-diciembre de 1986  1986:  “(L)as reformas a la ley electoral [fueron] aprobadas por los 33 diputados del PDC en la sesión legislativa del 23 de diciembre” (page 1046).  “(L)as reformas databan de varios meses atrás, pero sólo habían sido introducidas formalmente hasta en la sesión legislativa del 27 de noviembre y luego sometidas sucesivamente a las observaciones del ejecutivo y de la comisión de legislación y puntos constitucionales de la asamblea.  Durante ese lapso, las fracciones de oposición no habían cesado de adversarlas, arguyendo que, al ampliar los poderes administrativos del presidente del Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE)—actualmente el Dr. Mario Samayoa, del PDC—, el partido oficial podría ‘manipular el área administrativa, desde los empadronadores, los que extienden los carnets, el manejo de las computadoras y la parte del registro electoral,’ lo cual permitirá al PDC ‘montar un fraude para las próximas elecciones.’  Entre las reformas electorales se contaban modificaciones a la ley de inscripción de partidos políticos…Con las reformas, el PDC pretendió profundizar las contradicciones entre Patria Libre y ARENA y el PCN, cuyos delegados ante el CCE habían bloqueado sistemáticamente la inscripción de Patria Libre” (page 1047).

1987

Johnson 1993:  “Hugo Barrera, an ARENA deputy advocating a more moderate line, split from the party to found the ‘Partido de Liberación’ (PL).  Based upon neo-liberal principles, the PL left behind the uncompromising rhetoric and anti-communism so characteristic of ARENA and its principal leader, Roberto D’Aubuisson…The departure of Barrera and the creation of a competing party forced changes with ARENA itself.  The struggle between confronters and bargainers continued until the party’s annual convention in 1987.  At the convention Alfredo Cristiani, ARENA deputy and president of the Legislative Assembly succeeded in winning his party’s top post and thus locked up the nomination for the next presidential contest in 1989” (page 250).

Klaiber 1998:  “In 1987 [death squads] murdered Herbert Anaya Sanabria, the coordinator of the El Salvadoran Commission of Human Rights” (page 172).

Nickson 1995:  “In 1987 mayors of municipalities within the AMSS formed a consultative committee known as COAMSS” (page 177).

Radical women in Latin America:  left and right 2001:  “1987:  AMES becomes part of the Salvadoran Women’s Union (UMS), a coalition of the five revolutionary women’s associations associated with the FMLN.  A new generation of partisan women’s organizations is formed.  This new generation includes Women for Dignity and Life (Las Dignas) and the Mélida Anaya Montes Women’s Movement (MAM)” (page 34).

January

Crónica del mes.  Enero-febrero de 1987 1987:  “El primer mes del año 1987 constituyó el escenario de la más aguda crisis política enfrentada por el gobierno del presidente Duarte en sus 2 años y medio de gestión.  La crisis venía incubándose desde bastante atrás, pero se desencadenó abiertamente a partir del paquete de 13 nuevos impuestos y de las reformas a la ley electoral todo ello por los 33 diputados democristianos en las plenarias legislativas del 18 y 23 de diciembre de 1986 respectivamente.  El gobierno puso en juego todos sus recursos ideológicos para justificar tanto el paquete tributario como las reformas electorales…El 6, los 27 diputados de la oposición decretaron una huelga legislativa indefinida hasta que el gobierno ‘rectificara’ su política económica y, en general, el carácter y la dirección misma de toda su gestión” (page 117).  “Paralelamente a la lucha contra el impuesto de guerra, aunque con bastante menos éxito, la derecha prosiguió sus presiones para derogar las reformas electorales.  El 31 de enero, el representante de ARENA ante el Consejo Central de Elecciones, Francisco Merino, interpuso ante la corte suprema una demanda de amparo contra el Decreto 564, arguyendo que las reformas contenidas en éste violaban sus derechos como miembro del CCE” (page 123).

Movimientos pre-electorales 1988:  “En enero de 1987, tras más de un año de gestiones para alcanzar su legalización, el Partido Social Demócrata (PSD) había obtenido la aprobación de su inscripción ante el CCE, con lo cual se preparó de alguna manera el terreno para la ampliación ideológica del sistema de partidos” (page 931).

February

Crónica del mes.  Enero-febrero de 1987 1987:  “En febrero, el panorama político nacional continuó dominado por la confrontación entre el gobierno y la derecha en torno al paquete tributario y, en menor medida, a las reformas a la ley electoral del Decreto 564.  El 7 de febrero, el PDC organizó una multitudinaria manifestación en apoyo a la gestión gubernamental” (page 121).  “El 4 de febrero, ARENA, PCN, PAIS, PPS, el Partido Liberación, el Partido Social Demócrata (PSD) y el Partido Acción Renovadora (PAR) emitieron un pronunciamiento de 6 puntos en el cual señalaban que la promulgación del Decreto 564 rompía ‘por su base el proceso democrático salvadoreño’ y advertían que ‘de no contarse con las suficientes garantías de imparcialidad en el manejo de los futuros procesos electorales, los partidos que suscribimos este pronunciamiento nos reservamos el derecho de decidir, en su oportunidad, el retiro del proceso democrático y la no participación en las próximas elecciones.’  No obstante estas presiones, la corte suprema resolvió el 26 de febrero que la demanda de Merino no procedía, en tanto que el Decreto 564 no violaba sus derechos como concejal, e insinuó que lo que procedía era más bien un recurso de inconstitucionalidad contra él” (pages 124-125).

April

Crónica del mes.  Abril 1987:  “Con el decreto No. 639, la asamblea legislativa ha reformado la ley electoral vigente para lograr el equilibrio político en el Consejo Central de Elecciones, regulando con la mayor precisión posible la forma y el número de votos necesarios para tomar los acuerdos sobre importantes y delicadas atribuciones que le corresponden.  Los artículos reformados son los Nos. 20 y 21 que reflejan ahora una formulación más democrática y equilibrada.  Con estas modificaciones a la ley electoral, terminó la ‘huelga’ del Partido de Conciliación Nacional” (page 350).

June

Brockett 2005:  “On June 2, 1987, General Adolfo Blandón, the head of the armed forces, held a press conference charging guerrilla influence in recent protests, and the next day another military spokesman warned that street protests had reached the limits of what would be tolerated” (page 241).

July

Crónica del mes.  Julio 1987:  “El 1 de julio, el Dr. Guillermo Ungo manifestó que el FMLN-FDR había concedido al presidente Duarte un nuevo plazo de 10 días para que respondiera a la propuesta de diálogo de 18 puntos, presentada a finales de mayo.  Al día siguiente, Duarte reiteró que no dialogaría hasta que los Frentes rechazaran la violencia y se comprometieran a incorporarse al ‘proceso democrático’” (page 496).

October

Dunkerley 1994:  October 23, 1987:  “Rubén Zamora and Guillermo Ungo (FDR) return after seven years.  [October 29] FDR-FMLN withdraw from talks after murder of human rights leader Herbert Anaya” (page 108). 

November

Country profile.  Guatemala, El Salvador 1994-95: “The Convergencia Democrática (CD), founded in 1987, is a coalition of small left-wing parties” (page 40).

Crónica del mes.  Noviembre-diciembre 1987:  “(E)l acontecimiento político más relevante del mes lo constituyó el retorno temporal al país de la dirigencia del FDR.  El primero en hacerlo fue el Dr. Rubén Zamora, secretario general del Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano (MPSC), quien arribó el 21 de noviembre.  Dos días más tarde lo hizo el presidente del FDR y secretario general del Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), Dr. Guillermo Ungo, quien llegó acompañado del Dr. Héctor Oquelí y del Ing. Hugo Navarrete” (page 892).  “(E)l 29 de noviembre, durante acto político realizado en el Cine Darío, el MNR, el MPSC y el Partido Social Demócrata (PSD) formalizaron la constitución de la Convergencia Democrática…Tras el acto, Ungo, Oquelí y Navarrete…marcharon nuevamente al exterior.  Dos días más tarde, también Rubén Zamora siguió la misma ruta” (page 893).

Dunkerley 1994:  November 5, 1987:  “Duarte amnesties 400 political prisoners and declares fifteen-day ceasefire” (page 108).  November 11, 1987:  “(A)irforce breaks ceasefire…[November 15] (A)ll political parties except governing PDC withdraw from National Reconciliation Commission established under terms of Esquipulas.  [November 29] Zamora (MPSC) and Ungo (MNR) join [PSD] to form [CD], expressing tactical differences with FMLN” (page 109).

Keesing’s record of world events June 1988: “In late November 1987 the National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario--MNR) of Dr Guillermo Ungo and the Social Christian People’s Movement (Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano--MPSC) of Sr Rubén Zamora Rivas joined with the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Demócrata--PSD) to form the Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democrática), the main objectives of which were the achievement of a negotiated solution to the internal conflict and the examination of the possibility of participating in elections” (page 35953).

McClintock 1998:  “Although the FDR was not formally dissolved, it had little practical significance after 1987, when Ungo, Zamora, and other FDR members returned to El Salvador, assessed the possibility of their participation in the country’s elections and ultimately founded the [CD]” (page 53).

1988

Ladutke 2004:  “In 1988, the Catholic and Lutheran churches joined forces with sixty other organizations from civil society to create the Permanent Committee for the National Debate (CPDN)” (page 35).

McClintock 1998:  “In late 1988 (during Duarte’s final year as president), Defense Minister Vides Casanova appointed numerous members of the ‘tandona’ (an exceptionally large, cohesive, and hard-line class of forty-six graduates of 1966) to top positions within the armed forces.  ‘Tandona’ member General René Emilio Ponce became chief of staff.  The ‘tandona’ remained the dominant military class in El Salvador through 1991” (page 138).

Movimientos pre-electorales 1988:  “La fusión del MNR, MPSC y PSD en la Convergencia Democrática, aunada a la reinserción política de la UDN, han propiciado por fin un sistema de partidos efectivamente pluralista, pues va desde el presunto carácter marxista de la UDN…hasta las opciones de derecha representadas por ARENA y por la coalición Unión Popular” (page 931).

Whitfield 1994:  “The year 1988 saw the Convergence’s gradual reintegration into Salvadoran society as a nationally recognized entity dedicated to arriving at the end of the war through a negotiated political solution and providing the popular movement with the means for legal political activity” (page 317).

January

Baloyra-Herp 1995:   “(B)eginning in 1988, voting was no longer compulsory” (page 52).

Crónica del mes.  Enero-febrero 1988:  “El 20 de enero, el Concejo Central de Elecciones (CCE) declaró oficialmente abierto el período para que los partidos contendientes desarrollaran sus respectivas propagandas, con la cual los medios de comunicación del país se transformaron de la noche a la mañana en la cloaca de una descomunal verborrea política plagada de demagogia, oportunismo y vituperios recíprocos” (page 123).  “Por su parte, Convergencia Democrática, integrada por el Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), el Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano (MPSC) y el Partido Social Demócrata (PSD), mantuvo a lo largo del mes una postura de apertura flexible frente a la posibilidad de participar en los comicios y no anunció públicamente su decisión de no concurrir a ellos sino hasta el 28 de enero” (page 124).

McClintock 1998:  “(B)etween 1982 and 1988 in El Salvador, ballots were numbered and urns were transparent” (page 120).  “Before the introduction of registration procedures in 1988, double-voting, ballot stuffing, and other partisan efforts to manipulate electoral outcomes were blatant.  After 1988, incumbent governments seemed most intent on suppressing the country’s potential vote for the political left.  Throughout the period, suspicions that ballots were not honestly counted were rampant” (page 124).  “(F)or the 1988 election an actual registration procedure was introduced.  Although the new procedure reduced the incidence of double-voting and ballot stuffing, other strategies that skewed electoral outcomes were initiated.  In particular, obtaining the voting card and identifying the correct voting table became onerous for many Salvadorans; the new burdens fell disproportionately upon the poor and the illiterate, who were assumed to be more likely to vote for the political left…(W)hen it became apparent that securing a voting card was a demanding process—requiring a minimum of two visits to the electoral authorities—many Salvadorans opted out” (page 125).

Montes 1988: New code states “El sufragio es un derecho y un deber de los ciudadanos, su ejercicio es indelegable e irrenunciable.  El voto es libre, directo, igualitario y secreto” (page 178).

Primer informe centroamericano de gobernabilidad jurídica e institucional 2007: El Salvador 2007:  “En 1988 fue promulgado el primer Código Electoral” (page 127).

Sombrío panorama pre-electoral 1988:  “El 20 de enero recién pasado, el Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE) declaró oficialmente abierto el período de propaganda para la campaña electoral” (page 85).  “En la sesión del 8 de enero, por 24 votos del PDC y 10 del PCN, la Asamblea aprobó el Código Electoral, tras convenir ambos partidos que, a cambio de los votos del PDC al código, el PCN daría los suyos para la aprobación de una emisión de 100 millones de colones en bonos de refuerzo al Presupuesto General de la Nación de 1987.  La fracción de ARENA se abstuvo, arguyendo que el nuevo código era inconstitucional en diversos aspectos.  Por su parte, nueve diputados democratacristianos, simpatizantes de la corriente de Fidel Chávez Mena, optaron por no asistir a la plenaria” (pages 85-86).  “(L)a disputa por la alcaldía de San Salvador se ha constituido en uno de los frentes principales de la guerra sucia electoral.  Como no podía ser menos, la pugna se ha centrado entre el hijo del presidente, Alejandro Duarte, postulado por el PDC…y el jefe de fracción de ARENA en la asamblea legislativa, Armando Calderón Sol, postulado por una coalición integrada por ARENA, Liberación, PAISA y el PPS” (page 88).  “La nueva visita de Rubén Zamora y de Héctor  Oquelí Colindres, efectuada en la última semana de enero, polarizó nuevamente las expectativas sobre la participación de Convergencia Democrática en el evento electoral” (page 89).

February

Crónica del mes.  Enero-febrero 1988:  “El 5 de febrero, quedó cerrado el período de inscripción para los candidatos a diputados y a los concejos municipales” (page 130).

March

Crónica del mes.  Marzo 1988:  “El escenario socio-político nacional durante el mes de marzo estuvo dominado por la coyuntura electoral, tanto antes como después del día 20” (page 249).

March 20: congressional and municipal election

Acevedo 1991: Gives votes cast, invalid votes, and percent of vote obtained by ARENA, PDC, and PCN (page 31).  “This was indisputably a big defeat for the PDC, which won almost 180,000 fewer votes than in 1985.  ARENA won 160,000 more votes than in 1985, enabling it to take control of the Assembly” (page 31).  Gives municipalities won by ARENA.  Gives number of citizens who had registered to vote and number who had obtained polling cards and were able to vote.

Alcántara Sáez 1999:  En las elecciones municipales “ARENA obtuvo 178 alcaldías frente a las 79 que alcanzó el PDC” (page 142).

Arriaza Meléndez 1989: “Elecciones de diputados: 20 de marzo de 1988, resultados por departamento” (page 43).  Gives by department the votes for each party, the valid votes, “votos impugnados,” null votes, abstentions, and total votes.  “Elecciones de concejos municipales del 20 de marzo de 1988: resultados por departamento” (page 46).  Gives by department the votes for each party, the valid and null votes, the abstentions, contested votes,  and total votes cast.  “Concejos municipales electos” (page 48) gives total won by each party.

Benítez Manaut 1990: Gives mayoralties won by each party (page 83).   “Elecciones para diputados, 20/III/88" (page 84).    Gives total vote and percent of vote for each party; numbers of votes that were valid, null, contested, unused, or lost; and  number of abstentions.

Berryman 1988: Gives numbers of municipalities won by ARENA, PDC, PCN, and Liberación, with ARENA candidate Armando Calderón Sol becoming mayor of San Salvador.  Gives congressional seats won by ARENA, PDC, and PCN (page B247).

Blachman 1989: ARENA wins control of the assembly and sweeps two-thirds of the mayoral elections, including San Salvador (page 108).  Some one-third of registered voters did not participate in the elections (page 110).

Brockett 2005:  “With the failure of Duarte to deliver on his promises of peace and reform and the continuing decline of the economy, along with severe splits in the PDC and credible reports of rampant corruption in the government, the right was able to retake the government.  ARENA gained control of the congress in 1988” (page 242).

Castello 1989:  “Las elecciones de 1988” (pages 29-34).

Central America report April 8, 1988: Gives seats won by ARENA, PDC, and PCN in the first official count (page 103).  “Following a recount of the votes in the department of La Unión, where election officials initially said ARENA had won, the La Unión seat was given to the DC, splitting the assembly evenly between ARENA on one hand and the DC and the PCN on the other.”   Gives number of municipalities won by ARENA (page 104).

Central America report April 15, 1988: “El Salvador: preliminary official results of March 20 legislative assembly elections” (page 108).  Gives by department the seats won by ARENA, PDC, and PCN.

Central America report June 10, 1988: Gives number of registered voters; number who obtained voter registration cards for the March 20 elections; number of votes cast and percent this constitutes of the voting age population, the registered voters, and of those possessing voting cards; number of null, blank, and void votes; number of valid votes; number of votes won by the PDC, ARENA, and the PCN; number who abstained; percent of the eligible population who voted for ARENA; and number of mayoralties won by ARENA and the PDC (page 170). 

Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 22 1988:  For the March 20, 1988 elections for the Legislative Assembly gives the purpose of elections, the characteristics of parliament, the electoral system, the general political considerations and conduct of the elections, and statistics (pages 59-60). 

Córdova M. 1988: “El Salvador.  Elecciones del 20 de marzo de 1988.  Resultados de las elecciones para diputados” (page 95).  Gives votes and percent for each party.  “El Salvador.  Elecciones del 20 de marzo de 1988.  Cantidad de diputados y alcaldías municipales, por partido” (page 96).  “El Salvador: resultados elecciones para diputados.  20 de marzo de 1988" (“anexo no. 4," follows end of article).   Gives for each department the number of polling places, votes for eight parties, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, blank votes, unused ballots, missing ballots, and total valid votes.  “El Salvador: resultados elecciones para consejos municipales.  20 de marzo de 1988" (“anexo no. 5," follows end of article).  Gives for each department the number of polling places, votes for eight parties, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, blank votes, unused ballots, missing ballots, and total valid votes.

Country report.  Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras  1988. 2: “On March 20 Salvadoreans went to the polls to elect the 60 seat National Assembly and 262 mayors for the municipal authorities” (page 15-16).  Gives preliminary results of the election.  “The elections were characterised by widespread apathy among voters, and according to opinion polls over half the population felt that none of the parties standing represented their interests” (page 16).

Country report.  Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras 1988. 3: “The March 20 elections for the 60 seat National Assembly and 262 municipal authorities resulted in a crushing defeat for the ruling Christian Democrat Party (PDC) and victory for the right wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena).  Arena’s tally of seats rose from 13 to 30, the PDC lost its majority and eleven seats to leave it with just 22, while the third largest party, the Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN), won seven seats...Arena also swept the board in the municipal elections, winning control of 200 town halls, including the capital, San Salvador, where the president’s son, Alejandro Duarte, lost the vote after 24 years of continuous PDC rule” (page 18).

El Salvador: elections 1994: Calderón Sol elected mayor of San Salvador (pages 18 and 20).

Eguizábal 1992: “The PDC lost eleven deputies in the legislature and majority of the mayoralties.  ARENA obtained thirty-one deputies and 178 mayoralties, and the PCN received seven deputies and four municipalities” (page 142).

Eguizábal 1992a: Gives percent of vote and number of seats won by ARENA, PDC, and  PCN (page 56).

García 1989: Gives number of municipal races won by ARENA and number of congressional seats won by the PDC (page 81).

Johnson 1993:  “1988 legislative elections” (page 295-298).

Keesing’s record of world events June 1988: Gives official results of congressional and municipal elections (page 35952).

Montes 1988: “Diputados por partido y departamento, elecciones de 1988" (page 183).  Gives by department the valid votes, total seats representing that department, electoral quotient, and votes and seats won by PDC, ARENA, and PCN.  “Elecciones para diputados, por departamentos, 1988" (page 184).  Gives by department valid votes and percent they constitute of total vote; total of abstentions, null votes, contested votes, and missing ballots and percent they constitute of total vote; total who voted; ballots not used; and total ballots printed.

Montes 1989: “Resultados de las elecciones de 1988: diputados” (page 205).  Gives by department the votes for PDC, ARENA, PCN, and “otros,” valid votes, invalid votes and the percent they constitute of total votes cast, total votes, and percent of country vote in each department. 

Montgomery 1995: Gives seats and mayoralties won by the PDC and seats won by ARENA (page 208).

Ramos 1997: Gives seats lost by PDC, seats won by  PCN, and seats and mayoralties won by ARENA (page 68).

Resultados oficiales de las elecciones 1988: “Consejo Central de Elecciones de El Salvador.  Elecciones de diputados.  Resultados por departamento. (20 de marzo de 1988)” (page 285).  Gives by department the number of ballot boxes, votes for eight parties, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, unused ballots, missing ballots, and total valid votes.  “Consejo Central de Elecciones de El Salvador.  Elecciones de concejos municipales (20 de marzo de 1988).  Resultados por departamento” (page 286).  Gives by department the number of ballot boxes, votes for eight parties, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, unused ballots, missing ballots, and total valid votes.  “Consejo Central de Elecciones de El Salvador.  Elecciones de concejos municipales (20 de marzo de 1988). Resultados por municipio” (pages 286-295). Gives by municipality  the number of ballot boxes, votes for eight parties, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, unused ballots, missing ballots, and total valid votes.  

Walter 2000b:  Discusses the election (pages 586-587).

Williams 2003:  “(T)he issue of corruption was used effectively against the PDC during the 1988 legislative elections.  ARENA won just under a majority of the seats (30 of 62), but, together with the PCN, it now exercised effective control of the legislature.  The PDC won only 22 seats and 79 mayoralties” (page 313).

April

Crónica del mes.  Abril-mayo 1988:  “Los resultados de las elecciones diputadiles aceptados como definitivos por el Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE) sólo se conocieron hasta el 1 de abril, cuando el presidente de dicho organismo, el Dr. Mario Samayoa (PDC) informó que, una vez concluido el escrutinio, la distribución de diputados arrojaba 30 para ARENA, 23 para el PDC y 7 para el PCN.  Los diputados de las elecciones para concejos municipales fueron aún más precarios, al punto que el 24 de abril todavía estaba votándose para alcaldes en [varios localidades].  La total, 7 municipios en los cuales no pudieron efectuarse los comicios el 20 de marzo por las condiciones de violencia imperantes en dichas zonas.  Una vez computada la totalidad de municipios, ARENA resultó ganadora en 178 de ellos, mientras que el PDC ganó 79 municipalidades; el PCN, 4 y Liberación, 1” (page 407).

Dunkerley 1994:  April 2, 1988:  “ARENA claims electoral fraud deprives it of clear control of Assembly” (page 110).

May

Dunkerley 1994:  May 14, 1988:  “PDC leaders Julio Rey Prendes and Fidel Chávez Mena hold separate conventions” (page 110).

Johnson 1993:  “Long-simmering rivalries between leaders of the party finally exploded into public view in the [PDC] party convention of 1988.  Two basic factions fought for control over the party.  One faction was led by Adolfo Rey Prendes, a long close friend of Duarte and long-time party activist…A second faction, led by Fidel Chavez Mena, the Minister of Planning, sought to modify the PDC economic and social program” (page 297).  “In 1988, the divided PDC held two nominating conventions, one nominating Rey Prendes and the other Chavez Mena.  After the Central Elections Council annulled the nomination of Rey Prendes as the PDC candidate, he and his supporters formed a new party, the ‘Movimiento Autentico Cristiano’ (MAC), which promptly nominated him as their presidential candidate…In the course of splitting, Rey Prendes and MAC kept 16 of the 22 deputies elected in the 1988 elections, leaving the PDC with only 6 seats in the legislature.  Duarte, still president of the country, was not only without a majority, but had the humiliation of presiding over the smallest party group within the legislature” (page 298).

Williams 2003:  “A leadership struggle within the party added to the PDC’s problems following the election.  Duarte’s terminal illness left the government and party adrift for much of the rest of his term.  Disagreement over who would be the PDC’s presidential candidate in 1989 provoked a bitter split in the party.  Julio Rey Prendes, a longtime PDC leader and former mayor of San Salvador, left with 12 of the PDC’s 22 legislators to form the Movimiento Auténtico Cristiano” (page 313).

June

Dunkerley 1994:  “(I)n June 1988 what amounted to a coup [took] place within the armed forces with the major commands being occupied by members of the large 1966 graduating class of the military academy.  This group was known as the ‘tandona’ because of its fierce attachment to the culture and practices of the ‘tanda’ (cohort) system” (page 70).  June 23, 1988:  “PDC leadership backs Chávez Mena’s candidacy” (page 111).

July

Movimientos pre-electorales 1988:  “(L)a coalición Unión Popular, [es] integrada oficialmente el 26 de julio pasado por los partidos Liberación, PAISA y PPS” (page 931).

August

Movimientos pre-electorales 1988:  “(E)l presidente del Consejo [anunció] que la Unión Democrática Nacionalista (UDN) estaba autorizada a participar en los próximos eventos electorales al haber regularizado su situación legal” (page 931).

September

Crónica del mes.  Septiembre-octubre  1988:  “El 6 de septiembre, la Sala de lo Constitucional de la corte suprema declaró que había lugar el recurso de amparo interpuesto por ARENA contra los resultados de las elecciones sancionados por el CCE, y giró una notificación a este organismo para que en un plazo de 5 días otorgara las credenciales de segundos diputados propietario y suplente por La Unión a los candidatos de ARENA, dejando sin efecto su acta 517, la cual otorgaba dichos escaños a los candidatos del PDC.  En consecuencia, la mayoría de ARENA en la asamblea legislativa se vio incrementada automáticamente a 32 diputados” (page 959).  “Mientras tanto, en el PDC, los dinamismos conducentes al cisma se consolidaron en la convención del 3 de septiembre, realizada en la sede central del partido, durante la cual fueron excluidos del comité político el propio Rey Prendes, así como Guillermo Guevara Lacayo y la diputada Dolores Henríquez…Como nuevo secretario general del partido fue nombrado José Antonio Morales Ehrlich, en sustitución de Rodolfo Castillo Claramount.  A su vez, el domingo 11 de septiembre, el sector democratacristiano simpatizante de Rey Prendes celebró en el Cine DeLuxe una convención para elegir sus propias estructuras directivas: comité político, comité ejecutivo y tribunal de honor” (page 959).  “El primer partido en ratificar su fórmula completa fue el PCN, durante acto político realizado el 25 de septiembre en el Cine Presidente.  Como candidato a la presidencia ratificó a Rafael Morán Castaneda; y a la vicepresidencia, a Alejandro Dagoberto Marroquín” (page 960).

Dunkerley 1994:  September11, 1988:  “Julio Rey Prendes formalizes split in PDC by forming MADC” (page 111).

October

Crónica del mes.  Septiembre-octubre  1988:  “(E)l 20 de octubre…los partidos…designaron como nuevo presidente del CCE a Ricardo Perdomo, en sustitución de Mario Samayoa, quien a partir del 1 de noviembre ocupará el cargo de embajador ante el gobierno de la República Dominicana” (page 959).  “(E)n asamblea general realizada el 2 de octubre en el Teatro de Cámara, el MADC anunció su fusión con MERECEN para constituir el movimiento Auténtico Cristiano (MAC)…ARENA…ratificó el 9 de octubre, la candidatura de Cristiani, durante su asamblea nacional celebrada en el Hotel Sheraton.  Este eligió compañero de fórmula a Francisco Merino, hasta ese momento representante del partido ante el CCE.  La fórmula de la Convergencia Democrática fue integrada por Guillermo Ungo, secretario general del Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), y por Mario Reni Roldán, secretario general del Partido Social Demócrata (PSD).  El PDC permaneció indeciso sobre la elección del acompañante de Fidel Chávez Mena, mientras que el MAC anunció la candidatura de Rey Prendes.  Como compañero de fórmula de este último se mencionaba a Juan Ramón Rosales, secretario general del antiguo MERECEN” (page 960).

Dunkerley 1994:  October 25, 1988:  “FMLN leaders Joaquín Villalobos and Leonel González make first diplomatic appearance meeting Pres. Arias in Costa Rica.  [October 31] Chief of Staff Gen. Adolfo Blandón replaced by Col. René Emilio Ponce, CO 3rd Brigade and graduate of 1966 (‘tandona’) class” (page 112).

Movimientos pre-electorales 1988:  “El 3 de octubre recién pasado, el presidente del Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE) ratificó la inscripción legal del Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano (MPSC), según notificación entregada a su secretario general, Rubén Zamora” (page 931)  “En total, son catorce los institutos políticos pertenecientes actualmente al sistema de partidos:  UDN, MNR, PSD y MPSC entre las opciones de izquierda; PDC, PCN, AD, PAR, POP y el recientemente constituido Movimiento Auténtico Cristiano (MAC), como opciones de centro-derecha; y ARENA, Liberación, PAISA y PPS como alternativas de derecha” (pages 931-932).

Recrudecimiento de la violencia en El Salvador 1988:  “Desde el triunfo de ARENA en las últimas elecciones legislativas se aprecia un recrudecimiento de la violencia en El Salvador.  El fenómeno es complejo y, por ello, la referencia al triunfo electoral de la derecha no debe tomarse en principio como motivo de inculpación total, no obstante su influencia sobre determinadas formas de violencia, especialmente las relacionadas con los escuadrones de muerte.  Pero el fenómeno no se reduce a las acciones de los escuadrones de la muerte.  Está también el aumento de casos de graves violaciones de los derechos humanos, atribuidos a la Fuerza Armada, entre los que destaca por sus implicaciones la matanza de San Sebastián; hay una mayor contundencia de los cuerpos de seguridad en la contención de las manifestaciones populares.  Está asimismo el recrudecimiento de la violencia por parte del FMLN, no sólo en la línea de una mayor actividad estrictamente militar, sino también en formas de violencia contra objetivos civiles y, lo que es más significativo, contra personas civiles, asesinadas por el hecho de ser alcaldes en zonas conflictivas o por ser consideradas confidentes de la Fuerza Armada” (page 861).

November

Crónica del mes.  Noviembre-diciembre 1988:  “El 19 de noviembre, quedó abierto formalmente el período de propaganda para las elecciones presidenciales.  Dos días antes, representantes de trece partidos políticos, reunidos en la sede del Consejo Central de Elecciones (CCE), integraron la Junta de Vigilancia que presuntamente velará por la pureza del proceso electoral…El 11 de noviembre, los diputados de ARENA y del MAC aprobaron el decreto [No. 132], pero el Presidente Duarte lo vetó posteriormente; entonces ARENA y el MAC lo ratificaron definitivamente, por mayoría calificada, el 25 de noviembre” (page 1107).

Departamento de Ciencias Jurídicas 1988:  “El 11 de noviembre, la asamblea legislativa aprobó el decreto legislativo No. 132 con los votos de ARENA y del MAC.  El decreto contiene muchas reformas significativas al Código Electoral…Las reformas que introduce el decreto No. 132 al Código Electoral, creado por los partidos Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) y el de Conciliación Nacional (PCN), atacan los planteamientos hechos por ambos partidos en el momento de su formulación original.  El Código Electoral fue aprobado por el Partido Demócrata Cristiano, acuerpado por el de Conciliación Nacional, que había sido su ‘autor intelectual’…No se puede negar ni minimizar que en El Salvador, cualquier reforma electoral conlleva siempre un matiz político…Por lo tanto, no es de extrañar que precisamente ahora, en plena campaña electoral para elegir el próximo presidente, dada la encrucijada ‘histórica’ en la cual se encuentra el país entre el retorno a la derecha y la conservación de un débil centro, los partidos mayoritarios se encuentren enfrentados por motivos electorales” (pages 1053-1054).  “El decreto No. 132 consta de 49 artículos, los cuales constituyen un ‘paquete’ de reformas radicales al espíritu del Código Electoral anterior” (page 1054).  “El Código Electoral del 18 de enero de 1988 pretendía mantener o consolidar ciertos equilibrios y compromisos políticos existentes, caracterizados por una evidente y parcial ventaja de los partidos fuertes sobre los débiles…Ninguno de los partidos parece estar interesado en mejorar el Código Electoral.  En realidad, lo único que están persiguiendo es resolver de antemano situaciones conflictivas que puedan darse en el próximo escrutinio, precisamente en los momentos vitales del proceso electoral, y sobre todo después de la experiencia de las elecciones recién pasadas” (pages 1063-1064).

Dunkerley 1994:  “In November 1988 the ‘tandona’ took complete control of the military command structure with the appointment as defence minister of General René Emilio Ponce, who had been denied a US visa for several years because of his involvement in human rights abuses…(C)orruption within the office corps [was] encouraged by the large amount of US aid…Indeed, some US observers were convinced that the Salvadorean officer corps had become so locked into these lucrative scams that they did not wish to win the war and thus lose their North American source of income ” (page 70).  November 2, 1988:  “Government rejects FMLN talks offer; FMLN attacks National Police [headquarters]…[November 15] 50,000-strong march demands peace negotiations” (page 112).

1989

Foley 1996:  FUSADES’s “Department of Economic and Social Studies drafted the structural adjustment plan which became the basis for the economic program of the new ARENA government in 1989…Alfredo Cristiani and several of his cabinet members were among the founding members of the organization” (page 72).

Johnson 1993:  “The 1989 presidential campaign was the first one in many years in which communism was not an issue.  The passing of the Reagan era and the rapid thaw of the Cold War provided an opportunity to the Salvadoran political parties to focus almost exclusively on the economy and reconciliation” (page 298).

McClintock 1998:  “In early 1989, after the FMLN’s proposals for its participation in the presidential election conditioned upon electoral reform were rejected by the government, the FMLN sabotaged the election more seriously than ever before” (page 84).  “In 1989, 17 percent of Salvadorans who applied for their voting cards could not return to pick them up.  The onerousness of the new procedures was an important factor in the declining turnout in El Salvador’s 1989 and 1991 elections” (page 125).  “It also became much more difficult for unsophisticated Salvadorans to locate and reach their voting table” (page 126).  Describes how voting locations are assigned.

January

Dunkerley 1994:  January 23, 1989:   “FMLN offers to contest and respect elections if these [are] delayed for six months with [the] military confined to barracks” (page 72).  January 13, 1989:  “(G)overnment admits that fifty-two mayors have resigned following FMLN threats” (page 113).

February

Dunkerley 1994:  February 1, 1989:  “FMLN suspends action against non-military US personnel after ‘postive reaction’ by Washington to its proposals…[February 17]  PDC convenes meeting of parties to discuss FMLN offers” (page 113).

March 10

Dunkerley 1994:  March 10, 1989:  “10,000-strong march supports FMLN demand for poll delay” (page 113). 

March 19:   presidential election (Cristiani / ARENA)

Acevedo 1991: “The FDR-FMLN refused to participate in elections until the March 1989 presidential contest” (page 31).  The FDR decided to participate and the FMLN asked for the election to be postponed: this proposal was rejected and the FMLN responded with a boycott (page 32).  Gives turnout, valid votes, and votes for ARENA, PDC, PCN, and the Democratic Convergence (page 33).  “Of the total 2.3 million eligible voters, 22 per cent voted for Cristiani.” 

Alcántara Sáez 1999:  En 1989, “el electorado hacía Presidente, en la primera vuelta de la elección, al candidato de ARENA, Alfredo Cristiani, que también se aprovechaba de una abstención que rondaba el 50 por 100 del electorado” (page 142).

Arriaza Meléndez 1989: “Elecciones de presidente y vice-presidente, 19 de marzo de 1989" (page 50).  Gives by department the votes for each party, the valid and null votes, the abstentions, contested votes, and total votes cast.

Benítez Manaut 1990: “Resultados elecciones para presidente y vicepresidente, 19 de marzo de 1989" (page 88).    Gives total vote and percent of vote for each party; numbers of votes that were valid, null, contested; number of abstentions; and total votes cast.

Booth 2006:  “On March 19, 1989, moderate-appearing ARENA candidate Alfredo Cristiani won the presidential election, with party strongman Roberto D’Aubuisson discreetly in the background” (page 106).

Castro Morán 2005:  “Campaña electoral para las elecciones presidenciales de marzo de 1989, y resultados de estas elecciones” (pages 241-255).

Central America report March 31, 1989: “This month’s national elections in El Salvador took place in an atmosphere of violence and uncertainty.  Guerrilla sabotage actions and a four-day transport blockade paralyzed much of the country on election day.  The national elections commission suspended voting in 22 municipalities under guerrilla control, and rebel forces launched attacks in 20 towns...Although an ARENA win was virtually certain, the party scored even higher than observers had predicted, securing a clear 53.8% majority and avoiding a second round of voting...The Christian Democrats say they lost because of the guerrilla boycott...This position was echoed by Guillermo Ungo, from the leftist Democratic Convergence, who labeled the FMLN’s stance a “tactical error”“ (page 89). 

Close 1991: “1989 Presidential election, El Salvador” (page 62).  Gives the number and percent of votes won by each party, spoiled and blank ballots, and turnout.

Córdova Macías 1989: “Resultados elecciones de presidente y vicepresidente 19 de marzo de 1989" (page 88).  Gives for each department the number of municipalities, votes for each party, total valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, and total votes.  “Porcentaje de la votación, por partido” (page 89).  Gives percent of total country vote won by each party.  “Porcentaje de votos válidos en algunos departamentos” (page 96).  Gives by department the percent of country’s total valid votes cast.

Country report.  Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras 1989. 2: “(D)isruptions to the country’s transport system by the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) guerrilla group’s call for an election boycott, widespread military activity by both the guerrillas and the armed forces and the fact that only 1.4 mn of the 1.9 mn registered voters were issued with voting cards meant that the turnout was only around 55-65 per cent in the cities and a mere 30-50 per cent in the countryside” (page 14).

Country report.  Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras 1989. 3: Gives number and percent of valid votes received by each presidential candidate (pages 13-14).

Eguizábal 1992: Gives registered voters, number who voted, and votes for each candidate (page 148).

Eguizábal 1992a:  Gives registered voters, number who voted, and votes for each candidate (page  58).

El Salvador elecciones 1995: Gives votes for ARENA, PDC, PCN, CD, MAC, AC, UP, and PAR (page 102).

Gordon 1990: “Resultados de las elecciones de 1989" (page 326).  Gives by department the votes won by ARENA, PDC, PCN, CD, and “otros,”  total votes for each party, valid votes by department, and total valid votes.

Haggerty 1990: Gives percent of vote for ARENA, PDC, and CD (pages xxiii-xxiv).

Johnson 1993:  “1989 presidential elections” (page 298-306).

Keesing’s record of world events March 1989: Describes the election and gives the percent of the vote won by each presidential candidate as reported in the official results (page 36520).

Krauss 1991:  “U.S. policy collapsed on March 19, 1989, when the Salvadoran people elected Alfredo Cristiani, a coffee oligarch and presidential standard-bearer of the neo-Fascist Arena party, in a landslide victory” (page 103).  “Minutes before the polls opened, the FMLN sabotaged the country’s telephone and electrical grids, shut off the water to most homes, and attacked twenty-three towns across twelve of El Salvador’s fourteen provinces…Guerrilla actions discouraged tens of thousands of less committed voters, leaving the polls to Arena’s more highly motivated electorate.  That is what the FMLN wanted—a clear, polarized choice between it and the far right, and a Salvadoran government less likely to attract the billions of dollars of U.S. congressional support that the Duarte Christian Democratic government drew in over the previous five years.  Arena’s Cristiani won 53 percent, and second-place Christian Democratic candidate Fidel Chávez Mena won 36 percent, while voter turnout was considerably lower than in previous years.  Democratic Convergence candidate Guillermo Ungo, a social democrat identified with the guerrillas, won only 3.4 percent of the vote” (page 104).

Latin American regional reports.  Caribbean & Central America report May 4, 1989:  Discusses the election (electronic edition).  “Having failed in their attempt to have the elections postponed, the FMLN launched a major offensive on the eve of the polls, which took place against the background of a nationwide transport strike and power black-outs, through which the guerrillas sought to reinforce their call for a boycott of the elections.  In this the FMLN succeeded, with the government itself acknowledging that abstention was inordinately high—only some 850,000 out of 1.8m eligible voters turned out…For the left-wing Convergencia Democratica (CD), the FMLN’s tactics were counter-productive, with the CD’s presidential candidate, Guillermo Ungo, suggesting that Arena owed its victory to the guerrillas.”

Latin American regional reports.  Caribbean & Central America report March 28, 1991:  “As the candidate of the Convergencia Democratica, a coalition of his own FDR, Zamora’s MPSC and the [PSD], Ungo captured only 3.1% of the vote in the 1989 presidential elections” (electronic edition).

Lungo Uclés 1996: “Political survival for the Left required adapting to electoral participation, a process already initiated by Guillermo Ungo, Rubén Zamora, and others from the FDR by standing for election in 1989" (page 26).  “Ungo and Zamora ran as candidates for president and vice-president for the Convergencia Democrática in 1989" (page 39).  Gives percent of the vote they received.

Montes 1989: “Resultados oficiales de las elecciones de 1989” (page 206).  Gives by department the votes for PDC, ARENA, PCN, CD,  and “otros,” valid votes, invalid votes and the percent they constitute of total votes cast, total votes, and percent of country vote in each department. 

Montgomery 1995: Gives percent of vote for each party and their candidate (page 214).

Paige 1997:  “The election of Alfredo Cristiani in 1989 marked the first time since 1931 that a coffee grower had held the Salvadoran presidency.  Cristiani and his administration were closely tied to the core of coffee elite power” (page 23).  “The election of Alfredo Cristiani…as President of El Salvador…represented less a return to the ‘coffee republic’ of the Meléndez-Quiñónez dynasty (1911-1927) than the emergence of the agro-industrial faction of the coffee elite…as the leading contender for power…Election of a member of…the coffee elite to the presidency in 1989 did not necessarily imply a major change in political direction.  The army remains a formidable political force and has been an important ally of the coffee elite in the past” (pages 188-189).

Resultados oficiales de las elecciones 1989: “Consejo Central de Elecciones de El Salvador.  Resultados elecciones de presidente y vicepresidente, 19 de marzo, 1989" (page 271).  Gives by department the number of municipalities, votes for eight parties, valid votes, contested votes, null votes, abstentions, and total votes.

Smythe 1989: Cristiani won nearly 54 percent (500,000 votes) of the vote in the first round, making a second round unnecessary. “But his election should be seen as less of a victory for ARENA than a defeat for the Christian Democrats...The party won the support of only 16.3 percent of the country’s 3.1 million eligible voters, or 23 percent of those actually registered” (pages B241-B242).

Soto Gómez 2005:  “Los contendientes fueron:  Doctor Fidel Chávez Mena, PDC, Doctor Rafael Morán Castaneda, PCN, Doctor Guillermo Manuel Ungo, CD, y Don Hugo Barrera, UP, el 19 de marzo de 1989” (page 225).

Villaveces de Ordoñez 1989: “Resultados electorales oficiales” (page 7).  Gives total votes, valid votes, null votes, blank votes, and contested votes.  Chart (page 8) gives number and percent of abstentions; blank, null, and contested votes; and valid votes.  “Totales nacionales por partido” (page 8).  Gives by party the percent and number of votes.

Wade 2003:  “ARENA candidate Alfredo Cristiani won by a comfortable margin with 54 percent of the vote; PDC candidate Fidel Chávez Mena won 36 percent…CD candidate Guillermo Ungo won 3.8 percent and the MAC, a splinter group of the PDC, won 1 percent” (page 58).

Walter 2000b:  Discusses the election and gives results (pages 586-587).

Williams 2003:  “Although in the 1989 elections the PDC was able to slightly improve its 1988 vote total, ARENA’s convincing victory in the first round of the presidential elections came as a major blow to the party” (page 313).

Williams, Robert G.  1994:  “(I)n March 1989, the Christian Democrats were defeated in a national election, and for the first time in more than half a century a member of the coffee elite, Alfredo Cristiani, became president and began a program of returning nationalized assets to former owners” (page 224).

March 21

Dunkerley 1994:  March 21, 1989:  “Cristiani offers talks; in response FMLN proposes new poll, withdrawal of US military aid, radical reduction of military and trial of those responsible for repression” (page 72).

April

Latin American regional reports.  Caribbean & Central America report May 4, 1989:  “The assassination of El Salvador’s attorney-general Roberto Garcia Alvarado has fuelled fears of a bloodbath following the decisive victory of [ARENA] in the 19 March presidential elections, in which Arena’s Alfredo Cristiani obtained close to 54% of the vote against less than 37% for Fidel Chavez Mena, candidate of the ruling [PDC].  A member of [ARENA], Garcia was killed on 19 April…(M)any consider Cristiani as little more than an affable image-changer for a party ultimately controlled by its founder, Major Bob D’Aubuisson” (electronic edition).

June

Allison 2006:  “With the election of Alfredo Cristiani of the [ARENA]…party in 1989, the presidency finally arrived in the hands of an individual that represented the more powerful sectors of the country, albeit the ‘moderate’ sectors of the conservative economic elite tied to international capital.  Unlike Duarte, Cristiani was more likely to be able to pressure both the elites and military into accepting the benefits of a negotiated settlement to the war” (page 56).

Brockett 2005:  “Although Cristiani had no known connection to the death squads, the violent right was emboldened by the ARENA victories.  Given the continuing viability of the FMLN and its alleged ties to the urban contentious movements, repression was the response, especially in 1989” (page 243).

Dunkerley 1994:  “At his inauguration Cristiani offers talks without prior FMLN surrender” (page 72).  June 1, 1989:  “Gen. Humberto Larios named defence minister after conflict in ARENA” (page 114).  June 9, 1989:  “Assassination of José Antonio Rodríguez Porth, minister to the presidency; FMLN denies responsibility…[June 23] [G]overnment introduces severe anti-terrorist measures into penal code” (page 115).

Johnson 1993:  “Cristiani assumed power on June 1, 1989” (page 284).

McClintock 1998:  “Despite disgruntlement among ‘tandas’ before and after the ‘tandona,’ and despite perceptions that ‘tandona’ members were not particularly distinguished officers, its members soon occupied the vast majority of top military positions in the Cristiani government” (page 138).

Montgomery 2000:  “Leading a country that was demonstrably fatigued by war, President Cristiani pledged in his June 1989 inaugural speech to pursue peace negotiations with the FMLN.  The flaw was that ARENA and the U.S. government, now headed by President George Bush who wanted to extract the United States from Central America as expeditiously as possible, assumed the only thing to negotiate with the FMLN was its surrender” (page 483).

July

Dunkerley 1994: July 21, 1989:  “US House of Representatives approves $433 million economic and $58 million military aid” (page 115).

September

Castro Morán 2005:  “El 7 de septiembre de 1989, el Presidente Cristiani juramentó a la Comisión del Gobierno…En un comunicado fechado 10 de septiembre, el FMLN hizo saber que…su delegación estaría presidida por los Comandantes Joaquín Villalobos y Shafick Jorge Handal y miembros de la Comisión Política Diplomática” (page  265).  “En un marco de expectación mundial y de presiones a nivel nacional e internacional, por los requerimientos ansiosos de paz, ambas delegaciones se reunieron en la ciudad de México, los días 13, 14 y 15 de septiembre de 1989” (page 266).

Dunkerley 1994:  September 20, 1989:  “US Senate votes $90 million in military aid without conditions over talks or human rights” (page 116). 

Johnson 1993:  “Negotiations between Cristiani’s government and the rebels began in September 1989” (page 284).

October

Castro Morán 2005:  “El optimismo y las expectativas que generó la reunión de México, sufrieron una baja ostensible con los resultados de la de San José, Costa Rica, en la Casa Pastoral de las Hermanas Clarisas, en Moravia, los días 16, 17 y 18 de octubre de 1989, dado que no se avanzó en resultados concretos y de fondo…Se acordó celebrar la próxima rueda de diálogo en Caracas, Venezuela, los días 20 y 21 de noviembre de 1989” (page 267).

Klaiber 1998:  “On October 31 a bomb destroyed the headquarters of the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers and ten union leaders were killed” (page 187).

Krauss 1991:  “(T)he far-right derailed the peace process by placing a bomb in the headquarters of a leftist labor federation, killing ten people on October 31” (page 105).

November 2

Dunkerley 1994:  November 2, 1989:  “FMLN suspends participation in talks, accusing army of responsibility for FENASTRAS bomb” (page 117).

Ladutke 2004:  “(M)ilitary hard-liners and their allies saw little need to negotiate because they continued to believe that they were close to defeating the guerrillas...The FNLN responded [to the bombing] by withdrawing from the negotiations on November 2nd” (page 39).

November 11

Allison 2006:  “In November 1989, the FMLN launched its second’ final offensive’ pushing deep into the heart of the capital, San Salvador, and many of its exclusive neighborhoods…The FMLN offensive brought home to many that there was no chance of a quick military victory by either the guerrillas or the Salvadoran military” (page 57).

Dunkerley 1994: November 11, 1989:  “FMLN launches largest offensive since 1981 in San Salvador, occupying thirty ‘barrios’ and attacking presidential palace and residence” (page 117).

Krauss 1991:  “The people neither joined the strike nor the insurrection, demonstrating again that the base of popular support for the revolutionary struggle was as narrow as it was deep…No matter the guerrilla failures, the offensive revealed the persistent, deep weaknesses of the country’s U.S.-financed structures and institutions…The army’s performance deteriorated so badly that the United States almost intervened militarily” (page 106).

McClintock 1998:  “On 11 November, the FMLN besieged San Salvador and much of the rest of the country.  The offensive was the biggest of the Salvadoran war and also, in all probability, the biggest guerrilla offensive ever mounted against a Latin American government” (page 84).  “(T)he November 1989 FMLN offensive destroyed the belief of the civilian political right, both in El Salvador and in the United States, that the military was gradually becoming more professional and would soon win the war” (page 154).

Montgomery 2000:  “The government’s failure to negotiate in good faith and several assassinations of leftist political leaders in the fall of 1989 convinced the FMLN that it had to demonstrate its power.  The most significant offensive since 1981, launched on November 11, brought the war to San Salvador for the first time.  It revealed both the FMLN’s inability to provoke a general uprising and the army’s incompetence.  It also exposed the bankruptcy of U.S. policy:  Despite nine years of training and over U.S. $2 billion in U.S. military aid, the army could not rout the FMLN from the capital” (page 483).

Wade 2003:  “(T)he three-week offensive took the Salvadoran government and army by total surprise.  Both entities had spent years minimizing the size, effectiveness and popular support of the guerrillas.  Now it was overwhelmingly clear that the FMLN was not the poorly coordinated, rogue band of communists the military had made them out to be” (page 59).

November 12

Dunkerley 1994:  November 12, 1989:  “State of siege declared; fighting in seven urban centres outside capital; [Comalapa] international airport closed; some 200 killed” (page 117).

November 16

Allison 2006:  “During the 1989 offensive, the Atlacatl Battalion, upon orders from the Salvadoran military’s High Command, entered the grounds of the ‘Universidad Centroamericana ‘José Simeón Cañas’ (UCA)…and murdered six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter” (page 57).

Montgomery 2000:  “In the most egregious act since Archbishop Romero’s murder, four days after the offensive began, the U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion invaded the campus of the Jesuit Central American University…and killed six priests (including the university’s rector and dean), their housekeeper, and her daughter.  This single act had an impact at least as great as the offensive itself.  It marked the beginning of the end of the war” (page 483).

Ladutke 2004:  “The Armed Forces and the death squads decided to use the offensive as cover for an assault on leaders of the civilian opposition” (page 39).  “Father Ignacio Ellacuría, the head of the Jesuit Central American University (UCA) [was] singled out...precisely because of his denunciations of human rights violations and his calls for negotiation...The Armed Forces, President Cristiani, and the Bush Administration all attempted to blame the FMLN for the massacre” (page 40).

McClintock 1998:  “Although not only the Salvadoran military but also Cristiani tried for years to protect the intellectual authors of the crime, it gradually became clear that they were top Salvadoran officers, including chief of staff Ponce and air force commander Bustillo.  Dismayed, the U.S. government began to push much more vigorously for negotiations” (page 154).

Wade 2003:  “The murders captured world attention and drew heightened scrutiny to the Salvadoran military and the inability of the new Cristiani government to control it.  The murders clearly demonstrated that vast amounts of aid had failed to reform the military, which had operated with impunity throughout the war.  The U.S. government, in turn, withheld $42.5 million in military aid promised to El Salvador, signaling its unwillingness to tolerate continuing, egregious abuses.  Without aid from the United States, the Salvadoran military could not defeat the FMLN.  Both sides, recognizing that a military victory was no longer a possibility, agreed to negotiate an end to the war” (page 60).

November

Dunkerley 1994:  November 24, 1989:  “National Assembly formally approves comprehensive anti-terrorism law that outlaws virtually every manifestation of public dissent” (page 117).

December

Central America report January 12, 1990:  “The all-out military offensive of the FMLN, while not directly changing the balance of the 10 year-old war, clearly showed the insurgents’ capacity to expand the war into new areas and enter the capital at will, where they were able to occupy neighborhoods for several days.  Although it did not bring about a popular insurrection, economic losses were staggering and the deaths of the Jesuit leaders seriously jeopardizes the ARENA government’s international credibility” (page 3).  “For the rebels, the most positive results were in the military area where they claim to have disrupted the low intensity counterinsurgency push promoted by the US, forcing the government to declare a state of siege with strict curfew hours…When the offensive was launched the FMLN announced two objectives:  one to show its military might and two, to pressure the ARENA government to return to the negotiating table.  While it was not able to bring off a popular insurrection, there was no doubt about its strength and mobility.  The latter objective has generally been considered unobtainable given the hardline posture of the army and the extreme right” (page 4).

Dunkerley 1994:  “The November offensive starkly revealed the inefficiencies of both the high command and its tactical operations” (page 70).  “By November 1989 it was apparent that the army could not win the war even if it wished to do so.  Overall, it had performed badly enough during the offensive to have lost prestige in its bargaining with the ARENA government, and yet its support was essential to Cristiani’s own bargaining with both Washington and the FMLN” (page 71).