Elections and Events 1961-1980

1961

Grandin 2004: “In 1961, Guatemala joined the Alliance for Progress and established the Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria (INTA), a corrupt, military-controlled bureaucratic leviathan that nonetheless promoted colonization and established mechanisms for communities to solicit collective title to unused national and private land” (page 111).

January: municipal election

Parker 1981: “The municipal elections of 8 January 1961, though they resulted in several charges of fraud, brought PR officials into office in other ‘municipios’ including Quezaltenango; in addition Redención, MDN, and DCG candidates were favoured in a variety of localities” (page 107).

April

Ball 1999: “In April 1961 on the streets of Guatemala City, students and members of the outlawed communist party protested the government’s participation in training Cuban exile mercenaries for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Security forces opened fire on the gathering, killing three” (page 14).

August

Schirmer 1998: “In August 1961, Yon Sosa announced the formation of the MR-13 guerrilla movement (Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de noviembre)” (page 15).

December 3: congressional election

Brockett 2005: “(F)raudulent legislative elections in December 1961 indicated a turn by the regime toward more restricted popular access to governing institutions” (page 205).

Dunkerley 1991: “(T)he regime attempted its own electoral fraud--winning all but two seats in the congressional poll of 1961" (page 139).

Ebel 1998: “Parties contesting congressional elections of 1961” (page 229). Discusses the election (pages 229-232). “Congressional election results in department of Guatemala, 1961” (page 231).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: En “las elecciones de noviembre de 1961…el partido oficial obtuvo 50 diputaciones de un total de 66 y más de tres cuartas partes de las alcaldías del país. Tales resultados fueron considerados como producto de un fraude electoral, tanto por la oposición anticomunista como por la izquierda” (page 63).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “En lo que respecta a los partidos políticos, éstos renuevan su actividad a partir de diciembre de 1961, cuando se realizan las elecciones para diputados, renovándose la mitad de curules del congreso, convirtiéndose en el momento propicio para denunciar por parte del MLN y la DC el fraude electoral que realizó el gobierno” (page 120).

Sloan 1968: “Congressional elections--Dec. 3, 1961" (page 249). Gives for each department the number and percent of votes received by the RDN-MDN-PUD, DCG, and PR.

Villagrán Kramer 1993: “El 3 de diciembre se celebraron las elecciones de diputados al Congreso, y, como era de esperarse, la oposición, fraccionada y desarticulada como estaba, no logró resultados satisfactorios. Los votos anulados aparecieron claramente. El ambiente político y el clima de espectativas no permitía, sin embargo, un análisis ponderado de los resultados” (page 363).

1962

Grandin 2004: “In late 1962, after a disastrous attempt earlier that year at starting a guerrilla movement…, [PGT] party representatives met in Havana with members of its youth section, the JPT, and remaining rebels from the November 1960 army revolt to create the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR). Operating as the armed wing of the PGT, the FAR’s first combatants were young party and JPT activists who had gone to Cuba on education scholarships but once there opted, without obtaining permission from party leaders, to receive guerrilla training. In theory, the PGT would be in charge of political work and armed actions in the city, while the FAR would establish itself in the eastern departments of Izabal and Zacapa” (page 92).

Hacia dónde vamos? Guía electoral 2003 2003: “El PGT hasta su III Congreso en 1962 siempre consideró viable la ‘restauración democrática’ por la vía de la acción política y electoral legal (pacífica). Sin embargo en la medida que los espacios para la democracia se van cerrando por los gobiernos de derecha…se adopta la lucha armada como forma de lucha política” (page 17).

January

Villagrán Kramer 1993: “El estado de sitio decretado en enero no fue suficiente para que las aguas volvieren a su nivel” (page 365).

February

Brockett 2005: Survivors of the November 13, 1960 coup attempt “took their first violent action at the beginning of 1962 as Guatemala’s first (very small) guerrilla band, the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre (MR-13)” (page 99).

LaCharite 1973: “In February 1962, [MR-13] began guerrilla-style operations in the northeastern part of Izabal” (page 145).

March-April

Ball 1999: In 1962 “students took to the capital’s streets in the largest public demonstration since 1954. Protesters at first meant to shake up public complacency following fraudulent congressional elections. But the March 1962 protests grew as labor and middle-class groups joined the strikes and demanded that President Ydígoras step down…Scores were killed during March 1962 in clashes with the police, mostly working-class youth from insurrectionary urban neighborhoods. Then in April 1962, after the street fighting had calmed, army soldiers opened fire on a gathering of law students, killing four” (page 14).

Brockett 2005: “In March 1962, [MR-13 was] very briefly joined by a PGT-sponsored effort (the Movimiento 20 de Octubre), but it was quickly destroyed by the military in its first action” (pages 99-100).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “La jerarquía de la Iglesia Católica…emitió un pronunciamiento el 2 de abril de 1962 condenando las acciones contra el Gobierno y otro el 24 del mismo mes, llamando a la población a respetar el orden público” (page 65).

Jonas 1974: “Several thousand women in the ‘Frente de Mujeres Guatemaltecas’ marched through the streets in April, 1962, to protest the shooting of law students by the government” (page 202).

Luciak 2001: The guerrilla “foco” established in 1960 in Baja Verapaz is “destroyed by the army in March 1962” (page 130). “The March and April 1962 protests against the government of Ydígoras Fuentes were another catalyst for women’s organizing. In the wake of these events, the first women committed to seeking social change…[joined] the guerrillas” (page 183).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: El fraude electoral “es motivo de descontento y movilización popular en marzo y abril de 1962, amenazando la estabilidad del gobierno de Ydigoras y favoreciendo al incipiente movimiento guerrillero que realiza sus primeras acciones, principalmente en el oriente del país” (page 121).

Schlesinger 1982: “In mid-March, the three major opposition political parties...jointly demanded the resignation of Ydígoras” (page 241).

August

Ebel 1998: “(T)he ‘arevalista’ forces took a major step toward capturing the ‘Casa Crema’ with the establishment of the ‘Partido Revolucionario Ortodóxo’ (PRO); and its leader…freely went to Mexico in late August to consult with Arévalo about his candidacy…PNR-44 and the PUD both quickly jumped on the Arévalo bandwagon” (page 259).

September

Ebel 1998: “The municipal elections, which were seen by many to be a barometer of electoral loyalties in the up-coming presidential campaign, had been set by the Electoral Tribunal for November 4. However, the ‘arevalistas,’ who felt that they were just beginning to get organized, did not believe that they could compete effectively with the Christian Democrat-MLN coalition or the PR…Thus, on September 6 Francisco López, a supporter of the newly formed PRO demanded in Congress that the current mayor, Dr. Luis Fernando Galich, be allowed to serve out his full term and the elections be postponed until early 1963” (page 260).

November: Guatemala City mayoral election

Ebel 1998: Election results (page 270).

ICSPS Guatemala 1966: Gives votes won by Francisco Montenegro Sierra and the percent of registered voters who voted (page 12).

Villagrán Kramer 1993: “Las elecciones municipales de la capital, convocadas para el mes de noviembre de 1962 no estaban supuestas a tener significación política, dada la estrategia de algunos partidos de no participar a fin de no medir anticipadamente sus fuerzas. Los partidos en gobierno se abstuvieron de presentar candidatos, al igual que el MLN y los partidos ‘arevalistas’” (page 371). Lists parties that participated with their candidates (pages 371-372). Gives results (page 373).

Villagrán Kramer 2004: “Nuevamente en 1962, en elecciones municipales en la capital, consideradas el termómetro de las siguientes elecciones nacionales, en las que se anticipaba que participaría el ex presidente Arévalo, el candidato apoyado abiertamente por el PGT—el ex triunviro del 1944, Jorge Toriello—prácticamente quedó en último lugar…En efecto, fue electo alcalde Francisco Montenegro Sierra con 24,428 votos y el autor de este documento quedó en segundo lugar con 23,017 votos. El candidato de la Democracia Cristiana, Salvador Hernández en tercer lugar, con 13,284 votos. El ex triunviro Jorge Toriello obtuvo 9,224 votos” (pages 38-39).

November 25

Schirmer 1998: “On 25 November 1962, there was an uprising by Air Force officers; three hundred were taken prisoner by Ydígoras’s forces” (page 17).

December

Brockett 2005: The FAR “carried on the insurgency of the 1960s. Essentially, this meant the PGT supplying political direction, resources, and recruits, and the MR-13 leaders implementing the military campaign” (page 100).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “En diciembre de 1962 el PGT propició una reunión entre los dirigentes del MR13, del Movimiento 20 de Octubre y del Movimiento 12 de Abril, en la cual decidieron unirse para derrocar al Gobierno a través de la lucha armada. Ahí nacieron las Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes” (page 66).

Schirmer 1998: MR-13 “integrated (in December 1962) with FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes), the military wing of the [PGT] and with students of the Frente Revolucionario 12 de abril. All three ‘frentes’ of MR13Nov-FAR-PGT combatants, never numbering more than five hundred, were directed by these former officers trained by the U.S. military in special forces mountain and jungle warfare antiguerrilla operations” (page 16).

1963

Brockett 2005: In 1963, “some successful military actions were taken [by the FAR], and some limited support was built among the peasants of the region. This led some militants and observers to believe that the FAR was a serious threat to the regime. Instead, these gains had been permitted inadvertently by an ineffectual counterinsurgency effort. Once the rural insurgency was taken seriously by the Guatemalan military and its U.S.advisers, it was destroyed in little time. So, too, were the lives of countless thousands of innocent victims living in the counterinsurgency zones” (page 100).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “En 1963 las FAR organizaron sus primeros focos guerrilleros en los departamentos de Zacapa e Izabal” (page 67).

Luciak 2001: “By 1963, the surviving guerrillas formed a movement that became known as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias. FAR militants were subsequently involved in the creation of several other armed groups” (page 130).

March 28

Rojas Bolaños 1994: “El regreso clandestino de Arévalo a Guatemala, ocurrido el 28 de marzo de 1963, precipitó un golpe que fue decidido por el conjunto de la institución militar” (page 120).

March 30-31

Ball 1999: “In 1963, on the verge of national elections, an army coup (again encouraged by the U.S. government) further undermined faith in democratic alternatives. The high command installed former Minister of Defense Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia as President. He canceled the elections and strengthened the military’s control over the different government ministries” (page 14).

Barrios 2001: “En marzo de 1963 el presidente Miguel Idígoras Fuentes fue derrocado por su ministro de la defensa nacional, Enrique Peralta Azurdia” (page 211).

Daetz Caal 1999: “De inmediato se suspendió la vigencia de la Constitución y la actividad de los partidos políticos, y se legisló por medio de decretos leyes” (page 92).

Grandin 2004: “In March 1963, a military coup deposed Ydígoras and installed Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia as president. In the past army officers had served as presidents, yet the Peralta regime from 1963 to 1966 brought a new stage in the militarization of Guatemala’s political and economic life. From this point forward the army would rule, either directly or indirectly, as an institution…The coup pleased the [U.S.] State Department…The coup allowed the United States to intensify its military and police aid. It sent instructors and equipment to help the Guatemalan army’s effort to uproot the FAR” (page 95).

LaFeber 1993: “The United States soon recognized the new dictator...Evidence later surfaced that U.S. officials had encouraged the ‘golpe’ to keep Arévalo out of power” (page 167).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: Enrique Peralta “recibe el apoyo del MLN no así de la Democracia Cristiana, la cual se divide ante esta decisión” (page 120).

Pinto Soria 2004: “El golpe de Estado de marzo de 1963 tenía como fin inmediato impedir el evento electoral presidencial de finales de dicho año, el que pudo haber reencauzado el proceso democrático guatemalteco interrumpido en 1954” (page 86). “El golpe de 1963 significó un momento decisivo en la conformación del ejército como institución centralizada, que constituía el principal requisito para asumir el dominio sobre el país” (page 89).

Rojas Bolaños 1994: “Por primera vez desde 1944, el ejército asumió abiertamente la dirección del Estado; se implantó el estado de sitio, se derogó la Constitución de 1956, se cerró el Parlamento, y se ilegalizaron los partidos políticos y los sindicatos” (page 120).

Rosada Granados 1992a: The 1963 coup “signaled the military’s intention to become a dominant force in politics. The coup of 1963 also eliminated electoral opportunities for the democratic opposition. Thus, the first step toward a massive national counterinsurgency operation was underway...The Assembly was dissolved, political parties suspended, union activities made illegal, and a state of siege existed for twenty months” (page 96).

Schirmer 1998: “The regime of Colonel Peralta Azurdia (1963-66) established a political strategy that effectively prevented opposition reformist parties from participating in politics for the next fifteen years” (page 17).

Schlewitz 1999: “The return of Arévalo for the 1963 presidential election prompted Defense Minister Peralta to remove Ydígoras in a bloodless coup. Arévalo had enough support to challenge the major political parties, but the military deemed him a communist sympathizer and therefore an antimilitarist given Castro’s recent dissolution of the Cuban army. The coup was rather easy given that the principal political parties welcomed a coup, and that the US government vehemently opposed Arévalo’s return” (page 311). “The coup received rapturous praise in Guatemala. Newspaper editors and elite associations lauded the action of the new Chief-of-state, Colonel Peralta, as did the Municipal Council of Guatemala City. The Tripartite parties showed their gratitude by organizing a massive demonstration of support in the Capital’s central plaza. Even Congress passed a resolution in favor of the military coup” (page 462).

April

Brockett 2005: “(A)ll political parties were banned and a state of siege was promulgated; it was to last eleven months” (page 206).

Daetz Caal 1999: “El 10 de abril de 1963 se emitió la Carta Fundamental de Gobierno, y dos días después se promulgó la Ley de Defensa de las Instituciones Democráticas. En la Carta se indicaba que la ley determinaría lo relativo a elecciones, organismos electorales, partidos políticos y demás cuestiones de la administración pública. Por medio de la otra ley mencionada se prohibió en el territorio nacional la organización y el funcionamiento de partidos políticos, agrupaciones, asociaciones, comités, células, grupos de lucha, burós y, en general, toda clase de entidades de ideología comunista” (page 92).

Gaitán A. 1992: “El coronel Peralta Azurdia, gobernó a Guatemala del 1 de abril de 1963 al 30 de junio de 1966” (page 133).

Jonas 1974: “Several smaller leftist parties…have been kept out by means of a 1963 law requiring parties to have fifty thousand members and at least twenty percent of them literate, with government officials deciding whether or not a party’s membership rolls are valid” (page 196).

December

Villagrán Kramer 1993: El 26 de diciembre “el gobierno militar señaló que, previo al 30 de marzo de 1964, convocaría a elecciones para integrar una asamblea nacional constituyente, y que, dado el carácter militar del gobierno correspondería a los gobernadores departamentales, también militares, supervigilar en su jurisdicción, el desarrollo de los comicios, tanto para resguardar el orden como para asegurar a los ciudadanos en su máximo la garantía de un sufragio libre” (page 392).

1964

February

Villagrán Kramer 1993: “El 5 de febrero…los sectores políticos excluidos del esquema tripartito fueron sorprendidos por el gobierno militar al enterarse que, de común acuerdo entre el gobierno militar y la ‘alianza tripartita’, se fijaban nuevas reglas y requisitos para la constitución y funcionamiento de partidos políticos…(P)ara formar un nuevo partido político, este debería contar con no menos de cincuenta mil afiliados, de los cuales el veinte por ciento deberían ser alfabetos” (page 392). “Acto seguido, el gobierno militar convocó para el 24 de mayo de ese mismo año a elegir diputados a la Asamblea Constituyente…(E)l gobierno se aseguraba de antemano que, únicamente, participarían en las elecciones de diputados a la Asamblea Constituyente los tres partidos [MLN, PR, DC] con los que estaba concertado” (page 393).

May 24: constituent assembly election

Daetz Caal 1999: “Los candidatos fueron postulados en una sola planilla por el Movimiento de Liberación Nacional y el Partido Revolucionario, cuya alianza fue coyuntural, solamente para esos fines. Los resultados globales reflejaron un 80% de votos a favor del retorno a la constitucionalidad, según declaraciones de los dirigentes de ambos partidos. El otro 20% representaba la suma de votos nulos o en blanco” (page 92).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “En la tradición guatemalteca los golpes de Estado son legalizados posteriormente mediante la convocatoria a una Constituyente, que a su vez prepara una Carta Magna que, se supone, legitima al régimen. Las elecciones fueron convocadas en esta ocasión para el 24 de mayo de 1964…(L)as elecciones para la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente se efectuaron mediante planilla única, como resultado de un acuerdo confidencial celebrado por los tres partidos anticomunistas (MLN-PR-DC)…En el último momento, sólo el PR y el MLN propusieron sus 10 candidatos, según lo acordado, mientras que el Ejecutivo designó a los 60 diputados restantes. La DC se negó a última hora a proponer nombres. En esta elección de lista única, la abstención fue del 70%” (pages 70-71).

ICSPS Guatemala 1966: “Elections for the Constituent Assembly” (page 34). Gives for each electoral district the number registered to vote, the number who voted, the percent of registered voters who voted, the votes cast for each party and the percent of the total, the total invalid votes and the percent of the total votes, the number of polling places, and the country-wide totals for each of these categories.

Villagrán Kramer 1993: “Los resultados electorales indicaban que 333,643 ciudadanos concurrieron a las urnas a votar. Contrastaba con los 492,273 que había concurrido a las elecciones presidenciales de 1958. La abstención era evidente. Luego, el número de votos nulos fue sorprendente…En la capital, de los 81,401 ciudadanos que concurrieron a las urnas, 25,463 anularon su voto en protesta. Es decir, el 31.3 por ciento” (page 394).

Williams 2003: “The DCG’s decision to boycott elections for a Constituent Assembly led to its proscription until 1968” (page 317).

July

Villagrán Kramer 1993: “El 6 de julio…se instaló la Constituyente. La integraban diputados del MLN, del PR, otros escogidos por el gobierno militar y un reducido número de Democratas Cristianos” (page 397).

September

Montenegro Ríos 2002: El Partido Institucional Democrático (PID) “fue fundado en septiembre de 1964 [por el Ejercito Nacional] y llevó a partir de 1970, a todos los Presidentes de la República electos por la vía del fraude, fue inscrito el 4 de febrero de 1965” (page 121).

Schlewitz 1999: “Since the Peralta government would eventually have to return power to an elected President, as insisted by Guatemalan civilians and the US government, it would have to prevent any candidate from coming to power that might again steal the military’s independence…The military government…attempted to control the transition by creating its own political party, the ‘Partido Institucional Democrático’ (PID)” (page 470).

1965

Grandin 2004: “Throughout the mid-1960s, the expansion of FAR operations in the countryside matched a rise in urban revolutionary violence” (page 96).

McIntosh 1978: “Created in 1965, INFOM (National Institute for Municipal Promotion) is the chief central government agency concerned with municipal affairs” (page 23).

January

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “(E)l Partido Institucional Democrático (PID) [fue] creado en 1965 por el Gobierno de Peralta Azurdia con ex dirigentes del MLN y la DC” (page 72).

Sloan 1968a: “The organizing committee of the PID was formed in November, 1964, but the party was not registered until January, 1965. Basically, the party was composed of businessmen and government candidates who had run for the Constituent Assembly. The PID was a nationalist party which wanted to promote economic development, protect their members from foreign business, and prevent a radical revolution…Within three months of being formed, the PID announced it had 110,000 members. Such ‘success’, of course, was not due to the party’s popularity but to the support of the Peralta government” (page 18). “On January 15, 1965, the MLN satisfied the legal requirement of 50,000 members and became a registered political party” (page 24).

February

Hacia dónde vamos? Guía electoral 2003 2003: “(C)on la creación del Partido Institucional Democrático (PID) promovida por el mismo Ejército en febrero de 1965, el MLN fue desplazado como el favorito de la institución armada” (page 31).

Sloan 1968a: “(G)uerrilla terrorist activities…caused Peralta to declare a state of siege from February to July 1965. During this time political activity was prohibited” (page 16).

August

Sloan 1968a: Discusses the parties formed in 1965 to meet the Electoral Tribunal’s August 30, 1965 deadline; MDN, MNR, PSG, and DCG are “disqualified for alleged lateness” (page 16).

September

Berger 1986: The new constitution “was ratified in September 1965, but did not become effective until May 5, 1966” (page 447). “The Constitution created two new posts: the Vice-President and the Council of State” (page 448).

Black 1983: “A new constitution was adopted in 1965, drafted by a constituent assembly handpicked by the Peralta government. On the whole, this was a more conservative document than the constitutions of 1945 and 1956...(It) extended the suffrage, however, to everyone, literate or illiterate, over the age of 18. The presidential term was shortened to four years, and reelection was forbidden” (page 31).

Electoral observation in Guatemala, 1999 2001: “Universal secret voting was introduced in 1965 and was made compulsory for all citizens over the age of 18 (including women) and optional for illiterates, while excluding police and army members on active duty” (page 11).

Jickling 2002: “Advocates of decentralization made their influence felt in the selectively implemented constitution of 1965. This document provided for the election of mayors, legal prosecutors (síndicos), and city councilmen to two-year terms without the option of immediate re-election. In Guatemala City, however, municipal officials received three-year terms” (page 146).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “En 1965, El Congreso de la República decreta la entrega de las propiedades confiscadas a la iglesia en el siglo pasado, esta ‘devolución’ [es]...una reafirmación política e ideológica de los lazos que tradicionalmente han unido al Estado, La Jerarquía Católica y en este caso a la propaganda partidaria del MLN...De esta manera el MLN ‘pagó’ los favores eclesiásticos... porque desde el púlpito los curas incitaban a los feligreses abrazar la causa anticomunista, con homilías, pastoreles y ofrendas pecuniarias, so pena de excomunión” (page 115). La constitución de 1965 “se caracteriza por la ilegalización de los partidos de izquierda y por prohibir expresamente, la participación de partidos comunistas en el proceso electoral; así como también, por reforzar la ideología anticomunista, la cual logra tener un mejor campo de acción, principalmente a través de los partidos políticos” (page 120). “Estas leyes que emanan de la constitución de 1965, norman el funcionamiento de los partidos políticos...al aumentar el número de afiliados de 10,000 a 50,000 de los cuales el 12% deben ser alfabetos, para poder constituirse en partido legalmente inscrito. Con estos procedimiento[s] legales, se pone fin a los débiles partidos anticomunistas que nacieron en el período 1944-54...y se consolida definitivamente el MLN como el partido del anticomunismo guatemalteco” (page 121).

Mujeres latinoamericanas en cifras: Guatemala 1992: “La Constitución de 1965 extendió el derecho a voto a las analfabetas” (page 78). “El elevado analfabetismo entre las mujeres, concentrado en la población indígena, mantuvo y aún mantiene a importantes grupos al margen de la ciudadanía” (page 89).

Nickson 1995: “Municipal autonomy was reaffirmed in the 1965 Constitution precisely at a time when central government institutions were stripping municipalities of many of their functions” (page 184).

Olascoaga 2003: “(E)l gobierno contrarrevolucionario de Peralta Azurdia amplíe en 1965 el derecho al sufragio a todas la mujeres, alfabetas o analfabetas” (page 116).

Saénz Juárez 2002: “(L)a Constitución de 15 de septiembre de 1965…omite el Tribunal Electoral y lo sustituye por ‘el Registro y el Consejo Electoral, con funciones autónomas y jurisdicción en toda la República’” (page 11).

Taracena Arriola 2002: “(L)a ‘Constitución de la República de 1965’ declaró como ciudadanos a todos los guatemaltecos, hombres y mujeres, mayores de 18 años, terminando de esta manera con la exclusión de las mujeres analfabetas. Decretó, a su vez, que el sufragio era, a partir de ese momento: (1) universal y secreto; (2) obligatorio para los electores que supieran leer y escribir, y (3) optativo para los electores analfabetas” (volume 2, page 178).

Thillet de Solórzano 2001: “El 15 de septiembre de 1965…se establece en la nueva Constitución el voto universal” (page 107).

Villagrán Kramer 1993: “El 15 de septiembre de 1965 la Asamblea emitió la nueva Constitución…En ella fijó que las elecciones presidenciales se celebrarían el primer domingo de marzo de 1966” (page 406). “(L)os diputados electos integrarían el Congreso el 5 de mayo; las corporaciones municipales, el 15 de junio, y el Presidente y Vicepresidentes el 1o. de julio de 1966” (page 407).

Villanueva 1994: “En 1965 se establece el sufragio universal y secreto, obligatorio para los mayores de 18 años y optativo para los analfabetos. Se excluye del derecho al voto a los miembros de la policía en activo y del ejército” (page 124).

October

Berger 1986: “(A) new electoral law was passed in October 1965” (page 446). “On October 27, 1965, the Peralta Azurdia government announced that elections would be held for President, Vice-President and Congressional seats on March 6, 1966” (page 501).

Bowdler 1982: “On the eve of the 1966 election Mario Méndez [the PR candidate who had lost to Ydígoras in 1958] was assassinated...His brother...took his place” (page 129).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “La Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos (Decreto-Ley 387 del 23 de octubre de 1965) agregó nuevos requisitos, tales como hacer constar la constitución del partido y la nómina de afiliados en escritura pública y bajo juramento de no ser comunistas” (page 70).

Schlewitz 1999: “Mario Méndez Montenegro ran as the PR candidate. His mysterious suicide in October 1965 left the candidacy in the hands of his brother, Julio César” (page 471).

Sloan 1968a: “On October 31, 1965, Mario Méndez died. The PR leader was found dead by his wife; he had been shot in the heart. The police claimed that tests proved Mario Méndez shot himself with his own gun; the Méndez family said that he had been assassinated…(W)ithin five hours it was announced that [his brother] was the new PR presidential candidate” (pages 27-28).

Thesing 1976: “La Ley Electoral de 1956 sirvió de modelo para la redacción de la actual Ley Electoral del 23 de octubre de 1965” (page 18). Gives details. “El gobierno militar de Peralta quería impedir que algunos partidos tomaran parte en el proceso electoral del año 1966. Por esa razón se procuró dificultar la creación de nuevos partidos” (page 18).

December

Sloan 1968a: “Still struggling to attain legality the DCG held a national assembly on December 5, 1965 and nominated Lucas Caballeros for the Presidency” (page 16).

1966

Brockett 2005: “(T)he Federación Campesina de Guatemala (FCG) [is] established in 1966 under social Christian inspiration” (page 132).

Grandin 2004: “Prior to 1954, there existed about one [military] commissioner for each of Guatemala’s three hundred municipalities, mostly enforcing military conscription and exercising loose surveillance. By 1966 the number had grown to nine thousand. Fortified by new legal powers, commissioners aligned military and planter interests” (page 87). Many of the commissioners were members or supporters of the MLN (page 88). “In some places, the MLN’s rural vigilante structure became the state…Starting in the mid-1960s, death squads and paramilitary groups unleashed horrific repression against suspected guerrilla supporters…In the city, in collaboration with police and military units, the MLN operated under the name Mano Blanco…In addition to attacking the proscribed left, the MLN also decimated the anti-communist Partido Revolucionario (PR), the most important reform party allowed to operate after 1954 and the MLN’s chief rival in the countryside” (page 88).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “La intervención de…civiles, que actuaron como fuerzas paramilitares, tuvo su origen en 1966 con el surgimiento de los denominados ‘escuadrones de la muerte.’ De las 35 organizaciones paramilitares de este tipo, que se tiene registro, 15 iniciaron sus operaciones en 1966” (page 81).

Johnson 1971: “The 1966 presidential campaign” (page 38).

January

Sloan 1968a: “By the end of January, 1966, the DCG had exhausted all legal remedies to change the Electoral Tribunal’s decision…The DCG then requested its supporters to nullify the ballot in the March elections” (pages 16-17). “After secret negotiations with three of the five PSG directors a unity pact was signed on January 17, 1966. The PSG agreed to support the PID in the March elections” (page 22).

March 2-5

Ball 1999: “The week of the election, security forces detained at least 28 members of the PGT and other underground groups who had let down their guard. They were never arrested, nor tried, nor freed, nor did their bodies ever turn up. They were simply ‘disappeared’” (pages 15-16).

Berger 1986: “(I)n March 1966, government troops seized twenty-eight labor and political leaders…Only much later did the government acknowledge that the leaders had been taken into custody…The order had purportedly come from the executive branch” (page 476).

Brockett 2005: “Over the four months through March of 1966 and culminating early in that month, thirty-three leaders and activists from the radical left were kidnapped never to reappear (another twenty-one were arrested and later released)…The dead included the leaders of the large peasant and labor confederations of the Arbenz period, one of whom was at this point the secretary-general of the PGT” (page 100).

Grandin 2004: A U.S.-trained “rapid-response security unit…working under the name Operación Limpieza [and headed by Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque]…conducted over eighty raids and multiple extrajudicial assassinations, including an action that during four days in March captured, tortured, and executed more than thirty prominent left opposition leaders. The military dumped their bodies into the sea while the government denied any knowledge of their whereabouts. Among those murdered in March 1966 were Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez and Leonardo Castillo Flores, the respective leaders of Guatemala’s labor and peasant federations during Arbenz’s tenure. Coming on the eve of the election of a civilian president who pledged to reinitiate the reforms of Arévalo and Arbenz, just as the left was fracturing between the old and the new, these disappearances destroyed the possibility of a negotiated end to Guatemala’s escalating civil war” (page 73). “Operación Limpieza was a decisive step forward in the strengthening of an intelligence apparatus that would go on to mutate and expand throughout the course of Guatemala’s armed conflict, the cornerstone of a state repression that by war’s end was responsible for over two hundred thousand deaths and countless tortures” (page 98).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “Días antes de las elecciones, entre el 2 y el 5 de marzo de 1966, se produjo la captura y posterior desaparición de dirigentes y militantes del PGT, el MR13 y las FAR” (page 73).

Schlewitz 1999: “In March, Peralta presented the PR and PID leadership with a set of demands…For its part, the military government promised to turn over the government to the electoral winner, and maintain its apolitical role” (page 472).

March 6: general election (Méndez Montenegro / PR)

Adams 1970: “1966 presidential election vote from two sources” (pages 210-211). Based on election statistics from Sloan (1968) and Johnson (1967). Gives by region the votes/percent of vote for PR, PID, and MLN.

Alexander 1973: “During the election of 1966 the Christian Democrats sought an electoral alliance with the Partido Revolucionario...However, the two groups were not able to reach an agreement; and as a result the Christian Democrats urged their supporters to cast blank ballots. They claimed considerable success for this campaign, with the number of such ballots coming to 15 percent of the total cast” (page 361).

Anderson 1988: Leading candidate wins a plurality of votes (gives total votes cast). Election goes to newly elected Congress where the presidency is decided by a one-vote margin (page 25).

Berger 1986: The legislature elected in 1966 “was composed of 55 members: 31 legislators were from the Partido Revolucionario, 19 were from the Partido Institucional Democrática and 5 were from the Movimiento Liberación Nacional” (page 520).

Calvert 1985: Gives votes for top three candidates (page 83).

Daetz Caal 1999: “El gobierno de facto del Coronel Peralta convocó a elecciones generales en 1966 para elegir Presidente y Vicepresidente de la República, diputados y miembros de corporaciones municipales del Distrito Central y de cabeceras departamentales…Las elecciones se celebraron el domingo 6 de marzo de 1966. Los resultados dieron la mayoría al PR, con 201,077 votos, 44% del total. El segundo lugar correspondió al PID con 146,085 votos, y el tercero al MLN con 110,145” (page 92). “El Licenciado Ramiro Ponce Monroy, inscrito por un comité cívico, ganó la alcaldía de la capital” (page 93).

González Quezada 1978: Discusses municipal election in Guatemala City on March 4, 1966 (page 181). Gives names of five candidates and their parties, percent of vote received by the successful candidate, and the percent of registered voters who participated.

Grandin 2004: “Led by Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, the PGT in early 1966 decided to support Julio César Méndez Montenegro as head of the Partido Revolucionario in the March presidential election…The FAR likewise decided to support the PR” (page 93).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “Con el propósito de fortalecer la legitimidad del Gobierno, se convocó a elecciones el 6 de marzo de 1966. El proceso electoral puso a prueba la calidad de la democracia anticomunista. El esquema tripartito de partidos se mantuvo, aunque en substitución de la DC apareció el Partido Institucional Democrático…Para sorpresa de todos, los dos candidatos militares obtuvieron menos votos que el candidato del Partido Revolucionario, Julio César Méndez Montenegro (39.4% del total emitido), quien obtuvo así una mayoría relativa que debió resolverse en el Congreso, en elección de segundo grado” (page 72).

Guatemala, elecciones ‘95 1995: “Elecciones de marzo de 1966. Candidatos, votos recibidos y partidos postulantes” (page 76).

Hacia dónde vamos? Guía electoral 2003 2003: “Solamente tres partidos participaron en las elecciones convocadas para el 6 de marzo de 1966: el PID, el MLN y el PR” (page 32).

Johnson 1967: “Guatemala’s presidential vote of March 6, 1966: departmental election returns” (page 19). Gives number of votes won by each of four parties in each department.”Departmental rank orders by vote percentage and urbanization” (page 20). “Competitive scale, by department” (page 21).

Johnson 1971: “Voters in 1966, because they were sick of militarism, rejected the right-wing candidacies of Colonel Miguel Angel Ponciano and Colonel Juan de Dios Aguilar. They chose instead the pacifist and antimilitary Julio César Méndez Montenegro for the presidency” (page 35). “In the 1966 election there were 944,170 qualified voters out of a population of nearly five million. About 20 percent of the population was qualified to vote and approximately half of these abstained. Of the total vote (531,200) approximately one-fifth (101,082) were nullified” (page 37). “Guatemala’s presidential vote of March 6, 1966. Departmental election returns” (page 39). “Congressional elections” (pages 41-42). Discusses 1966 and 1970 elections. “In 1966 the Revolutionary Party obtained a majority of the 55 regular seats in congress. The distribution was as follows: Revolutionary Party—55; Institutional Democratic Party—20; National Liberation Movement—5” (page 42). “Departmental rank orders by vote percentage and urbanization, 1966 election” (page 43).

Millett 1992: “To the surprise of the military, Méndez Montenegro won. He was allowed to take office, in part because, along with the other candidates he had earlier signed an agreement not to interfere in army matters...Under these circumstances, although Méndez Montenegro held office, the military continued to hold power” (page 61).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “El MLN participa en las elecciones para Presidente de la República, apoyando la candidatura del Coronel Miguel Angel Ponciano, en estas elecciones obtiene un tercer lugar” (page 122). “El partido obtiene 110,145 votos a su favor de un total de 531,200 sufragantes, lo que significa en cifras relativas un 20.73%; esta vez la población total del país era de 4,645,841 habitantes y estaban inscritos para votar 944,170 ciudadanos, lo que significa el 20.32% de la población de Guatemala...(E)l abstencionismo continuó aumentando, llegando para esas elecciones a un 43.74%” (page 133).

The 1990 national elections in Guatemala. 1991: “[Méndez Montenegro] was elected in 1966, but was permitted to take office only after agreeing not to interfere in the army’s internal affairs or its counterinsurgency activities. Human rights during his term deteriorated” (page 10).

Olascoaga 2003: “No es hasta 1966 en que por primera vez una mujer es electa para desempeñar el cargo de diputada. En aquella ocasión se trató de la licenciada Blanca Luz de Rodríguez postulada por el Movimiento de Liberación Nacional MLN, una periodista proveniente de las organizaciones de mujeres anticomunistas” (page 117).

Sloan 1968: “Presidential elections--March 6, 1966" (page 250). Gives for each department the number and percent of votes received by the PID, MLN, and PR.

Sloan 1968a: “The 1966 election in Guatemala…was unique: for the first time in Guatemalan history an opposition party was successful at the polls” (page 15). “The PR won the presidential election by receiving 201,077 votes; the PID received 146,085 votes; and the MLN received 110,145. The PID received most of its votes from…predominately Indian departments…The PR was most successful in Ladino departments” (page 22). “The elections of March 6, 1966, were not marred by violence; the PR emerged victorious by receiving a sizeable plurality of the presidential vote and by capturing a majority of the congressional seats” (page 30).

Verner 1971: The article “presents an analysis of the types of people who are recruited into the legislative process” focusing on members of the Guatemalan national congress elected in 1966. “Since the renewal of constitutional government in 1966, the Congress has played a moderating role in the political system. Due to the weakness of the presidency, the Congress has become of necessity the center for the discussion of political programs and the settling of political conflicts” (page 299). Lists the number of legislators from each party (page 299) and lists the qualifications (pages 300-301). “Indians, who account for over 55 percent of the population, have never been represented in the Congress” (page 301). “Legally, women may hold a seat in the Guatemalan legislative system. The fact is, however, that only two women have served in the Congress since 1823. The first was elected to a seat in 1956. The second woman, a member of the MIN (ultraconservative),…was elected for the 1966-70 term” (page 302).

Villagrán Kramer 1993: “Para sorpresa del gobierno en la fecha fijada para las elecciones—6 de marzo—la ciudadanía concurrió masivamente a votar…Terminando las votaciones se procedió al escrutinio. Después de la media noche y en el transcurso de las primeras horas del día siguiente se conocían únicamente los resultados de la capital y algunas cabeceras y municipios. En todos ellos triunfaban abrumadoramente las planillas revolucionarias sobre las de los otros dos partidos” (page 408). “Sin embargo, el gobierno militar—que conocía los resultados totales—los mantenía en reserva” (page 409).

March 12

Sloan 1968a: “Immediately after the election the Peralta government was ominously silent; the Electoral Tribunal refused to announce the official results until March 12. On March 9, based on unofficial figures, Aguilar claimed that, since no one received a majority of the vote, the newly elected congress would have to select the president. At that time the official congressional results were not known either, so it was possible that a coalition of PID and MLN congressmen might choose Aguilar. In fact, however, the PR had won thirty congressional seats, the PID twenty, and the MLN five, so that such a coalition would not constitute a majority. Finally…Peralta decided to adhere to his promise to allow the election, whatever the outcome, to stand” (pages 22-23). “(I)t was during this week that the Peralta government and the PR held secret negotiations” (page 30). “The victory of Julio César marked the first time in Guatemalan history that an opposition candidate had won over the official candidate” (page 31).

May

Ball 1999: “As the new President prepared to take office, he was forced to sign a pact with the military command allowing it to fight the guerrillas on its own terms, without interference from the civilian government and without having to work through the justice system” (page 15).

Calvert 1985: Gives votes in Congress, where the presidency is decided on May 5, 35 votes to 19 (page 83).

Daetz Caal 1999: “Como ninguno de los candidatos obtuvo la mayoría absoluta fue necesario que el Congreso eligiera entre las dos planillas que obtuvieron mayor cantidad de votos. El Congreso eligió, para un período de cuatro años, a quienes obtuvieron el primer lugar en la elección directa” (page 92).

Grandin 2004: “(F)ollowing the elections, the Guatemalan military forced the president-elect to sign a ‘secret pact.’ The army agreed to let civilians elected in the recent vote be inaugurated. In exchange, the new president promised not to negotiate with ‘subversives’ and granted the army complete autonomy, along with all the ‘help needed to eliminate’ the guerrillas” (page 98).

Jonas 1974: “In May, 1966, twenty-eight intellectuals and students being held as ‘guerrillas’ were executed…by government firing squad” (page 199).

Pinto Soria 2004: “El pacto militar de 1966 y sus consecuencias” (pages 94-107).

Schlewitz 1999: “A guerrilla band under ex-Lieutenant Turcios Lima ambushed an army patrol at Zunzapote in May, 1966” (page 466). “In May, a week before the formal declaration of his electoral victory, Méndez Montenegro signed the pact” (pages 472-473).

July

Berger 1986: “On July 1, 1966, Julio Méndez Montenegro took office as President. Clemente Marroquín Rojas became Vice-President and hardliner Colonel Arriaga Bosque was appointed Minister of Defense” (page 508).

Grandin 2004: Arriaga Bosque is appointed defense minister by Méndez Montenegro (page 98).

Johnson 1971: “Despite the fact that he had been elected on a campaign pledge to make a truce with the guerrillas and to pacify the country via nonmilitary means, the Méndez Montenegro government was a prisoner of the military establishment from the outset and maintained itself by keeping its hands off the military. As a result the Méndez Montenegro regime (1966-70) was characterized by military repression and guerrilla violence” (page 35).

Schlewitz 1999: “Julio César Méndez Montenegro took office in July, and Colonel Peralta moved himself and his family to Miami. However, the military state remained in place, though subdued and shrouded by the trappings of democracy” (page 473). “The military was still responsible for rural development and order, and soldiers remained the preeminent state agents in the countryside” (page 474).

October

Grandin 2004: “In October, [Arriaga Bosque]…carried out with the help of the MLN Guatemala’s first scorched earth campaign, killing eight thousand to defeat a few hundred guerrillas. Soon after this successful campaign, Arriaga Bosque consolidated military authority over Mano Blanca and other right-wing groups” (page 98).

LaCharite 1973: “Turcios Lima, chief of the Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces,” dies in October 1966 (page 149).

1967

Garrard-Burnett 1998: “(F)rom 1966 to 1967,…Col. Carlos Arana Osorio, the ‘jackal of Zacapa,’ conducted a sweeping, bitter, scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign in the eastern departments that nearly obliterated the insurgency, but at the cost of the lives of thousands of peasants” (page 111).

LaCharite 1973: “(S)ecret rightest groups which had merged into a single organization by the close of 1967, the Organization of Associations Against Communism (ODEACEC), were effective in reducing leftist terrorism to an all time low” (page 149). “By March 1967, military and paramilitary forces had forced the insurgents into a defensive posture and, in fact, almost crushed the entire guerrilla movement” (page 159).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “Por esta época surgen distintas organizaciones anticomunistas paramilitares como la MANO; NOA; OJO por OJO y otras de menor relevancia; de las cuales la MANO se le considera según voz popular, factura del MLN” (page 122).

1968

Brockett 2005: “At the beginning of 1968 the PGT and FAR split (the MR-13 had earlier), with the PGT forming its own guerrilla arm, also using the FAR initials…The PGT’s new FAR was named the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias” (page 101).

Cerdas Cruz 1993: “La Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) fue organizada a fines de los años cincuenta, pero no fue sino hasta 1968 que fue registrada legalmente” (page 60).

Johnson 1971: “(T)he North American and West German Ambassadors [are murdered] by the [FAR] who also [take] the lives of two United States military advisers and numerous members of the Guatemalan military-police establishment” (page 35).

Jonas 2000: “From 1966 to 1968, the United States became directly involved in counterinsurgency operations in order to keep Guatemala from becoming a ‘second Cuba.’…The United States sent hundreds of Green Berets to Guatemala and played a crucial role in ‘professionalizing,’ training, and reorganizing what it viewed as an inefficient army; the goal was to transform it into a disciplined counterinsurgency force…This was the origin of the killing machine known as the Guatemalan counterinsurgency army. It was in Guatemala that Latin America first saw such phenomena as death squads and ‘disappearances.’…Working directly with U.S. advisers, the Guatemalan army temporarily defeated the rebels by 1968. Since the army’s objective was to eliminate the social support base of the guerrillas, the price was paid in civilian lives (around 8,000) in the conflict area and among center-leftist forces in the capital” (page 120).

LaFeber 1993: “In January 1968, guerrillas killed two high U.S. advisers...In August, terrorists murdered U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein...In 1968...several Maryknoll priests and a nun publicly defended the guerrillas” (page 172).

Williams 2003: In 1968, the PDCG “was allowed to reregister in time for municipal elections” (page 317).

Municipal election

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “(E)n las elecciones municipales de 1968, [el PID y el MLN] logran con buen éxito, catalizar a su favor 22 distritos electorales lo que significó más del 50% de las municipalidades del país” (page 122).

Williams 2003: “The Christian Democrats won 20 out of 326 municipalities” (page 317).

March

Johnson 1971: “The rightest ‘Mano Blanca’ kidnapped the Guatemalan archbishop Mario Casariego y Acevedo in March 1968” (pages 35-36).

Jonas 1974: “In March, 1968,…the ‘MANO Blanca’ kidnapped Archbishop Casariego, hoping the deed would be blamed on the Left and would provoke a military coup” (page 199).

1969

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “En 1969 se constituyó la Asociación de Profesionales Aranistas (APA), como grupo de apoyo para la candidatura presidencial del Coronel Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio” (page 45).

December

Hacia dónde vamos? Guía electoral 2003 2003: “El IV—y último—Congreso del PGT…se realizó en condiciones de severa clandestinidad, el 20, 21 y 22 de diciembre de 1969. Se trató de un esfuerzo por dotar de contenido las acciones políticas que para entonces habrían aceptado la lucha armada como vía para la revolución” (page 19).

1970

Alcántara Sáez 1999: “En la década de 1970 tuvieron intervenciones importantes el Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), las Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) y la Organización del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA). El saldo en su lucha contra las Fuerzas Armadas fue negativo, y su lucha revolucionaria sirvió de excusa a éstas para la sistemática persecución y exterminio de líderes sindicales y de políticos de la oposición” (page 211).

Davis 1988: “In the early 1970s opposition political parties, especially the Christian Democratic (CD) party,...began to organize and to gain influence in the Guatemalan countryside” (page 16).

Johnson 1971: “The 1970 presidential campaign” (pages 38-41).

Luciak 2001: “In the 1970s, an increasing number of indigenous women became part of the guerrilla movement. Military leadership functions, however, were almost exclusively reserved for male Ladinos” (pages 27-28).

Mahoney 2001: “By 1970, the question of executive transfer had been standardized through the use of elections every four years in which fraud and repression ensured that officers representing the official military party controlled the presidency” (page 239). “In Guatemala, the decision of military officers to respond to peasant demands in the 1970s with state terrorism legitimated the revolutionary cause and contributed to the escalation of guerrilla activity” (page 240).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “En 1970 fue formada la Central Aranista Organizada (CAO)” (page 45).

Schirmer 1998: “The counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1970s permitted the military to deepen its control over state and civilian institutions, and to strengthen and make permanent its presence in the western highlands, where it had traditionally been weak or absent” (page 18).

March 1: general election (Arana Osorio / MLN)

Alexander 1973: “By the late 1960s the Christian Democrats had become one of the country’s three principal parties. They had considerable following in the working and middle classes and were serious contenders for power” (page 361). Gives votes for top three candidates in the March 1970 election.

Anderson 1988: Gives candidates for president and their parties (page 28). Leading candidate won a plurality of votes (gives votes received and percent of total votes); the election was decided in Congress.

Brockett 2005: “The March 1970 elections were mixed for popular forces. Winning the mayor’s race in the capital, the country’s second most important elected position, was the leading progressive politician of the 1970s, Manuel Colom Argueta of the Frente Unido de la Revolución (FUR). Winning the presidency, however, was the military’s candidate. Arana Osorio, the head of the vicious counterinsurgency campaign recently completed in the eastern region, was back from his ‘diplomatic exile’ and now ready to bring his strong-arm rule to the entire country” (page 209).

Berger 1986: “Hardliners secured a victory in the presidential elections of March 1970 due to a combination of tactics. First, they exploited the reemergence of the guerrillas in 1969 to scare the Guatemalan elite into supporting a law and order campaign…Finally, they chose a candidate who maintained strong influence within the army” (page 560). “Since Arana Osorio did not win a majority at the polls, the Guatemala Congress—dominated by the Partido Revolucionario—thus had to make the final decision. The Legislature quickly confirmed Colonel Arana Osorio’s victory” (page 563). “(T)he PID/MLN joined forces in the 1970 Congressional elections and won 32 of the 51 seats…(T)he PR won 15 seats and the Christian Democrats gained 4 deputy seats” (page 575).

Calvert 1985: Gives percent of vote won by top three candidates (page 84). Election went to Congress, where it was decided thirty-seven votes to seventeen, with one abstention.

Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 4 1970: For the March 1, 1970 election for congress gives the characteristics of parliament, the electoral system, general political considerations and conduct of the elections, and statistics (pages 73-74).

Daetz Caal 1999: “Distribución de votos en las elecciones presidenciales de 1970” (page 93). “(P)articiparon unidos los partidos MLN y PID; y, separadamente, el PR y la DCG…Los resultados fueron confiables porque el gobierno no manipuló los resultados. El total fue de 640,328 votos válidos y no hubo mayoría absoluta,…por lo que le correspondió al Congreso realizar una elección de segundo grado, en la que fueron asignados los candidatos del MLN-PID. La alcaldía de la ciudad de Guatemala fue ganada por el Licenciado Manuel Colom Argueta, postulado por el [FUR], que principiaba a perfilarse como una organización capaz de organizar a las fuerzas de la izquierda” (page 93).

Dunkerley 1991: “By the 1970 elections the PR was comprehensively discredited and the right in such ascendency that Arana could return from Managua to campaign on an explicitly repressive platform...Arana’s victory with the support of some 5 per cent of the population, in an election in which fewer than 50 per cent of registered voters cast a ballot, marked the first of a string of polls in which population disenchantment paralleled the successes of the official, military-sponsored candidate” (page 143).

Ebel 1990: “Beginning with the elections of 1970 the Guatemalan military and segments of the economic and political elites succeeded in creating a military-civilian coalition that, while faction-ridden and often violent, succeeded in managing Guatemala’s conflict-ridden society for a decade and a half” (page 504).

Fischer 2001: “The 1970 election was important first because of the mobilization of Indian voters who voted en masse for the first time. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s education levels of Indians in Tecpán (as well as in other parts of the country) had steadily increased, due in large part to the efforts of the state’s bilingual education program” (page 55). Discusses election in Tecpán.

González Quezada 1978: Discusses the municipal election in Guatemala City (page 182). Gives name, party, and percent of vote received by each of the twelve candidates.

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “Las elecciones del 1 de marzo de 1970 fueron ganadas sin mayoría absoluta por la coalición MLN-PID…, por lo que el Congreso realizó una elección de segundo grado donde se confirmó el triunfo de éstos. La alcaldía de la ciudad de Guatemala fue ganada por el licenciado Manuel Colom Argueta, postulado por el Frente Unido de la Revolución (FUR), que se perfilaba como una organización potencialmente capaz de aglutinar a las fuerzas de izquierda democrática. El MLN-PID obtuvo el 60% de los diputados al Congreso” (pages 92-93).

Guatemala, elecciones ‘95 1995: “Elecciones marzo 1970. Candidatos, votos recibidos y partidos postulantes” (page 76).

Hacia dónde vamos? Guía electoral 2003 2003: “En 1970, el MLN ganó por primera vez las elecciones presidenciales en coalición con el [PID]…A pesar de las acusaciones de los otros partidos sobre que el MLN tenía organizadas bandas paramilitares que eran responsables del asesinato de 6,000 personas el partido ganó las elecciones respondiendo que era el único partido que practicaba la ‘violencia organizada’ para liberar al país de la amenaza comunista” (page 32).

Handy 1984: Gives number of votes cast, percent of registered voters, percent of population who voted, and percent of votes won by leading candidate (page 167).

IIPS 1978: Gives percent of absenteeism and percent of registered voters who elected the winning candidate (page 426).

Johnson 1971: “In 1970 Guatemala’s official population was slightly over five million. Officially 1,125,482 citizens were qualifed voters, or slightly more than 21 percent of the total population…Nearly 60 percent of those qualified…voted and of those (640,684) only 61,360 were nullified, considerably fewer than in the 1966 election…The total valid vote in 1970 was 579,234…(V)oter composition changed markedly in 1970” (page 37). “Guatemala’s presidential vote of March 1, 1970. Departmental election returns” (page 41). “Congressional elections” (pages 41-42). Discusses 1966 and 1970 elections. “The congressional distribution was completely reversed in the 1970 election with the pro-military MLN-PID bloc winning 32 seats, giving them a clear majority. The Revolutionary Party retained only 15 seats while the Christian Democrats elected 4 deputies. The result can be considered as a clear victory for military reactionism” (page 42). “The performance of the Christian Democratic Party in the Congressional election of 1970 was impressive considering that they won three of their congressional seats in the capital city department of Guatemala. This constituted half of the city’s allotted six seats” (page 42). “Departmental rank orders by vote percentage and urbanization, 1970 election” (page 46).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “Bajo este clima de violencia, el pueblo de Guatemala es convocado nuevamente a elecciones en 1970. En esta oportunidad el Ejército promueve de manera directa al candidato que deberá llegar a ser Presidente, así como también señala a los partidos que deben de apoyarlo: el MLN y el PID son los partidos designados para llevar adelante la candidatura del Coronel Carlos Arana Osorio” (page 122). “Además, la coalición MLN-PID logra mayoría de diputados, obtiene 38 de un total de 55 curules” (page 123). Arana “obtiene 251,155 votos a su favor, lo que le proporciona un total de 39.20% de los sufragios emitidos” (page 133). “La población del país en estas elecciones era de 5,221,925 habitantes y estaban inscritos para ejercer el voto 1,125,482 ciudadanos, lo que significa el 21.55% de la población total [del] país. Sin embargo, votaron 640,684 personas o sea el 57% de ciudadanos aptos para ejercer el voto, esta vez, el abstencionismo llegó al 43%” (page 134).

Soto Rosales 2002: “Arana consiguió la mayoría relativa y tocaba entonces al Congreso de la República decidir, en elección de segundo grado, entre él y Fuentes Pieruccini. El PR contaba con los votos suficientes para declarar electo a su candidato sin violar precepto legal alguno, pero un sector de ese partido se apresuró a pactar con Arana” (page 68). “Elecciones presidenciales del 2 de marzo de 1970” (page 68). Gives number of votes for three candidates (page 68).

Tooley 1994: “In 1970, Colonel Arana, the head of the army, also known as the Jackal of Zacapa, won the presidency by the vote of four percent of the population, forty-three percent of those voting. Guatemala watched as Arana and the death squads rained terror on the countryside, in the name of anti-communism, counterinsurgency, and national security…Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio was call Jackal of Zacapa because of his ruthless counterinsurgency campaign in the provinces of Zacapa and Chiquimula from 1966-1970. Under the guise of wiping out communism, he killed an estimated 10,000 noncombatants in order to assassinate 300-500 guerrillas” (page 40).

Villagrán Kramer 1993: “Al practicarse el escrutinio de las elecciones resultaría vencedor el coronel Arana con un total de 251,135 votos; el Lic. Fuentes Pieruccini con 202,241 votos y la coalición DC-URD con 125,948 votos, registrándose, además, 61,360 votos nulos” (page 454).

Villagrán Kramer 2004: “Elecciones nacionales en 1970” (pages 63-67).

Williams 2003: “In the 1970 elections, the Christian Democrat-supported candidate, Colonel Jorge Lucas Caballeros, won 20% of the presidential vote” (page 317).

June

Berger 1986: “Marco Aurelio Yon Sosa, leader of the MR 13 was killed in June 1970” (page 631).

July

Gaitán A. 1992: “El general Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio gobierna a Guatemala del 1 de julio de 1970 al 1 de julio de 1974, acompañándole como Vicepresidente de la República el Licenciado Eduardo Cáceres Lehnhoff…(E)s sobrino del exjefe de las fuerzas armadas, coronel Francisco Javier Arana” (page 139).

November

Ball 1999: “In November 1970, shortly after taking office, President Arana suspended constitutional guarantees by declaring a state of siege that would last through February 1972. In the countryside, the siege transferred authority from elected officials to the military commissioners” (page 18).

Berger 1986: “The primary goal of both Arana Osorio and military hardliners was to reestablish law and order in Guatemala. Consequently, in November 1970, the newly installed President declared a state of siege” (page 571).

1971

Johnson 1971: “Before the end of Arana Osorio’s first year in office the capital city had been turned into a virtual police state” (page 36).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: Frente Unidad Nacional (FUN) “formada en 1971 con el propósito de participar en las elecciones generales de 1974, autodefiniéndose como eminentemente nacionalista y apoyando la figure del ExJefe de Gobierno Coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia (1964-1966)” (page 42).

Weaver 1994: “It was during the administration of a mildly reformist civilian president, then, that the vicious barbarism of the Guatemalan military and paramilitary units began in earnest. During the first year after the 1970 ‘election’ of General Carlos Arana Osorio, who had earned a fearful reputation in the pacification of one province, an estimated 2,000 political murders occurred” (page 196).

May

Berger 1986: “Carlos Arana Osorio was promoted to the rank of General in May 1971” (page 564).

1972

Berger 1986: “By 1972, the United Fruit Company had pulled completely out of Guatemala” (page 330).

Brockett 2005: “ORPA can…be traced back to the guerrilla movements of the 1960s, with its commander Rodrigo Asturias (alias ‘Gaspar Ilom’) one of the survivors of the ill-fated band so quickly destroyed in March 1962…When they formed ORPA in 1972, they broke with FAR over both the ‘foquista’ strategy but also more importantly over Guatemala’s racial identity and what that meant for revolutionaries and revolution” (page 122).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “La ORPA estuvo ocho años en formación, desde su separación de las FAR en 1972” (page 118).

Guatemala elections ’90 1990: “The FUN was originally organized in 1972 as a political committee to support the frustrated presidential candidacy of former chief of state Peralta” (volume 4 page 2).

Luciak 2001: “(T)he Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres announced its existence in 1972. At the same time, another group of disgruntled FAR militants started to build the Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas” (page 130).

January

Brockett 2005: The EGP’s “origins were a small group of former FAR militants of the 1960s who regrouped outside of the country, along with others from the PGT’s youth wing, the JPT, and a small contingent of Catholic students who had been working with peasants in Huehuetenango…(I)n January 1972 the group of fifteen reentered the country from Mexico into the remote northern jungles of Guatemala to begin the slow work of building contacts and recruiting in the region. Here in the Ixcán region and then as they moved a little further south into the Ixil Triangle, the population was almost totally Maya, as it was everywhere in the countryside that the EGP would later expand into” (page 119).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “El 19 de enero de 1972 la primera columna guerrillera proveniente de México ingresó por Ixcán” (page 117).

September

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “La represión se mantuvo sobre el proscrito partido comunista, aconteciendo uno de los casos más notorios el 26 de septiembre de 1972 cuando fueron capturados y ejecutados por fuerzas de seguridad del Estado seis miembros del buró político del PGT” (page 94).

November

Barrios 2001: “Ante la discriminación de los partidos políticos hacia el indígena, a principios de la década de 1970 se formó el comité cívico ‘Xeljú,’ el cual dio mayor participación al indígena, logrando participar en tres corporaciones municipales con un regidor” (page 293).

Bastos 2003: En la “primera mitad de los 70 también toma forma una tendencia que se ha venido perfilando desde antes: la participación como indígenas en las elecciones municipales como un medio para arrebatar el poder local a los ladinos y poder decidir sobre su propio destino” (page 41).

Fischer 2001: “(T)he 1972 founding of an indigenous political party [Xel-hú] [was] led by a group of young K’iche’ professionals…Xel-hú’s leaders stressed the need for national pan-Maya unity and a symbolic revaluation of Maya culture, but they opted for a grassroots approach, focusing their efforts on getting Indians elected to local offices in a few towns in the Quetzaltenango region” (page 93).

Sichar Moreno 1999: “Aunque no es un partido politico [Xel-Jú], merece la pena su mención por el papel que representa. Es un comité cívico creado el 17 de noviembre de 1972 en Quetzaltenango con mayoría de participación por k’iche’” (page 52).

Municipal elections

Calvert 1985: Gives percent of vote for PR, MLN, and PDCG (page 106).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “Después de 1972 Arana se había distanciado del MLN, a pesar de que en las elecciones municipales de ese año, la alianza ganó la dos terceras partes de las alcaldías” (page 96).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “En 1972, se realiza el ‘experimento’ de fraude electoral maniobrado por el MLN, que juntamente con el PID, logran obtener el 74% de las alcaldías municipales de segundo grado (cantones, aldeas, caseríos y municipios)” (page 123).

1973

Brockett 2005: “(T)he Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC) [is] founded in 1973” (page 132).

Guatemala: monografía de partidos políticos 2000-2004 2004: “Ríos Montt saltó a la palestra pública en 1973, cuando el partido Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca le propuso ser su candidato presidencial en las elecciones generales de 1974. Al aceptar la oferta, se constituyó una coalición de centro izquierda, denominada Frente Nacional de Oposición (integrada además de la DCG por el Partido Revolucionario Auténtico—PRA—, y el Frente de Unidad Revolucionaria—FUR—)” (page 40).

McIntosh 1978: “Until recently, no governor was allowed to serve in any given department for more than three successive years. This law was changed in 1973 to lift all restrictions on a governor’s tenure of office” (page 22).

Valdés 2000: “1973: Las mujeres campesinas comienzan a unirse a la guerrilla en grandes números. Las mujeres juegan allí un importante rol: en los frentes montañosos de la guerrilla, habitados por indios, la actuación de las mujeres no solo ha sido importante si no decisiva” (Anexo: Participación de las mujeres en conflictos políticos: Guatemala).

August-September

Berger 1986: “All coalitions announced probable candidates in August and September, but the choices of the DC and PR met with serious resistance from the armed forces. Both party coalitions had chosen civilian presidential candidates and were informed by the military that the officers corps would not accept the election of any non-military presidential candidate” (page 635).

October

Berger 1986: “By October, the electoral coalitions had been made and all coalitions had nominated military presidential candidates to represent them at the polls. The MLN/PID coalition nominated General Kjell Laugerud García and Mario Sandoval Alarcón for the respective positions of president and vice-president. The DC coalition nominated General Efraín Ríos Montt for president and Alberto Fuentes Mohr as vice-president. The PR selected Colonel Ernesto Paíz Novales for its presidential candidate and Carlos Sagasume as the vice-presidential contender” (page 636).

Brockett 2005: “With the possibility of victory in the March 1974 elections the ultimate target, other groups soon mobilized as the opposition gathered behind the [DC] candidate General Efraín Ríos Montt and his vice presidential choice, one of the top social democratic leaders of the period, Alberto Fuentes Mohr” (page 210).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “A pesar de las tensiones internas, el MLN y el PID se unieron para las elecciones presidenciales de marzo de 1974…El PR y la DC también postularon a militares, considerando que este tipo de candidatura era la única fórmula que podía tener éxito, debido a la importancia política que había adquirido el Ejército” (page 96).

December

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “A las reducidas opciones militares se añadió la exclusión de otras formas partidarias a las que el Registro Electoral les negó la participación, como el case del Frente Unido de la Revolución Democrática (FURD), que en 1973 presentó la nómina de 60,000 afiliados para participar en la contienda electoral y le negaron la inscripción junto con otros dos partidos” (page 96).

1974

Berger 1986: “(B)y 1974, there were four separate guerrilla groups operating in minor ways in various parts of the country: the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes [FAR] in alliance with the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo [PGT] operated…on the southern coast; the Regional de Occidente worked in the western highland department of San Marcos; the MR 13 acted in the capital city and in Izabal and Rabinal; and the Nueva Organización Revolucionaria de Combate, a new splinter group operated in the capital, highlands and on the southern coast” (page 632).

Fischer 2001: “Inspired by the example of Xel-hú, a group of politically active Kaqchikel Maya founded an organization [Patinamit] in Tecpán to support Fernando Tezaguic Tohón’s 1974 bid for a congressional seat” (page 94).

LaFeber 1993: The “1974 presidential campaign began with the murder by right-wing groups of a dozen Christian Democratic Party officials” (pages 256-257).

Schirmer 1998: “With the 1974 elections, the PDCG sought out military candidates who had not been openly involved in the repression” (page 188).

Villagrán Kramer 2004: “El preludio electoral” (pages 81-84).

March 3: general election (Laugerud García / MLN-PID coalition)

Arias 1990: “Many members of the Indian bourgeoisie were also members of the DCG, and were mobilized by General Efraín Ríos Montt as that party’s presidential candidate in 1974. In those elections, various members of the Indian bourgeoisie presented themselves as candidates in their respective departments. The majority did so through the DCG, but some also appeared even on the rolls of the...PR...These candidacies were, however, not individual efforts, but rather responded to the interests of specific Indian groups” (page 242). Gives the names and origins of two Indians elected to congress. “This was the first time in Guatemalan history that Indians were elected as national deputies who continued to identify themselves as Indians at that level and who derived their power from Indian bases” (page 242).

Bastos 2003: “En las elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias de 1974 parece que puede abrirse la puerta para la participación electoral al más alto nivel: dos indígenas son elegidos para diputados. Se trata de Pedro Verona Cumes, de Comalapa, por la Democracia Cristiana en Chimaltenango, y Fernando Tetzagüic, maestro de Tecpán por el Partido Revolucionario por Sololá, quien desde su postulación cuenta con el apoyo de la agrupación Pa Tinamit” (page 42). “(L)a apuesta hacia el cambio que había hecho la Democracia Cristiana queda en entredicho cuando admite la pérdida de unas elecciones presidenciales que había ganado, en las que Ríos Montt se postulaba para Presidente. Para el núcleo politizado que había puesto en este partido sus esperanzas, se trató de un hecho fundamental para definir su estrategia política posterior” (page 44).

Berger 1986: “Laugerud García and Sandoval Alarcón were declared the victors of the March 1, 1974 elections, despite the fact that they did not win the popular vote. Most agree that the DC ticket actually won the vote count with approximately 49% of the vote” (page 639). “(T)hree days after the elections, the Electoral Registry announced that the MLN-PID ticket had received 260,313 votes or 41% of the total; the DC coalition had obtained 225,586 votes or 35.7% of the total ballot; and the PR coalition had received 145,967 votes or 23.1% of the total votes cast. During the three days between the election and the announcement of General Laugerud García’s victory, key army officers met continuously” (page 640). “Finally, top conservative reform officers who questioned the fraud, refused to act against President Arana Osorio and military hardliners” (page 641).

Brockett 2005: The PDC “was critical to the achievement by the indigenous of some political power on the local level, especially in the election of 1974, one which was probably won at the national level by the Christian Democrats but denied to them by fraud. At the local level, though, DC candidates won in a number of towns” (page 134). “The opposition was allowed to keep the capital’s mayor office, but the military kept the presidency, this time requiring fraud to do so (the results were held up for nine days)” (page 210).

Calvert 1985: “At the 1974 elections none but military candidates were presented” (page 84). Give number and percent of vote for top three candidates (page 85).

Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 8 1974: For the March 3, 1974 election for congress gives the characteristics of parliament, the electoral system, general political considerations and conduct of the elections, and statistics (pages 53-55).

Daetz Caal 1999: “El Frente Nacional de Oposición (FNO), formado por la DCG, el FUR, y el Partido Revolucionario Auténtico (PARA), postuló al General José Efraín Ríos Montt para presidente y al Economista Alberto Fuentes Mohr para la vicepresidencia. El movimiento asumió una posición de izquierda moderada…El Congreso realizó la elección de segundo grado y proclamó Presidente y Vicepresidente a quienes obtuvieron la mayoría relativa en las elecciones directas. El General Ríos Montt fue nombrado Agregado Militar a la Embajada en España” (page 93). “Distribución de votos en las elecciones presidenciales de 1974” (page 93).

Davis 1988: “Although the military denied the [Christian Democrats] an electoral victory in the 1974 presidential contest, the [Christian Democrats] and other opposition parties were successful in municipal elections that year. In the largely Indian Department of Chimaltenango, for example, the [Christian Democrats] and the Revolutionary party (PR) won 70 percent of the presidential vote, compared to only 30 percent for the right-wing, official MLN-PID coalition. Similarly, Indian candidates ran in eleven of the sixteen mayoral races in Chimaltenango and were victorious in eight” (page 16). Discusses results in mayoral races in Patzicía and San Martín Jilotepeque also.

Dunkerley 1991: “The main opposition was provided by the DCG, whose leaders tried to circumvent official impediments to their campaign by fielding a conservative officer, General Efraín Rios Montt, as their candidate...The DCG claimed that 180,000 votes were altered to provide Laugerud with victory” (page 144).

Figueroa Ibarra 1978: Gives abstention rate in the presidential election (page 293).

Fischer 2001: “Acting as a de facto political party, Patimamit was instrumental in Tezaguic’s election as a congressional deputy for the Partido Revolucionario. In the same elections, another Kaqchikel man, Pedro Verona Cúmez of Comalapa, was elected to Congress. Although these were not the first Maya congressional deputies, the significance of their election stems from the fact that they were the first to ‘identify themselves as Indians at this level of power.’ Personal feuds between the two deputies…hindered their ability to establish any sort of coalition, and neither was able to introduce the pro-Indian reforms called for in their campaign platforms” (page 94).

Fischer 2004: “In Tecpán the group Patinamit, in alliance with the [PR] elected Fernando Tezaguic Tohón, who served a one-term tenure, and then kept a low profile during the violence” (page 88).

Gálvez Borrell 1997: “By the mid 1970s, there had taken place what was described as ‘a phenomenon never seen in the post-conquest history of Guatemala:’ the participation of two indigenous deputies in the National Congress. The group Patinamit was founded in 1974 to support the candidacy of one of them” (page 31).

González Quezada 1978: Discusses the municipal election in Guatemala City (page 182). Gives names of the twelve candidates and percent of vote received by top two candidates, also the percent of registered voters who voted.

Guatemala, elecciones ‘95 1995: “Elecciones marzo 1974. Candidatos, votos recibidos y partidos postulantes” (page 77).

Guatemala: monografía de partidos políticos 2000-2004 2004: “En las elecciones de 1974 la DCG promovió nuevamente un Frente Nacional de Oposición que se convirtió en la expresión legal de grupos políticos democráticos. El FNO postuló al general Efraín Ríos Montt a la presidencia. Según observadores de esas elecciones, el Frente ganó las elecciones, pero el gobierno del general Carlos Arana Osorio realizó un fraude electoral en favor del candidato oficial, el también general Kjell Eugenio Laugerud García” (page 17).

Gutiérrez 1997: “(E)n las elecciones de 1970, pero más claramente en las de 1974, la DCG encabezó amplias coaliciones con la izquierda socialdemócrata, comunista y cristiana, los sindicatos y las ligas campesinas, levantando la bandera de la reforma agraria. Ganaron los comicios, pero el triunfo les fue arrebatado mediante la alteración deliberada de los resultados” (page 71).

Hacia dónde vamos? Guía electoral 2003 2003: “El Ejércio decidió nuevamente participar en las elecciones de 1974 a través de la coalición MLN-PID” (page 32).

Handy 1984: Gives PDCG secretary general’s estimate of votes altered by the military (page 171).

IIPS 1978: The election results varied according to the source of electoral statistics. Gives votes for the three parties/coalitions receiving the most votes as reported by the Congress, the coalition MLN-PID, and the PDCG. The Congress also gives total votes and null votes (page 427).

LaFeber 1993: “General Efraín Ríos Montt ran as the most moderate of three military candidates...Ríos Montt doubtless won the election, but in a fraudulent recount conducted by the army, Laugerud became president. Ríos Montt protested, but played the game and did nothing more” (page 257).

Millett 1992: “(M)assive fraud resulted in the election of Laugerud” (page 61).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: Los socialistas democráticas formaron alianza “con la Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca y el Frente Unido de la Revolución en 1974, ocasión en que se manifestó a través de la agrupación Partido Revolucionario Auténtico” (page 54). “El MLN propone al ejército la candidatura para las elecciones de 1974 a Clemente Marroquín Rojas...como presidente...; pero el ejército por medio del PID tiene otra propuesta: el General Kjell Laugerud García para presidente” (page 123). “Así nuevamente las elecciones favorecen a la coalición MLN-PID, la cual obtiene 298,953 votos a su favor de un total de 727,079 votantes, lo que le aporta en cifras relativas el 41.11% de los votos emitidos. (L)a población total del país era de 7,200,000 habitantes y estaban inscritos para votar 1,448,729 votantes, es decir, el 20.12% de la población total; el abstencionismo fue del orden de 53.75%” (page 134).

Painter 1987: “In the 1974 elections the Christian Democrats joined an alliance with the social-democrat parties, the FUR and PRA, to form the powerful National Opposition Front (FNO). General Ríos Montt was chosen as the FNO’s candidate, not because he shared all their views but because his reputed honesty represented the best hope of preventing the military from denying the coalition its possible victory. In the event Ríos Montt was not a sufficient guarantee: the FNO was widely considered to have won the vote, but not the count. The FNO claimed between 45 and 49 percent of the vote to the 34 per cent gained by MLN-PID’s candidate” (page 65).

Paz 1993: “En las elecciones de 1974, salen electos dos diputados indígenas: Pedro Verona Cumes (D.C.) por el departamento de Chimaltenango y Fernando Tezahuic Tohon (P.R.) por Sololá” (page 27).

Soto Rosales 2002: “Elecciones presidenciales del 3 de marzo de 1974” (page 83). Gives votes for three candidates.

Villagrán Kramer 2004: “Los resultados electorales” (pages 84-85). “Los acontecimientos postelectorales” (pages 85-87).

Warren 1998: “Fernando Tesagüic Tohom” is one of two Maya representatives elected to Congress in 1974 (page 195).

Williams 2003: “In the fraudulent elections of 1974, the [Christian Democrats] supported General Efraín Ríos Montt, who was thought to have won the elections. Although the Christian Democrats were awarded fourteen seats in the legislature, within the party, there was significant disagreement as to whether to participate in the new congress” (page 317).

July

Berger 1986: “General Kjell Laugerud García and Mario Sandoval Alarcón took office on July 1, 1974” (page 641).

Brockett 2005: “Conditions under the…administration of General Kjell Laugerud…were perfect for accelerating labor organizing and contentious political activities more generally” (page 113). “But there were contradictory forces within the regime, too, symbolized by the vice president and coalition partner, Mario Sandoval Alarcón. The long-time head of the political party of the far right [MLN], the head of the national congress during the Arana administration and hoping to be president of the country some day, Sandoval was the reputed godfather of the Guatemala’s notorious death squads… Serious splits between the president and vice president and the factions they represented were apparent just months into the new administration” (page 211).

Grandin 2004: “General Kjell Laugerud, who served as president between 1974 and 1978, took advantage of the pacification conducted by his predecessors to pursue a program of modernization…He made peace with the MLN by giving its leadership key government posts, while at the same time trying to undercut its support in the military and rein in the death squads. Laugerud even permitted the formation of a number of social democratic parties and urban and rural unions. This political opening caught the government in a bind. On the one hand, it allowed rural organizing and promoted, through INTA, land reform aimed at ‘transforming’ Guatemala’s unproductive agrarian economy. On the other hand, the corruption, intransigence, and avarice of army officials and the ruling class led to increasing violence against the growing oppositional movement” (page 162).

Guatemala: monografía de partidos políticos 2000-2004 2004: “Ríos Montt…fue…enviado a España como agregado militar de la Embajada de Guatemala. Fue durante esta estadía en el exterior que se convirtió al evangelismo” (page 40).

1975

Berger 1986: “The Committee of Relatives of the Disappeared estimated that 15,325 Guatemalans ‘disappeared’ between 1970-1975” (page 627).

Metallo 1998: “Ríos Montt had converted to [a Pentecostal sect called Verbo] in 1975, when he was in a period of despondency over having been denied the presidency in the 1974 election” (page 325).

Schirmer 1998: “A new wave of repression began to be used selectively in 1975 under President-General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud García (1974-78),…but it had little success in stemming either guerrilla activity or popular organizing” (page 18). “Beginning in 1975, the army began repressive moves against peasants in the northern transversal area called ‘zones of the generals,’ where much of the mineral- and oil-rich land was being claimed by high-ranking military officers and presidents” (page 41).

June

Bastos 2003: “Guatemala está entrando en una fase de polarización política. En 1975, el EGP realiza su primera acción pública: el ajusticiamiento del ‘Tigre del Ixcán,’…un finquero de la zona ixil. Poco después, en esta área y en Ixcán, la represión se va tornando cada vez más dura y cotidiana” (page 43).

Brockett 2005: “(I)n June, in an event that received more national attention, [the EGP] executed a particularly unpopular landlord in the same area—but a man who also had important political ties in the capital. In response, the army initiated its counterinsurgency campaign in northern El Quiché” (page 120).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “La primera acción pública importante [del EGP] fue la ejecución del finquero José Luis Arenas (conocido como el ‘Tigre de Ixcán’), el 7 de junio de 1975. Tuvo un carácter simbólico, aunque la reacción del Ejército no se hizo esperar, por lo que este hecho se considera como el inicio de las acciones armadas en aquella región” (page 117).

1976

Dunkerley 1991: “The most palpable single threat to the indigenous population was the establishment of the Northern Transverse Strip (Franja Transversal del Norte, FTN) by the Laugerud regime in 1976. This project amounted to the declaration of a ‘development zone’ close to the areas of most dense Indian settlement on the Mexican border and in the department of Izabal on the Caribbean coast” (page 149).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “Buscando la legitimación de un mandato ilegitimo, el gobierno Laugerud debió permitir ciertas formas de organización y expresión populares...Fue esta brecha a la participación organizada la que hizo posible la emergencia de mayores niveles de expresión popular y del desarrollo cualitativo de la conciencia de clase; en 1976 surgen el Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical (CUNS) y el Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC)” (page 18). “En 1976 un grupo de profesionales en combinación con el Movimiento Nueva Juventud y el Comité Cívico Independiente de Unidad y Progreso, iniciaron un movimiento renovador que consideraron necesario ante los resultados electorales de 1974” (page 55).

Weaver 1994: “The road was built primarily to make the Guatemalan oil fields on the Mexican border of Chiapas more accessible, but it also opened a corridor through a large region that had been inaccessible for urbanites and made the land attractive for development. As a consequence, vast tracts of Indian lands were ruthlessly appropriated by army officers and allied civilian politicians. This use of position for personal enrichment by military officers, however, was different from the growth of the economic power of the military as an institution....The institutional aspect of military penetration of civil society was more important than opportunism by individual officers; the Guatemalan military was beginning to aspire to be the propertied classes’ partners rather than merely their instrument” (pages 196-197).

January

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “En la ciudad se produjo el conflicto de los trabajadores de la Embotelladora Guatemalteca S.A., distribuidora de la Coca-Cola. A raíz del despido de 154 sindicalistas, el 24 de enero de 1976, los trabajadores decidieron ocupar la fábrica; luego fueron expulsados violentamente. A partir de estos hechos, varios sindicatos lanzaron acciones de solidaridad” (page 105).

February

Arias 1990: “On February 4, 1976, the entire Guatemalan highlands was jarred by a massive earthquake. More than one million people were made homeless in less than forty-five seconds...The majority of the victims were Indians” (page 243).

Bastos 2003: “En febrero de 1976, ‘El Terremoto’ se convierte en un marcador de la historia social y política del país, con sus 27.000 muertos, 70.000 heridos y casi un millón de damnificados entre la población más pobre de la capital y el Altiplano Central. La corrupción y luchas internas dentro del gobierno por el manejo de la ayuda internacional—un actor que hace su entrada en este momento—se opusieron a las muestras de solidaridad y autogestión que se vivieron entre los afectados” (page 44).

Guatemala: crisis y opciones. Informe final 1986: “La catástrofe ofreció…la oportunidad para que el general Laugerud García buscara legitimar su gobierno que había nacido del fraude electoral de 1974” (page 13).

Metallo 1998: “In 1975, the rate of Protestant growth hovered around seven percent. Then on February 4, 1976, a massive earthquake shook Guatemala to its foundation. The earthquake would give the evangelicals’ message an urgency which it had never before carried. As a result, from 1976 on, Protestant growth in Guatemala would soar” (page 279). “Since 1976, the Protestant, and particularly the Pentecostal churches, have divided and subdivided into over 200 denominations” (page 281).

Rosada Granados 1992a: “The earthquake of 1976 marked the emergence of a series of popular movements and revealed the degree to which the popular sector had been previously stifled and political parties had been unable to channel demands and protests” (page 98).

Weaver 1994: “(T)he earthquake destruction stimulated the formation of local reconstruction organizations that the military considered potentially dangerous...One notable urban example of the government’s response to dissent was the systematic murder of workers attempting to unionize the local Coca Cola plant” (page 196).

March

Schirmer 1998: The army “launched a counterinsurgency offensive in northern El Quiché in March 1976 in which church and cooperative workers were forcibly disappeared” (page 41).

November

Bastos 2003: En “noviembre de 1976, Patinamit se lanza a su transformación en un partido político” (page 48).

Fischer 2001: “With the hope of gaining Maya legislative power while avoiding the personality cults fostered by Tezaguic and Cúmez, a group of indigenous leaders founded the Partido Indígena de Guatemala in 1976 to prepare for the 1978 elections. The country’s more established political parties and the national press roundly condemned the party as racist…and divisive…Undeterred by this vehement response, yet cognizant of the need to present a nonthreatening image to the ladino power structure, the party quickly changed its name to Frente de Integración Nacional (FIN), and leaders began to speak more of national unity than of ethnic differences. Initially [it] aligned with the liberal Christian Democratic Party” (pages 94-95).

Gálvez Borrell 1997: “(T)he indigenous party called National Integration Front, FIN,...was founded in late 1976" (page 31).

Taracena Arriola 2002: “(A) raíz de una reunión celebrada el 20 de noviembre de 1976, la actividad de Patinamit se orientó hacia la formación de un partido político indígena…La idea era formar el Partido Indígena de Guatemala, idea que desde el principio fue adversada por la prensa y los partidos políticos tradicionales, que la acusaban de ser inconstitucional, racista y fomentar la lucha de clases. Seguidamente, el 11 de noviembre de ese año, se dio en Chimaltenango la creación de tal partido político, el Frente de Integración Nacional (FIN), el cual derivaba de la agrupación Patinamit, pero que en su plataforma aceptaba la posible participación de los ladinos” (volume 2, page 181).

Warren 1998: “In 1976 [Tezahuic Tohón] attempted to create the Indigenous Party of Guatemala and become ‘the maximal leader of the indigenous people,’ only to be forced…to repackage the political party as nondiscriminatory and nationalist. The renamed Front for National Integration was compelled to retool its nascent indigenous agenda and forge alliances with existing parties as Tezahuic Tohón sought votes to extend its base past the core of several hundred activists… Tezahuic Tohón courted parties across the spectrum only to end up joining the right-wing alliance supporting General Lucas García for president. This futile alliance generated few votes and no momentum or enduring party structure” (page 195).

Municipal elections

Ebel 1997: Describes the 1976 mayoral election in San Juan Ostuncalco (page 178-179).

Fischer 2001: “Though they [Xel-hú party members] failed in their attempt to gain control of Quetzaltenango’s city government (in fact, none of their candidates were elected there), they were influential in electing San Juan Ostuncalco’s first Indian mayor in 1976” (page 93).

Taracena Arriola 2002: “(E)n 1976 resultó electo en la alcaldía de Panajachel, Sololá, Gabriel Vicente Queché Metzar, postulado por la coalición pro gubernamental PR-PID” (volume 2, page 180).

1977

Berger 2006: “(T)he military as an institution acquired land, and individual officers used their political positions in the 1970s and 1980s to amass personal wealth, with many officers obtaining land in the northern provinces. General Romeo Lucas García, who in 1977 was in charge of development in the northern section of the country known as the Northern Transversal Strip and was the minister of defense between 1975 and 1976, acquired three estates, totaling 130,000 acres” (pages 22-23).

Dunkerley 1991: “The years 1977-1983 were marked by open social and political conflict in which both government and military were increasingly hard-pressed to maintain control in large areas of the countryside, and sometimes in the capital itself; the bulk of the 100,000 people estimated to have been killed for political reasons since 1954 lost their lives during this period...(I)t was primarily the indigenous peoples of the western highlands who suffered its effects” (page 148).

Grandin 2004: “By 1977, a wave of land invasions had led to the militarization of many municipalities, with invading families growing increasingly belligerent” (page 126). “In Panzós, the…diffuse nature of the [land struggle], aimed not at a couple of families but at a broad front of ascendant planters, along with the PGT’s more sustained attempt to work with local reformers, brought…tensions to a head. By 1977, over twenty-three land skirmishes throughout Panzós threatened to turn the town into a war zone. The response time between repression, protest, and reaction accelerated” (pages 146-147).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: En “1977 emergen el Comité de Entidades de los Trabajadores del Estado (CETE); posteriormente la Coordinadora de Pobladores (CDP) y el Comité Pro Justicia y Paz (CJP); entidades todas que conjuntamente con el Movimiento Nacional de Pobladores (MONAP), el partido Socialista Democrático y el Frente Unido de la Revolución, integraron en 1979 el Frente Democrático Contra la Represión (FDCR)” (page 18).

April

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “Las relaciones bilaterales con los EEUU fueron deteriorándose con la elección de James Carter como presidente…En abril de 1977, se publicó el primer informe del Departamento de Estado sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en varios países, entre los que se encontraba Guatemala. Frente a este informe el Gobierno de Laugerud…decidió renunciar a la ayuda militar estadounidense” (page 98).

November

Guatemala: crisis y opciones. Informe final 1986: “En [noviembre] 1977 con la marcha de los mineros de Ixtahuacán se introdujeron ‘las marchas’ como medio de presión pública” (page 16).

1978

Luciak 2001: “ORPA went public officially in 1978. Both the EGP and ORPA organized primarily within the indigenous community” (page 130).

Warren 1998: “Between 1978 and 1985, the western highlands of Guatemala were engulfed in intense internal warfare, ‘la violencia’ as it was called in the countryside. This was the worst of a series of crises during the decades of authoritarian regimes and military-dominated democracies that plagued the country after the mid-1960s…The effects of ‘la violencia’ in the western highlands ranged from the total destruction of some four hundred hamlets and municipal centers to periodic sweeps, repression, and selective killings in other settlements” (page 86). “Many Mayas felt that the government used the counterinsurgency war as an excuse to destroy Maya populations. Both their desire for wider political participation and their distinctiveness in language and community were seen as political threats by rightist political groups and the military. The painful irony that foot soldiers for this counterinsurgency effort were overwhelmingly Maya was not lost on rural populations” (page 87). “The conflict did not have the same intensity in all parts of the highlands. Zones of major guerrilla activity, such as the Ixil Triangle in the Department of El Quiché, were the most heavily militarized, although bases and civil patrols were set up throughout the highlands. To resettle populations dispersed by the violence, the government created thirty-three model villages (‘polos de desarrollo’), which left civilian populations directly under military control” (page 89).

February

Bastos 2003: “(A)unque una parte del partido no lo avala, el FIN se alía con el Frente Amplio que propone al general Romeo Lucas en una ceremonia que tiene lugar en las ruinas de Iximché el 18 de febrero de 1978” (page 48).

Fischer 2001: “(B)y early 1978 FIN had joined forces with the Partido Revolucionario, which had been courting its endorsement. In a politically fatal miscalculation, FIN then formally endorsed the successful candidacy of General Romeo Lucas García for president” (page 95).

March 5: general election (Lucas García / PR, PID, and CAO coalition)

Aguilera P. 1978: “Es un poco difícil precisar exactamente quién obtuvo el mayor número de votos, debido a las caracteristicas voluminosas y bastante burdas del fraude que se llevó a cabo” (page 167). Gives number of electoral districts won by each party. Gives percent of abstention as reported by official sources and electoral observers (page 168).

Anderson 1988: Gives candidates for president and their parties, the percent of potential voters who voted, and the number of votes for each candidate (page 33). The election was decided in Congress. Gives the number of seats in Congress won by each party and names the winner of Guatemala City’s mayoral election.

Bastos 2003: “(E)l experimento [de FIN] fracasó electoralmente, y en el siguiente periodo legislativo ya no hubo la presencia indígena que se había conseguido a través de Tetzagüic y Verona, pues sólo quedaron dos diputados indígenas, pero como suplentes…Algo similar sucede con el poder municipal: tras las elecciones de 1978, las alcaldías gobernadas por indígenas aumentan de forma importante, llegando a las cabeceras departamentales de El Quiché y Chimaltenango y a lugares como Chichicastenango. Pero la autoridad municipal no les previene de la represión estatal. Antes de 1982 habrán muerto los alcaldes de Chichicastenango, Santa Cruz del Quiché, [y otros mas]” (page 49). “El comité Cívico Xel-ju’, se presenta en las elecciones de 1978 bajo el lema de ‘Sólo el pueblo salva al pueblo,’ de clara connotación de izquierdas, no porque se hubiera aliado con la guerrilla, sino porque ese era el discurso dominante de entonces” (page 50).

Berger 1986: “The PID/PR coalition was…guaranteed an electoral victory—fraudulent or not. According to official tabulations, the PID/PR coalition received 173,237 votes, the MLN candidate obtained 168,068 and the DC coalition received 124,053. Only about 10% of the electorate had thus voted in the 1978 elections: 60% did not even go to the polls, and another 20% destroyed their ballots in accordance with directions from the left” (page 719).

Bowdler 1982: “Every fraud in the book was mentioned in discussions of the 1978 election: disappearance of ballot boxes, falsification and tampering with registration books, elimination of names from the voter registration books, forgery of certificates of residence and certificates of citizenship required to identify the voting citizens, citizens voting two or three times with different sets of documents, ballots given to rural citizens already marked, and finally ‘phantom’ precincts out in remote parts of the country...(O)ne precinct reported 14,000 votes when according to electoral law no precinct was supposed to have more than 600 ballots, but the National Electoral Council accepted these votes as valid” (page 137).

Brockett 2005: “Given the fraud of 1974 and the ‘legal’ exclusion of Colom Argueta and his party from the March 1978 presidential election, the abstention rate hit 65 percent. The winning candidate, Gen. Romeo Lucas García (Laugerud’s defense minister), was almost defeated by the even further to the right candidate of the MLN, the head of the 1963 junta, General Peralta Azurdía” (page 214).

Central America report 23 July 1999: “In 1978, the PR formed an alliance with the right-wing (PID), bringing General Romeo Lucas García to power” (page 2).

Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 12 1978: For the March 5, 1978 election for congress gives the characteristics of parliament, the electoral system, general political considerations and conduct of the elections, and statistics (pages 81-83).

Daetz Caal 1999: “Elecciones de 1978” (pages 93-94). “Distribución de votos en las elecciones presidenciales de 1978” (page 95).

Dunkerley 1991: “(T)he army was able to retain its control without major difficulty in the election of 1978. General Romeo Lucas García was elected in a poll in which 69 per cent of registered voters abstained and 20 per cent of the ballots were spoiled” (page 150).

Ebel 1990: “When Gen. Romeo Lucas García was elected in 1978 on a coalition ticket made up of PID, PR, and...CAN, both the military and the dominant economic groups, led by the...CACIF, were prepared to repress any further mass agitation” (page 505).

Figueroa Ibarra 1978: Gives number of eligible voters, number of votes won by the top three candidates, percent of registered voters who voted for the top three candidates, percent of eligible voters who cast blank votes, null votes, or abstained, and percent of eligible voters who actually voted for the winning candidate (page 293).

Fischer 2001: “In 1978, General Romo Lucas García took control of the government, and he and his brother, the minister of defense, escalated military actions against the population at large. Because the guerrilla movement was now based in the Indian highlands, ladino elites’ Cold War-inspired anxiety about Marxist revolutionaries converged with their long-smoldering fears of an Indian uprising, creating the ideological justification for the ethnocidal campaigns directed by the military” (page 77). “Lucas García quickly dashed any hopes of sponsoring pro-Maya policies; instead, he escalated the country’s burgeoning civil war and targeted Maya populations as potential, if not active, subversives subject to eradication” (page 95).

González Quesada 1978: Gives number registered to vote in each department as of September 1977 and number of these affiliated with the MLN, PID, PR, and DC (page 103). Gives number of seats held by MLN, PID, DC, PR, and CAO as of March 1 (page 125). Discusses electoral fraud and estimates voter abstention (page 157-159). For the first sixty-six “mesas” whose votes were tabulated in the municipal elections of Guatemala City gives by candidate the number and percent of votes they received (in increments--votes after five tables counted, after ten tables, after nineteen, etc.) (pages 185-186).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “En 1978 los militares continuaron con el modelo electoral de los años anteriores…La elección se dio en medio de una crisis política…Los resultados de los comicios del 5 de marzo de ese año originaron una vez más protestas, violencia y denuncias de fraude…La tendencia a la abstención electoral se acentuó con un 63.5% de no votantes. Fue este el binomio electoral menos votado en la historia del país, prueba de la poca legitimidad del modelo militar y del régimen político” (pages 129-130).

Guatemala, elecciones ‘95 1995: “Elecciones 1978. Candidatos, votos recibidos y partidos postulantes” (page 78).

Guatemala: monografía de partidos políticos 2000-2004 2004: “Para las elecciones de 1978, la DCG…impulsó la creación de la Cruzada de Unidad Nacional, que pustuló al general Ricardo Peralta Méndez como candidato presidencial; sin embargo, nuevamente se denunció fraude electoral, lo que favoreció al candidato oficial” (page 17).

Gutiérrez 1997: Lucas García “inició la cacería de izquierdistas en todo el país. Bajo este gobierno ocurrió la masacre de Panzós..., los asesinatos de los líderes socialdemócratas..., así como de decenas de líderes sindicales, campesinos, catequistas y estudiantes,...de la poeta Alaíde Foppa, de 27 sindicalistas de la Central Nacional de Trabajadores...y otros” (page 82).

Hacia dónde vamos? Guía electoral 2003 2003: “El MLN participó solo en las elecciones de 1978 luego de la ruptura con el PID” (page 33).

Handy 1984: Gives percent of registered voters who abstained, percent of null votes, percent of eligible voters who voted, percent of population who voted, and number of votes for the top two candidates (page 176).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “Retrospectivamente podemos decir que el cambio de gobierno realizado en 1978 se originó en un abierto y descarado fraude electoral” (page 19). “El FUN participó en las elecciones generales de 1978 en alianza con el Movimiento de Liberación Nacional” (page 44). “(A)l haberse roto la coalición con el PID, el MLN se ve obligado a participar solo en las elecciones presidenciales de 1978 con la ayuda de los grupos PARN y FUN que todavía no tenían carácter de partidos legalmente inscritos” (page 125). “Por su parte el PID había realizado una nueva coalición, esta vez con el Partido Revolucionario y la Central Aranista Organizada, que sin ser partido legalizado, era una importante fuerza electoral por el apoyo financiero que el Coronel Arana Osorio le brindaba...Nuevamente el fraude se impone y de esta manera llega a la Presidencia el General Romeo Lucas García” (page 126). El MLN “obtiene 211,393 votos de un total de 764,898 votos emitidos, es decir, el 27.63% en términos porcentuales” (page 134). “El total de personas que estaban inscritas para participar en las elecciones era de 1,800,025 y anularon su voto o fue declarado en blanco, un total de 126,772 votos...(A)sí, el abstencionismo total para estas elecciones, fue de 64.54%. Para ese año la población estimada de Guatemala era de 8,500,000 habitantes, lo que nos indica que solamente el 21.17% de sus pobladores participaron en los procesos electorales” (page 135).

Paiz-Andrade 1997: “General Lucas rose to power through elections widely recognized as fraudulent. He presided over a corrupt regime that squandered millions of Guatemala’s international reserves; his rule was characterized by violence, guerrilla warfare, and counterinsurgency operations” (page 141).

Rivas 1978: Gives number of votes and percent of total vote for three presidential candidates. (page 434).

Rosada Granados 1992a: “The change of government in 1978 came about by open and impudent electoral fraud” (page 98).

Schooley 1987: Gives the seats in Congress won by each party (page 25).

Sichar Moreno 1999: “En 1978, en las elecciones municipales, [Xel-Ju] quedó como segunda fuerza en Quetzaltenango a tan solo 40 votos del PR-PID. Es la expression política maya más consolidada y su mayor éxito fue conseguir que por primera vez en la historia el alcalde de Quetzaltenango, la segunda ciudad del país, sea un maya: Rigoberto Quemé Chay” (page 52).

Soto Rosales 2002: “Elecciones presidenciales del 5 de marzo de 1978” (page 85). Gives votes for three candidates.

Villagrán Kramer 2004: “1978: elecciones nacionales” (pages 132-134).

Williams 2003: “The 1978 elections were characterized by widespread fraud and unprecedented levels of abstention…The regime declared General Lucas García the winner (although he was believed to have placed third), and the Christian Democrats’ candidate, General Ricardo Peralta Méndez, was awarded third place” (page 318).

March 13

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “El Congreso practicó la elección de segundo grado el día 13 de aquel mes, desestimando las pruebas de la victoria del coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia (candidato del MLN)” (page 129).

April

Bastos 2003: “Finalmente el 15 de abril de 1978, el CUC decide salir a la luz pública…Sus demandas recogen las urgencias de un trato digno para los cuadrilleros, un rechazo a las agarradas para los cuarteles, reclamos de los pequeños campesinos y hasta de los pequeños comerciantes…(E)l CUC surge como una organización ‘de clases’ pero que ‘nunca niega el carácter indígena’ de la mayoría de sus componentes” (page 46).

Brockett 2005: The Comité de Unidad Campesina is “Guatemala’s most potent peasant organization since the CGTG of the 1944-1954 reform period…Most of CUC’s early leadership came from…the left wing of Catholic Action” (page 135). “CUC emerged publicly in April 1978…CUC’s historic ambition was to unite within one organization indigenous and ladino campesinos” (page 136).

May

Dunkerley 1991: “The absence of any change in [human rights] policy was sharply reconfirmed in May 1978 when some hundred Kekchi peasant farmers from the town of Panzós, Alta Verapaz, were shot down by the army...The Panzós massacre is widely and justifiably perceived as opening a new phase of rural confrontation out of which emerged the Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC) and a disposition on the part of many inhabitants of the countryside to support the armed organizations of the left” (pages 150-151).

Grandin 2004: Describes the events leading up to the Panzós massacre on May 29, 1978, and gives survivor accounts (pages 133-155). Adelina Caal, also known as Mamá Maquin, is one of the first killed (page 151). “Perhaps no other event had such far-reaching political and symbolic consequences, consequences that rang through all levels of society—the left, unions, indigenous movements, the insurgency, the Church, the military, and the state. Unlike the massacres that were soon to come, Panzós was not denied” (pages 155-156). “For many indigenous activist taking part in the assorted strands of opposition politics, Panzós came to represent a change in the relationship between indigenous communities and the government…Two days after the massacre, on the eve of the first protest, about a thousand indigenous members of the Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC) filled a religious convent in downtown Guatemala City to attend a mass in honor of the victims. Operating mostly in the western highlands and along the southern coast, the CUC was Guatemala’s first national peasant federation organized and led by Mayans” (page 160).

Mujeres latinoamericanas en cifras: Guatemala1992: “En 1978 nació el Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC), con el propósito de agrupar todas las organizaciones campesinas e impulsar la lucha conjunta obrero-campesina...Llegó a reunir 150.000 miembros, en su mayoría indígenas. Forzado a la clandestinidad en 1980, tras el asesinato de veintinueve integrantes--quemados vivos en la ocupación pacífica de la Embajada de España en protesta por la represión militar--reemergió en 1987” (page 95).

Schirmer 1998: “In 1978, the army, under pressure from local landowners and labor contractors, mounted a massive wave of repression against the popular mobilization of the Indian population, with the May 1978 Panzós massacre marking the use of massacre as a counterinsurgency tactic” (page 39).

Tooley 1994: “On May 29, 1978 the army opened fire on an unarmed crowd of 700 Kekchí Indians in Panzós, wounding 300 and killing over 100. The crowd had gathered in a peaceful demonstration to protest the expropriation of their land by army generals and developers” (page 92).

Weaver 1994: “U.S. financial and tactical assistance was crucial in the fuller development of the repressive system, but the Guatemalan military and propertied elites demonstrated their ability to sustain these efforts even when U.S. president Jimmy Carter cut off military aid to Guatemala in the late 1970s on the principled grounds of human rights violations” (page 197). “Although this development is described here in terms of U.S. decisions about funding the Guatemalan military, it was the result of an explicit decision by the Guatemalan military that it did not want U.S. aid if it were to be supervised or held accountable for human rights violations” (page 198).

June

Grandin 2004: “The demonstrations following the Panzós massacre were an important step toward open rebellion. For the first time since 1954, protesters publicly accused the state of assassination and genocide” (page 156). “In the national Congress, the massacre sparked three months of debate and calls for reform, even agrarian reform…Yet the majority of MLN and conservative Christian Democrats blocked any substantive legislation” (page 157). “For the PGT, the Panzós massacre was the effective end. Twelve days after the killings, a more militant faction within the party retaliated and killed nineteen military police in Guatemala City…The party split. The more conservative wing retained authority in Alta Verapaz…In Panzós and elsewhere, the PGT’s decimated structure was replaced by armed insurgents, most notably the Ejéricto Guerrillero de Los Pobres (EGP)” (page 159). “The Panzós massacre galvanized the national left, providing a focal point of unification. The killings further radicalized politics and destroyed the lingering ability on the part of not just the PGT but a range of other parties, organizations, and individuals to work through state institutions” (page 165).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: El Partido Socialista Democrático se “inicia en la vida política en su carácter institucional, a partir del 15 de junio de 1978...representando a los trabajadores manuales e intelectuales de Guatemala” (page 49).

July

Gaitán A. 1992: “El general Romero Lucas García asumió la primera magistratura de la nación el 1 de julio de 1978, fungiendo como Vicepresidente el licenciado Francisco Villagrán Kramer, quien renunció a medio período presidencial” (page 147).

Grandin 2004: “Inaugurated a month after the massacre, Laugerud’s successor, General Romero Lucas García, facing an unprecedented popular movement and a spreading insurgency, let loose the death squads…(A)t the same time…, there emerged within the military a cohort of officers who increasingly identified the kind of chaos that led to the Panzós massacre as an obstacle to national security and stability” (page 162).

Schirmer 1998: “(R)epression became increasingly blind, random, and massive under President-General Romeo Lucas García (1978-82)—which, in turn, swelled the ranks of the guerrillas…[The] pattern of explicitly military elections and governance eviscerated political institutions and political life through the 1970s and into the 1980s. But during the Lucas García regime, repression by state-controlled death squads and counterinsurgency patrols rapidly began to have a negative effect on the military as an institution as well” (page 18).

Villagrán Kramer 2004: “El uno de julio de 1978 asumimos el general Romeo Lucas García la Presidencia de la República y el autor, la VicePresidencia, cargo que desempeñaría hasta renunciar el 1 de septiembre de 1980 y el general Lucas, hasta el 22 de marzo de 1982, fecha en que fue derrocado por oficiales jóvenes del Ejército” (page 147).

August

Brockett 2005: “On August 4, 1978, one month after Lucas’s inauguration, an unauthorized march against violence by some 10,000 protesters was broken up by police…Afterwards, the new administration declared that under no circumstances would it permit illegal acts. However, political space disappeared gradually, not all at once” (page 215).

September

Montenegro Ríos 2002: El Partido Nacional Renovador “consiguió su inscripción oficial, el 14 de septiembre de 1978” (page 55).

October

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “A partir de 1977 se introduce la modalidad de las marchas desde los lugares de trabajo hacia la ciudad capital...Fue este un período de tomas de centros de trabajo y de estudio, de huelgas victoriosas, de masivos desfiles públicos, construcción de redes de solidaridad definidas entre la dirigencia sindical, campesina, estudiantil y de pobladores que desembocó en las jornadas urbanas de septiembre y octubre de 1978 motivadas por el aumento en el costo del transporte público. A partir de este momento el terrorismo del estado se sistematizó en contra de la dirigencia popular y democrática logrando el descenso en las movilizaciones públicas urbanas y la casi desaparición de la dirigencia sindical y campesina” (page 19).

1979

Arias 1990: “In 1978, the state initiated a counterinsurgency plan to strike at the popular, democratic movement in order to separate it from the more explicitly revolutionary movement: the political-military organizations, which, by means of guerrilla columns, had initiated their armed activity in 1975 and whose operations grew immensely, especially in 1979. Until late 1978, indigenous ethnic groups had favored mass organizations over armed struggle, but in early 1979, the army’s active presence began to be felt throughout the highlands, and this began to generate changes in that judgment” (page 252).

Bastos 2003: “(L)a ORPA sale a la luz pública a inicios de 1979—después de siete años de trabajo en silencio—con la toma de una finca cafetalera en Quetzaltenango, el EGP toma Nebaj…Es el momento del ‘optimismo’: el triunfo sandinista en Nicaragua y la fuerza del FMLN en El Salvador se sentían como señales evidentes de que el próximo triunfo revolucionario sería en Guatemala. Pero este momento culminante de la movilización popular es también el del inicio de la escalada represiva que lleva a su desmantelamiento” (page 55).

Brockett 2005: “(B)y the end of the decade the EGP was operating more boldly in the northern zone. For example, on several occasions in early 1979 it occupied towns in the Nebaj area of the Ixil Triangle…Furthermore, it now had expanded its presence throughout El Quiché and the southwestern highlands more broadly into other departments, especially Chimaltenango and Alta and Baja Verapaz” (page 120). “In 1979, an indigenous group split off [from ORPA] and formed a new organization, the Movimiento Revolucionario Popular-Ixim (MRP-Ixim)” (page 122).

Dunkerley 1991: “(T)he events of 1978...underscored the opposition’s need for agreement on a broad platform. Early in 1979 steps were taken towards this with the formation of a loose alliance of centrist parties and the major unions in the Frente Democrático Contra la Represión (FDCR)” (page 151).

Fischer 2001: “Whereas the early to mid-1970s had ushered in an era of increased Maya participation in national and local politics…, the civil war of the late 1970s brought a virtual end to such forms of organization and collective action…With war raging between communist revolutionaries and the U.S.-backed military, there was little political room in Guatemala for the pursuit of Maya identity politics during the early 1980s” (page 96).

Mahoney 2001: “After 1978, the vast majority of these state-sponsored abuses were directed at Mayan rural communities in the northwestern departments, most notably in Quiché. The CEH has documented more than six hundred massacres—usually perpetrated against indigenous communities—that can be directly attributed to state forces” (page 238).

McCleary 1999: “In late 1979, the military...learned of the extent to which the two guerrilla movements, EGP and ORPA, had infiltrated nearly three-fourths of the Guatemalan territory with the support of indigenous communities” (page 44).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “Ante el asesinato de sus más importantes dirigentes durante el año 1979 y como producto de la etapa represiva desplegada a partir de ese momento, la dirigencia del [PSD] se vio en la necesidad de optar por la resistencia pacífica activa” (page 49).

Painter 1987: “When General Lucas García...turned his attention to the Christian Democrats as part of his general offensive against ‘the centrist option,’ the result was the murder of at least 300 middle-ranking and provincial Christian Democrat leaders” (page 68).

Schirmer 1998: “By late 1979, the EGP…controlled a considerable amount of territory in the Ixil Triangle in El Quiché” (page 39).

January

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “El asesinato del dirigente socialdemócrata Alberto Fuentes Mohr, el 22 de enero de 1979, fue el anuncio de más asesinatos de esta naturaleza” (page 135).

February

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “La CAO evolucionó hasta convertirse en el Comité pro-formación del Partido Central Auténtica Nacionalista, concretando su personalidad jurídica el 17 de febrero de 1979, fecha en la que, en la primera Asamblea Nacional fueron aprobados sus estatutos” (page 45).

March

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “En marzo Manuel Colom Argueta, dirigente del recién inscrito Frente Unido de la Revolución (FUR), también fue asesinado” (page 135).

Guatemala: crisis y opciones. Informe final 1986: “Constitución del Frente Democrático contra la Represión (FDCR)” en marzo 1979 (page 16).

September

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “La ORPA estuvo ocho años en formación, desde su separación de las FAR en 1972. Su primera acción guerrillera la realizó el 18 septiembre de 1979 cuando atacó la finca Mujulliá, en el municipio de Colomba, Quetzaltenango” (page 118).

1980

Bastos 2003: “(A) finales de los 70 una buena proporción de alcaldías del altiplano están en manos de indígenas. El ejército ve como peligrosas a las autoridades municipales y muchas de ellas caerán bajo la estrategia de asesinatos selectivos” (page 271).

Brockett 2005: “When guerrilla activity picked back up, FAR’s presence was felt in Guatemala City once again with a series of kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings in 1980. However, its major zone of rural insurgence had shifted to the furthest corner of the country, the flat jungle, of El Petén” (page 118). “But, despite its years of being the revolutionary vanguard, FAR was now a minor actor in Guatemala’s new revolutionary movement. Instead, armed struggle was driven by two new organizations, both of which had leadership that had broken years before from FAR and who were determined not to repeat the errors of the 1960s: the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) and the Organización del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA)” (page 119).

Davis 1988: “In the late 1970s the social tensions always present in agrarian, multiethnic Guatemala exploded into a full-scale civil war that has had a permanent effect on the country’s large indigenous population. Although the Indian communities have been undergoing important social and cultural changes for more than a century, it was not until the 1980s that they became a source of mobilization and support for the country’s several guerrilla organizations and hence a perceived threat to the country’s powerful economic and military elites” (page 6).

Garrard-Burnett 1998: “The growth of evangelical churches in the areas of conflict was not lost on the officers of the Guatemalan army, who saw in the Protestant surge an opportunity to create a new political base; the Lucas government began to court their support. By 1980, Lucas opened most public functions with a prayer from a Protestant pastor…The primary thrust of Lucas’s attempt to tap the evangelicals for political support came from the countryside” (page 132).

Guatemala: causas y orígenes del enfrentamiento armado interno 2000: “A finales de los años setenta las iglesias protestantes crecieron considerablemente en el país, convirtiéndose en un refugio espiritual para muchos guatemaltecos ante la crisis económica y política que atravesaba el país” (page 103).

Luciak 2001: “(W)hile female participation [in the Guatemalan guerrilla struggle] during the 1960s and 1970s was limited, it started to increase in the 1980s” (page 23). “The UNAMG had originally emerged in 1980. It was the result of several years of organizing by women close to the guerrilla movement” (page 188).

January

Bastos 2003: “El año 1980 comienza con la masacre de 14 miembros del CUC junto a obreros y estudiantes en la Embajada de España el 31 de enero” (page 55).

Trudeau 2000: “January 31, 1980, remains a day of infamy in Guatemalan political history. For more than a month, a delegation of Mayan community leaders had been seeking an audience with the government, to petition for relief from the violence being visited on their highland region. Frustrated at every turn, on that day the group, supported by university students, entered and then peacefully occupied the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City, seeking to provoke a dialogue with Guatemala’s elected military rulers. In response, and in spite of the Spanish ambassador’s entreaties, the Guatemalan police surrounded and destroyed the building in a hail of explosives, resulting in some forty deaths by fire” (page 493).

Valdés 2000: “1980: En enero, un grupo de mujeres y hombres del pueblo Quiché se toma la embajada española para tratar de hacer escuchar sus reivindicaciones. El gobierno incendia el edificio con los manifestantes dentro, muriendo un grupo de manifestantes de ambos sexos” (Anexo: Participación de las mujeres en conflictos políticos: Guatemala).

February

Bastos 2003: “(E)l ‘Manifiesto de Iximché’ surge de la reunión que el CUC y otras organizaciones convocan el 24 de febrero de 1980 para protestar contra la masacre de la Embajada de España” (page 62).

Grandin 2000: “A few days following the firebombing of the Spanish embassy in 1980…the CUC called a meeting at the symbolically charged Iximché ruins, the former capital of the Kaqchikel kingdom. Representatives of nearly every important indigenous group attended, including those not allied with the guerrillas. This unprecendented coalition produced a declaration that linked mythical symbols of a pan-Indian past with class-based interests of a brutal present” (page 224). Reproduces translated text of the declaration (page 225). “This inclusive vision, however, was not to take hold. The social movement from which this manifesto emerged would be brutally suppressed by the state. The military unleashed a wave of terror that severed alliances, destroyed organizations, and decimated not only the rebels, but nearly all forms of social organization” (page 225).

Jonas 2000: “In February 1980, CUC staged a massive strike of workers on the southern coast sugar and cotton plantations” (page 23).

April: municipal elections

Anderson 1988: Gives number of mayoralities won by each party (page 46).

Ebel 1997: Describes the April 1980 municipal elections in San Juan Ostuncalco and gives the results (pages 185-187).

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “La primera experiencia electoral del CAN fue en 1980, con motivo de la renovación municipal del 50% de los consejos edilicios, habiendo obtenido un resultado favorable en 65 de los 135 municipios convocados” (page 48).

Williams 2003: “In response to the DCG’s denunciations of human rights abuses and its gains in the 1980 municipal elections, especially in Mayan communities, the regime began to persecute Christian Democratic mayors and activists. Some 300 were disappeared or assassinated during the Lucas García period” (page 318).

December

Montenegro Ríos 2002: “El 18 de diciembre de 1980 el PNR definió la candidatura presidencial de Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre y lanzó su programa de Autoconfianza Nacional” (page 57).