1948-1964

1948

Dodd 2005:  “The 1948 presidential campaign marked a new era in Honduran politics, the year Carías stepped down after a fifteen-year rule.  Popular organizations reflecting the interest of new economic and social groups appeared.  Divisions within each of the traditional parties emerged” (pages 216-217).

Fúnes Valladares 2004:  “En 1948, el Comité Femenino Hondureño demandó ante el Congreso Nacional la institucionalización de los derechos políticos de la mujer, una petición que ni siquiera fue considerada” (page 194).

Soluri 2005:  “Political changes in Honduras and elsewhere further complicated matters for the fruit companies.  Following the defeat of fascist regimes in World War II, authoritarian governments in Central America came under internal and external pressures to democratize political institutions.  In 1948, faced with growing opposition led by university students and radical Liberal party factions, President Carías stepped down from power after ruling Honduras for sixteen years, paving the way for his vice-president and former United Fruit Company lawyer, Juan Manual Gálvez, to assume the presidency” (page 171).

Villars 2004a:  “En 1948, el Comité Femenino Hondureño presentó ante el Congreso Nacional una petición para que se consignara a la mujer el derecho al voto” (page 126).  “La petición ‘cayó como una bomba’ entre los diputados del régimen cariísta, y ni siquiera fue considerada” (page 128).

February

Euraque 1996:  “Zúñiga Huete’s domination of the Liberal Party continued after his return to Tegucigalpa in February 1948” (page 69).

April

Euraque 1996:    The Liberal “party’s convention in April…excluded liberals associated with either the FDRH or the PDR” (page 69).

May

Dodd 2005:  “The [Liberal] party ticket, the same nominated in 1932, was announced at a convention on May 16, as grass roots organizations were barely evident.  Harassed and intimidated for years with no leadership, the Liberal Party in 1948 was a paper institution” (page 217).

August

Euraque 1996:  “In August 1948 a segment of the Liberal Party joined the PDRH, the successor of the PDR of San Pedro Sula. These divisions in the leadership of the Liberal Party, coupled with repression by the Carías dictatorship, signaled the collapse of Zúñiga Huete’s preeminence” (page 69).

September

Euraque 1996:  “By September [Zúñiga Huete] pulled his party from the October elections” (page 69).

October:  presidential election (Gálvez / PN)

Argueta 1989: Gives the number of registered voters, number of votes for PN and PL, null votes, and number who did not vote (page 333).

Bardales B. 1980: Describes the election (pages 46-47).

Euraque 1996:  “In the uncontested elections of 10 October, the National Party secured 85 percent of the vote” (page 70).

Krehm 1957: Carías’ candidate was elected when the opposition candidate withdrew (pages 158-159).

Leonard 1998: “In October 1948 Carías’s handpicked successor, Juan Manuel Gálvez, won the presidential election unchallenged.  The change in leadership, however, set Honduran politics in a new direction.  Two new political groups soon came forward, labor and the military, each seeking to have the political system serve its own interests” (page 96).

Parker 1981: “Juan Manuel Gálvez, an able lawyer and friend of Carías, won by an easy margin when his Liberal opponent Angel Zúñiga Huete withdrew from the race before the elections” (page 189).

Posas 1983: “En las elecciones presidenciales de octubre de 1948, que resultan ser elecciones de un solo candidato, triunfa Juan Manuel Gálvez, exabogado de la Cuyamel Fruit Company primero, más tarde, de la United Fruit Company y Ministro de Guerra durante el prolongado régimen cariísta.  El candidato opositor, Angel Zúñiga Huete, se retira del proceso electoral, previendo elecciones viciadas, no sin antes llamar a la insurreción armada a sus partidarios, sin ningún éxito” (page 113).

Rojas Bolaños 1994:   “(E)n las elecciones realizadas el 11 de octubre de 1948 [Gálvez] resultó vencedor con el 80% de los votos” (page 108).

Stokes 1950:  “The elections of October, 1948 brought the Carías administration to a close” (pages 57-58).

Weaver 1994: “Even though the Liberal Party had been made legal again to give the appearance of a competitive election with the National Party, the Liberals boycotted the elections after assessing their chances.  But as so often is the case in Central American history, the carefully chosen successor did not turn out to be all that malleable after all” (page 145). 

1949

Fúnes Valladares 2004:  “Un nuevo rechazo sufrió al año siguiente [el Comité Femenino Hondureño], pese a que la nueva estrategia incluyó la firma de sectores diversos y fue respaldada por dos diputados” (page 194).

MacCameron 1983:  “(S)hortly after taking office, President Gálvez took steps to restore guarantees to political exiles.  Hundreds of Honduran political exiles began to return home, including Liberal party leaders Alfredo Trejo Castillo and Zuñiga Huete.  Political factions once again surfaced” (page 17).

Soluri 2005:  In 1949, “university students and others openly protested the terms of a concession sought by United Fruit, a clear signal that the fruit companies’ influence in Tegucigalpa was waning” (page 171).

January

Euraque 1996:  “Juan Manuel Gálvez assumed office in January 1949” (page 70).

MacCameron 1983:  “In January, 1949, the aging Carías voluntarily relinquished power to his vice-president, a former United Fruit Company lawyer, Juan Manuel Gálvez.  No one expected Gálvez to be anything other than a rubber stamp for Carías” (page 17).

Stokes 1950:  “Manuel Gálvez and Julio Lozano were inaugurated president and vice-president respectively in January, 1949” (pages 57-58).

Villars 2004a:  “Desde el momento de su arribo al poder, Juan Manuel Gálvez ensayó un programa de modernización institucional del Estado y de desarrollo de la economía nacional, y en el campo político permitió una ‘tímida’ apertura democrática.  Esa apertura favoreció la reestructuración interna de los partidos tradicionales (el oficialista Partido Nacional y el opositor Partido Liberal)” (page 127).  “Al siguiente año [el Comité Femenino Hondureño] presentó una nueva petición, luego de recoger firmas entre las mujeres de diferentes sectores, y esta vez fue apoyada por los diputados Jesús Villeda Vidal y Eliseo Pérez Cadalso.  Estos dos diputados introdujeron en la Cámara una exposición y proyecto de decreto para conceder los derechos políticos a las mujeres hondureñas alfabetizadas y mayores de dieciocho años.  El proyecto de decreto fue rechazado por la mayoría de los diputados, lo que tomó por sorpresa a algunas mujeres sufragistas, quienes pensaron que sería aprobado sin mucha discusión” (page 128).  “En la sesión legislativa del 26 de enero de 1949, el diputado Jesús Villeda Vidal leyó la exposición de motivos del anteproyecto de ley sobre el sufragio femenino” (pages 133-134).  Quotes his presentation and discusses the debate that follows.

March

Villars 2004a:  “El tercero y último debate sobre esta iniciativa se llevó a cabo el 11 de marzo de 1949.  Al final de una larga discusión, la moción fue derrotada por 33 votos contra nueve a favor” (page 134).

1950

Bowman 2001:  “Unlike any of the other five Central American republics, the military had no political influence in Honduras 1900-1950…Honduras simply did not have institutionalised and professional armed forces until the 1950s” (page 543).

Euraque 1999a:  “(L)as primeras generaciones árabes-palestinas se mantuvieron al margen de la vida social y política del país.  Pero a partir de los 1950, los árabes-palestinos lentamente estrechan relaciones matrimoniales con viejos y nuevos ricos” (page 157).

Godichet 1997:  “Desde la administración de Carías Andino hasta los años 50’s la autonomía municipal había sido diezmada al imponerse Alcaldes por nombramiento del Ejecutivo y dejar el poder real en manos de los comandantes ‘militares’ regionales” (page 9).

Soluri 2005:  “In 1950, President Gálvez signed legislation creating a 15-percent income tax on the banana companies’ in-country earnings” (page 171).

December:  municipal election

Euraque 1996:  “The first contested municipal elections in Honduras after 1933 did not take place until 1950, under the presidency of Juan Manuel Gálvez.  That year the nationalists obtained over 90 percent of the votes and won every municipality except one” (page 68).

Kantor 1969: “When municipal elections were held in December 1950, the Liberal Party actually won in one ‘municipio,’ Nacaome, and was allowed to take office.  The vote in the 1950 election, one of the fairest ever held until then, demonstrates how few voters Honduras has traditionally had, for the official result gave the National Party 77,593 and the Liberal Party 8,103, a total of 86,697 at a time when the country’s population was 1,428,089" (page 139).

1951

Anderson 1981:  “In the postwar period regional organizations proliferated throughout the world, and the Central Americans were not slow to see that they might achieve a degree of their long-sought unity by having their own.  In October 1951 they met at San Salvador and established the Organización de Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA)” (page 9).

Villars 2004a:  Los “esfuerzos organizativos de diferentes sectores de mujeres, en su mayoría intelectuales, cristalizaron en 1951 en la formación de la Federación de Asociaciones Femeninas de Honduras (FAFH), la cual dirigió la lucha final por la consignación del derecho de la mujer al voto” (page 126).

1952

Bowman 2001:  “The national military academy was not founded until 1952” (page 543).

Martz 1959: Under Carías’s “nominal leadership the party had won 76 percent of the total vote in 1952 municipal elections” (page 145).

January

Villars 2004a:  “En enero de 1952, El Frente Femenil Pro-Legalidad, una organización fundada durante la dictadura cariísta por mujeres liberales para demandar el retorno a la ‘legalidad’, se dirigió también al Congreso Nacional para pedir ‘igualdad de derechos civiles, políticos y sociales’ para la mujer” (page 129).  Quotes from petition.  “El Comité Femenino de [el PDRH] también se identificó con la lucha de la FAFH; en 1952 pidió al Congreso Nacional el apoyo al anteproyecto de ley prosufragio femenino presentado por esta Federación.  Otro grupo ligado al PDRH que apoyó la demanda sufragista fue el Comité Coordinador Obrero, que fue fundado en 1950 por varios sindicatos de Tegucigalpa” (page 133).

February

Fúnes Valladares 2004:  “La tercera derrota del período la sufrió esta vez la Federación de Asociaciones Femeninas de Honduras (FAFH), en 1952, aún con las limitaciones que la propia moción impuso:  que el derecho a voto le fuera otorgado a las mujeres mayores de 21 años y profesionales” (page 194).

Villars 2004a: “La Federación de Asociaciones Femeninas de Honduras…presentó al Congreso Nacional una petición para obtener los derechos políticos de la mujer.  La petición fue acuerpada por un grupo de diputados quienes, en febrero de 1952, introdujeron en la Cámara una moción para que se les otorgara el derecho al voto a las ‘mujeres mayores de veintiún años que tengan título profesional.’  La moción fue nuevamente derrotada” (page 128).  Discusses debate (pages 129-130).  “Esta vez, la moción fue más restrictiva que en 1949…La moción fue nuevamente derrotada, pero con un margen más estrecho:  21 votos en contra y 17 a favor” (page 134).  Gives additional details.  “Cuando el 25 de febrero de 1952 se rechazó en la Cámara Legislativa la iniciativa pro sufragista, muchos de los legisladores que votaron en contra lo hicieron por su temor de que el voto de las mujeres favoreciera al Partido Liberal” (page 152).

December

Villars 2004a:  “En deciembre de 1952, en apoyo a la petición de las mujeres, una tercera iniciativa fue presentada por un grupo de diputados” (page 128).

1953

MacCameron 1983:  “The Gálvez liberalization program culminated in a call for national elections in October, 1954, the first elections in twenty-two years” (page 19).  “Although President Gálvez outlawed the PDRH in 1953, it was the only political party in the country to take the credit for instigating the strike [in May 1954]” (page 59).

Vallejo Hernández 1990:  “Bajo la acertada conducción del Dr. Ramón Villeda Morales, el Partido Liberal presentó un programa atractivo de reformas para el país, tanto en el sector agrario e industrial, como en el de salud, educación y político.  Fue de esta manera que el Partido obtiene una significativa victoria en las elecciones municipales de 1953” (page 57).

January

Villars 2004a:  “La iniciativa fue también desechada en su último debate, realizado el 13 de enero de 1953” (page 128).  Gives more details (page 134).  “(L)a iniciativa sufragista introducida en diciembre de 1952 fue rechazada (el 13 de enero de 1953) esencialmente debido a las disputas entre los diputados de las dos fracciones del Partido Nacional:  la ‘conservadora’ o cariísta y la ‘reformista’ (Movimiento Nacional Reformista).  La iniciativa de diciembre de 1952 fue introducida por un grupo de diputados del Movimiento Nacional Reformista” (page 152).  “Esta fracción…vio en la instauración del sufragio femenino un recurso para ensanchar su caudal político; de ahí la oposición de los diputados cariístas a la iniciativa” (page 153).

May

Euraque 1996:  “Preparations for the presidential election of October 1954, beginning with the May 1953 Liberal Party convention, surely helped to wrest more liberals from the PDRH” (page 71).

1954

Haggerty and Millet 1995: “By early 1954...a major [U.S.] covert operation against Guatemala was being organized...with greater Honduran cooperation.  One reason for the cooperation was the Honduran government’s concern over increased labor tensions in the banana-producing areas, tensions that the fruit companies blamed, in part, on Guatemalan influence” (page 33).

MacCameron 1983:  “Facing a split opposition, the [Liberal] party enjoyed the rising attraction of many Hondurans...The Liberals then nominated a medical doctor, Ramón Villeda Morales, to lead the party to an apparent long-awaited victory” (page 19).  “Due to his vigorous management of the 1953 municipal party elections, and Zuñiga Huete’s death that same year, [Villeda] received the party’s presidential nomination in 1954” (page 96).

Sullivan 1995: “In the early 1950s, women’s associations fought for women’s suffrage, which finally was achieved in 1954, making Honduras the last Latin American country to extend voting rights to women” (page 190).

Villars 2004a:  “Villeda Morales era también el esposo de una connotada lideresa del movimiento sufragista en Honduras, Alejandrina Bermúdez de Villeda Morales.  Ella fue la primera presidenta de la FAFH” (page 154).

January

Bertrand Anduray 1992:  “En 1954 la FAFH introdujo nuevamente la moción sobre los Derechos Políticos para la Mujer y esta vez obtuvo un triunfo parcial al emitir el Congreso el Decreto Legislativo No. 30 del 26 de enero de 1954, siendo Presidente de la República el Dr. Juan Manuel Gálvez” (page 19).  “Este decreto no pudo ser ratificado a pesar de haber sido aprobado por unanimidad de votos, al haber entrado el país en un ‘régimen de facto’, pasando a ser Jefe de Estado el P.M. Julio Lozano Díaz, Ministro de Gobernación de ese entonces” (page 20).

Villars 2004a:  “El 25 de enero de 1954 los palcos y pasillos del Congreso Nacional de Honduras se encontraban abarrotados de mujeres que habían llegado allí para presenciar el último debate sobre una nueva iniciativa, presentada por un grupo de cinco diputados, para instituir el sufragio femenino.  Esta vez, los resultados del debate eran predecibles:  entre los representantes de la Cámara existía un consenso de que ‘era la hora’ impostergable para otorgarle a la mujer hondureña sus derechos políticos.  Después de que fue leído y puesto a discusión el dictamen de la Comisión Primera de Legislación, que era favorable al proyecto de decreto, 17 de los 47 diputados presentes razonaron su voto a favor del proyecto y, seguidamente, fue sometido a votación siendo aprobado por unanimidad” (page 151).  “El mismo grupo de diputados del Movimiento Nacional Reformista que introdujo en el Congreso Nacional la iniciativa del voto femenino en diciembre de 1952, la introdujo nuevamente en 1954, pero esta vez corrió mejor suerte ya que los legisladores de las dos fracciones del Partido Nacional votaron unánimemente a favor de ella” (page 153).

February

Dodd 2005:  “Still in control of the party, Carías was nominated as its candidate for president in February 1954.  In his acceptance speech, he castigated members who wanted to split the Nationalist Party and amend the constitution extending Juan Manuel Gálvez’s term” (page 228).

MacCameron 1983:  “The conservative National party faced a hopeless split between supporters of Gálvez and Carías.  In fact, Carías had decided that Honduras would only return to its proper course if he regained the presidency.  Therefore, he soon announced his candidacy for president on the National party ticket.  In response, the reform wing of the National party, the ‘Movimiento Nacional Reformista’ (MNR), nominated General Abraham Williams, former vice-president and minister under Carías, as successor to Gálvez” (page 19).

April

Anderson 1981:  “On 10 April 1954 the dock workers of the United Fruit Company struck spontaneously at Tela, demanding double time for Sunday” (page 55).

Euraque 1996:  “Insiders have asserted that the modern Partido Comunista de Honduras was founded in April 1954…Though set up by left-wing leaders in San Pedro Sula in April 1954, the PCH remained a clandestine organization and some of its members participated in the still legal PDRH” (page 95).

Martínez 1999:  “Entre la incipiente militancia marxista de ese momento surge la polémica sobre el tipo de partido a organizar.  Entre otras cosas, se discutía si el partido debía ser un partido electoral de masas o si debía ser un partido de cuadros rigurosamente seleccionados y preparados para luchar por las transformaciones revolucionarias en el país.  Finalmente triunfó la tesis del partido de cuadros y el 10 de abril de 1954 se reorganizó el Partido Comunista de Honduras” (page 143).

Rojas Bolaños 1994: The Partido Comunista Hondureño is founded in April 1954 (page 109).

Villars 2004a:  “La plataforma ideológica del PDRH descansaba en ideales socialdemócratas, pero entre sus dirigentes se encontraban jóvenes marxistas, quienes reorganizaron, en 1954, el Partido Comunista de Honduras” (page 131).

May 3

Anderson 1981:  “(B)y 3 May the strike had spread to UFCO operations at Puerto Cortés, La Lima, and El Progreso.  The government of Gálvez declared the strikers to be ‘communists,’ as was customary, and sent troops to the North Coast, provoking violence and doing nothing to quell the strike, which now spread to the railroad itself and to the field workers on UFCO’s plantations…By 11 May the Standard Fruit workers had also joined in…The Rosario Mining Company, the Honduran Brewery Company, and the British-American Tobacco Company, the latter two linked financially to the fruit companies, went out on strike along with a number of smaller firms, not only on the North Coast but in Tegucigalpa as well…Standard Fruit then agreed to concessions; but United, backed by the government and encouraged by United States Ambassador Whiting Willauer, continued to make life difficult for the strikers” (page 55).

Delgado Fiallos 1986: “La Huelga de Mayo de 1954 está considerada como uno de los acontecimientos más importantes de la historia de Honduras...Con la huelga…la clase obrera hace acto de presencia en la vida política del pais” (page 173).

Euraque 1996:  “In May 1954 President Gálvez, conspiring to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, faced the greatest strike ever attempted against banana companies during this century; it involved 40,000 workers” (page 71).

Leonard 1998: “The strike affected Honduras’s two political parties.  For eighteen years following the strike, the Liberal Party (PLH) became the representative of the lower socioeconomic groups, while increasingly the National Party (PHN) became the representative of the traditional elite groups.  The struggle between them provided the military with the opportunity to become a major participant in the political arena” (page 101).

Schooley 1987: “A political and economic crisis erupted in April 1954 when dock workers at Tela refused to load ships at the UFCO wharves...As the dispute escalated into a general protest against the UFCO management, Gálvez sent troops..., but by May 3 the strike had spread to the four UFCO divisions....The strikers’ case was supported by Guatemala, fueling allegations...that the strike was ‘communist’ inspired” (page 37).

Soluri 2005:  “The ‘Gran huelga’ of 1954 gave rise to powerful union and campesino movements that, in alliance with liberal North Coast merchants, succeeded in reforming Honduran labor codes, agrarian laws, social welfare, and tax structures.  The fruit companies responded to the rising power of Honduran workers by cutting jobs” (page 11).

May 20

Alcántara Sáez 1989: “En el transcurso de 1954 se articuló un Acuerdo de Ayuda Bilateral con los Estados Unidos gracias al cual fue posible la creación del moderno y profesional ejército de Honduras” (page 183).

Bowman 1999: “On 20 May 1954, in a quid pro quo for Honduran support of the Castillo Armas invasion and as a continuation of U.S. military assistance policies in Latin America, the United States and Honduras signed a Bilateral Agreement of Military Assistance that called for U.S. military aid in exchange for free access to raw materials that may be needed by the United States” (page 9).

Haggerty and Millet 1995: “As the strike was spreading, Honduras was also becoming more deeply involved in the movement to topple the Arbenz government in Guatemala.  In late May, a military assistance agreement was concluded between the United States and Honduras, and large quantities of United States arms were quickly shipped to Honduras....[and] passed on to anti-Arbenz rebels commanded by Castillo Armas” (page 34). 

Ropp 1974: “In order to fully understand the impact that the U.S. Military Aid Mission’s effort to create a more professional Honduran Army was to have on Honduran politics, one must realize that such professionalization of the Armed Forces was paralleled by a decline in the institutional cohesion of the two Honduran political parties.  While it is true that the National and Liberal parties had never been anything more than semi-institutionalized factional groupings, party disarray reached true crisis proportions during the forties and early fifties” (page 513).

June

MacCameron 1983:  “(I)mportant to the [United Fruit] company’s well being...were the military and political events transpiring in Guatemala in late June, 1954.  At 5 p.m. on June 18, [Guatemalan] General Castillo Armas and a band of rebel soldiers crossed into Guatemala from Honduras...Castillo Armas succeeded in forcing [Guatemalan] President Jacobo Guzmán Arbenz to resign on June 27.  Now the United Fruit Company, which believed it had struggled against the symptoms of communism on Honduras’ north coast, witnessed with great relief the disease itself expunged from Guatemala City.  Shortly after the coup, the Armas government rescinded the Arbenz agrarian reform program and returned nearly 200,000 acres of expropriated land to the United Fruit Company” (page 51).

July

Bowman 1999: “The First Infantry Battalion was organized by the United States on 20 July 1954—less than a month after the fall of Arbenz...With alleged communists in neighboring Guatemala and leftists participating in banana strikes on the Honduran north coast, Washington wanted insurance for their many investments” (page 9).

Sieder 1995:  “A bilateral military agreement with the USA had been signed in July 1954 and US influence over the military increased in subsequent decades” (page 107).

September

MacCameron 1983:  “The last week in September, 1954, a hurricane struck the country’s north coast...Torrential rains accompanying the hurricane created the worst flooding in the country’s history” (page 71).

October 10:  presidential election

Anderson 1981:  “Any hope that political quiet could be restored after the trauma of 1954, was dashed by the events surrounding the elections scheduled for the same year…The elections took place, with relative honesty, on 10 October, and Villeda outpolled Carías by 121,213 to 77,041…Villeda had not, however, won a majority of the votes cast” (page 59).

Bardales B. 1980: Describes the election and gives the results (pages 47-48).

Becerra 1983: Gives number of votes for PL, PN, and MNR (page 161).  Gives seats occupied by each party in the Constituent Assembly, which ultimately selected the vice president as president.

Bowdler 1982: “According to Roberto Gálvez Barnes who was one of the three military officers who served on the 1956 junta, and whose father Dr. Juan Manuel Gálvez was President in 1954, this election was one of the most unusual and complex situations in Honduran history, even though at first it followed constitutional provisions” (pages 179-180).  Details the chain of events before and after the 1954 election.

Dodd 2005:  “Elections were held on October 10.  Of 400,000 eligible voters, Ramón Villeda Morales, the Liberal candidate, received a large plurality of 121,213 votes, but he lacked a majority by just over 8,000 votes.  Carías followed with 77,041, and Williams with 53,041.  By law, congress therefore was obliged to elect a chief executive” (page 229).

Euraque 1996:  “Villeda Morales won the October 1954 election, but only by a plurality of votes—48 percent.  This placed the selection of the president in the Congress because the presidency could be won only with an absolute majority” (page 71).

Fernández  1970:   “The 1954 electoral campaign was one of the few campaigns where a third party made significant headway in the electoral process.  This came about mostly as a result of Carías’ decision to return to the presidency” (pages 84-85).  Gives details of the campaign and the election. 

Fernández 1983: Gives percent of vote won by candidate of PL (page 29).  “Elecciones de octubre de 1954” (page 33).  Gives party, candidate, and number of votes and percent of vote received.

Haggerty and Millet 1995: The PNH split to form the MNR (page 34).  “(A)pproximately 260,000 out of over 400,000 eligible voters went to the polls.”  Gives votes for each presidential candidate.  Describes the events that follow the failure of the leading candidate to win a majority of the total votes (pages 34-37).

MacCameron 1983:  Describes the election (pages 76-78). 

Martz 1959: Describes the election and the results (pages 141-148).

Morris 1984: “The split among the Nationalists enabled the Liberals to win a plurality (48 percent) in the national elections, but without an absolute majority the election was thrown into the National Congress, where the distribution of seats favored the Nationalists and the MNR” (page 11).

Parker 1981: “The elections on 10 October gave Villeda Morales a clear plurality but left him 10,000 votes short of topping his combined opponents [Carías was second, Williams third].  The votes for Congress, which now had the responsibility of choosing the president, gave the Liberals 24 seats, the Nationalists 23, and Reformists 12...The Nationalists and Reformists, unable to concur on a candidate of their own, had agreed to block Villeda" (pages 190-191). 

Posas 1983: Gives votes for top three presidential candidates (page 147).

Villars 2004a:  “En éstas se enfrentaron tres candidatos presidenciales:  Tiburcio Carías Andino, por el Partido Nacional; Abraham Williams Calderón, por el Movimiento Nacional Reformista y Ramón Villeda Morales por el Partido Liberal.  Este último obtuvo la mayoría absoluta para convertirse según la Constitución en Presidente de la República” (page 152).

Weaver 1994: “Appealing to the plantation and transportation workers and the small urban middle class with a reformist platform, the Liberal Party ran Ramón Villeda Morales against Carías in the 1954 election.  Villeda won a plurality, but for two years he was prevented from assuming the presidency because of fraud perpetrated by Gálvez’s vice-president, who had become president after Gálvez’s resignation” (page 146).

November

Anderson 1981:  “(T)he election was thrown into Congress, which the Nationals then boycotted in order to prevent a decision.  In the midst of this crisis, President Juan Gálvez, stricken by illness, turned over the power of the presidency to his vice-president” (page 59).

Bowman 2001:  “Unfortunately, two-thirds of the deputies was necessary to constitute a quorum and when the National and Reformist deputies boycotted the proceedings (in a ploy designed by US Ambassador Whitting Willauer), a stalemate ensued” (page 551).

Cálix Rodríguez 2001:  “Un nuevo traspiés político sucedería en las elecciones de 1954, cuando de nueva cuenta el candidato ganador no logró obtener la mayoría absoluta entre los tres postulantes al cargo presidencial…Como en el caso de 1924, la decisión recaía en el Congreso Nacional; no obstante, los diputados de las dos facciones del partido nacional boicotearon la legislatura, de manera que se tornó imposible elegir un nuevo presidente.  Esto provocó una crisis nacional debido a la virtual paralización del órgano legislativo…En la coyuntura de este bloqueo político, sorpresivamente asumió el gobierno (de facto) el entonces vicepresidente, Lozano Díaz, quien declaró disuelto el Congreso y se proclamó jefe de Estado, mientras tanto no fueran convocadas nuevas elecciones” (page 17).

Dodd 2005:  “Thirty-eight votes were needed to obtain a quorum electing a chief executive.  Carías’s National Party loyalists had twenty-two deputies, MNR twelve, and Liberals twenty-three.  A bloc of solid Liberal votes with the MNR still lacked three for the needed quorum.  Then, compounding the political problem, Juan Manuel Gálvez resigned prematurely on November 16, claiming poor health.  He turned his office over to Vice-President Julio Lozano Díaz…The sudden turn of events bringing Lozano, a longtime Carías friend and cabinet minister in his government, changed the political equation” (page 229).

Schulz 1994: “In November 1954 Vice President Julio Lozano Díaz assumed the presidency during a constitutional crisis occasioned by an anarchic election.  His ostensible purpose was to save the country from descending into chaos.  Once in power, however, he decided to stay there” (page 25).

November:  municipal election

Euraque 1996:  “(I)n the municipal elections of November 1954…liberals won 98 of 237 municipalities, whereas in 1950 they had prevailed in only one municipal government” (page 72).

December

Anderson 1981:  “Owing to the failure of Congress to agree on a winner, the country seemed about to plunge into a civil war, which no one wanted.  Thus there was almost relief when, on 6 December, Lozano moved decisively, declaring himself dictator.  It was the same old story of someone assuming strong-man rule in order to avoid the imaginary ‘chaos’ that would result from democratic rule.  Soon Lozano even uncovered the obligatory ‘communist plot,’ allegedly backed by Guatemalan ex-president Juan José Arévalo, which allowed him to tighten the screws even more.  Villeda and other Liberal leaders were exiled from the country” (page 59).

Dodd 2005:  “President Lozano, asserting his independence, dissolved congress and appointed a consultative council with representatives from the Liberal, National, and MNR Parties.  It was to write a new constitution, labor code, social security law, and act merely in an advisory capacity to the president” (page 229).

MacCameron 1983:  On December 5 “the National Congress failed to convene due to the absence of a two-thirds quorum...Therefore, congress was dissolved and Lozano became constitutional dictator under Article 89 of the 1936 Constitution, which granted such power to the chief executive in the event of a constitutional breakdown...The three political parties were to enjoy participation in the national governance through a Council of State, weighted politically in favor of Liberal party representation and led by Liberal Antonio Castillo Vega” (page 78).

Posas 1983: “Lozano disuelve el Parlamento e instala en su lugar un Consejo Consultivo de Estado (10 de diciembre, 1954) integrado por 59 personas, adscritas a los tres partidos políticos enfrentados en la lucha electoral” (page 147).

Rojas Bolaños 1994: “El día fijado para realizar la elección, el 5 de diciembre, el Congreso no pudo sesionar por falta de quorum: un acuerdo entre el Partido Nacional y el Partido Nacional Reformista lo habían impedido” (page 109).  Lozano “disolvió el Congreso, se declaró ‘Jefe Supremo del Estado’ y estableció el 10 de diciembre un Consejo Consultivo de Estado” (page 110).

1955

Euraque 1996:  “Unique among branches of the Latin American armed forces, the Honduran air force as of 1955 accounted for 32 percent of the country’s total armed forces strength” (page 67).

MacCameron 1983:  “By late summer of 1955, Chief of State Lozano’s political honeymoon had ended.  It had become increasingly clear that he did not plan to restore the country to even nominal constitutional rule by calling for elections to a national constituent assembly.  Instead, Lozano appeared most intent upon promoting an alliance of business men, industrialists, and Reformist party members, with the objective of maintaining himself in office indefinitely.  The Council of State had remained a meaningless appendage to national political rule” (page 85).

Schulz 1994:  “As of 1955, Honduras had only forty kilometers of paved road, and about half of the unpaved roads were impassable in the rainy season.  (There were no paved roads between Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula)” (page 27).

January

Bertrand Anduray 1992:  “La FAFH volvió sobre sus pasos con mayor fuerza, introduciendo nuevamente su petición…el 12 de enero de 1955.  Dicha solicitud fue aprobada por el Congreso y el 24 de enero de 1955 el Jefe Supremo de Estado, Julio Lozano Díaz firmó el Decreto-Ley No. 29, en donde se le conceden los Derechos Políticos a la Mujer Hondureña…Estos Derechos Políticos fueron otorgados a la mujer en forma optativa, es decir, voluntaria” (page 20).  Gives full text (pages 20-21).

Fúnes Valladares 2004:  “’El voto es activo, es una función pública, obligatoria e irrenunciable para los varones y optativa para las mujeres,’ señalaba el Decreto Ley en uno de sus artículos, dejando al libre albedrío de las sufragistas el cumplimiento de un derecho y un deber ciudadanos” (pages 182-183).  “La conquista del derecho al voto, aprobada por unanimidad en 1954 y ratificada en 1955, estuvo precedida de un movimiento político femenino significativo, que encontró eco en el movimiento popular organizado de la época.  Una coyuntura política favorable acompañó también su aprobación” (pages 194-195).  “En 1955 se creó también la Comisión Interamericana de Mujeres y la Oficina de la Mujer del Ministerio del Trabajo” (page 195).

Posas 1983: Women are given the right to vote by decree on January 24, 1955 (page 155).

Sabillón Pineda de Flores 1998:  Discusses the decree and its contents (pages 28-29).

Villars 2004a:  “El Decreto No. 30, que otorgaba a la mujer hondureña sus derechos políticos tenía que ser ratificado en la legislatura de 1955, luego de las elecciones generales de octubre 1954” (page 152).   Discusses vote for ratification (page 159).

May

Villars 2001:  “El 19 de mayo de 1955, Julio Lozano Díaz convocó a una inscripción censal a todos los ciudadanos, hombres y mujeres, para la práctica de elecciones generales de representantes a una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente” (page 419).

October

Parker 1981: “In October 1955...the Partido Unión Nacional (PUN) [is] organized to support the policies and person of Julio Lozano Díaz” (page 191).

Posas 1983: “El PUN se forma con las bases sociales del Movimiento Nacional Reformista y con núcleos conservadores desafectos con el control rígido que el General Carías ejerce sobre el Partido Nacional” (page 155).

Villars 2001:  “(S)e creó la Unión Nacional (con las bases del Movimiento Nacional Reformista) para impulsar la candidatura presidencial de Lozano Díaz” (page 419).

1956

August

Bowman 1999: In August 1956 the United States relinquishes its jurisdiction over the Honduran First Infantry Battalion (page 9).

Dunkerley 1988: “Increased repression of Liberal opposition from early 1956 together with well-founded expectations that the regime would fix the constituent assembly elections planned for October of that year provoked a group of Liberal activists to resort to an old-style insurrection, taking temporary control of the capital’s San Francisco barracks in August” (page 533).

Posas 1983:   “El 1o. de agosto de 1956, el cuartel San Francisco, en Tegucigalpa, fue tomado por núcleos partidarios ligados al Partido Liberal y por estudiantes universitarios que desde julio de 1956 han pasado, mediante una huelga, a hacer oposición directa al régimen” (page 154).  The barracks are retaken, with the loss of close to one hundred lives and many students are imprisoned.

Villars 2001:  “En agosto de 1956, después de la emisión de un Estatuto Electoral y de la finalización del censo electoral, se fijó el 7 de octubre de 1956 como fecha de las elecciones para representantes a la Asamblea Constituyente…De acuerdo al censo electoral de 1956, las mujeres constituyeron el 41.15% de la población censada, porcentaje significativo, si se considera que su inscripción fue optativa” (pages 419-420).

October 7: constituent assembly election

Anderson 1981:  “To add insult to injury, Lozano decided to hold rigged elections for a new legislature in October 1956.  With the Liberals exiled and the Carías faction of the Nationals boycotting them, the elections were an easy victory for Lozano.  Nonetheless, blood ran in the streets when a group of protesting Liberals were fired on by police in Tegucigalpa” (pages 59-60).

Bardales B. 1980: Describes the election and gives the results (pages 48-50).

Becerra 1983: Gives votes for MNR-PUN coalition, PL, and PN (page 163).  The government wins all seats in the assembly.

Becerra 1994:   “La primera vez que sufragaron las mujeres en Honduras fue el 7 de octubre de 1956 para elegir una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, episodio que, por desgracia, bajo la manipulación del dictador de turno, se convirtió en una de las farsas electorales más descaradas y burdas de la historia latinoamericana” (volume 1 page 341). 

Bertrand Anduray 1992:  “La mujer hondureña votó por primera vez en 1956, durante las elecciones para integrar la Asamblea Nacional del Congreso de la República.  Su voto fue decisivo para los resultados obtenidos.  Tres mujeres salieron electas para diputadas” (page 23).  Gives their names.

Bowdler 1982: “The situation created by this 1956 election (the most positive contribution of which was to allow women to vote for the first time in Honduras by decree of Lozano) was that all three organized parties, Liberal, National, and ‘Reformista,’ were opposed now to Lozano” (page 181).

Cálix Rodríguez 2001:  “Para buscar legitimar su gobierno, Lozano Díaz convocó a elecciones de una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente el 7 de octubre de 1956, de manera que ésta lo pudiese elegir como Presidente.  Las elecciones de 1956 se realizaron sin la participación de los principales líderes del partido liberal, y obtuvo la victoria el Movimiento Nacional Reformista.  Sin embargo, dicha asamblea no llega a ser inaugurada por el golpe de Estado del 21 de octubre” (page 17).

Dodd 2005:  “In 1956, congressional elections were held, with the president firmly in control of electoral machinery.  Feeling locked out of any chance to win legislative seats, Carías urged his followers to abstain from voting.  Lozano’s party obtained 370,318 votes, Liberals 41,726, and Carías’s Nationalists 2,000” (page 230).

Dunkerley 1988: “Following a turnout that was suspiciously high even allowing for the enfranchisement of women, the PUN received a formidable 89.4 per cent of the vote (370,318 votes) against the Liberals’ 10.1 per cent (41,724) and a desultory 0.5 per cent (2,003) for the rump of the PN.  The fraud was transparent.  With both traditional parties denouncing Lozano’s already illegal and increasingly unpopular regime and the prospect of further violence quite manifest, the army was obliged to intervene” (page 533).

Fernández 1983:  “Elecciones de octubre de 1956 (asamblea constituyente: 58 bancas)” (page 33).  Gives party, percent of vote, and seats won.

Kantor 1969: “The government announced that its organization, the National Union Party, had won 370,381 votes and all fifty-six seats in the Constituent Assembly that was to elect the new president.  The Liberal Party was awarded 41,724 votes, the National Party 2,003" (page 140).

Martz 1959: “Official results released a week later showed the PUN to have won all fifty-six seats. Not one anti-government candidate won” (page 158).  Describes the election fraud.

Morris 1984: “The Constituent Assembly elections of 7 October 1956 were the first in which Honduran women participated and that fact accounted for the turnout of over 400,000 voters.  But with Liberals in exile and the Nationalists abstaining, election results that showed Lozano’s coalition winning a 90 percent majority plunged the nation into even more turmoil” (page 11).

Parker 1981: “The National party abstained from voting.  PUN by official count won all fifty-six of the seats in the assembly” (page 192).

Posas 1983: Gives the number of votes for each party (page 155).  The constituent assembly is to convene November 1, 1956.

Sabillón Pineda de Flores 1998:  “En este año histórico, la mujer tiene oportunidad de ejercer el sufragio por primera vez, en las elecciones convocadas para integrar la Asamblea Nacional del Congreso de la República.  Sin embargo, para la mujer la acción de ejercer el sufragio fue legislada de forma optativa, por lo tanto, no se consideraba importante su participación en el proceso electoral.  La idea predominante era que la mujer tenía que atender la casa, esposo o compañero, hijos y los animales domésticos; por esas razones no podía salir de la casa a votar” (page 32).”Diputadas por partido político, 1956” (page 33).  Gives names and party.

Villars 2001:  “El 7 de octubre de 1956 se realizaron elecciones generales para elegir los representantes a una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente que retornaría al país a la vida constitucional.  En ese proceso electoral participaron tres mujeres como candidatas a representantes propietarias y quince como suplentes” (page 417).  “De los 56 candidatos para representantes propietarios, tres fueron mujeres (5.35% de las nominaciones).  De igual número de candidatos suplentes, quince fueron mujeres (25.86% del total de nominaciones)” (pages 420-421).  “Las elecciones del 7 de octubre:  bautizo de ciudadanía de la mujer” (pages 424-428).

October 21

Anderson 1981:  “On 21 October a military coup led by the younger officers unseated the seventy-one-year-old dictator, who was hustled into exile without bloodshed and without ceremony…Having won power…they began to set in motion the machinery for truly free elections to give the country a constituent assembly which in turn would choose a new president” (page 60).

Bowman 1999: “On 21 October 1956, a mere two years after the armed forces took institutional shape, the colonels ousted Julio Lozano in the first military coup in the country in the 20th century.  The armed forces had quickly emerged as the most powerful institution in the country” (page 9).

Dunkerley 1988: “On 21 October General Roque Rodríguez, commander of the military academy, took power at the head of a junta whose only declared objective was the return of constitutional government through new elections.  In this spirit political prisoners were released and exiles allowed to return” (page 533).

Dunkerley 1996: “In 1956 the military, in their first foray into national politics, intervened to restore the Constitutional order after a particularly inept bid at ‘continuismo’ by Vice-President Lozano Díaz” (page 71).

Euraque 1996:  “The top conspirators included Colonel Héctor Caraccioli, head of the air force; Major Roberto Gálvez Barnes, minister of development; and General Roque J. Rodríguez, director of the military academy in Tegucigalpa.  These officers then organized a military government with General Rodríguez as its apparent leader, primarily because of his seniority” (page 67).  “The military coup of 21 October 1956 represented a major turning point in the post-World War II restructuring of Honduras’s political system” (page 68).

MacCameron 1983:  “The three-man military junta which seized power on October 21, 1956 promptly annulled the election of October 7 and announced its desire to return the country to democratic rule...The junta took two other significant actions:  first, it replaced the commandants of the country’s seventeen departments with younger army officers, all trained in the United States Military Assistance Program; and second, it appointed Villeda Morales as ambassador to the United States immediately upon his return to Honduras” (page 93).

Merrill 1995: “A coup in 1956 ousted the elected president and marked a turning point in Honduran history.  For the first time, the armed forces acted as an institution rather than as the instrument of a political party or of an individual leader.  For decades to come, the military would act as the final arbiter of Honduran politics” (page xxvii). 

Millett 1992: “The 1956 Honduran coup that ousted President Julio Lozano Díaz marked the first institutional involvement of the military in internal politics.  A junta was set up, with a promise to restore constitutional order as soon as possible” (page 57).

Parker 1981: “The junta of three officers who took [Lozano’s] place, led by General Roque Rodríguez, set about doing what Lozano had only pretended to do, preparing for honest elections to provide a representative body which would write a new constitution” (page 192).

Schulz 1994: “As it became clear that the president was preparing to maintain himself in power indefinitely, the military decided that it had had enough.  On 21 October 1956 it ousted Lozano and set up a junta to govern until new elections could be held.  The coup d’état of 1956…marked the ascendancy of the armed forces as the dominant political force in Honduras” (page 25).

Villars 2001:  “Catorce días después de realizadas, las elecciones fueron declaradas sin valor ni efecto por una Junta Militar de Gobierno que depuso en forma incruenta al gobierno de Julio Lozano Díaz” (page 417).

Weaver 1994: “(A)fter a particularly blatant attempt to steal the 1956 elections by the interim government and the National Party, the military overthrew the government” (page 146).

1957

Nickson 1995: “In 1957 the district system was abolished, and municipal elections were held until 1972" (page 192). 

May

Bowman 2001:  “In May 1957, the powerful and burgeoning Honduran labour sector demanded that the election be scheduled for 15 September 1957.  Newspapers and the Liberal Party also placed pressure on the military junta.  The Junta relented to political and civil society pressures and scheduled Constitutional Assembly elections for 21 Sept. 1958” (page 551).

MacCameron 1983:  “(I)n May 1957 the junta announced the scheduling of elections for a National Constituent Assembly the following September.  Shortly thereafter, Villeda returned to Honduras to begin his party’s campaigning” (page 93).

July

Euraque 1996:  “By July 1957…Rodríguez resigned from the government due to the pressures and machinations of the minister of defense, aviation colonel Oswaldo López Arellano.  In this way the leading sector of the armed forces consolidated its power within the military triumvirate.  López Arellano’s control of the government and his eventual dominance of the armed forces as a whole reflected both his personal ambition and the historical trajectory of the air force within Honduras’s military structure” (page 67).  “(I)n July the military leadership scheduled Constituent Assembly elections for September 1957” (page 73).

August

Villars 2001:  “El 21 de agosto de 1957, la Junta Militar de Gobierno, tal como lo prometió, convocó al pueblo hondureño a elecciones, a practicarse el 22 de septiembre de 1957, para elegir los diputados de una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, que se instalaría en Tegucigalpa el 21 de octubre del mismo año” (page 428).

September 22:  constituent assembly election

Anderson 1981:  The “elections were hailed as the most honest in Honduran history.  The assembly which emerged was dominated by the Liberals” (page 60).

Bardales B. 1980: Describes the election and gives the results (pages 50-52).

Becerra 1983: Gives votes and seats won by PL, PN, and MNR (page 168).

Dunkerley 1988:   “Although the Liberal Party possessed a strong anti-militarist contingent, the Villeda Morales leadership was prepared to accept the new terms of military organization, which worried it a good deal less than did the traditionally partisan police force of the regional ‘comandantes.’  In the event, regular troops replaced these units in overseeing the September 1957 poll for a new constituent assembly, allowing relatively unhampered expression of support for a party that had been out of office for twenty-five years...Unchallenged to the left, the PL took 62 percent of the ballot (209,109 votes), making the division of its opponents (PN--30 per cent; MNR--8 per cent) purely academic” (page 535).

Euraque 1996:  “The Liberal Party won over 60 percent of the vote in 1957.  This gave the liberals control of the Constituent Assembly” (page 73).

Fernández 1983: Gives percent of vote for PL, PN, and MNR (page 29).  “Elecciones de septiembre de 1957 (asamblea constituyente: 58 bancas)" (page 33).  Gives party, number of votes, percent of vote won, and seats won (page 33).

Kantor 1969:   “A wave of enthusiasm swept over Honduras.  All the political parties became active and an election was organized for September 22, 1957.  This was the first election in the country’s history not dominated by the armed forces, the first to include women voters, and the first to use the system of proportional representation.  The political leaders had finally begun to understand that a country must have a loyal opposition, and therefore all parties must be represented in the Congress.  That year 522,359 persons registered to vote, including 213,065 women and 313,373 illiterates” (page 141).  Gives percent who voted; the number of votes and percent of total votes won by the Liberal Party, the National Party, and the National Reform Movement; and the number of seats won by each.

MacCameron 1983:  “As predicted, the election results marked a decisive victory for the Liberal party:  it received 209,109 popular votes and thirty-six seats in the assembly, a clear working majority.  The National Party won eighteen seats, and the MNR, still under the leadership of Abraham Williams, won four seats” (page 94).

Morris 1984: Gives number registered to vote and percent of vote won by PL (page 36).

Parker 1981: “The outcome was a constitutional convention composed of 36 Liberals, 18 Nationalists, and 4 Reformists” (page 192).

Posas 1983: Gives votes and seats for each party (page 161). 

Schulz 1994:  “In September 1957, Constituent Assembly elections were held.  The Liberals emerged with a working majority” (page 27).

Vallejo Hernández 1990:  “Las Fuerzas Armadas, fieles a su Proclama, convocaron a elecciones de diputados para una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, las cuales se practicaron el 22 de septiembre de 1957.  El Partido Liberal logró 209.109 sufragios; el Partido Nacional 101,274; y el Movimiento Nacional Reformista 29,487 votos” (page 58).

Villars 2001:  “En septiembre de 1957 se practicaron nuevamente elecciones de diputados a una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente; esta vez, tres mujeres fueron electas diputadas propietarias” (page 417).  “Las elecciones se llevaron a cabo, esta vez, en forma ordenada y honesta, obteniendo el Partido Liberal el 61.52% de los votos.  De los 58 escaños parlamentarios, tres fueron ocupados por mujeres, Carmen Griffin de Lefebvre (Partido Liberal), Herlinda Blanco de Bonilla (Partido Liberal) y Carmen Meléndez de Cálix (Partido Nacional)” (page 428).

October

Bowman 2001:  “On 21 October 1957, exactly one year after the ousting of Lozano, the Liberal Party-controlled Constitutional Assembly convened” (page 551).

November

Bowman 2001:  Discusses various scenarios leading to the appointment of Villeda to the presidency (page 553).

Bulmer-Thomas 1991: “The new president went out of his way to accommodate the  military...Indeed, the suspicions held by some sections of the armed forces about Villeda Morales were the main reason for the President’s agreeing to share power with the military under the Constitution of 1957 with disputes to be settled by Congress” (page 208).

Dunkerley 1988:   “Even with a fourteen-seat majority in the fifty-eight-seat assembly the Liberal deputies needed López Arellano’s good offices to permit the indirect election of Villeda Morales as president and thus avoid three polls in as many years” (page 535).

Dunkerley 1996: “The Constitution passed...by the interim military ‘triunvirato’ granted the armed forces effective autonomy from the executive.  The consolidation of a central role for the armed forces in national political life was favoured by the historically weak and divided nature of Honduran civilian elites” (page 71).

Haggerty and Millet 1995: “(I)n November, by a vote of thirty-seven to twenty, the assembly selected Villeda Morales as president for a six-year term” (page 36).

MacCameron 1983:  “(T)o offset accusations by the opposition that Villeda’s election to the presidency by a simple majority of the assembly was totally ‘undemocratic,’ the Liberal party agreed to a form of coalition government whereby cabinet portfolios were distributed on a 6:2:1 ratio among the Liberal, National, and MNR parties.  Even so, after Villeda’s election on November 16, 1957, the National and MNR parties staged protest demonstrations in the streets of Tegucigalpa, and it was not until late that night, when the military junta confirmed the election, that the possibility of armed conflict disappeared” (page 94).  “The National Constituent Assembly named Colonel Osvaldo López Arellano as the country’s first chief of the armed forces.  His appointment was to run for six years” (page 95).

Martz 1959: “Although Villeda had expressed a preference for presidential elections, the November meetings of the constituent assembly felt otherwise, and Villeda was not reluctant to accept their mandate as chief executive.  On the sixteenth, after nine hours of rancorous discussion, he was named to begin a six-year term on January 1, 1958.  The final vote was thirty-seven to twenty” (page 161).

Morris 1984:  “The assembly converted itself into the National Congress while confirming the appointment of Villeda Morales as president of the republic” (page 37).

Schulz 1994: “At first glance, the coup seemed a benevolent enough intervention.  The following year elections were held, and the government was turned over to civilians.  Something had changed, however.  The new constitution fundamentally altered the relationship between the president and the armed forces.  Henceforth, presidential orders to the military had to go through the latter’s commander.  If a conflict arose between the two, it would be submitted to Congress for decisions” (page 26).

Vallejo Hernández 1990:  “El 15 de noviembre la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente rubricó la victoria del Dr. Ramón Villeda Morales, eligiéndolo Presidente Constitucional de Honduras” (page 58).

Villars 2001:  “Contra las expectativas de quienes esperaban elecciones presidenciales, la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente designó, el 16 de noviembre de 1957, a Ramón Villeda Morales Presidente Constitucional de la República” (pages 428-429).

Weaver 1994: “The military...exacted a high price for its role in setting up new elections, allowing a majority party to take office, and returning to the barracks.  The new constitution, which in several ways was a more democratic document than its predecessor, explicitly limited civilian politicians’ authority over the military to little more than symbolic functions” (page 146).

December

Becerra 1994:   Gives the portions of the 1957 constitution relating to elections (volume 1 pages 341-343).  “Por primera vez se crea en Honduras el Consejo Nacional de elecciones como organismo exclusivo de la actividad electoral.”

Bowman 1999:  The 1957 constitution “gave the armed forces unparalleled power and autonomy.  Articles 318 through 330 established that the Chief of the Armed Forces would be selected by the military and that soldiers would be obedient to him and not to the president, that the Chief of the Armed Forces could use his discretion in obeying or disobeying the president, that civilian courts would have no jurisdiction over crimes by soldiers, and civilians would have no access to or oversight of military budgets” (page 9).

Euraque 1996:  “In December 1957 Villeda Morales’s minister of the interior appointed municipal authorities throughout Honduras.  This allowed the liberals to control the municipalities” (page 74).

Fúnes Valladares 2004:  “La Constitución de 1957 instituyó como obligatorio el voto femenino” (page 195).

Godichet 1997:  “Se restituye parcialmente la autonomía a las municipalidades en 1957 (decreto 10 de fecha de 7 de diciembre de 1957)” (page 34).

MacCameron 1983:  “Villeda Morales’ inauguration on December 21 coincided with the National Constituent Assembly’s adoption of the country’s eleventh constitution.  Unlike preceding constitutions, this document clearly reflected the ascendancy of the military to political power in Honduras.  In essence, it placed the military in a position of complete autonomy from the executive branch of government” (page 94).

Parker 1981: “On 21 December 1957 Ramón Villeda Morales, choice of [the constituent assembly] was inaugurated as president...Honduras’ eleventh constitution took effect on the same day Villeda became president...[It] specified a six-year presidential term with no immediate re-election...[and] a unicameral legislative authority...(B)oth men and women over the age of eighteen [were included] in the popular suffrage” (pages 192-193).

Sarmiento 2004:  “No es sino hasta 1957 que las mujeres adquieren el derecho al voto y, con el, el derecho a ser electas representantes ante el Congreso nacional, adoptándose el mismo año el sistema de representación proporcional a base de cocientes y residuos electorales para la elección de Diputados” (page 5).

Soluri 2005:  “During the presidency of Villeda Morales (1957-1963) the previously marginalized voices of workers and small-scale farmers resonated loudly, expanding the boundaries of political discourse in Honduran society and reshaping state-led development projects” (page 173).

Somoza 2005:  “Until 1957, parliamentary elections had to be won by an absolute majority in single-member constituencies with no run off.  If no candidate achieved the required 50%, the Electoral Commission (‘Junta Electoral’) had to decide between the two best-placed candidates.  The 1957 Electoral Law introduced a system of proportional representation in single-member, two-member, and multi-member constituencies” (page 403).

Villanueva 1994:   “La Constitución de 1957 otorga el voto a la mujer mayor de 18 años” (page 134).

Villars 2001:  “(E)l sufragio universal fue consignado…en la constitución emitida en 1957” (page 155).  Villeda Morales “asumió el poder el 21 de diciembre de 1957, y la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, inaugurada el 21 de octubre, se convirtió en Congreso Nacional Ordinario.  La función más sobresaliente de la Asamblea Constituyente, en sus dos meses de vida, fue la emisión, el 19 de diciembre, de una nueva Constitución Política” (page 429).  “La Constitución de 1957 concedió el estatus de ciudadano a todos los hombres y mujeres mayores de 18 años, sin importar su estado civil o su grado de escolaridad.  Por otra parte, el sufragio femenino fue instituido sin el carácter optativo que tuvo anteriormente.  Este hecho, significó el reconocimiento institucional de la mujer como ciudadana en sentido pleno” (pages 430-431).

1958

June

Anderson 1981:  “(I)n June 1958, meeting in Tegucigalpa, the five [Central American] states signed a Multilateral Treaty of Free Commerce and Economic Integration” (page 9).

1959

February

Schooley 1987: In February 1959 “there was an abortive military coup, with fighting continuing for several months” (page 39).

July

Acosta 1986: “On July 12, 1959, the bloody events that played a leading role in the unsuccessful return of Colonel Armand Velasquez allowed the Villeda administration to organize the Civil Guard to replace the old National Police, who were allegedly involved in these events.  The Civil Guard became political police, repressing nationalists and leftist groups and colliding head-on with the armed forces, staging many bloody engagements throughout the country” (page 45).

Anderson 1981:  “(A) new labor law of 1959 [made] unions mandatory in firms of over a certain size” (page 58).

Bowdler 1982: “President Villeda, smarting under his lack of control over the armed forces who were under Colonel López and the political advisor of the Armed Forces and close confidant of the Colonel, later political boss of the National Party, Ricardo Zuñiga, decided to create a sort of police militia force of his own called the ‘Guardia Civil.’ This was further necessitated by the fact that the Army had virtual control of the regular police forces.  To be in the ‘Guardia Civil’ required Liberal Party affiliation” (page 184).

Bulmer-Thomas 1991: “A series of minor revolts culminated in an uprising by the National Police in July 1959, which was suppressed with some difficulty.  In retaliation, the President created a separate Civil Guard subject to presidential control (unlike the National Police, which had been subject to the control of the armed forces).  Clashes between the 2,500-strong Civil Guard and the armed forces became frequent and contributed to a sharp deterioration in the relationship between the military and the Liberal government” (page 210).

MacCameron 1983:  “Attempting to preserve his administration Villeda created a Civil Guard.  This act nearly plunged the country into civil war, as a fierce jealousy developed between this special security force and the regular army” (page 112).

1960

Schulz 1994:  “In 1960…Honduras entered the Central American Common Market” (page 28).  “The 1960s witnessed a rapid increase in foreign—mostly U.S.—economic penetration.  Between 1961 and 1965, US$200 million in private capital poured into Honduras.  Between 1963 and 1967, U.S. investment doubled” (page 34).

1961

Anderson 1988:   “Despite [Villeda’s] quarrel with the fruit companies, his polices in general won the support of the United States, and John F. Kennedy lavished aid upon the Villeda government through the Alliance for Progress.  Emboldened by this support from abroad, Villeda decided to do something more tangible for the peasantry, who sought a larger percentage of the land…He created the ‘Instituto Nacional Agraria’ (INA) in March 1961” (pages 130-131).

1962

September

González 1998:  “La Ley de Reforma Agraria de 1962 reconoció ‘el derecho de propiedad de las comunidades indígenas sobre las tierras, bosques, aguas y ejidos que actualmente disfrutan, ya estén titulados o por simple ocupación inmemorial’” (page 69).

MacCameron 1983:  The “agrarian reform law passed in September, 1962...created a furor among large corporate and private landholders in the country” (page 112).

Schulz 1994:  “Villega’s most important contribution was the 1962 agrarian reform law…(T)he measure attempted to provide an escape valve for the anger of an increasingly militant peasantry” (page 29).  “Though the reform guaranteed private property and set no limit on it, provided that it was properly used, the oligarchs and fruit companies felt threatened.  There was an uproar in the U.S. Senate, where angry legislators let it be known that aid to Honduras would be revoked if the measure were not amended…Eventually, Villeda worked out a new version of the law with UFCO negotiators.  The result was a mutilated piece of legislation that made it almost impossible to expropriate private land” (page 30).

November:  municipal election

Bowdler 1982: “Villeda established a political police force [Guardia Civil] which did act and seek to influence the one municipal election held during the Villeda administration in 1962...The Liberal Party actually won the municipal election of 1962 but the National Party claimed frauds had been committed including voting by many Salvadoran exiles who were not eligible” (page 184).  

Euraque 1996:  “In 1962 the liberals, nationalists, and all other interested elite powers realized that the results of the municipal elections scheduled for November 1962 would be used to evaluate the prospects for each party’s presidential candidates in 1963…The results of the 1962 municipal elections seem to have doomed the National Party.  The liberals won over 70 percent of 278 municipalities.  More important, they consolidated their power throughout the North Coast, winning virtually every municipality in the Departments of Cortés, Atlántida, Yoro, and Colón.  The liberals also won in fourteen of the eighteen departmental capitals, including San Pedro Sula” (pages 114-115).

1963

Bertrand Anduray 1992:  “1963:  La Profesora Victoria Buchard de Castellón fue nombrada Secretaria del Consejo Nacional de Elecciones, puesto ocupado por primera vez por una mujer” (page 39).

MacCameron 1983:  “By 1963 Modesto Rodas Alvarado, president of the National Congress, had emerged as the principal leader of party opposition to Villeda.  In doing so, he became a strong candidate to gain the Liberal party nomination for the October, 1963 presidential elections” (pages 115-116).

February

Euraque 1996:  “Early in 1963 the nationalists…found themselves on the verge of political extinction, reduced to charging electoral fraud.  In February they gathered in a national convention to nominate a presidential candidate to confront Modesto Rodas Alvarado, the liberals’ sure winner that year” (page 115).

April

Bowman 2001:  “Due to the support given the Liberals by the peasants, the working class, the emerging middle class and the North Coast industrialists, the Liberal Party looked strong going into the election…The Liberal Party selected Modesto Rodas Alvarado, even though Villeda favoured another candidate.  Villeda and most of the party maintained unity” (page 558). 

MacCameron 1983:  “At the Liberal party convention in April, 1963, Rodas received the presidential nomination, unquestionably damaging the prestige of Villeda Morales” (page 116).

May

Euraque 1996:  “When the nationalists reconvened in May, Gálvez and Carías put aside their differences and allowed the nomination of Dr. Ramón Ernesto Cruz to go forward…His nomination reflected more a compromise candidate of the party’s old caudillos than a man of broad appeal to the rural masses or the organized working people of the banana plantations…Immediately after the May convention, Carías resigned as the party’s jefe supreme and with his son formed the Popular Progressive Party” (page 116).

MacCameron 1983:  “(T)he National party nomination of Ramón E. Cruz...marked the requiem once and for all of the forty-year domination of Tiburcio Carías over the National party.  Because Cruz defeated Carías’ son, Gonzalo Carías Castillo, by just three votes in the convention, Gonzalo proceeded to form a third party, again creating a split in National party ranks similar to that which existed in 1954” (pages 116-117).

July

MacCameron 1983:  “Villeda announced in July that observers from the Organization of American States had accepted an invitation to come to Honduras to ensure a free and democratic election process.  Villeda also decided that the Civil Guard would act as the security force for the elections, taking on the function traditionally assigned to the regular army” (page 117).

September

Pan American Union 1963: This study is requested by Villeda Morales on July 25, 1963 and the report is submitted to him on September 11, 1963.  It recommends changes to the electoral system for the elections to be held October 13, 1963.

October 3

Anderson 1981:  “All things considered, this was the most tragic of all the long line of tragic events that make up the history of Honduras.  It brought to power a man of the most sinister political morals, and led to a long period of political supression and institutionalized violence.  Out of the coup, in the rural areas came a new organization linked to the National Party, the Mancha Brava, a group of ‘shock troops’ composed largely of public employees, ‘authorized to attack and kill’ enemies of López Arellano’s government.  This Mancha Brava was to maintain a shadowy existence for many years and become synonymous with government-inspired violence” (page 62).

Anderson 1988:   “Before any land reform was out of the planning stages, it was necessary to elect a new president.  Direct popular elections were scheduled for 13 October 1963; it appeared the winner would be the chief of the Liberal Party, Modesto Rodas Alvarado.  If he had been elected, he would have been quite likely to try to carry through the reforms set by Villeda; but powerful landholders of the National Party, the fruit companies, and a clique of conservative officers took measures to prevent this.  On 3 October a coup was successfully launched, Villeda was exiled, and the elections were canceled” (page 131).

Bowman 1999: “The 1963 election campaign favored Modesto Rodas Alvarado, the charismatic and fiery former president of the Constitutional Assembly, who promised to large campaign crowds that he would reduce the power of the military...There was a ground swell of support from various sectors of Honduran society to follow the Costa Rican model and proscribe the military.  But a violent pre-emptive coup was launched a mere ten days before the October 1963 elections, ending a six-year democratic opening in the country and effectively silencing the debate on demilitarization” (page 10).

Bowman 2001:  “Cognisant of the democratic support of civil society and students in the previous coup attempt, the military unleashed an exceptionally violent coup.  Scores of civil guards were killed as they slept and violence against civilians continued for days.  Attempts by students and Liberal Party supporters to challenge the overthrow of democracy were met with brutal reactions by ‘los gloriosos’” (page 559).

Brockett 1998: “On October 3, 1963, the eve of national elections scheduled to select his successor, Villeda was overthrown by a military coup...(T)he probable victor in the election would have been the head of Villeda’s party, viewed by many as a radical who would continue with his general reform program; this was undoubtedly a major cause of the coup.  More generally, large landowners, both domestic and foreign, were alarmed at the growing mobilization of peasants on the north coast and appreciated the value of the coup as a conservative reaction against the awakening of popular forces in the countryside” (page 186).

Bulmer-Thomas 1991: “The real reason for the coup was the military’s fear of an election victory by Rodas, who had committed the Liberal Party to revise the Constitution of 1957 and re-establish civilian control over the armed forces” (page 210).

Delgado Fiallos 1986: “El 3 de octubre, días antes de las elecciones el coronel Oswaldo López Arellano derrocaría a Villeda Morales.  Más que contra Villeda el golpe fue contra Rodas Alvarado [candidate of the PL]” (page 175).

Dunkerley 1996: “Following an anti-communist coup in 1963, the first institutionalised military government ...was installed” (page 71).

Haggerty and Millet 1995: “The elections were scheduled for October 1963...All signs pointed to an overwhelming victory for the PLH, an outcome that the military found increasingly unpalatable...Before dawn on October 3, 1963, the military moved to seize power.  The president and the PLH’s 1963 presidential candidates were flown into exile, Congress was dissolved, the constitution was suspended, and the planned elections were canceled.  Colonel López Arellano proclaimed himself president, and the United States promptly broke diplomatic relations” (page 37).

LaFeber 1993: “By 1963 changes were occurring rapidly enough so that Villeda Morales’s days in power were numbered.  Alliance [for Progress] officials, the small middle class, the banana companies, and the U.S. Ambassador all had growing doubts about an Honduran president raising such issues as agrarian reform and patriotic textbooks.  The army had even sharper doubts, especially since the president had formed his own 2,500-man Civil Guard to keep the army a safe distance from the presidential residence” (page 180).

MacCameron 1983:  “As the new ‘Jefe de Gobierno,’ Colonel Osvaldo López Arellano issued a proclamation defending the actions of the armed forces…The proclamation…singled out Rodas Alvarado’s election campaign as being characterized by violent language, unlawful utilization of government funds, and attempts to foment civil war, thereby undoing the diligent efforts of the armed forces since 1956 to create national order and harmony” (page 117).

Millett 1992: “Armed Forces Commander Col. Osvaldo López Arellano installed himself as president” (page 58).

Ropp 1974: “After General López got rid of the Liberals ‘for the Nationals,’ he skillfully initiated a bargaining process whose end result was López’s installation as constitutionally elected President.  By promising to deliver 35 of the 64 available seats in the General Assembly to the Nationals, he was able to maintain their support without really alienating the Liberals” (page 527).

Rosenberg 1990: “(T)he military now made an alliance with the National party, whose leading operative was a close adviser to the military officer who ruled the country.  For the next eight years the country’s political direction was determined by...López Arellano...and by National party leader Ricardo Zuñiga Agustinus” (page 521).

Ruhl 2000:  “General Oswaldo López Arellano ruled Honduras from 1963 to 1971 in league with National Party boss Ricardo Zuñiga Agustinus” (page 50).

Schooley 1987: “A successful coup was staged in October 1963 (pre-empting the scheduled elections) under the leadership of Col. Oswaldo López Arellano, the Defence Minister and Head of the Armed Forces....[Vice president] Rodas, who as the candidate of the PL in the forthcoming election had been expected to win, had declared during the campaign that if elected he would seek to exert stronger control over the armed forces.  Col. López issued a decree naming himself as president, and announced the immediate imposition of a state of siege, the dissolution of Congress and the proscription of all political activity” (page 38).

Schulz 1994:  “Villeda was deposed and the elections canceled.  The civil guard was suppressed, Congress dissolved, and the constitution suspended.  The president and Rodas were sent into exile.  The U.S. response was instructive.  Villeda had been one of John F. Kennedy’s favorites:  a democrat and a reformer but also a fervent anticommunist who respected private property…Washington broke off diplomatic relations” (page 31).

Sieder 1995:  “In October 1963, amidst widespread rumours of United Fruit involvement,
the mildly reformist, Alliance for Progress-inspired Liberal administration of Ramón Villeda Morales (1957-63) was overthrown in a coup led by Minister of Defence, Colonel López Arellano.  With the support of the traditionally conservative, landowner-dominated National Party (PN), López maintained control of government until 1970” (page 107).

Weaver 1994: “Ten days before the 1963 presidential elections, the military, fearful of Villeda Morales’s establishment of a Civil Guard independent of the military and encouraged by the fruit companies and domestic landlords, successfully overthrew the Villeda Morales government and canceled the elections, which probably would have been won by a Liberal colleague of the president’s.  Although the Kennedy administration refused to grant U.S. diplomatic recognition to the new regime, the Johnson administration did so a year later” (page 208).

November

Schulz 1994:  “In November, Kennedy was cut down by an assassin’s bullets.  His successor, Lyndon Johnson, abruptly changed course.  When the new head of the Honduran government, Colonel Oswaldo López Arellano, proved willing to pay the necessary lip service to democracy, relations were restored…U.S. policy was riven with contradictions.  Indeed the coups that were sweeping the hemisphere were in part the ‘consequence’ of that policy.  Hand in hand with the Alliance for Progress came a military strategy designed to strengthen the Latin American armies, enabling them to crush any guerrillas that they faced or might have to face” (page 31).  “Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, counterinsurgency warfare became the fashion.  Military doctrine now acquired political and socioeconomic dimensions” (page 32).

1964

Anderson 1981:  “To regularize his position, López Arellano decided to call for still another National Constituent Assembly, to draft still another constitution and choose a president” (page 62).

Schulz 1994:  “(T)he new Honduran dictatorship…quickly repressed the labor and peasant movements.  Independent unions were destroyed…The agrarian reform was effectively terminated.  López Arellano proceeded to develop close ties with the National Party, whose leader, Ricardo Zúniga Agustinus, became secretary for the presidency—in effect the éminence grise of the regime” (page 32).

January

Anderson 1988:   “John F. Kennedy, who had warmly admired Villeda, refused to recognize the new government, but in January 1964, Johnson granted recognition” (page 131).