Langley 2002: “Zelaya’s army swept through Honduras and on March 18, 1907, defeated [Honduran president] Bonilla’s force and its Salvadoran allies in the battle of Namasigüe…In the course of the war American vessels patrolled the Honduran coast and, in accordance with nineteenth-century naval custom, forbade the shelling of coastal towns containing sizable numbers of foreign residents” (page 53).
Smith 1993: “In 1907 Honduran troops entered Nicaragua chasing anti-Honduran government rebels, attacking and killing Nicaraguan soldiers on their return. Zelaya retaliated by sending Nicaraguan troops to Honduras, and the war escalated as the Salvadorean government and exiled Nicaraguan conservatives joined with the Honduran forces. The Nicaraguan conservative, Emiliano Chamorro, was named as commander of the anti-Zelaya forces but even this combined opposition was no match for Zelaya’s Nicaraguan army” (pages 78-79).
Central American Peace Conference
Kamman 1968: The United States helps to establish the Central American Court of Justice “in 1907 to keep down revolutions” (page 10).
Munro 1974: Representatives of the five Central American states at the conference in Washington “promised not to interfere in one another’s internal politics and not to permit the use of their territory as a base for revolutionary activities against other states…After 1907 the main effort of American diplomacy in Central America was to persuade or compel the five governments to live up to these agreements…The principal troublemaker was President José Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua, who opposed American interference in Central America and continued his efforts to increase his own influence by subverting the governments of his neighbors” (pages 116-117).
United States . Department of State 1932: “It was [Zelaya’s] intermeddling with the other countries of Central America that aroused concern in the United States. In order to put an end to the continual warfare that existed from 1902-1907, the United States and Mexico called a conference at Washington in 1907. At this conference the five republics of Central America signed a series of conventions” (page 6).
Smith 1993: “The US administration of 1909 headed by President William Taft didn’t waste much time in the practice of its ‘dollar diplomacy’ in Nicaragua. When US businessmen based on the Atlantic Coast complained that President Zelaya had made a decision to annul highly concessionary agreements, the Taft administration started to apply pressure” (page 79).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 10 de septiembre de 1909 el “Secretario de Estado Americano Mr. Knox, manda a su sobrino a Nicaragua para supervisar el movimiento revolucionario en contra de Zelaya. En Managua se contrata a dos jóvenes americanos con ciudadanía hondureña llamados Lee Roy Canonn [Cannon] y Leonard Groce como especialistas en poner minas. Estos se ponen a las órdenes de los líderes conservadores” (page 461).
Booth 1985: “(T)he U.S. government and private interests joined with the plotting British and Conservatives. The foreign conspirators backed the Conservatives’ revolt against the regime in the Atlantic port of Bluefields in 1909. President Taft then landed U.S. Marines ‘to protect U.S. lives and property’ and to support the rebels” (page 24).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 11-12 de octubre de 1909 el “General Juan José Estrada gobernador liberal de Bluefields se rebela contra el Presidente José Santos Zelaya…Se publica en esta fecha en Bluefields el decreto por el cual el general Juan José Estrada, Gobernador de la Costa Atláñtica desconoce al gobierno del Presidente José Santos Zelaya, asumiendo provisionalmente la Presidencia de la República con el apoyo y cooperación de los conservadores liderados por Adolfo Díaz, quien ofrece conseguir el dinero para financiar los gastos de la revolución lo mismo ofrece su ayuda incondicional el general Emiliano Chamorro Vargas y los criollos de Bluefields” (page 462).
Langley 2002: U.S. president Taft’s secretary of state is “Philander C. Knox, a former Pittsburgh corporation lawyer and banker with ambitious economic schemes for Central America” (page 56). “Though the State Department pursued a blatantly anti-Zelaya course during the troubles of 1909-10, the navy’s role in the Bluefields rebellion generally followed the traditional pattern of looking out for the safety and well-being of the town’s American population” (page 57).
Ramírez 1989: “Toward the end of 1909 the Conservatives, with the open aid and support of the Department of State, rose in arms against Zelaya…Their insurgent army was financed by The Rosario and Light Mines Co., a yankee mining enterprise…upon which Zelaya had been pressing claims for unpaid taxes” (page 54). Philander C. Knox, the U.S. Secretary of State is the attorney for the Rosario and Light Mines Co. and the president imposed by the Conservatives on the country, Adolfo Díaz, is the chief accountant of the Rosario and Light Mines Co.
Smith 1993: “In October 1909 the new governor of the Atlantic Coast region, Juan Estrada, rose against Zelaya, backed by the conservatives led by Emiliano Chamorro and Adolfo Díaz. The rebellion was financed by US business based on the Coast and by the conservative president of Guatemala, Estrada Cabrera. The rebel forces were joined by US citizens…Among the latter were Leonard Groce and Lee Roy Cannon who were captured by Zelaya’s troops, found guilty of attempting to blow up a boat carrying 500 government troops, and executed by firing squad. It was this incident which gave a pretext to [ U.S. secretary of war] Philander Knox to sever diplomatic relations with the Nicaraguan government, despite the fact that these two US mercenaries had been caught in carrying out acts of war against a ‘friendly’ government” (pages 79-80).
Stansifer 1998: “A Conservative rebellion against Zelaya gave the United States an opportunity to assist militarily in removing him from office. Now the Conservatives, from the Liberal perspective, had become...traitors, by inviting U.S. intervention” (page 122).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The Conservative Party, which sponsored the revolution, set up a government at Bluefields under the provisional presidency of Juan J. Estrada, the Liberal Governor of the province” (page 7).
Leonard 1985: “After the overthrow of dictator José Santos Zelaya in 1909, politics became strongly influenced by the United States. Often the selection of presidents was made in accordance with the wishes of the State Department. Financial and economic guidance was given. Marines were stationed in the country to maintain order” (page 128).
United States . Department of State 1932: “(T)he United States remained neutral. However, in November, 1909, the execution by President Zelaya of two American soldiers of fortune, Cannon and Groce, who held commissions in the revolutionary army, precipitated a crisis” (page 7).
United States . Department of State 1932: “In a note of December 1, 1909, to the Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affaires, the United States broke off diplomatic relations” (page 7).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: “El Presidente de Nicaragua General José Santos Zelaya renuncia a su cargo ante la Asamblea Nacional” (page 464).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: “A las 10:20 de la mañana el Presidente General José Santos Zelaya entrega el poder a través del Presidente del Congreso Nacional que designa para el cargo al Doctor José Madriz Rodríguez. Termina la dictadura de Zelaya con 16 años y 4 meses” (page 464).
Mahoney 2001: “Before leaving Nicaragua,...Zelaya made certain that the Nicaraguan congress appointed a liberal candidate, José Madriz, to the presidency. This was unacceptable to Knox, and the U.S. government continued to back the rebels led by Estrada and Chamorro” (page 189).
Smith 1993: “Zelaya resigned to try to preempt further US interference in Nicaragua’s internal affairs, and the National Assembly appointed José Madriz, a respected former foreign minister, as president. Government troops continued to put down the rebellion, retaking Bluefields and the adjacent harbour town of El Bluff. In order to prevent the Nicaraguan government regaining control, the US landed marines at Bluefields” (page 80).
United States . Department of State 1932: “When his subsequent attempts to reach an understanding with the United States failed, President Zelaya resigned, depositing the Presidency in Dr. José Madriz, a distinguished Liberal of León” (page 8).
Vargas 1989: “El 24 de diciembre de 1909, Zelaya renuncia ante el congreso nicaragüense” (page 17).
Booth 1985: “The United States refused to recognize Madriz and held to its argument that Estrada’s minority Conservative party revolutionaries represented ‘the great majority of the Nicaraguan people.’ Negotiations failed to bring peace, and the war resumed. Estrada’s muddling forces would have lost to the government in 1909 but for the continued defense of their Bluefields stronghold and supply lines by the U.S. Navy” (page 30).
United States . Department of State 1932: “Despite his nonrecognition by the United States, Madriz not only managed to maintain his régime but drove the forces of General Estrada into Bluefields, where he besieged them” (page 8).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 22 de febrero fuerzas “liberales al mando del Doctor y General Benjamín F. Zeledón derrotan y ponen en fuga a las fuerzas conservadoras del General Emiliano Chamorro al mando del General Frutos Bolaños Chamorro…El Presidente Doctor José Madriz felicita al Doctor y General Benjamín F. Zeledón por su actuación” (page 467).
Langley 2002: “(W)hen the rebellion was on the verge of being snuffed out,…Estrada told the American consul he could not defend the town [Bluefields]…[American consul] Moffat frantically cabled for marines” (page 57).
Ramírez 1988: “Fuerzas del Cuerpo de Marinos de Estados Unidos, desembarcadas en Bluefields, declaran a este puerto ‘zona neutral’ (19 de mayo), protegiendo evidentemente a los alzados e impidiendo la victoria del ejército liberal del doctor Madriz” (page 72).
Barquero 1945: “El 27 de Agosto de 1910 entró el ejército revolucionario victorioso a Managua…Al llegar a Managua el General Juan Estrada encontró el Poder en manos de su hermano el Senador don José Dolores Estrada en quien el doctor Madriz había depositado” (page 178).
Booth 1985: “On 20 August 1910 José Madriz, too, succumbed to the pressure and resigned. Juan Estrada…took control of Nicaragua’s government” (page 31).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 20 de agosto “el Doctor José Madriz, al no lograr ser reconocido por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, y continuar la guerra apoyada por ese país, renuncia a su cargo y viaja al exilio a México para nunca regresar. [El 21 de agosto el] ejército revolucionario conservador entra triunfante a Managua. El liberal General Juan José Estrada es nombrado Presidente. [El 29 de agosto toma] posesión a la Presidencia de Nicaragua el liberal General Juan José Estrada y como Vice-Presidente el conservador Adolfo Díaz Recinos” (page 469).
Díaz Lacayo 1996: “El 28 de agosto de 1910, al recibir la renuncia de José Madriz, la Asamblea Nacional le entregó el mando presidencial al Diputado José Dolores Estrada y éste, después de unas horas, se lo traspasó a su hermano Juan José” (page 115).
Langley 2002: “Inspired by the apparent American commitment to their cause, the rebels launched a counterattack. In the summer of 1910 they pressed toward the capital. In August Madriz resigned and, as had Zelaya, fled the country. Juan J. Estrada was now proclaimed president…(H)e appealed for diplomatic recognition, declaring his commitment to new elections and a thorough restructuring of the national economy” (page 60).
Mahoney 2001: “After initially resisting and calling for British intervention, Madriz soon also realized the situation was impossible, and he took refuge in exile in August 1910. The liberal government then quickly collapsed. With turmoil reigning in Managua, the conservative vanguard entered the capital and announced that elections would be held to determine a new president” (page 189).
Smith 1993: “Madriz was forced to resign in August 1910, and Juan Estrada, backed by the conservatives, was installed as president. The US backing given to the new conservative government was to have its price” (page 80).
United States . Department of State 1932: “Failing to capture Bluefields, the Madriz troops were unable to maintain themselves in that region and were forced to retire. Estrada immediately launched a successful counteroffensive. On August 21, 1910, the day after Madriz left Managua, General Estrada assumed control of the Government” (page 9).
Vargas 1989: “Ante demostración tan evidente que no era persona grata para Washington, Madriz renunció a la Presidencia de Nicaragua el 20 de agosto de 1910...El 22 de agosto de 1910, los jefes de la contrarrevolución entraban en Managua. Washington había logrado poner a sus hombres en el poder. Era el paso previo para ejercer el control total de país" (page 21).
Kamman 1968: “The American government sent Thomas C. Dawson to Managua as special agent to report on conditions and help reestablish constitutional government with free elections, rehabilitation of finances, and payment of legitimate foreign and domestic claims. Dawson arrived on October 18; after ten days of talks, Estrada, Díaz, and Mena agreed to call an election for members of a constitutional convention. The convention was to elect a president and vice-president for two years; leaders of the revolution agreed to support Estrada for president and Díaz for vice-president” (page 12).
Smith 1993: “In October 1910 five Nicaraguan conservative leaders met with the US minister to Panama, Thomas G. Dawson--on board a US warship. This meeting was to decide, among other things, who was to emerge as the next president of Nicaragua” (page 82).
United States . Department of State 1932: “On October 27, 1910, General Estrada, Minister of Foreign Affairs Diaz, Minister of War Mena, and General Chamorro signed a series of pacts, commonly known as the Dawson Pacts, although Mr. Dawson was not a signatory” (page 10). Gives the provisions of the pact.
Cardenal Tellería 2000: “El Gobierno de Juan J. Estrada destierra del país a prominentes profesionales, escritores, políticos y periodistas liberales” (page 470).
Millett 1977: “(F)ollowing State Department approval...the constituent assembly...obediently ‘elected’ Estrada and Díaz and the United States promptly extended recognition to the new government” (page 27).
United States . Department of State 1932: “In accordance with [the Dawson Pacts], elections for the Constituent Assembly were held on November 27, 1910, resulting in a Conservative victory. Thirty thousand votes were cast. While the Liberal Party claimed that the elections had not been entirely free, it was felt by the Department of State that popular opinion had been fairly well expressed” (page 10).
Vargas 1989: “El 27 y 28 de noviembre de 1910, la Asamblea Constituyente, totalmente conservadora, elige a Estrada para presidente y a Díaz para vicepresidente” (page 23).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 31 de diciembre con “los principales líderes liberales desterrados, prisioneros y huyendo para salvar sus vidas, el General Juan José Estrada y el Sr. Adolfo Díaz Recinos son nombrados oficialmente como Presidente y Vice-Presidente de Nicaragua por la Asamblea Nacional controlada ya por las fuerzas ultraconservadoras y favorables a los norteamericanos” (page 470).
United States . Department of State 1932: “On December 31, 1910, the Constituent Assembly unanimously elected General Estrada and Adolfo Díaz President and Vice President, respectively, to which Government the United States extended recognition on the following day” (pages 10-11).
Foroohar 1989: “When Zelaya was ousted by an opposition supported by U.S. troops, and a Conservative government was installed in the country, again under total protection of the United States government, the Church hierarchy regained its hopes to revive its old privileges and social status. Naturally, the hierarchy supported the new government against any danger of a Liberal revolt. Knowing that the Conservatives could not stay in power in the absence of the U.S. marines, the hierarchy extended its support to the United States’ occupation of Nicaragua” (page 17).
Kamman 1968: “The revolution was soon over, and the revolutionists then divided. They had been members of both Nicaraguan political parties, and their political hatreds and spites overcame the unity established in the anti-Zelaya cause…Alignment of the parties after the defeat of Zelaya was admittedly confusing, for while most of the dictator’s opponents had been Conservatives, among the rebels were many Liberals. The provisional president, Juan Estrada, was a Liberal. General José María Moncada was also a Liberal but a long-time opponent of Zelaya…As minister of war the new government appointed General Luis Mena, a supporter of the Chamorro family” (pages 11-12).
Barquero 1945: “También tomó posesión como Vicepresidente don Adolfo Díaz. El período administrativo sería de 2 a ños de acuerdo con la letra de pactos firmados en 1910” (page 178).
Smith 1993: “In January 1911 Juan Estrada was recognized by the US government as the new president” (page 82). Outlines the expectations of the U.S. government in return for recognizing the “conservative-led government of Nicaragua.”
United States . Department of State 1928: General Estrada “assumed office January 1, 1911” (page 6).
Zub K. 2002: “El primer protestante electo como diputado fue Alfred W. Hooker, moravo, quien en representación de una región dominantemente protestante, en 1911 asumió la representación legislativa de la Costa Atlántica por el Partido Liberal” (page 27).
United States . Department of State 1928: “General Chamorro failed to cooperate in carrying out the Dawson agreements, and on April 5, 1911, President Estrada dissolved the Assembly because of his lack of control over its actions. General Chamorro left Managua a few days later. President Estrada appealed to the United States for assistance at this time, as in addition to his difficulties with the Conservative Chamorro faction, the Liberal leaders in the neighboring Republics were actively fomenting a revolution against the Conservative government in Nicaragua” (page 7).
United States . Department of State 1932: “After electing the President, the Constituent Assembly proceeded to the drafting of the new Constitution. General Chamorro, who controlled the Constituent Assembly, used his power to force through a Constitution which would have made the Assembly superior to the President…The Chamorro majority in the Constituent Assembly ignored [President Estrada’s objections]…and adopted the Constitution. President Estrada immediately vetoed the Constitution, dissolved the Constituent Assembly, and called for new elections…Through his control of the Army, General Mena succeeded in packing the new Constituent Assembly, elected on April 16, 1911, with his own adherents” (page 11).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 8 de mayo el “jefe del Ejército General Luis Mena Solórzano es puesto bajo arresto por órdenes del Gobierno de Estrada…[El 9 de mayo renuncia] el Presidente Liberal Juan José Estrada. Los ultra conservadores jefeados por Adolfo Díaz Recinos asumen el gobierno de Nicaragua” (page 470). El 11 de mayo el “Presidente Juan José Estrada…y otros liberales del grupo de Estrada que ayudaron a derrocar a Zelaya son forzados a salir al destierro por sus ex-aliados conservadores y por los norteamericanos” (page 471).
Kamman 1968: “Events came to a crisis on May 8, 1911. In a fit of drunkenness Estrada arrested Mena for treason. The arrest excited Mena’s troops and revolution was imminent. The United States minister…believed Estrada had acted with advice of Moncada, perhaps in conjunction with a Liberal plot. Estrada resigned. Díaz became president and released Mena. Mena turned back the troops then marching on Managua” (page 13).
United States . Department of State 1928: “General Mena, who had been one of the prominent Conservative leaders during the 1909 revolution and who enjoyed a large following, had become Minister of War under President Estrada. On May 9, 1911, he was placed under arrest by Estrada who immediately resigned and turned over his office to Adolfo Diaz, who in turn released General Mena…As a result of a Liberal plot the Loma Fort in Managua was blown up on May 31, 1911…In view of the disturbed conditions United States naval vessels were again sent to patrol the Atlantic and Pacific coasts” (page 7).
United States . Department of State 1932: “(A)fter President Diaz assumed office in May, 1911, he convoked the Nicaraguan Assembly, which had been dissolved by President Estrada. On May 6, 1911, the Assembly, by a vote of 25 to 7, authorized him to negotiate a $20,000,000 loan in the United States” (page 13). “Although Diaz was the nominal head of the Government, General Mena was the real power. He had the complete support of the Army and controlled the Constituent Assembly. Shortly after Diaz became President in May, 1911, the two leaders signed an agreement by which Mena pledged his assistance to Diaz during the present Administration and Diaz in turn promised to put no obstacles in the way of the election of General Mena for the succeeding constitutional term” (page 19).
Vargas 1989: “Díaz asume la Presidencia de Nicaragua en forma provisional, el 9 de mayo de 1911" (page 24).
Booth 1985: The Castillo-Knox Treaty “provided for U.S. loans of $15 million to Nicaragua in return for the right of the United States to protect its interests there and to arbitrate any dispute in which Nicaragua became involved…Never ratified, the treaty did not take effect, but for all intents and purposes it outlined the nature of the economic and political relationship between the two countries for years to come” (page 32).
Munro 1967: “On June 6, 1911, a treaty was signed with the United States, by which that country agreed to assist Nicaragua in securing a loan from American bankers for the consolidation of its internal and external debt and for other purposes. The loan was to be secured by the customs duties, which were to be collected, so long as the bonds remained unpaid, by an official appointed by Nicaragua from a list presented by the fiscal agent of the loan and approved by the President of the United States...(I)t was never ratified by the United States Senate” (page 235).
Schooley 1987: Nicaragua becomes a protectorate of the United States under the Knox-Castillo Treaty (page 72). Gives details.
United States . Department of State 1928: “In June 1911, President Diaz stated that the friendly intervention of the United States would be necessary in order to establish a constitutional régime in Nicaragua” (page 8).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 10 de octubre la “Asamblea Nacional elige como Presidente de Nicaragua al General Luis Mena Solórzano para el período 1913-1916. Díaz y Chamorro pierden el control de la Asamblea Nacional. Los diputados están molestos y preocupados por la actitud de Díaz y Chamorro en relación a los empréstitos con banqueros privados norteamericanos y las condiciones impuestas. Mena inicia de inmediato conversaciones con líderes liberales a fin de firmar una alianza para tratar de salvar al país. El Sr. Adolfo Díaz Recinos pide ayuda inmediata al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos” (page 472).
United States . Department of State 1932: Mena “proposed that the Constituent Assembly elect him President for the 4-year term beginning January 1, 1913, in contravention of the so-called Dawson Pacts, which provided for a popular election. President Diaz, who favored this plan, believing that free elections were hopelessly impracticable for several years in Nicaragua, asked that the situation be submitted to the [ U.S.] Department of State…Finally, however, General Mena had the Constituent Assembly in October, 1911, elect him President for the term beginning January 1, 1913. This action was distinctly distasteful to the Granada Conservatives, who hoped to elect one of their own members to the Presidency. General Chamorro returned from El Salvador and immediately threatened a revolution if the so-called Dawson Pacts were not strictly adhered to” (page 20).
Vargas 1989: “El 7 de octubre de 1911 una nueva Asamblea Constituyente fue electa” (page 24).
Fiallos Oyanguren 2000: “En 1911 se volvió al bicamerismo pero se mantuvo el sistema electoral mayoritario ya referido aunque con algunas variantes de menor importancia” (page 248).
Parker 1981: “A new constitution prepared in November  provided for a return to bicameralism and a four-year presidential term after democratic elections” (page 226).
La política es aún un campo dominado por los hombres 1997: “La Carta Magna de 1911 establecía la ciudadanía a mayores de 21 años o de 18 que supieran leer y escribir; mediante un Decreto Presidencial se sujetaba el derecho al voto a los dispuesto en la Ley Electoral la cual excluía a las mujeres del sufragio” (page 8).
Walter 1993: “Under the Constitution of 1911, the municipal governments were elected by direct popular vote for two-year periods. As occurred with the elections for president and Congress, the party in power pretty much managed the entire show” (page 82).
United States . Department of State 1928: President Díaz “proposed in December to insert a clause in the new Constitution which would permit intervention by the United States in order to maintain peace and the existence of a lawful government. The United States refrained from expressing an opinion in this regard” (page 8).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 12 de enero la “Asamblea Nacional Constituyente aprueba la nueva Constitución Política de Nicaragua, confirma al General Luis Mena Solórzano como Presidente de Nicaragua y desconoce a Adolfo Díaz” (page 473).
United States . Department of State 1932: “Encouraged by the popular protests against [U.S. government financial intervention], General Mena forced through the Constituent Assembly a Constitution which would have made difficult the rehabilitation of Nicaraguan finances…It also made constitutional the election to the Presidency of General Mena…(T)he Constitution was irregularly promulgated by the Constituent Assembly on January 12, 1912” (page 20).
Vargas 1989: “En enero de 1912, la Asamblea Constituyente toma posesión y elige a Luis Mena como presidente de la república para el periódo de enero de 1913 a 1917” (page 24).
United States . Department of State 1932: The Knox-Castillo convention was “defeated on May 9, 1912, in the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate” (page 13).
Barquero 1945: “La guerra civil quedó iniciada el 29 de Julio de 1912. El pueblo dió a esta guerra el nombre de ‘Guerra de Mena’” (page 182).
Booth 1985: “Luis Mena…revolted against the Díaz government in July 1912. Almost immediately Liberal Benjamín Zeledón seized the day on behalf of the coffee grower-exporter faction and attacked government troops. Díaz, alarmed by this bilateral assault and bereft of any independent power base, requested military assistance from the United States” (page 31).
Kamman 1968: “Near the end of July, 1912, after weeks of preparation, [Mena] attempted but failed to gain control of La Loma, a fortified hill dominating Managua. Chamorro, in charge of loyal troops, took countermeasures; full-scale war was about to begin. The new American minister, George T. Weitzel, interceded at the request of Díaz and obtained the resignations of both Mena and Chamorro. Mena then fled to Masaya, where he set up a rival government. Since Americans resident in Managua feared for their lives, the minister requested a detachment of men from the U.S.S. Annapolis” (page 16).
Smith 1993: “By July 1912, General Mena who had been replaced as minister of war by his erstwhile colleague Emiliano Chamorro, was ready to challenge Díaz for power. Together with other dissident Conservatives and the liberal opposition, Mena set up an alternative government in Masaya. Popular uprisings took place throughout the country and Díaz, after discussion with the US minister in Nicaragua, George Weitzel, called in the US marines… Managua and Masaya were recaptured by US forces and Mena was deported to Panama” (page 85).
United States . Department of State 1928: “The difficulties between Diaz and Mena became more and more acute, and on July 30, 1912, revolutionary disturbances broke out in Managua. Diaz was able to control the immediate situation, however, and dismissed Mena as Minister of War” (page 8).
United States . Department of State 1932: “In July, President Diaz learned of General Mena’s preparations for a revolt. On July 29, 1912, he curtailed the powers of General Mena, appointing Chamorro the General in Chief of the Army. General Mena immediately took up arms” (page 20).
Bacevich 1980: “Military involvement in Nicaragua began in 1912 when U.S. Marines landed in the midst of civil war to restore order and protect American lives and property. Although the occupation was not intended to be a long one, an American garrison remained for over a decade, propping up the increasingly unpopular regime that had first invited the United States to intervene” (pages 241-242).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 1 de agosto se “firma Alianza Liberal-Conservadora Zeledón-Mena…[El 3 de agosto] Adolfo Díaz Recinos desesperado, por medio de su Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores Diego Manuel Chamorro Bolaños pide la intervención inmediata de las fuerzas militares de Estados Unidos en Nicaragua para salvar su gobierno…El Gobierno norteamericano ordena el envió de una fuerza de ocupación a Nicaragua…con más de seis mil hombres entre tripulantes y combatientes…[El 9 de agosto las] fuerzas nacionalistas de Zeledón y Mena controlan Nicaragua, pero cunde el pánico entre los partidarios de Díaz y Chamorro Vargas” (page 475). [El 14 de agosto tropas] “del Cuerpo de ‘Marines’ de los EE.UU. desembarcan en el Puerto de Corinto [y] se dirigen a Managua bajo el comando del mayor Smedley S. Butler…[El 18 de agosto fuerzas] leales al Jefe del gobierno revolucionario, General Benjamín Zeledón, que han tomado la ciudad de León la fortifican y la mantienen, rechazando el contraataque de las fuerzas conservadoras” (page 476). El 25 de agosto “barcos de guerra norteamericanos llegan a aguas de Nicaragua y bloquean las costas del Atlántico y el Pacifico” (page 478).
Munro 1967: “If Zelaya’s followers regained control of the government, all of the efforts of the State Department to place Nicaragua on her feet politically and financially would have been useless, and the interests of the New York bankers, who had undertaken their operations in the country at the express request of the United States Government, would be seriously imperiled. The American Minister, therefore, demanded that President Díaz guarantee effective protection to the life and property of foreigners in the Republic. The latter replied that he was unable to do so, but asked the United States to assume this responsibility itself. In compliance with this request, American marines landed at Corinto” (pages 243-244).
Stansifer 1998: “ U.S. marines arrived in Nicaragua in 1912 in order to keep the Conservatives, probably the minority party at this time, in power against an active Liberal rebellion. Conservatives proceeded to undo previous Liberal measures, punish Liberal adherents, and monopolize the spoils of office in the usual manner. Like the Liberals they held regular elections every four years. Marine supervision of these elections...provided a facade of legitimacy to Conservative dominance” (page 122).
United States . Department of State 1928: “By August conditions in Managua had become so serious that a Legation guard of 100 men was sent by the United States Navy. A few days later Managua was attacked and isolated by the Liberal General Zeledon, ex-Minister of War under Zelaya, who had allied himself with Mena. Property of various foreigners…was seized by revolutionary forces. The Legation guard at Managua was therefore reinforced by 360 additional Marines” (page 8).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The revolution was joined by a large body of Liberals under the leadership of General Zeledón, formerly Minister of War under Zelaya. The Liberals of León revolted and took over the city, which became a focal point for the revolution” (page 20). Gives the U.S. government rationale for intervention.
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 23 de septiembre el “General Luis Mena Solórzano Presidente electo de Nicaragua por la Asamblea Nacional…se entrega gravemente enfermo a los ‘U.S. Marines’ comandados por el Mayor Smedley D. Butler en Granada, a fin de evitar mayor derramamiento de sangre…Zeledón…queda en la ciudad de Granada como Jefe Supremo del Gobierno de Nicaragua, del Ejército revolucionario y de la Defensa de la Soberanía y el Honor Nacional…[El 28 de septiembre un artículo de] Rubén Darío acusa, fustiga y ataca duramente la intervención norteamericana en Nicaragua y en especial a quienes localmente la apoyaban” (page 479).
Kamman 1968: “Mena finally surrendered to the Americans, who sent him and his son to Panama” (page 16).
Langley 2002: By September 1912 the United States “had more than a thousand marines and bluejackets in the Central American country” (page 65).
Smith 1993: “Only one patriot continued the fight [after Mena’s deportation]. General Benjamin Zeledón had been the minister of defence in the Zelaya government…Zeledón fought and won Masaya, Jinotepe and León, and then fought his last battle…Zeledón was killed on 4 October 1912…and his lifeless body dragged through the streets of southern Nicaragua. Zeledón’s army had been a threat to the ruling clique…because he had gathered around him the nucleus of a popular army of peasants and workers who wanted national independence on their own terms. No longer were the conflicts about whether elites from Granada or León should dominate the government…A 17-year-old Augusto C. Sandino…watched the defilement of Zeledón’s corpse” (page 85).
November: presidential election (Diáz / Conservative)
Barquero 1945: “Pacificado el país Nicaragua fué convocada a elecciones Presidenciales. El Partido liberal se abstuvo de votar. No creía en la libertad electoral, porque el país se apartaba de las normas y principios de la Democracia. Don Adolfo Díaz resultó electo con 15,000 votos para ejercer la Primera Magistratura de la Nación, la cual desempeñó hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1916” (page 184).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: Es “electo fraudulentamente e investido por los norteamericanos como Presidente de Nicaragua por segunda vez, el ex-contador de las concesiones mineras de la familia Fletcher Sr. Adolfo Díaz Recinos. El Partido Liberal estaba proscrito y aún así se llevan a cabo ‘elecciones’ en Nicaragua las que gana el Partido Conservador” (page 489).
Kagan 1996: “In 1912 the Conservatives placed Adolfo Díaz in the presidency through an election which the Liberals had no chance of winning and in which they did not participate” (pages 5-6).
Munro 1967: “At the election, which was held while a large part of the American marines were still in the country, the three or four thousand voters who were allowed to participate unanimously approved the official ticket, which was the only one in the field” (page 245).
Parker 1981: “(T)he ‘election’ of Díaz in 1912 was unanimous (among those allowed to vote) after his designation by the United States minister” (page 226).
Smith 1993: “With Zeledón and his popular army defeated, Díaz went ahead with the November 1912 elections. Díaz was the only candidate and the franchise for the entire country was restricted to some 4000. Emiliano Chamorro was packed off to Washington as ambassador with the promise that he could become president next time around, and about 100 marines stayed as a ‘legation guard’ to remind the various factions who was really in control” (page 86).
United States . Department of State 1928: “Chamorro, a candidate for the Presidency, resigned [as Minister of War] shortly before the elections, which were called for November 2, 1912. President Diaz was elected to succeed himself, an agreement having been reached between the leaders that General Chamorro would withdraw his candidacy and represent Nicaragua as Minister in Washington” (page 10).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The election of Adolfo Diaz, 1912” (page 22).
Vargas 1989: “La guerra civil se termina a principios de octubre y para finales del mismo mes, Díaz convocó elecciones para presidente y diputados, resultando electos todos los que estaban a favor de la intervención. No había contrincante, ya que los norteamericanos habían prohibido que los liberales hicieran política en Nicaragua...La fórmula Díaz y Solórzano obtuvo 23,467 votos; Emiliano Chamorro, que no se presentaba como candidato, 2,229 votos y Francisco Baca, liberal zelayista y que tampoco era candidato, 43 votos...Adolfo Díaz asume la Presidencia de Nicaragua el primero de enero de 1913” (pages 28-29).
Langley 2002: In December 1912 “Col. Clifford D. Ham became collector of Nicaraguan customs” (page 62).
Mahoney 2001: “From 1913 to 1923, Conservative politicians ruled with the blessing of the United States, but civil war broke out at least ten times, and martial law was almost continuously exercised. During this period, Liberal politicians came to recognize that opposing the United States held no political future in Nicaragua; they eventually joined Conservatives in supporting broad U.S. interests” (page 230).
Ramírez 1988: “Con el apoyo de Estados Unidos, Adolfo Díaz toma posesión de su cargo como Presidente de Nicaragua para el período 1913-1916 (1. de enero)” (page 75).
Gould 1998: In 1914, “Congress reversed Zelaya’s abolition of the Comunidades Indígenas. Legalization of the communal lands and organizations proved vital to the survival of many Indian groups” (page 43).
Parker 1981: “The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty [was] signed in 1914 and ratified in 1916” (page 226).
United States . Department of State 1932: The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty “was negotiated on August 5, 1914” (page 29). Gives provisions of the treaty.
Kamman 1968: “By the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1916 Nicaragua agreed to give the United States, in perpetuity, exclusive proprietary rights for construction, operation, and maintenance of an interoceanic canal, and it granted a long-term lease on the Great and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean and on land for a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific side. Thus Nicaragua continued to interest the United States. Because of its strategic location in the Caribbean, its nearness to Panama, and its suitability for a canal site, this Central American republic was destined to take a part in American diplomacy out of all proportion to its size” (page 9).
MacRenato 1991: “On January 15, 1916 the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, had told the Conservative candidate Chamorro that ‘the United States would view his candidacy with great pleasure’” (page 67).
Smith 1993: “On 17 September 1916 the US minister to Nicaragua Benjamin Jefferson called in the liberal candidate Julian Irias” (page 88). Lists the requirements of the U.S. government for any candidate who wants to be president of Nicaragua.
October: presidential election (Emiliano Chamorro Vargas / Conservative)
Kamman 1968: “By provision of the new constitution Díaz could not succeed himself. His party united in support of Emiliano Chamorro, who became president” (page 17).
Merrill 1994: “The liberals boycotted the 1916 election, and conservative Emiliano Chamorro was elected with no opposition” (page 20).
Munro 1967: “It was clear from the beginning...that the outcome of the election would depend not so much upon the will of the majority as upon the attitude assumed by the United States” (page 250). “The election was held in October, and the new president, General Chamorro, was inaugurated in January, 1917" (page 252).
Schooley 1987: The liberals were barred from the election and the United States ensured that Chamorro ran unopposed (page 73).
Smith 1993: “The 1916 elections were marked by continued and overt US interference… Emiliano Chamorro stood, unopposed, with the marines guarding the polls” (page 88).
United States . Department of State 1928: “Although the United States offered to assist President Diaz to hold free elections in 1916, this offer was rejected. A verbal promise was obtained from President Diaz, however, that the elections would be free” (page 11).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The elections of 1916” (pages 32-33). “The electoral situation in 1916 was complicated by a split in the Conservative Party and by the decision of the Liberals to present a candidate” (page 32). “General Chamorro…received 51,810 votes” (page 33).
Vargas 1989: “Chamorro fué electo con 51,810 votos. No había otro candidato y los barcos norteamericanos garantizaban la ‘libertad electoral’” (page 35).
Barquero 1945: “El General Emiliano Chamorro…ascendió a la Presidencia de la República el 1o de enero de 1917” (page 187).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 1 de enero “Emiliano Chamorro Vargas asume la presidencia en elecciones sin contrincante ya que el Partido Liberal tiene muchos años de estar ‘proscrito.’ Los conservadores pro Chamorro apoyados por los norteamericanos que ocupan el país, siguen en el poder” (page 498).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 1 de abril de 1918 se “crea la Alta Comisión Estados Unidos-Nicaragua, para asegurarse el pago de la deuda de Nicaragua a los banqueros y financieros norteamericanos” (page 499).
Millett 1977: “(A) High Commission [was established], consisting of Nicaragua’s Finance Minister, a resident American commissioner, and a third member appointed by the Secretary of State. The Commission controlled all Nicaraguan revenues in excess of $95,999 each month...and used these funds to pay off foreign creditors” (page 35).
Smith 1993: “The new President adopted the ‘Lansing Plan’ named after the US secretary of state, which placed all of Nicaragua’s finances under the control of a three-person High Commission—two US government nominees and one Nicaraguan” (pages 88-89).
United States . Department of State 1932: Describes the details of the financial plan (pages 35-36).
United States . Department of State 1932: “In December, 1919, President Chamorro hinted that he might be a candidate to succeed himself. The Department of State immediately expressed surprise at this proposal, since the provisions of the Constitution forbade his candidacy. Thereupon General Chamorro withdrew but through his control of the party machinery secured the Conservative nomination for his uncle, Diego Chamorro…Diego Chamorro’s nomination was not popular either with the party or the country at large” (page 40).
Barquero 1945: “(E)n 1920 se organizó en Nicaragua el partido conocido por el de la Coalición, formado por los miembros más destacados de los partidos Liberal, Unionista y Progresista. Este partido eligió como Candidato para las próximas elecciones presidenciales a don José Esteban González” (pages 188-189).
Mahoney 2001: “By 1920, the State Department believed that electoral competition between Liberals and Conservatives without direct U.S. occupation would provide a better basis for political stability and the long-term protection of U.S. economic interests” (page 231).
United States . Department of State 1932: “During the four years following the 1916 elections, the Liberals criticized the Department of State for its support of an electoral machinery that tended to perpetuate the power of the Conservatives who controlled it. The Liberals claimed that since the elections were manipulated to their disadvantage and since the United States would not countenance revolution, it was impossible for them ever to secure control of the Government. Early in 1920 the Department of State…suggested that the Nicaraguan Government invite someone to make a study of the electoral system and sugest possible revisions therein. President Chamorro replied that it was inopportune to make any changes, since the existing electoral law amply provided for free elections and the proximity of the elections would not permit a thorough study” (page 39). “The Liberals, who attracted various dissatisfied elements, led a formidable opposition to the Conservatives under the name of the Coalition Party…With the disaffection in the Conservative ranks, the likelihood of the Coalitionists winning the elections became a real possibility if fair and free elections were held. The preelection period was a turbulent one. The Coalitionists demanded that all eligible voters should have the right of casting the ballots regardless of whether or not they were inscribed on the official catalogues. At the suggestion of the Department of State, President Chamorro granted two additional days for registration... Thousands were unable to register. The Government imprisoned many of the Coalition leaders” (pages 40-41). “Just before the elections, President Chamorro decreed that all citizens should be allowed to cast a ballot whether inscribed or not, and that when the votes were counted there should be rejected the ballots of all citizens whose names did not appear on the official catalogues, not only of that of 1920 but of all prior years” (page 42).
November?: presidential election (Diego Manuel Chamorro / Conservative)
Barquero 1945: “El Presidente General Chamorro que había fracasado en su propósito de reelección que no era aceptada por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos debido a la interpretación que daba a la Constitución de Nicaragua, dispuso apoyar la Candidatura Presidencial de don Diego Manuel Chamorro y como Vicepresidente la de don Bartolomé Martínez. Las elecciones fueron supervigiladas por el comisionado americano Coronel Miller” (page 189).
MacRenato 1991: “The 1920 elections had the benefit of an American observer, Major Jesse I. Miller, who was sent by the State Department. The Major concluded that there had been much fraud and improper use of government power. He made a study of the registration books and concluded that the lists ‘were enormously padded.’ Miller also learned that neither party took the results seriously because ‘neither thought that the election was decided until the State Department had passed on it’” (page 68).
Merrill 1994: “The liberals did participate in the 1920 elections, but the backing of the United States and a fraudulent vote count assured the election of Emiliano Chamorro’s uncle, Diego Manuel Chamorro” (page 20).
Smith 1993: “Diego Manuel Chamorro, who was elected as president in 1920, continued the policy of obeisance to the United States that had been followed by his nephew Emiliano” (page 89).
United States . Department of State 1928: “The declaration of the United States Government regarding its desire to see free elections was at least partially responsible for the casting of an unusually high vote, the Conservative candidate Diego Chamorro receiving 58,000 votes against 32,000 for the Liberal candidate” (page 22).
United States . Department of State 1932: “The elections resulted in a victory for Diego Chamorro, who received 62,000 votes, to 32,000 for González and 762 for Doctor Urtecho” (page 42). Describes charges of fraud.
Vargas 1989: “Resumen de la elección de 1920 por departamentos” (page 50). Gives by department the number/percent of votes for conservatives and liberals and total votes.
United States . Department of State 1928: “As soon as the election was over and shortly before the completion of his term, President Emiliano Chamorro agreed to a revision of the electoral laws and in December 1920 requested that the Department of State send an expert for that purpose” (page 22).
Barquero 1945: “El General Emiliano Chamorro depositó el Poder el 1o de enero de 1921 a su tío, don Diego Manuel Chamorro” (page 189).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: “Sube al poder otro Chamorro con el apoyo de las fuerzas interventoras norteamericanas y en elecciones sin adversarios, los liberales continuaban proscritos” (page 501).
Kamman 1968: “The first step had been to draft an election law that would insure free elections, and so in December, 1921, the Nicaraguan government had engaged a young college professor of political science and secretary of the National Municipal League, Harold W. Dodds to come to Nicaragua to help write a new law…As might be expected, Conservatives were not enthusiastic over this project, while Liberals, aspiring for power, welcomed the American’s proposed reforms” (page 20).
Munro 1974: “In the congressional and municipal elections in 1922, the conservative candidates won in practically every district, including the overwhelmingly liberal city of León” (page 165).
Kamman 1968: Describes Dodds’ concerns about the existing election laws (page 20).
MacRenato 1991: “Dr. Dodds arrived in Nicaragua in February, 1922, and the new President Diego M. Chamorro treated his arrival as an additional American intervention that might infringe on his control of the next election” (page 68).
Kamman 1968: “The…’Dodds law’ gave suffrage to males over twenty-one; those able to read or write or who were married could vote at eighteen. Both parties were to have representatives on election boards, central and local. The law set up small election cantons. It provided prior registration of voters, posting of registration lists, government-printed ballots, dual party supervision of voting, prompt reporting or returns. Since the Conservative-controlled congress understandably hesitated to embrace the proposal, the State Department [reminded] President Diego Manuel Chamorro of the Nicaraguan government’s promise to employ an American expert for revision of the electoral law and [informed] Chamorro that the State Department believed this implied acceptance of the expert’s recommendations” (page 20).
United States . Department of State 1928: “By October 1922 a draft of a new electoral law had been completed and this was presented to the next Congress. Certain political interests endeavored to have the law so modified by the Congress that its beneficial effect would be largely lost” (page 22).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: Mentions mayoral elections on January 22, 1923 (page 503).
Kamman 1968: “After the collapse of the 1907 Central American Court of Justice over canal rights through Nicaragua, the United States in 1923 supported a new conference in Washington which promised not to recognize government brought to power by coup d’état or revolution, or a president not qualified by law” (page 17).
MacRenato 1991: “(T)he Washington Treaty of 1923…had been signed by all of the Central American Governments. Emiliano Chamorro, then Minister to Washington, had signed for Nicaragua. Article 2 committed the governments not to recognize any administration in the area that gained office by coup d’etat or a revolution against a freely elected government. The treaty also denied recognition to persons related by blood or marriage to coup leaders” (pages 77-78).
United States . Department of State 1928: “The policy of [the U.S.] Government in recent years with regard to the recognition of Central American Governments has been predicated upon Article 2 of the general treaty of peace and amity of February 7, 1923, between the Central American Governments” (page 23). Reproduces the text of the treaty.
Kamman 1968: “After two months and several attempts at modification, Congress passed the [election] law on March 16, 1923” (pages 20-21).
United States . Department of State 1932: “(A) new electoral law…was enacted…on March 16, 1923. The new law provided an administrative organization adequate to the task of conducting an election on a national scale, gave the minority party in each department a share in each step of the electoral process, and legalized and regularized appeals from the arbitrary conduct of the majority. Abuses in registration, balloting, and counting the votes were eliminated” (page 43).
Barquero 1945: “El 12 de Octubre de 1923 falleció [Diego Manuel Chamorro] en Managua…El Doctor Rosendo Chamorro asumió interinamente el Poder Ejecutivo, en su carácter de Ministro de Gobernación. De conformidad con la Constitución llamó al Vice-Presidente de la República” (page 195). “(P)or el repentino fallecimiento del señor Presidente don Diego Manuel Chamorro acaecida el 12 de octubre de 1923, fué llamado el señor Martínez para terminar el período constitucional 1921-1924” (page 197). Martínez “puso en vigor la nueva Ley Electoral, conforme a la cual se practicaron las elecciones presidenciales de 1924” (page 198).
Booth 1985: “When the elder Chamorro died in office in 1923 Vice-President Bartolomé Martínez, a representative of the anti-Chamorrista wing of the Conservative faction, took over the office. Martínez bitterly opposed Emiliano Chamorro’s desire to return to the presidency. Martínez thus turned to the Liberals to forge a coalition that might thwart the caudillo’s fond hopes for a second presidential term” (page 37).
Cardenal Tellería 2000: El 17 de octubre el “Vice-Presidente de Nicaragua, el jinotegano Sr. Bartolomé Martínez González es investido como Presidente de Nicaragua” (page 504).
Musicant 1990: “To prevent his arch-rival Chamorro, now a lawful candidate, from garnering the votes, Martínez formed a coalition party of relative moderates, the Conservative Republicans. For the offices of president and vice president, they nominated the Conservative Carlos Solórzano and the Liberal Dr. Juan Sacasa” (page 288).
Ramírez 1989: Martínez is “the first of the Conservative presidents who did not by kinship belong to the oligarchy and who thus offered a certain possibility of acting independently…(H)e sought an alliance with the Liberals to oppose the Conservative Granadan oligarchy in the coming elections” (page 56).
Booth 1985: “The United States pressed hard, and successfully, for the adoption of a revised electoral law and for sufficient electoral supervision to prevent a massive election fraud that would return Chamorro to power” (page 37).
Munro 1974: Describes the events and political negotiations leading up to the election (pages 167-177).
United States . Department of State 1932: Chamorro’s “successor, Bartolomé Martínez, although selected as Vice President by the Chamorro-dominated Conservative convention of 1920, was ambitious to continue his control of the Administration. His plans ran counter to those of Gen. Emiliano Chamorro and the Granada Conservatives, who wanted to regain the leadership lost through the death of President Diego Chamorro. The attempts of the Conservative leaders to agree to a national party in which the Liberals would participate were unsuccessful. The Conservative convention, which was again dominated by General Chamorro, nominated him for the Presidency. The Liberal Party, which met shortly afterwards, likewise split into two factions…The larger, under the party name of Liberal Nationalists, nominated Juan B. Sacasa…; the smaller, under the party name of Liberal Republican, nominated Luís Corea…In the meantime President Martínez had developed a new party…for the purpose of bringing about his own nomination…After securing his nomination, President Martínez requested the views of the Department of State on the political situation in Nicaragua” (page 49).
Munro 1974: “Under the new electoral law, the registration of voters took place in March 1924” (page 171).
Munro 1974: “In May 1924…the conservative convention nominated Chamorro for the presidency and the liberals nominated Juan Bautista Sacasa” (page 172).
United States . Department of State 1932: Reproduces the June 13, 1924 letter from the American Chargé d’Affaires in Nicaragua stating that the U.S. government would not support Martínez’s presidency because the Nicaraguan constitution did not allow for the re-election of sitting presidents (page 50). “Upon the receipt of this letter, President Martínez renounced his candidacy and entered into a union with the Liberal Nationalists, which called itself the Transaction. By the terms of the agreement, Carlos Solórzano, a Conservative follower of Martínez, was selected as presidential candidate, and Doctor Sacasa, who previously had been given the presidential nomination by the Liberal Nationalists, accepted renomination as the vice presidential candidate…This coalition united the larger of the Liberal factions with the smaller of the Conservative…Because of Martínez’s alliance with the Liberal Nationalists among whom were several Zelayistas, many of the dissenting Conservatives returned to the genuine Conservative Party” (page 51).
October : presidential election (Solórzano / Conservative)
Barquero 1945: Martínez “trató de implantar un Gobierno Nacional formado éste por Liberales y Conservadores, por tal motivo fueron firmados los Pactos llamados de Transacción. De conformidad con ellos el partido liberal propuso para Presidente de la República a don Carlos Solórzano, conservador, y como Vicepresidente al doctor Juan B. Sacasa. Resultó triunfante en los comicios la fórmula Solórzano-Sacasa en el Gobierno llamado de Transacción” (page 198).
Booth 1985: “Martínez’s designated candidates, Conservative Carlos Solórzano for president and Liberal Juan Bautista Sacasa for vice-president, won a solid victory” (page 37).
Gould 1998: “The failure to sway the casta indígena away from Chamorro, the one national political figure who had consistently supported their cause, led the coalition government to practice the same form of politics their predecessors had mastered: violence and intimidation. Typically, the coalition government forces imprisoned or recruited Indians into the army so that they would be ineligible to vote in the elections” (page 92).
Kagan 1996: “As predicted, the incumbent Chamorro was defeated in a landslide by a Liberal-Conservative coalition” (page 7).
Kamman 1968: “The State Department hoped that the 1924 Nicaraguan election would bring conditions which would allow withdrawal of the legation guard from Managua…But the Nicaraguan election of 1924, conducted little better than preceding elections, was a saddening affair—no exception to the country’s political axiom that the candidate of the party in power always won” (page 19). “The Nicaraguan government claimed that the election of October 5, 1924, took place with admirable liberty and impartiality” (page 29). “The Conservatives were unhappy with the outcome and protested voting in several cantons…Strangely, even the victors of 1924 were far from jubilant. They feared extralegal action from the Conservatives, especially Chamorro” (page 30).
MacRenato 1991: “The 1924 Nicaraguan elections turned out to be as fraudulent as the others” (page 70). “State Department certification was now required even before an election was held…The State Department chose to recognize the Conservative-Liberal winning ticket. Carlos Solórzano, a Conservative from Managua, was elected President, and Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa, a Liberal from León, was elected Vice President. Emiliano Chamorro, supported by the Granada Conservatives, went down in bitter defeat” (page 71).
Merrill 1994: “A moderate conservative, Carlos Solórzano, was elected president in open elections in 1924, with liberal Juan Bautista Sacasa as his vice president” (page 20).
Munro 1974: “Just before the election, Martínez issued decrees making changes in the personnel of the electoral boards and creating a special force of armed police to be present in each polling place. The Supreme Court upheld the national electoral board when it protested against these actions, but the government rejected the court’s decision. Election day, October 5, was relatively quiet, though the government imposed a state of siege late in the afternoon because of minor disorders in the conservative department of Chontales. The coalition candidates were reported to have won by a substantial margin” (pages 177-178).
Musicant 1990: “Through force, intimidation, and wildly fraudulent ballot counting, the coalition ticket swept into office” (page 288).
Smith 1993: “Martínez supported the successful effort of the ‘national unity’ election alliance, also known as the ‘Transacción’ group, in the 1924 presidential elections. The conservative ‘Transacción’ nominee Ramon Solorzano, was elected as president, and the liberal nominee, Juan Bautista Sacasa, as vice-president” (page 89).
United States . Department of State 1932: “Although the Conservatives controlled the electoral machinery, Congress, and the Supreme Court, the Transactionists had the full support of the Administration…Of a total of 115,000 registered, 84,096 voted. Of the votes cast, Solórzano received 48,072, General Chamorro, 28,760, and Corea, 7,264” (page 53). Discusses irregularities in the election.
Vargas 1989: Gives number of registered voters, number who voted, votes for three candidates, and null votes/abstentions (pages 61-62). “Resumen de la elección de 1924 por departamento” (page 64). Gives by department the registered voters, number/percent of votes for conservatives and liberals, total number of votes, and percent of abstentions.
Munro 1974: “In November the conservative majority of the national board of elections declared that the board could not make the final canvas of the vote because some of the returns had not been received, but the liberal member of the board completed the canvas by himself. The government announced that slightly more than two-thirds of those registered had voted, and that Solórzano had received 48,000 votes and Chamorro 28,000” (page 178). Describes the aftermath of the election (pages 178-181).