Pezzullo 1993: “Leading Sandinistas…return to Nicaragua. Most go into the northern mountains…The Frente numbers fifty to seventy legal members and ten to fifteen clandestine militants” (page 258).
Schooley 1987: The National Civic Alliance is formed to contest the 1972 election (page 75).
Dunkerley 1988: In 1971 Somoza “signed the ‘Kupia-Kumi Pact’ with Aguero whereby the ‘Zancudo’ Conservatives had their congressional quota increased to 40 per cent, a constituent assembly was established, and a triumvirate comprised of Aguero and two Somocistas designated to rule until the end of 1974, when fresh elections were to be held. Throughout this period Somoza would retain his post as Guard commander, just as his father had done in the late 1940s, to ensure no loss of real power. This pact confirmed and legalized the Conservatives’ preference for minority participation in the system to leading a sustained challenge on it, and as such it broke the historic constituency of the party” (page 234).
Gambone 2001: “(T)he pact required the creation of a national constitutional convention to revise the document and called for the creation of a new National Assembly by February 1972. Once the legislature had been determined, an additional round of balloting would be held in May for a three-man ‘Executive Council,’ which would serve for a period of two and a half years until the next presidential election. Agüero insisted, and was allowed, to serve as the Conservative member of the new ruling troika” (page 188).
Godoy Reyes 1992: The Kupia Kumi (one heart) pact “established new representative parliamentary limits (60 percent for the majority and 40 percent for the minority)” (page 181).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: “(E)l 28 de marzo de 1971 los liberales y los conservadores suscribieron un nuevo acuerdo...mediante el cual se le garantizó al Partido Conservador el 40% de los escaños en las elecciones convocadas para el 27 de febrero de 1972, para integrar una nueva asamblea constituyente. Además, se nombró una Junta de Gobierno..., para gobernar el país desde mayo de 1972 hasta diciembre de 1974, fecha en la cual se deberían realizar elecciones presidenciales” (page 148).
Pezzullo 1993: On May 19 “Archbishop Obando y Bravo and other church officials condemn the violence of the regime” (page 258).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections 6 1972: “On August 31, 1971, the 2 Houses of Congress, in joint session, advocated a deep-seated plan of constitutional reform...Nationwide elections, with proportional distribution of seats among parties, would be provided for, it being understood however that the losing party or parties in the presidential elections could not be represented in either House by less than 40% of its total membership” (page 7).
Pezzullo 1993: In August in “accordance with the Liberal-Conservative Pact, Congress dissolves itself pending the election of a constituent assembly” (page 258).
Schooley 1987: Congress is dissolved and all executive and legislative power is given to Somoza Debayle until a new constitution is drafted (page 75).
Booth 1985: “The decision of Agüero and his collaborators to cooperate once again with the regime in exchange for shared power and spoils alienated many Conservatives and splintered the party. There were heavy desertions to the Social Christian party (especially by the MPDC reformers) and to new groups: Pedro Joaquín Chamorro’s Conservative National Action (Acción Nacional Conservadora—ANC), the Authentic Conservative party (Partido Conservador Auténtico) and the Democratic Conservative party (Partido Conservador Democrático)…In sum, the opportunism of the Conservative leadership alienated successive generations of young Conservatives, eroded electoral support, splintered the party, and eventually left it dead and buried—by the hands of its own leaders” (page 100).
Coleman 1997: The “Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP-ML)…had its origins in 1971-72, when it left the FSLN in a disagreement over tactics, taking more or less the position of the Proletarian Tendency that urban organization was necessary” (page 174).
Pezzullo 1993: Pedro Joaquín Chamorro “forms [the] Conservative National Action (ANC) after being expelled from the Traditional Conservative party (PCT) by Aguero for opposing the [Pact]” (page 258).
Smith 1993: “In 1972, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, a dissident conservative and editor of the newspaper ‘La Prensa,’ formed the ‘Conservative National Action’” (page 122).
Tenorio 1996: “En las elecciones de 1972, las mujeres liberales organizadas en el ala liberal femenina, jugaron un papel importante en las diferentes campañas electorales. En cada lugar visitado por el candidato liberal se escuchaba el discurso femenino de la ciudad, municipio o departamento” (page 12).
February: constituent assembly election
Chronicle of parliamentary elections 6 1972: Gives the reasons for the election, the characteristics of parliament, the electoral system, general political considerations and conduct of the elections, and gives the results, including the distribution of seats by sex (out of 100 seats nine are won by women) (pages 87-89). “When it has completed its constituent function, this body is to become the national Congress and as such, to hold the legislative power until November 14, 1974. This national Congress is to consist of a 70-member Chamber of Deputies and a 30-member Senate, as well as of formerly-elected Presidents of the Republic” (page 87).
Pezzullo 1993: The February 6 “constituent elections produce [the] agreed 60-40 Liberal-Conservative split in Congress” (page 258).
Schooley 1987: Gives number of votes for liberals and conservatives (page 75).
Pezzullo 1993: In May 1972 a “three-man junta of two Liberals and one Conservative (Fernando Aguero) assumes executive power. Somoza retains control of the [Guardia Nacional]” (page 258).
Schooley 1987: Triumvirate takes power from May 1, 1972 until December 31, 1973 (page 75).
Close 1985: The Somozas “kept power by co-opting the upper strata of society and ignoring or coercing the lower levels, all with the unflinching support of the United States. [Their] downfall was precipitated by the greed of the last member of the line, Anastasio, who wrecked the ‘modus vivendi’ between the state and the upper class after a December 1972 earthquake that leveled the capital, Managua, created opportunities for profit that the dictator could not resist. He greatly expanded the size and scope of his economic interests and put himself into direct competition with Nicaragua’s upper class. The latter perceived Somoza as a threat to their livelihood, and began to withdraw their support” (pages 152-153).
Los evangélicos y el poder político en América Latina 1986: “El CEPAD fue fundado el 27 de diciembre de 1972 por ocho denominaciones, para responder a las graves necesidades causadas por el terremoto sufrido en aquel año. La ciudad de Managua se vio enlutada por diez mil muertos al ser destruida el 23 de diciembre de 1972. Como resultado del siniestro 40.000 vivendas fueron arrasadas y más de 200.000 personas se vieron desplazadas. Debido a la destrucción de edificios, tiendas, etc., se dio una grave escasez de víveres y medicinas, entre otras cosas” (page 331).
Gorman 1984: “On the morning of December 23, 1972 Managua was devastated by a massive earthquake. In the aftermath of the disaster, Somoza demanded and received unlimited power from the constituent assembly to direct efforts at national reconstruction...The scope and aggressiveness of Somocista corruption after 1972 virtually isolated the regime” (page 53).
Leonard 1998: “Prior to 1972 the peasant was not represented in Nicaragua’s political arena. The Communist Party was outlawed, and the Socialists made little effort to appeal to the peasants. In fact, by blind allegiance the peasants remained loyal to the party of their employers--Liberal and Conservative...The catalyst for change in Nicaragua came with a devastating earthquake that in December 1972 destroyed half of Managua and killed an estimated 10,000 people...Somoza took personal control of the relief efforts, again marked by personal graft and corruption. He silenced opposition by a series of laws and decrees and prepared to resume the presidency via elections in 1974” (page 99).
Zub K. 2002: “El año 1972 quizás sea el que inauguró una nueva etapa del protestantismo nicaragüense. Con la destrucción de Managua por un terremoto de 7.3 grados Richter, de los escombros de su capital nació el Comité Evangélico Pro Ayuda a los Damnificados (CEPAD) como una expresión de la cooperación evangélica. Este hecho cambió la dirección de las iglesias, tanto en su organización, como en su liderazgo y programas…Los evangélicos se negaron a ser parte del Comité Nacional de Emergencia creado y presidido por Somoza, quien, como se supo luego, distribuyó la ayuda internacional con fines políticos…Esta posición tomada por un sector de las iglesias protestantes fue una acción política audaz y representó una desconfianza hacia el dictador” (page 35).
Christian 1986: “(I)n 1973 a group of Miskitos led by Wycliffe Diego, a Moravian pastor, organized to seek redress from the Somoza regime for a number of long-simmering complaints. They formed ALPROMISU— Alliance for the Progress of the Miskitos and Sumos” (page 297).
Hale 1987: “The Somoza government responded to ALPROMISU with an effective combination of repression and co-optation. It jailed a few Miskitu organizers during the 1970s, but also offered to fund ALPROMISU, and assigned seats in the National Assembly to two Miskitu associated with the organization” (page 104).
Pezzullo 1993: “FSLN urban groups step up recruitment efforts among refugees displaced by the earthquake. MCR joins the FSLN as an intermediate organization” (page 258).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: “(E)l terremoto...brindó a Somoza la oportunidad de reasumir el control total del gobierno en marzo de 1973" (page 148).
Smith 1993: “(I)n 1973 Ramiro Sacasa formed a breakaway group from Somoza’s own National Liberal Party, the ‘Constitutionalist Movement’” (page 122).
Brysk 2000: “The foreign missionaries of the Moravian Church helped establish Nicaragua’s first ethnic federation, ALPROMISU, in 1974” (page 80).
Freeland 1988: SUKAWALA (Nicaraguan Association of Sumu Communities) is founded in 1974 (page 57).
Schooley 1987: Constituent assembly dissolves itself in March 1974 (page 76).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections 9 1975: The new constitution, “which restored constitutional guarantees and made possible the re-election of General Somoza, was finally adopted on April 3, 1974” (page 69).
Pezzullo 1993: The “Group of Twenty-seven, led by P.J. Chamorro, calls for an election boycott” (page 259).
Smith 1993: “In July 1974, 27 public figures from the middle-class opposition called for a boycott of that year’s elections” (page 122).
Foroohar 1989: “(O)n August 6, 1974, the Episcopal Conference denounced the fraudulent electoral procedures” (page 96).
September: general election (Somoza Debayle / PLN)
Blackford 1992: “In the 1974 presidential election, the official figures listed the abstention rate as 31 percent, while the leading opposition newspaper ‘La Prensa’ reported that less than 50 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots” (page 31).
Bowdler 1982: “The 1974 election was characterized by abstentionism...There were no incidents on election day; in fact very few people went to the polls, this in spite of the fact that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal reported voter registration of 1,152,268 citizens or 60.8% of the total Nicaraguan population, which is nearly 240,000 more than the number of citizens 18 years and older reported by the Census of 1971...(T)he official results listed 733,662 votes for Somoza and 66,330 for...[the] leader of one faction of the Conservative Party who ran against Somoza. The total percentage of votes cast according to official figures was approximately 69%...Except for local mayor’s races, the entire 1974 election seemed a rather lackluster affair” (page 64).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections 9 1975: Gives the characteristics of parliament and general political considerations and conduct of the election. “General Somoza gained an overwhelming victory on election day, reportedly obtaining over 80% of the votes cast. Opposition to him had been reduced drastically when, prior to the elections, a number of competing parties were declared illegal because they had failed to secure the required signatures of 5% of the electorate. The Liberal Party captured 60% of the seats in Congress” (page 69).
Dunkerley 1988: Somoza “won 743,985 out of 815,758 votes cast, the Conservatives picked up their allocation of 40 per cent of the seats for fulfilling the tryst and an equal proportion of the electorate abstained. The very predictability of this result provoked a growing number of dissidents from the Conservative and Liberal Parties to join with the PLI, PSCN, PSN and a number of trade unions in forming the ‘Unión Democrática de Liberación’ (UDEL)” (pages 235-236).
González 1997: “En las elecciones de 1974, el Ala Femenina le dio a los Somoza entre el 60% y el 67% de los votos electorales” (page 204).
LaFeber 1993: “Somoza won by a margin of twenty to one, leaving nothing to chance: his henchmen bribed voters with money, food, and rum” (page 228).
Millett 1977: “Anastasio Somoza Debayle ran for reelection against a phantom candidate and ‘won’ after a month’s ‘counting’ of nonexisting votes” (from introduction by Miguel d’Escoto, M.M.) (page 4). “The September elections (produced) the predictable overwhelming Somoza victory over a handpicked puppet opponent” (page 242).
Smith 1993: “In the September presidential elections Somoza beat the token Conservative candidate, Edmundo Paguaga Irías, receiving 748,985 of the total of 815,758 votes” (page 122).
Stein 1997: “With the exception of Archbishop Obando’s public declarations against the fraudulent nature of Somoza’s 1974 reelection, there was little documented concern by Catholic bishops for the integrity and competitiveness of the electoral process during the ten elections under the Somozas” (page 239).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections 9 1975: Somoza takes office December 1, 1974 for a six-year term (page 69).
Klaiber 1998: “In 1974 several groups of businessmen and professionals founded the Democratic Union for Freedom (UDEL: Unión Democrática de Liberación). This was a worrisome portent: the middle classes, tired of a corrupt and scandalous dictatorship, were now beginning to turn against it” (page 198).
Pezzullo 1993: The UDEL unites “Christian Democrats, trade unionists, and Socialists (PSN)” (page 259).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: The Unión Democrática de Liberación (UDEL) is created on December 15, 1974 and led by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro (page 148).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “In 1974, the growing elements of the reformist bourgeoisie and middle classes which saw little alternative to Somoza’s ouster, joined to form the opposition Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL)” (page 72).
Pezzullo 1993: “Following mediation by Archbishop Obando y Bravo, Somoza agrees to release fourteen prisoners, pay $6 million, raise the minimum wage, broadcast a 12,000-word FSLN communiqué, and arrange the commandos’ flight to Cuba” (page 259).
Smith 1993: “By 1974 the Sandinistas were anxious to regain the political initiative from the dissident middle classes who had formed a ‘Democratic Liberation Union’ (UDEL) on 15 December 1974. The Frente also needed to disperse Somoza’s forces who were engaged in full-scale counterinsurgency exercises against the guerrillas in the mountains. At 11 pm on 27 December 1974 an FSLN commando force…raided a Christmas party in the wealthy Los Robles suburb of Managua and took hostage 30 senior Somocistas including the dictator’s brother-in-law Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa. Somoza was forced to accede to all the Frente’s demands” (page 123).
Spalding 1994: “Although initially giving the Sandinistas visibility and new credibility, this incident led to the imposition of another round of martial law. The dynasty’s grip on the Nicaraguan state tightened” (page 54).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “A major turning point in the opposition movement occurred in 1974, when a group of Sandinista guerrillas invaded a Christmas party of Managua’s elite. In exchange for release of the hostages, the FSLN successfully demanded a $2 million ransom, publication of several communiqués, and release of a number of imprisoned Sandinista leaders. The daring raid gave the FSLN instant international visibility and shattered the myth that the dictatorship was invulnerable” (page 73).
Booth 1990: “(T)he national guard easily controlled the Sandinistas until the mid-1970s, when Anastasio Somoza Debayle sharply escalated repression. The new repression and economic recession in the mid- and late 1970s turned more and more of Somoza’s once-reformist opponents into rebels and allies of the now rapidly growing FSLN” (pages 471-472).
González 2001: “By 1975, Liberal women (most of them affiliated with the Ala) held a wide variety of posts within the Somoza administration and within the Somocista Nationalist Liberal Party (PLN)” (page 57).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “Somoza overreacted to the 1974 raid, declaring a state of siege that lasted three years. Under cover of martial law, the National Guard launched a massive campaign of indiscriminate repression, directed particularly against the northern region where FSLN strongholds were located. While the FSLN probably had fewer than 150 armed and trained guerrilla fighters in 1974, some 3,000 people were killed by the National Guard during the state of siege. The massacres had a major effect in intensifying domestic and international opposition to the dictatorship” (page 73).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: In October 1975, the FSLN splits into three factions (page 150).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “In the mid-1970s the FSLN split into three factions or ‘tendencies,’ divided in their analysis of the Nicaraguan situation and of the appropriate strategy of opposition to the dictatorship. The Proletarian Tendency (TP), perhaps most influenced by orthodox Marxist analysis, felt that opposition organizing should capitalize on the growing proletarianization (both urban and rural) which characterized the Nicaraguan social formation since the 1950s. The Prolonged Popular War (GPP) tendency, influenced by Maoist thought, focused on creating bases for rural guerrilla struggle. A third…was represented by the Insurrectional Tendency (TI), also known as the ‘Terceristas’” (pages 71-72).
Close 1985: “Splitting from the mainstream Social Christians in 1976, the PPSC has promoted the politics of liberation theology” (page 154).
Christian 1986: “Another significant event for Nicaragua in November 1976 occurred outside the country. It was the election of Jimmy Carter as President of the United States” (page 39).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: Carlos Fonseca Amador, founder of the FSLN, is killed by the National Guard on November 8, 1976 (page 150).
Booth 1999: “From 1977 on, the National Guard conducted an ever-intensifying war against the people of Nicaragua. Such repression eventually drove thousands, especially young people, to join the FSLN” (page 73).
Close 1985: “The FSLN had existed since 1961, yet prior to 1977 it had been little more than a nuisance to the old regime. But a combination of governmental ruthlessness and the Sandinistas’ adoption of a strategy of alliances with all anti-Somoza sectors gave them new life and a new outlook. They were transformed from a small, sectarian guerrilla band into the representatives of all who opposed the dictatorship: workers, peasants, professionals, and even big business” (page 153).
Freeland 1988: The SICC (Southern Indigenous and Creole Community) is founded in 1977 “to promote cultural and social interests of the Creole population of South Zelaya” (page 56).
Gordon 1987: “(I)n the mid to late 1970s…the Creole population in the southern Atlantic Coast began to organize to advance themselves as a group. The vanguard role in this movement was played by the ‘Southern Indigenous and Creole Committee’ (SICC)…Its existence and influence are important indicators of the resurgence of ethnic militancy in the Creole community during this period” (page 140).
Pezzullo 1993: On January 20, 1977 “Jimmy Carter becomes president of the United States” (page 260).
Pezzullo 1993: On March 4, 1977 the U.S. “State Department issues first public U.S. criticism of Somoza’s human rights record” (page 260).
Los evangélicos y el poder político en América Latina 1986: “(D)esde su creación en 1972, la Asamblea del CEPAD se fue convirtiendo en un foro de las denominaciones miembros…(E)n abril de 1977 el Comité de Pastores del CEPAD recibió de parte de los hermanos, especialmente de pentecostales en la zona norte del país, los datos documentados de asesinatos de evangélicos… por la Guardia Nacional…(L)a Asamblea decidió que tres hermanos fuesen a hablar con Anastasio Somoza Debayle en nombre de CEPAD para denunciar estos asesinatos…(D)urante la insurreción las iglesias se vieron confrontadas con la necesidad de dar albergue y abrigo a las personas que eran afectadas por la represión de Somoza” (page 335).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “In April 1977 the newly-inaugurated Carter administration, embarrassed by the National Guard’s massacres and seeking to define a new human rights policy, had attempted to send Somoza a message by restricting military and economic aid to Nicaragua” (page 73).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: Somoza has a heart attack in July 1977 and is hospitalized in Miami for a month. “La UDEL aprovechó la circunstancia para publicar un programa de democratización de Nicaragua...En este mismo mes se formó ‘el Grupo de los Doce,’ un grupo representativo de los diferentes sectores de la sociedad nicaragüense” (page 150).
Foroohar 1989: “In August, the Social Christian Party announced its decision to hold its congress on September 24 and 25” (page 162).
Isbester 1999: “In August 1977 two women organized a mass-based women’s group to protest human rights violations. The women’s group was called the Association of Women Protesting the National Problem (AMPRONAC)—the national problem being Somoza” (pages 187-188).
Pezzullo 1993: In August 1977 “Humberto Ortega recruits Edén Pastora and Fernando Chamorro, two longtime anti-Somoza activists with social democratic reputations…[On August 24] citing election fraud, corruption, human rights abuses and harassment of non-Somocista businessmen, UDEL condemns the government” (page 261).
Christian 1986: Somoza returns to Nicaragua on September 7. “Two weeks after returning home, Somoza lifted the state of siege he had imposed at the end of 1974 as part of the National Guard campaign against the Sandinistas. He took this step, which reinstated constitutional guarantees, including freedom of the press, in response to pressure from Washington, which had been delaying decisions on military and economic aid to Nicaragua” (page 47).
Foroohar 1989: The September Social Christian Party “Congress concluded with a call for termination of the dictatorship and the beginning of a democratic system in the country” (page 162).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: “El 19 de septiembre de 1977 Somoza levantó el estado de sitio y la ley marcial, y convocó a elecciones municipales” (page 151).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “In September 1977, Somoza lifted the state of siege, and the country erupted in expressions of pent-up protest…(I)n September, the [ U.S.] aid restrictions were lifted” (page 73).
Booth 1985: The “’Group of Twelve,’ exposed in 1977, fled Nicaragua for safety. From abroad, the Twelve began to lobby against international aid for Somoza and to organize the anti-Somoza coalitions within Nicaragua” (page 102).
Bowdler 1982: “‘The Group of Twelve’ was a blue-ribbon, heterogeneous committee of Nicaraguan elites, organized in exile in October 1977” (page 75). Gives names and occupations of the members (page 76).
Pezzullo 1993: On October 23 “Archbishop Obando and…Alfonso Robelo form a National Dialogue committee, with the backing of UDEL and…COSIP. Somoza refuses to negotiate” (page 262).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “In October 1977, the opposition newspaper ‘La Prensa’ published a statement by twelve prominent Nicaraguan businesspeople and professionals—‘Los Doce’—praising the participation of the FSLN in the struggle against the dictatorship” (page 72).
Pezzullo 1993: In November 1977 the Guardia Nacional “sacks the Solentiname community in retaliation for [FSLN attacks]. Father Ernesto Cardenal becomes an FSLN militant” (page 262).
Pezzullo 1993: On December 27 the “FSLN-DN (Tercerista) rejects the national dialogue [and] calls for a popular insurrection” (page 262).
Gorman 1984: “In January 1978, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, a nationally popular opponent of the dictatorship, was assassinated (apparently with the complicity of Somoza). This act galvanized the bourgeoisie into an open attempt to depose Somoza” (page 59).
Isbester 2001: “Participation of middle- and upper-class women [in AMPRONAC] skyrocketed after the January 1978 assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro” (page 35).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “In January 1978, the UDEL Chairman, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of ‘La Prensa’ and outspoken critic of the dictatorship, was assassinated. The assassination had the effect of galvanizing and unifying the opposition movement. The bourgeois and middle class elements of the opposition moved closer to the militant position staked out by the FSLN, which drew its strength from the popular sectors” (page 72).
Prevost 1997a: “The independent uprising of the Indian community of Monimbó in February 1978 pushed the FSLN in all of its factions to move toward general insurrection” (page 151).
February 5: municipal election
Bowdler 1982: “The municipal elections of February 5, 1978, were the last held under Somoza’s rule...Even the official figures gave a turnout of some 31-35% of the voters, much below the usual official tally. This was attributed to a boycott of the election by the various factions of the Conservative Party, now totally in disarray and disillusioned following the assassination of the one conservative leader who had offered token opposition through his newspaper” (page 65).
Kagan 1996: “On February 5 the municipal elections went ahead as planned. A majority of Nicaraguans stayed away from the polls, the opposition decried the vote as illegitimate, and Somoza’s Liberal Party won by a landslide--more than a ten-to-one margin” (page 46).
Pezzullo 1993: “Municipal elections are boycotted by most voters” (page 263).
Pezzullo 1993: On February 26 “40,000 attend pro-Somoza rally in Managua” (page 263).
Christian 1986: On February 27, 1978 Somoza “announced he was going to step aside in 1981, after presidential elections in late 1980” (page 59).
Booth 1985: “Industrialist Alfonso Robelo Callejas organized a new opposition party of progressive business interests and professionals, the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense—MDN) in March 1978” (page 103).
Booth 1985: “In May 1978 the Group of Twelve, the MDN, and the UDEL’s organizations joined to form the Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio Opositor—FAO)” (page 103).
Isbester 2001: “IN 1977 [should say 1978], the Terceristas made alliances with the agri-industrial class through its umbrella organization, the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), which was also attempting to oust Somoza…The FAO needed the FSLN to bring the working class into a united front…However, the FAO’s agenda was different from the Sandinistas’; the FAO intended to have...a political opening that nevertheless protected the economic status quo. The FAO had no intention of including the Sandinistas in the postvictory organization of the country” (page 40).
Pezzullo 1993: In May 1978 the FAO is “formed by UDEL, MDN, Socialist party (PSN), and other political and labor groups. Alfonso Robelo is named leader” (page 264).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “In May 1978 the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) was formed, linking the old UDEL to the pro-FSLN Los Doce as well as a variety of other reformist opposition groups” (page 72).
Pezzullo 1993: The “three FSLN tendencies agree to coordinate tactics, but little progress is actually made toward reunification” (page 264).
Isbester 2001: “Once the Sandinistas realized that the FAO was intending to cut them out after the revolution, the FSLN split from it and began to build its own umbrella organization, the United People’s Movement (MPU), which was formed by popular groups supportive of the Sandinista agenda. AMPRONAC was instrumental in establishing the MPU in the spring of 1978 with fourteen groups made up of students, youth, trade unions, political parties, and neighborhood defense communities” (page 40).
Pezzullo 1993: On July 5 a “crowd of 30,000 greets ten members of the Twelve as they arrive at the Managua airport. Declaring themselves Sandinistas, they join the FAO and tour the country promoting a national unity government…[On July 17 the] United People’s Movement (MPU) [is] formed by twenty-two student, labor, and political organizations representing the TP and GPP as well as the Socialist (PSN) and Communist (PCdeN) parties. Under the leadership of Moises Hassan, the MPU serves as FSLN’s urban mobilization arm (PCdeN)” (page 264). On July 25 the “Bishop’s Conference calls for Somoza’s resignation. Its declaration is endorsed by the FAO and Alfredo Pellas, head of the BANAMER business group” (page 265).
Prevost 1997a: “Disagreement over the question of alliances had led the Insurrectionalists to participate in the [FAO] through their supporters in the Group of Twelve, while the GPP and the TP were concentrating on what was to become the [MPU]” (page 151).
Smith 1993: “In July 1978 the FSLN supported the creation of the United People’s Movement (MPU), a broad coalition which included left political parties, women’s organizations, neighbourhood and student groups and trade unions…In July 1978 Los Doce returned to Nicaragua” (page 126).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “Los Doce returned from exile in July and joined FAO, the reorganized opposition grouping that for the first time formally linked middle class and bourgeoise opposition groups to pro-FSLN groups” (page 73).
Williams 1994: “The growing mobilization and organization of traditionally marginalized groups in civil society achieved its most visible expression in the ‘Movimiento del Pueblo Unido’ (MPU) in 1978, a broad-based alliance of popular organizations linked to the FSLN. The organization of such an alliance was a key element in guaranteeing the success of the popular uprising against Somoza and in heading off efforts by antisomocista political party elites to assume the leadership of the opposition…Unlike other cases of transition from authoritarian rule, in Nicaragua political party elites did not play a dominant role in the final period leading up to the overthrow of Somoza or during the initial stages of the transition. Party elites were not absent from or uninvolved in the opposition movement. However, the FSLN was successful in outmaneuvering them and consolidating its leadership over the mass protest movement” (pages 172-3).
Anderson, Leslie 2005: “The Monimbó riot would be followed by the flamboyant guerrilla capture of the legislature, led by Edén Pastora and Dora Maria Tellez, and a four-pronged military assault on Managua coming from the north, south, east, and west” (page 55).
LaFeber 1993: “(T)wenty-five FSLN guerrillas dramatically seized the National Legislative Palace, kidnapping nearly all of Somoza’s congress and several of his relatives...Another general strike and urban uprising followed the incident. The FSLN army multiplied ten times to 7,000 members” (page 231).
Pezzullo 1993: On August 21 “FAO publishes a sixteen-point plan for a transitional government and free elections [and] prepares for a general strike…[On August 22-24] FSLN commandos under Edén Pastora, Hugo Torres, and Dora María Tellez capture the National Congress to gain release of Tomás Borge and fifty-eight other prisoners…[On August 25] FAO begins an open-ended general strike…Rioting associated with the general strike develops into a spontaneous insurrection in Matagalpa” (page 265).
Rojas Bolaños 1994: The FSLN occupies the National Palace on August 22, 1978. “Ésta fue una de las acciones más importantes y de mayor trascendencia del Frente, no sólo porque se logró liberar a un gran número de miembros de la organización que estaban prisioneros, sino porque mostró las debilidades del régimen” (page 152).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “The daring action won popular admiration as well as concessions similar to those obtained in the December 1974 raid. Equally significant for the eventual course of re-democratization, the raid also apparently forestalled a palace coup intended to install a compromise government which would have excluded the FSLN” (page 74).
Gorman 1984: A “nationwide insurrection broke out in September resulting in over 6,000 casualties and more than 30,000 refugees. In response to this increasingly revolutionary situation, the FAO made one last attempt to negotiate an end to the dictatorship. When this had completely failed, many of the more progressive members of the FAO began to openly support the Sandinista Front” (page 60).
Pezzullo 1993: On September 13 Somoza declares martial law…[On September 14] FAO nominates Alfonso Robelo, Rafael Cordova Rivas, and Sergio Ramírez (representing the Twelve and indirectly the Terceristas) to participate in mediations…[On September 30] Somoza agrees to mediation with FAO, but says he will serve out his term until May 1981 and run for reelection” (page 266).
Prevost 1997a: “Although the Terceristas are often credited with the alliance strategy that ultimately proved successful in overthrowing Somoza, their flirtation with the FAO ended in October 1978 when many of the key backers cooperated with a U.S.-sponsored mediation that was intended to keep the FSLN out of power” (page 151).
Pezzullo 1993: On October 4 the “Ortega brothers declare that the TI would reject any mediation designed to achieve ‘Somocismo sin Somoza.’…FAO accepts U.S. mediation offer to negotiate Somoza’s resignation. Refuses face-to-face talks with the regime” (page 266). On October 6 the U.S. “mediation team…arrives in Managua…[On October 25] Ramírez and six other members of the Twelve announce their withdrawal from the mediation effort and the FAO” (page 267).
Christian 1986: “(O)n November 6 the Nationalist Liberal Party issued a statement saying Somoza would serve out his term—until 1981—but proposing a sort of plebiscite to test the relative electoral strength of each of the opposition political groups. The strongest among them would be allowed to join the Somoza government until the next elections” (page 88). Describes reaction to this proposal (pages 88-100).
Christian 1986: On December 26, 1978, “Cuban radio announced that the three factions of the Sandinista Front—Prolonged War, Proletarian, and ‘tercerista’—had agreed to merge their forces both politically and militarily” (page 97).
Pezzullo 1993: On December 4 “FSLN announced in Mexico City that negotiations between the TI, TP, and GPP have resulted in an agreement to unite in the future…[On December 20 the U.S.] mediation team presents detailed plebiscite proposal” (page 267).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “Under U.S. pressure, FAO agreed on 10 December to violate its compact with the FSLN by beginning direct talks with Somoza, provoking more defections from FAO” (page 75).
Pérez-Baltodano 2004: “In 1979…the Nicaraguan bishops went as far as to proclaim the legitimacy of the armed popular insurrection against Somoza” (page 88).
Close 1988: In “January 1979, three key groups—the Twelve, the Independent Liberals, and the Popular Social Christians—quit the FAO in favour of the MPU” (page 35).
Pezzullo 1993: On January 11 the “Mediation team returns to Managua with a proposal for an internationally supervised plebiscite. Both Somoza’s PLN and FAO express reservations. Washington threatens to reassess relations with Somoza unless a plan acceptable to the FAO can be negotiated” (page 268).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “Somoza terminated negotiations in January 1979, gambling that the United States would prefer to support him rather than risk an FSLN victory” (page 75).
Booth 1985: “The National Patriotic Front, formed 1 February 1979, gave final shape to the FSLN’s policy of alliance with other groups as the battle with the dynasty escalated toward its climax…[It] united the MPU revolutionary coalition with several other opposition groups, including the Independent Liberals, the Popular Social Christian faction, the Group of Twelve, and several unions” (pages 154-155).
Prevost 1997a: “A new group, the [FPN], using the MPU as its axis, was formed and brought a variety of anti-Somoza organizations together under the hegemony of a new, united FSLN” (page 151).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “A number of the disaffected parties and groups which left FAO were recruited to join with the MPU in a National Patriotic Front (FPN), organized by the FSLN in February 1979. By this point, the lines of polarization were drawn: the FSLN was at the head of a broad-based revolutionary alliance seeking to overthrow the dictatorship” (page 75).
Pezzullo 1993: On February 8 “ Washington terminates all military agreements with Nicaragua [and] places a moratorium on future economic aid” (page 268).
Booth 1999: “The FSLN, split for several years over tactics, realized that popular outrage had doomed the regime and rendered its tactical debate sterile. The three Sandinista factions quickly reunified in 1979 under the Joint National Directorate...and began to build a network of wealthy and influential supporters” (page 74).
Christian 1986: “Sometime in March 1979 representatives of the three factions were brought together in Havana and a nine-man directorate emerged made up of the three top men from each faction” (page 104). Describes each member.
De Franco 1997: “In 1979, before the fall of Somoza, three different currents of thought circulated within the FSLN concerning the best strategy for gaining power. The Front had three groups: The Tercerista group advocated insurrection; the Proletarian Tendency group advocated popular struggle, and the GPP (Prolonged People’s War) advocated protracted warfare” (page 110).
Payne 1985: On March 7, 1979 the “leaders of the three FSLN factions announced the formation of a nine-man National Directorate unifying the three groups. Vanguard reunification was Fidel Castro’s main condition for providing the Sandinistas with their first significant amount of Cuban military and material aid” (page 19). Lists the three leaders of each faction.
Pezzullo 1993: In March 1979 “three Conservative factions unite to form the Democratic Conservative party (PCD), with Fernando Aguero, Rafael Cordova Rivas, Clement Guido, and Adolfo Calero as executive council” (page 268).
Pezzullo 1993: On April 30 in “an effort to head off a May Day strike, the government arrests forty FAO political and labor leaders, including Alfonso Robelo and Rafael Cordova Rivas. The United States protests the arrests” (page 269).
Booth 1985: “On 1 May 1979, an opposition demonstration turned out some twenty-five thousand protesters” (page 173).
Black 1981: “The original composition of the Council [of State], which was to share legislative powers with the Junta, was outlined in the June 1979 programme of government. It was to contain thirty-three members drawn from…a total of twenty-three organisations” (pages 244-245). Lists the organizations.
Booth 1985: “(F)rom the Costa Rican capital the revolutionaries announced on 10 June 1979 the existence of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction, its membership still secret. The junta began planning to assume power, to organize a government, to establish new public policy” (page 178).
Booth 1998: “The single event that finally shattered what remained of the regime was the National Guard’s 20 June 1979 murder of ABC television correspondent Bill Stewart in front of his own camera crew. Its revelation to the world the following day and the outraged reaction it caused sowed panic among the Somocistas” (page 148).
Close 1988: “Frightened by the probability of a Sandinista victory, the United States asked the OAS to send a peacekeeping force to Managua to secure conditions favourable to setting up a new government that would retain significant elements of the old regime. In a precedent-shattering decision, the OAS overwhelmingly rejected Washington’s transparent effort to save the old system” (page 35).
Payne 1985: “During the Seventeenth Consultive Meeting of Foreign Ministers [6/23/79], the OAS adopted a resolution calling for the immediate resignation of Somoza, the installation of the Government Junta with its Program announced the previous week, and early and free elections” (page 21).
Pezzullo 1993: On June 16 the “FSLN announces the creation of the Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN). Its executive junta consists of [Daniel] Ortega, Moises Hassan, Violeta Chamorro, Robelo, and [Sergio] Ramírez” (page 271). On June 23 the “OAS approves Venezuelan resolution supporting opposition forces and early free elections” (page 272).
Spalding 1994: “On June 6, COSEP issued a communiqué calling for the immediate resignation of Somoza and the creation of a new government of national unity. Eleven days after the JGRN was formed in Costa Rica, COSEP issued a statement formally recognizing it as the new government…After years of battles and confrontations, organized economic elites finally broke with the regime and, at the last hour, formally threw their support behind the new government” (page 60).
Booth 1985: On July 11, “the junta publicly announced its membership, program, and tentative cabinet” (pages 178-179). Lists members of junta.
Christian 1986: On July 12 “Somoza called Francisco Urcuyo Maliañó, speaker of the lower house of the Nicaraguan Congress, to the Bunker and told him that presidential authority would soon pass to him” (page 129).
Anderson, Leslie 2005: “In response to such mass participation and coordination, Somoza and his family fled to Miami on July 17, 1979, leaving the National Guard” (page 55).
Black 1981: “ Washington’s hope for a swift, orderly and ‘controlled’ handover would have prevented the FSLN taking Managua by force and might have preserved some remnants of the Somoza state. But Urcuyo, as a loyal functionary of that state, carried through Somocista logic to the end and wrecked the Americans’ final gambit. Urcuyo’s order that the ‘irregular forces’ should lay down their arms, and ‘Somocismo’s’ obstinate last-ditch attempt to preserve its institutions only guaranteed their absolute destruction…Urcuyo’s flourish gave the FSLN the margin it required. Negotiations on the ceasefire and transfer of power collapsed. In one of the heaviest nights of fighting in the whole war, especially on the Frente Sur where the Guard still controlled much of Rivas, the FSLN destroyed the remnants of ‘Somocismo’” (page 179).
Booth 1985: “In an astonishing footnote to the collapse of Somocismo, interim president Dr. Urcuyo Maliaño attempted to remain in power. He named a new head of the National Guard…, called on the armed forces to defend the government, and announced that he would complete the remaining two years of Somoza’s term of office. Astounded by this unexpected turn of events, the United States demanded Urcuyo’s resignation…The FSLN immediately resumed its military campaign to capture Managua” (page 182).
Figueroa Ibarra 1994: “La forma en que se produjo la renuncia de Somoza el 17 de julio modificó la moderación programática del FSLN, al generar una incontrolable e inesperada desbandada de la Guardia Nacional. La torpeza del presidente provisional, Francisco Urcuyo, anunciando que se quedaría en el poder hasta 1981, produjo confusión en las filas somocistas y favoreció al sandinismo” (page 67).
Pezzullo 1993: On July 17 “Somoza sends [his] resignation to Congress at 1 a.m. and flies to Miami. Once named president by Congress, Urcuyo violates the understanding on transfer of power by announcing plans to serve out Somoza’s term until 1981” (page 274). Describes efforts of U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo to convince Urcuyo to resign.
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “Both Somoza and the U.S. lacked the necessary leverage at this point to influence the composition of the new government. On 17 July, Somoza resigned and flew to Miami. In a bizarre finale, the interim president, Francisco Urcuyo, who was supposed to turn over power to the new government, announced his intention to remain in power” (page 76).
Booth 1985: “Urcuyo at last recognized the hopelessness of his position and gave up” (page 182). “(T)he junta elaborated public policy along the lines determined by or with the FSLN Joint National Directorate (Dirección Nacional Conjunto—DN) and executed that policy through the various government ministries. During the first year following the fall of Somoza the junta legislated by unappealable decree under emergency powers” (page 187).
Booth 1999: “Somoza lost direct U.S. and regional support and vital economic resources, permitting the Sandinistas to oust him and establish the revolutionary regime with a center-left coalition and revolutionary rules. The excluded Somocista Liberals and an increasing number of other disaffected economic and political forces formed various outside-the-regime forces, including the U.S.-backed contra rebels” (page 67).
Canadian Church and Human Rights Delegation 1984: “The 1978-1979 war, which liberated Nicaragua from…the Somoza regime, saw 50,000 Nicaraguans killed and 100,000 injured” (page 5).
Chinchilla 1994: “Nicaraguan women played an important role in the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship, constituting some 20 percent of the armed combatants, with a large proportion of those in neighborhood organizations” (page 178). Describes different activities of groups of women.
Los evangélicos y el poder político en América Latina 1986: “(P)ara el 19 de julio de 1979 el CEPAD estaba relacionado con más de 200 comités cuyas bases eran las iglesias evangélicas y las comunidades en general. Debido a la ubicación de las iglesias evangélicas por todo el país y a que los programas del CEPAD se realizaban en unas 300 comunidades rurales, hubo necesidad de hacer contacto con el gobierno revolucionario con el Frente Sandinista desde el primer día del triunfo” (page 336).
Gilbert 1988: “As the triumphant Sandinista forces poured into Managua on July 19, 1979, Archbishop Obando celebrated a victory mass attended by thousands. The event was symbolic of broad Christian support for a popular insurrection—a development without precedent in Latin American history. Two priests held positions in the newly appointed cabinet: Foreign Minister Miguel D’Escoto and Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal…The revolution enjoyed the support of a national network of Christian organizations. But it would soon be apparent that the fall of the old regime had left a latent division between two tendencies in the church that paralleled the tension betwee the FSLN and the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie” (page 135). Describes the two tendencies.
Goodsell 1983: “A veritable civil war engulfed [ Nicaragua] during those last eighteen months. Some 50,000 persons lost their lives; another 100,000 to 150,000 were injured or wounded; and as many as 200,000 families were left homeless, with some 30,000 children orphaned…The loss in terms of the economy was equally staggering. Some 33 percent of industry was destroyed and much of the rest was damaged. Agricultural production, particularly in cotton and sugar cane, was set back at least two years” (page 475).
Luciak 2001: “Considering that women represented 38 percent of the FSLN’s membership in 1979, a large number of leadership positions should have been occupied by female militants. Indeed, in the days following the Sandinista victory, women occupied a number of important positions in the party…This early success story changed rapidly. Female militants were soon replaced in many of the positions they had held initially…In general, women participated in greater numbers in the guerrilla movement than in the Sandinista party, and female leaders tended to experience more equality in gender relations during the days in the mountains than following the taking of power” (page 170). Discusses the reasons for this.
Merrill 1994: “A five-member junta assumed power, pledging political pluralism, a mixed economic system, and a nonaligned foreign policy” (page xxxi).
Smith 1993: “On 19 July, after heavy fighting against the remnants of the Guard, FSLN guerrilla columns from all over the country entered Managua” (page 128).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 15 1982: “On 20 July 1979, the five-member Junta of the [FSLN]...proclaimed itself the Government of National Reconstruction and issued, on the same day, the Basic Statute of the Republic of Nicaragua (‘Estatuto Fundamental’), which provided for the dissolution of the existing Chamber of Deputies and Senate and conferred legislative power on the Junta and a representative body called the Council of State…Originally, the total number of representatives [was] 33” (page 20). Describes the Council (pages 20-21).
Municipal autonomy in Nicaragua 1990: “As part of the patronage system of the Somoza regime, [municipal] appointees had access to power and money…Many of them fled the country with Somoza in July 1979, emptying local treasuries and destroying records…As a result, when the Sandinistas took power in July 1979 they had to create municipal governments from scratch” (page 35).
Municipalities: where democracy is born 1997: “1979: The revolution creates Municipal Reconstruction Boards. Some had sprung up during the insurrection in cities liberated by guerrilla advances. The first was Diriamba. The Municipal Affairs Offices was created to coordinate and direct Board activities throughout the country” (page 20).
Nickson 1995: “The FSLN quickly recognized the municipal reconstruction juntas (‘juntas municipales de reconstrucción,’ or JMRs) that had sprung up throughout the country to replace the corrupt municipal officials, who invariably fled in the wake of Somoza’s defeat” (page 212). Describes the composition and function of the JMRs.
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “A transitional Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) replaced the old structures of government during the period from 1979 to 1984…Formal executive powers passed to the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN), which had been formed in exile in Costa Rica before the fall of the dictatorship…The composition of the first Junta reflected a balance between the forces that had allied to overthrow Somoza: Daniel Ortega, a Tercerista and member of the FSLN’s National Directorate; Moises Hassan, from the MPU; Sergio Ramírez, writer and intellectual and member of Los Doce; Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, widow of ‘La Prensa’ editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro; and Alfonso Robelo, wealthy industrialist of the BANAMER group and private-sector leader…While formal executive powers rested in the junta from 1979 to 1984, general lines of policy were formulated by the nine-member Joint National Directorate (DNC) of the FSLN. The DNC, composed of three representatives of each of the three old ‘tendencies,’ functioned as the collective leadership of the FSLN. The National Directorate consulted on major policy issues with an 81-member Sandinista Assembly of party leaders” (page 79).
Decker Molina 1986: El Partido Social Demócrata “se fundó en agosto de 1979, un mes después del derrocamiento de Somoza, en oposición abierta al FSLN y al gobierno de coalición que entonces gobernaba Nicaragua” (page 157).
Radical women in Latin America: left and right 2001: “1979: AMPRONAC turns into AMNLAE, the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Nicaraguan Women’s Association” (page 32).
Smith 1993: “The FSLN was backed by the national Sandinista women’s organization, the ‘Luisa Amanda Espinosa Nicaraguan Association of Women’ (AMNLAE), named for the first woman member of the FSLN to be killed by the National Guard” (page 200). “Just two weeks after the overthrow of Somoza in July 1979 the dissolved women’s organization was re-formed as AMNLAE” (page 201).
Booth 1985: “The junta, which legislated by decree until the Council of State was established in 1980, constituted itself and other formal government institutions by its own decree, the Fundamental Statute of the Republic of Nicaragua, on 22 August 1979. This revolutionary charter abolished the previous constitution and constitutional laws and dissolved the former Congress, Supreme Court of Justice, courts of appeals, labor courts, and ‘remaining structures of Somocista power’” (page 187).
Serra Vázquez 1995: “El marco jurídico del nuevo Estado fue establecido en el Estatuto de Derechos y Garantías promulgado por el Gobierno (agosto 79) que deroga la anterior Constitución. Esta ley reconoce las libertades de pensamiento, expresión de culto, organización política y sindical…Por otro lado, el Estatuto establece los tres poderes del Estado: el ejecutivo a cargo de una Junta de Gobierno, el legislativo con el Consejo de Estado y el judicial con la Corte Suprema y Tribunales” (page 271).
Smith 1993: “The Fundamental Statute of the Republic of Nicaragua was passed on 22 August 1979. This statute abolished the Somocista constitution and legal apparatus. This Fundamental Statute formally established the five-member Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN); the civil service; the co-legislative body—the Council of State; and the Courts…The JGRN included representatives of the middle classes throughout the period of its existence, from 1979 to 1984” (page 144). “(T)he...‘Statute of the Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans’ included a commitment to equality of rights of men and women” (page 199).
Black 1981: “On 26 September, at the organisation’s first assembly of cadres and militants, the word ‘joint’ was dropped from the [Joint National Directorate’s] title, formally burying the three tendencies…At the level of junior and intermediate cadres, identification with one or other tendency did not always break down so rapidly” (page 230).
Smith 1993: “(Y)oung liberation fighters provided the nucleus of the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) formed on 2 September 1979” (page 143).
Black 1981: “The postponement and enlargement of the Council of State was one of the FSLN’s key battles against right-wing opposition in the first year” (page 244). “The formal decision to postpone and restructure the Council of State came on 22 October” (page 245).
Klaiber 1998: “(I)n October 1979 five hundred [Protestant] pastors published a document in which they expressed solidarity with the revolution. Just as the revolution divided Catholics, so it divided the Protestants” (page 212).
Brysk 2000: “ Atlantic Coast residents responded to the challenge of the 1979 revolution by founding…MISURASATA [in 1979]. MISURASATA sought territory, self-government, and cultural autonomy…The original leader, Steadman Fagoth, was part Miskito and part German Moravian” (page 80).
Freeland 1988: “In 1979 there were only two main roads [on the Atlantic coast], which served the rapid removal of raw materials to the ports. Neither one connected the region to Managua, nor even linked Bluefields to Puerto Cabezas. Travel to Managua took six hours by river to Rama, then a further four by road. There was no telephone link. The region had closer ties to the Caribbean and the USA, than the national capital” (page 31). “In November 1979, [Miskito university students] persuaded the Government of National Reconstruction to recognize an indigenous mass organization for the Atlantic Coast, and ALPROMISU was absorbed into MISURASATA [Miskito, Sumo and Rama Sandinista Alliance]” (page 53).
Hale 1987: “The impulse to revive ALPROMISU came from a group of ‘costeño’ university students in Managua. Among them were Miskitu such as Steadman Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera, Hazel Lau and Alfonso Smith, all of whom criticized ALPROMISU for having ties with Somoza and an excessively moderate programme. These students formed the nucleus of MISURASATA, the organization that was to replace ALPROMISU in November 1979” (page 105).
Booth 1985: “In early 1980…the MDN transformed itself into a political party and adopted a social democratic platform” (page 204).
Close 1985: The “multi-class coalition did not last. By early 1980 its more conservative elements, who wished to be rid of Somoza but who did not want a social revolution, were clamouring for the FSLN to stand down and let the pre-1979 centrist parties start governing” (page 153).
Ortiz 1988: “In mid-1980, the Ministry for the Atlantic Coast (INNICA) was established with regional offices in Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields and headquarters in Managua. The Minister appointed to head INNICA was not from the coast, and did not speak any of the coastal languages other than Spanish. More significantly, MISURASATA was neither consulted nor given a role within the new ministry. Most Miskito leaders regarded the establishment of INNICA as a way of undermining the status and role of MISURASATA and a means of lessening the influence of coastal people in the new revolutionary government” (page 7).
Pérez-Baltodano 2004: “During the revolutionary decade of the 1980s, the Nicaraguan Catholic Church opposed the centralist political project and materialistic philosophy of the FSLN and it became the most important institutional expression of the opposition against the Sandinista regime” (page 88).
Smith 1993: The EPS “was backed up by the voluntary Sandinista People’s Militias (MPS) which were organized from February 1980” (page 143).
Figueroa Ibarra 1994: “El Estatuto Fundamental de la República sustituyó la vieja constitución liberal y en marzo de 1980 se estableció el Consejo de Estado” (page 68).
Robinson 1992: In March 1980 the “revolutionary government launches a massive literacy campaign that reduces illiteracy rate from more than 50 percent to 13 percent in five months” (page 290).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 15 1982: “(B)y ‘Decree No. 374’ of 16 April 1980 [the number of representatives] was increased to 47” (page 20).
Serra Vázquez 1995: “En abril de 1980 la JGRN decidió expandir el CE de 33 a 47 miembros dando una mayoría a los representantes de sectores populares afines al FSLN” (page 272).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo, “representing the non-Somoza bourgeoisie, resigned in April 1980 [from the JGRN]” (page 79).
Vargas 1999: “Seis días antes de su renuncia, Robelo señala que el pueblo no ha escogido a sus gobernantes y demanda ‘elecciones verdaderamente libres’” (page 38).
Vargas 1999: “A partir de mayo de 1980, el COSEP comienza a presionar, en público y en privado, para que el FSLN se comprometa a realizar unas ‘elecciones libres y democráticas’” (pages 38-39).
Black 1981: “The new Council of State: allocation of seats” (page 246). Lists each group and the number of seats assigned to them.
Booth 1985: “The revolutionary government of Nicaragua inaugurated its consultative representative assembly, the Council of State, on 4 May 1980. Its membership had originally been negotiated among the broad revolutionary coalition prior to Somoza’s fall, but it was modified in April 1980. The council was originally slated to have thirty-three representatives, with twelve for the FSLN and its closest political allies, but the FSLN Directorate and the junta later added fourteen new delegates, twelve from pro-FSLN groups” (page 191). “Membership and voting strength in the Council of State, 1981-1984” (page 193). “During its first session in 1980, the council had no formal opposition bench” (page 194).
Close 1995: “Although the Frente viewed governmental machinery as an instrument to build socialism better, its first attempt at constructing a representative assembly was both novel and controversial. The Council of State (Consejo de Estado) was a curiousity among legislatures because its members were appointed, not elected, and represented economic, political, and social groups instead of geographic constituencies” (page 50).
Los evangélicos y el poder político en América Latina 1986: “Al inaugurarse el primer período del Consejo de Estado, el CEPAD fue invitado para enviar un representante, como también lo fueron los otros grupos que estaban haciendo una contribución a la vida global de Nicaragua. Esto fue discutido ampliamente por la Asamblea General del CEPAD, que después de recibir la opinión por escrito de cada denominación miembro, declinó la invitación. Se razonó que…era preferible que como iglesias no hubiese una representación directa en el Consejo de Estado. Fue notorio, sin embargo, que el gobierno tomase en cuenta a las iglesias evangélicas, ya qu nunca antes se había dado esto en Nicaragua y había habido poca participación por parte de estas iglesias en la vida nacional y en la lucha por la liberación del país” (page 338).
Reding 1991: “The dispute over the Council of State was a revolutionary watershed. From that point on, there was no mistaking the predominance of the FSLN and its agenda of fundamental social change over the mildly reformist preferences of much of the opposition” (page 17).
Serra Vázquez 1995: “El [CE] era el órgano co-legislativo y estaba compuesto por 47 representantes de 8 partidos políticos, 3 organizaciones populares, 7 centrales sindicales, 7 organizaciones populares, 7 centrales sindicales, 7 organizaciones gremiales y sociales, 5 organizaciones empresariales” (page 272).
Williams 1994: “Political parties not allied with the FSLN were given formal representation in the council of state and, at least until the imposition of the state of emergency in March 1982, were allowed limited political space. Nevertheless, the council of state’s bias against political parties, which received only twelve out of forty-seven seats (only three not allied to the FSLN), and the determination of each parties’ allotment of delegates by the state served to limit democratization of the political arena” (pages 176-177).
La política es aún un campo dominado por los hombres 1997: “A partir del 80 mediante consultas locales se designó a los y las integrantes de Juntas Municipales de Reconstrucción, gestoras de la localidad e institucionalizados mediante la Ley creadora del cinco de mayo del mismo año” (page 12).
Christian 1986: “On May 18, two new members were named to the junta…Both were members of the Democratic Conservative Party” (page 186).
A political opening in Nicaragua: report on the Nicaraguan elections of November 4, 1984 1984: “On May 19, 1980, Arturo Cruz and Rafael Cordova Rivas replaced Chamorro and Robelo, the two non-FSLN members of the Junta, who had resigned their positions” (page 11).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo “were replaced by Rafael Córdova Rivas, a cattle rancher and leader of the Conservative Democratic Party (PCD); and Arturo Cruz, international banker and member of Los Doce” (page 79).
Booth 1985: “In May and June 1980 the Democratic Action Front (Frente de Acción Democrática—FAD)…began armed harassment of the regime” (page 206).
Payne 1985: In June 1980 “non-FSLN parties took advantage of the lifting of the State of Emergency to for the first time hold meetings and rallies in expectation of the upcoming announcement of dates for elections” (page 27).
Latin American regional reports. Caribbean & Central America 15 August 1980: “The 19 July celebrations in Nicaragua, marking the first anniversary of the overthrow of the Somoza regime, were also the signal for intensified activities by anti-government forces…Attacks by such armed groups, which in some cases are up to 200-strong, have recently kept the Ejercito Popular Sandinista (EPS) and the Sandinista air force on almost continuous alert…There seems little chance of a ‘somocista’ restoration or right-wing takeover. The main aims of the attacks appear to be to destabilise the government from within, and to provoke a confrontation with Honduras, which might eventually provide an excuse for outside military intervention” (Latinnews.com).
Payne 1985: On July 21, 1980 “COSEP and opposition parties held a press conference to demand that the FSLN keep its promise and called for municipal elections in 1981, legislative elections in 1982, and presidential elections in 1983” (page 28).
Christian 1986: “Just three days before [Ortega’s speech on August 23 rd], four of the opposition parties (the Democratic Conservatives, Alfonso Robelo’s MDN, the Social Christians, and the Social Democrats) had issued a joint demand for elections, citing the junta’s written commitment to the OAS in July 1979 to call elections. The four parties included a proposed timetable to begin the election process the following year, with municipal voting” (page 199).
Christian 1986: On August 23, 1980 “Humberto Ortega…said demands for elections were part of a growing counter-revolutionary threat…He read an FSLN communiqué declaring that there would be no elections until 1985, no political campaigning until 1984…Ortega’s words threw the opposition groups into shock” (page 198).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 15 1982: “In August 1980, the Junta announced that general elections for a directly-elected Parliament would be held in 1985 and that electoral activities would be authorized as from January 1984” (page 20).
Close 1985: “When the Sandinistas announced in August 1980 that they did not plan elections before 1985, a rightist opposition formed around the issues of early elections and the rapid dismantling of the revolutionary state” (page153).
A political opening in Nicaragua: report on the Nicaraguan elections of November 4, 1984 1984: “Immediately after taking power in 1979, the government of Nicaragua committed itself to holding elections. In August 1980, the Council of State approved a decree postponing elections until 1985 and prohibiting open partisan political activity until 1984. The justification for the delay was that the country’s economic, social and moral destruction in the aftermath of the revolution required a rebuilding of the society before the holding of elections. The decision to delay elections until 1985 was the subject of considerable criticism within Nicaragua and among the international community” (page 16).
Serra Vázquez 1995: “En 1980, se estableció el calendario electoral para 1985. Sin duda, que los dirigentes del FSLN desconfiaban de los sistemas políticos liberales por el riesgo de la manipulación propagandística que pudieran realizar los partidos burgueses tal como históricamente lo habían hecho y sentían mayor atracción por un sistema monopartidista en el cual la participación ocurría a través de organizaciones sectoriales que confluían en un ‘partido de vanguardia’” (page 270).
Christian 1986: Anastasio Somoza Debayle is assassinated in Asunción, Paraguay on September 17, 1980 (page 206).
Decker Molina 1986: “El 10 de septiembre de 1980, la Junta de Gobierno sancionaba el Decreto No. 513 estableciendo que el proceso electoral se iniciaría en enero de 1984 y señalando el año 1985 para la celebración de elecciones generales en Nicaragua” (page 139).
Luciak 2001: “The first Sandinista Assembly was constituted in September 1980, during the Third National Assembly of Sandinista Militants, held September 13-15, 1980. It consisted of sixty-six members whose selection was based on evaluations made by the party leadership. This Assembly included fifteen women, representing 23 percent of the membership” (pages 118-119).
Vargas 1999: “El 14 de septiembre de 1980, varios partidos políticos firmaron un comunicado contra la celebración demasiado distante de las elecciones” (page 39).
Booth 1985: “In early November COSEP and several of the more conservative parties and their unions withdrew their delegates from the council as a protest against the postponement of elections and in an effort to rally the private sector for stronger opposition” (page 206).
Christian 1986: “On November 12, 1980, three of the opposition political parties, the six COSEP representatives, and two labor federations walked out of the Council of State” (page 209).
Latin American regional reports. Caribbean & Central America 28 November 1980: “More than 100,000 people attended an official rally in Managua’s main square last week, following the recent resignation of 11 members of the council of state, and the death in a shoot-out with Sandinista soldiers of Jorge Salazar, the vice-president of Nicaragua’s private sector organisation, Cosep” (Latinnews.com).
Spalding 1994: “The election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in November 1980…exacerbated the growing tensions” (page 69).
Bautz 1994: “A partir de 1981, la Mosquitia Nicaragüense se convirtió en uno de los principales focos de conflicto. Líderes indígenas gestaron un movimiento que se opuso a las políticas implementadas en la Costa Atlántica desde Managua. La incomprensión y el irrespeto a la idiosincrasia y a las tradiciones de los pueblos costeños por parte de las autoridades centrales y regionales, además, la dinámica cruel de la guerra, provocaron que la Iglesia Morava se involucrara en gran parte de este movimiento de resistencia. Moravos y evangélicos de otras denominaciones, reconocidos por su militancia eclesial en las iglesias de la Costa Atlántica, asumieron posiciones claves en la resistencia” (page 20).
Booth 1985: “By the 1981 session of the [Council of State]…a clear opposition bloc had formed. Styled the Democratic Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Democrática-CD), it included the Nicaraguan Social Christians (PSCN), Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), Constitutionalist Liberals (PLC), Social Democrats (Partido Social Demócrata (PSD)), five private-sector groups, and two unions…Pro-Sandinista forces also organized into a National Patriotic Front (Frente Patriótico Nacional—FPN), which included the FSLN, the People’s Social Christians (PPSC), the Independent Liberals (PLI), and the Nicaraguan Socialists (PSN)” (pages 194-195).
Booth 1990: “Following a Nicaraguan tradition, some opponents, encouraged and financed by the United States, took up arms against the Sandinistas. These rebels, known as ‘contras’..., waged a growing guerrilla war from 1981 to 1988 and forced the government to mobilize a massive army for counterinsurgency” (page 473).
Isbester 1999: “In 1981 [AMNLAE] proposed changes to the Patria [Potestad] law, which had granted men almost unlimited rights over women and children. In sharp contrast, AMNLAE’s proposed reforms created equality in the family…To overcome resistance from both the male populace and the FSLN, AMNLAE organized 285 public assemblies” (page 191).
Smith 1993: “From 1981 to 1984 the by then three-person Government of National Reconstruction included Daniel Ortega of the FSLN, Sergio Ramírez of ‘Los Doce,’…and Rafael Córdoba Rivas of the Democratic Conservative Party” (page 144).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “The Junta was again reorganized and reduced to three members in 1981, when Arturo Cruz was appointed ambassador to the United States and Moises Hassan was shifted to a cabinet post” (page 79).
Christian 1986: “In January 1981 the MISURASATA leaders decided…’to declare open political war on ‘sandinismo’’” (page 302). Describes events leading to the decision (pages 299-301).
Decker Molina 1986: “En enero de 1981 asumía la presidencia de los EEUU, el conservador Ronald Reagan lo que importaba para Nicaragua un cambio de actitud política” (page 139).
Merrill 1994: United States suspends all aid to Nicaragua on January 23, 1981. “Later that year, the Reagan administration authorized support for groups trying to overthrow the Sandinistas” (page 42).
Decker Molina 1986: En “febrero de 1981 el Departamento de Estado presentó el ‘Libro Blanco,’ en el que se pretende demostrar que Nicaragua es el principal proveedor de armas a la guerrilla salvadoreña, comenzando simultáneamente el bloqueo económico: La administración Reagan suspendió un crédito de 15 millones de dólares del paquete de 75 millones aprobado por Carter” (page 140).
Hale 1994: “After pursuing moderate, conciliatory policies for eighteen months—concessions, overtures, attempts to draw Miskitu people into the revolutionary alliance—in February 1981 the state enacted a swift and radical change in policy. Security forces arrested Indian leaders and disbanded their organization. For the next three and a half years, state officials justified nearly every action toward Coast people by invoking threats to ‘state security’ and assigned little or no legitimacy to Miskitu people’s demands as Indians” (page 29).
Ortiz 1988: “In 1981, following the exit from Nicaragua of several leaders of MISURASATA along with thousands of followers, counter-revolutionary bands began to attack Miskito villages on the Nicaraguan / Honduran border. What provoked the exit of MISURASATA leaders and their attacks was the crackdown by the Nicaraguan security forces in February 1981” (page 7).
Payne 1985: “In February 1981 State Security arrests the principal leaders of the Indian organization MISURASATA and 3,000-5,000 Miskitos flee to Honduras” (page 31).
Freeland 1988: “The Sumos were not happy to be absorbed into MISURASATA, which they correctly perceived to be exclusively dedicated to Miskito interests…In March of 1981, SUKAWALA formally dissociated itself from the separatist activities of MISURASATA” (page 50).
Latin American regional reports. Caribbean & Central America 20 March 1981: “A new point of conflict between the government and the opposition reached flashpoint last weekend with Alfonso Robelo’s Movimiento Democrático Nacional (MDN) cancelling its planned rally in Nandaime. The MDN cancelled the meeting as a result of counterdemonstrations by supporters of the [FSLN]…The tension has heightened in recent weeks as Washington has linked future aid for Nicaragua to the government’s response to its critics…If the opposition parties continue to refuse to operate inside the consensus represented by the provisional government, and if this leads to increasing international isolation of Nicaragua, then further conflicts can be expected” (Latinnews.com).
Chronicle of parliamentary elections and developments 15 1982: “(B)y ‘Decree No. 718’ of 10 May 1981, [the total number of representatives to the Council of State] was further increased to 51” (page 20).
Gilbert 1988: “On July 19, 1981, the second anniversary of the victory over Somoza, the government unveiled a stunning package of economic measures” (page 114).
Gorvin 1989: The CDN is a “conservative anti-Sandinista coalition founded in July 1981” (page 250).
Payne 1985: In July 1981 “ Eden ‘Comandante Cero’ Pastora, Vice-Minister of Defense and Sandinista hero, resigns his position” (page 32).
Goodsell 1983: The “surprising departure in August 1981, of Edén Pastora Gómez…was a bitter blow to the Sandinistas. It seriously rent the fabric of Sandinista unity” (page 479).
Horton 1998: “In August 1981, under U.S. guidance, several small groups of exiled ex-National Guardsmen were united to form the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática, FDN) headed by former National Guard Colonel Enrique Bermúdez” (pages 117-118).
Orozco 2002: “In 1981 the contras formed the [FDN] comprising three organizations, the National Liberation Army, the Revolutionary Nicaraguan Alliance, and the September 15 Legion. All were made up of former National Guard members” (page 71).
Robinson 1992: In August 1981 the “Agrarian Reform Law is promulgated” (page 291).
Freeland 1988: “From September 1981 onwards, Miskito fighters began to circulate in the communities, fomenting ethnic hostility against the ‘atheist-communist Sandinistas’ and recruiting other Miskitos to a ‘holy war’ for independence and the return of their ‘Kingdom’” (pages 52-53).
Smith 1993: AMNLAE’s membership increases “to 25,000 by October 1981. AMNLAE had representatives at municipal, departmental and national levels of government. It was directly represented in the Council of State” (page 201).
Horton 1998: “The FDN forces received a vital boost in November 1981 when the Reagan administration approved $19.5 million in military funds for the contras” (page 118).
Robinson 1992: In November 1981 the “Reagan administration authorizes $19 million to destabilize the Nicaraguan government, giving the CIA a green light to organize ex-National Guardsmen into a counterrevolutionary army based in Honduras” (page 291).
The electoral process in Nicaragua 1984: “In December, 1981, President Reagan approved an initial expenditure of $19 million for the ‘secret war’ against the FSLN government” (page 3).
Freeland 1988: “In December 1981 armed Miskito incursions began along the River Coco. Indigenist demands had become harnessed to the counterrevolution, and within the year had escalated into a full-scale war, backed by the power of the US” (page 44).
Hale 1987: “From the FSLN’s perspective, Fagoth’s clear ties with the Somozan ex-National Guardsmen and the Honduran army made these incursions the first major operation of the U.S.-backed counter-revolution. That this counter-revolution had a potentially strong social base among the local inhabitants made it all the more dangerous. The government responded with a prompt military decision to evacuate the Rio Coco, to permit an effective defence against the incursions” (page 112).
Ortiz 1988: “(T)he December 1981 attacks on the border Miskito villages caused the inhabitants to flee in all directions. The closest haven was across the river in Honduras, an area the Miskitos considered part of their traditional homeland” (page 7).
Gorman 1984a: “Organization and officials of the Nicaraguan state” (page 562). “Principal opposition groups” (page 564). “Sandinista mass organizations” (page 567).
Isbester 2001: “By 1982, [the JGRN] had shrunk in size as non-Sandinista members, unhappy with its policies, left it and as the volume of work it needed to perform also diminished” (page 46).
Latin American regional reports. Caribbean & Central America 8 January 1982: “One of the most significant measures introduced in the last session of the council of state was the bill to regulate the formation and activities of political parties. Drafted by the [FSLN], it is being discussed in a special commission of the council which is to continue during the five-month recess. The bill does not deal specifically with elections but concentrates on the legalisation of the parties…There are at present ten political parties, most dating back to pre-revolutionary days. The largest of these is the Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguense (MDN), led by ex-junta member Alfonso Robelo…But most are small, with a handful of leaders in a central office, and few rank-and-file members. Three parties are allied with the FSLN in the Frente Patriotico …The proposed legislation would establish the right to form and run a political party…Details of membershp, leaders, and political platform must be submitted to the council of state, to which all parties must belong…The FSLN stresses that these proposals are intended as a basis for discussion” (Latinnews.com).
Municipalities: where democracy is born 1997: “1982: The FSLN government regionalized the country, sending more technicians and professionals to the territories. It created greater presence of state institutions in the municipalities with a larger volume of financial and material resources and a broad range of activities in benefit of the local population. It substantially increased municipal responsibilities, but clearly subordinated Municipal Boards to regional government delegates. Municipal autonomy did not exist” (page 20).
Nickson 1995: “The regionalization program initiated in 1982...involved a process of administrative deconcentration...Nine administrative regions were created: six regions (each composed of two to four departments) and three special zones (all on the Atlantic Coast). Presidentially appointed governors (delegados) with ministerial rank coordinated the activities of state agencies in each region” (page 213).
Ortiz 1988: “INNICA was dissolved in 1982 when the entire country was reorganized into regions…The dissolution of INNICA did not change the character of governance of the region, since its minister remained as head of the northern region of the Atlantic Coast, though a Creole Sandinista commander headed the southern region” (page 7).
Serra Vázquez 1995: “La división política del país, en 16 Departamentos y 136 Municipalidades, fue reordenada a partir de 1982 con la creación de 9 regiones” (page 289).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “The 1982 State of Emergency was decreed the day after CIA-backed commando teams blew up two key bridges in northern Nicaragua. By that time, extensive U.S. involvement in the armed effort to overthrow the Nicaraguan government was an open secret” (page 87).
Booth 1985: In 1982 “Robelo went into exile with other key MDN leaders and joined forces with Edén Pastora to form the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (Alianza Revolucionaria Democrático—ARDE) in Costa Rica. This action devastated the MDN as a legal political force within Nicaragua, and its influence and presence suffered irreparable damage” (page 204).
Goodsell 1983: Robelo’s “departure in February 1982, marked the end of hopes that he would serve as a bridge between the Sandinistas and the business community. Moreover, it spelled the determination of a growing number of Nicaraguans to seek alternatives to Sandinista rule” (pages 478-479).
Gurdian 1987: “Tasba Pri was created as the result of a military decision to relocate the civilian Miskitu population settled along the Rio Coco in order to enable the military confrontation of what was seen to be an invasion effort that would use the Miskitu population as the spearpoint of its plans” (page 174).
Hale 1987: “Half the 21,000 [Miskitu] inhabitants fled to Honduras rather than move to resettlement communities 70 miles to the south; the other 10,000 went reluctantly along with the ‘traslado.’ Both groups felt deep generalized resentment against the state, which led many, especially those in Honduras, to opt for the armed alternative” (page 112).
Stahler-Sholk 1987: “As fighting intensified, in February 1982 the government relocated some 8,500 indigenous people from their homes along the Rio Coco, which marks the Honduran border, to resettlement areas farther from the border” (page 90).
Canadian Church and Human Rights Delegation 1984: “Because of the war [with the contras], Nicaragua has been under a state of emergency since March 1982” (page 5). Gives the measures included.
Crónica de una guerra no imaginaria: cronología de las relaciones Estados Unidos-Nicaragua, 1979-1984 1986: “Marzo 14: La contrarrevolución vuela los puentes sobre el Río Negro y el puente sobre el Río Coco” (page 21).
Reding 1991: “To counter the military threat, [the JGRN] imposed a State of Emergency on March 15, 1982” (page 22).
Williams 1994: “In response to increasing U.S. military and economic aggression, the government decreed the State of Emergency Law in March 1982, which suspended a number of personal and political liberties…These provisions were lifted during the 1984 electoral campaign” (page 177).
Payne 1985: “The third Council of State session convened [May 1982]” (page 36).
Los evangélicos y el poder político en América Latina 1986: “Cuando en julio de 1982 se incrementaron las agresiones por parte de las bandas somocistas en Honduras en contra de Nicaragua, organizaciones de masa tomaron los templos de los mormones, los Testigos de Jehová y los Adventistas debido al gran número de misioneros norteamericanos que había en esos grupos. El CEPAD abogó por la devolución de estos templos, lo cual se logró posteriormente” (page 337).
Smith 1993: “In August 1982, as border clashes between Nicaragua and Honduras escalated, the Nicaraguan government invited the head of the Honduran armed forces and the Honduran president to talks aimed at reducing tensions. Honduras, backed by the United States, refused to take part in discussions…The presidents of Venezuela and Mexico…wrote to the presidents of Nicaragua, Honduras and the United States, calling for peace talks” (page 271).
Freeland 1988: In September 1982 “administrative boundaries were redrawn to take better account of regional characteristics…In recognition of its particular problems the huge state of Zelaya was divided into three ‘Special Zones’; Special Zones I and II corresponded roughly to North and South Zelaya respectively, and Río San Juan, at the southern extreme of Zelaya, became Special Zone III” (page 59).
Los evangélicos y el poder político en América Latina 1986: “En octubre de 1982 el CEPAD suscribió un documento intitulado ‘Objetivos de las pláticas entre la Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional, el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional y el CEPAD’, después de haber consultado a 45 denominaciones y haber votado la gran mayoría a favor del documento. Es así que estas pláticas se agendaron y se estableció que las iglesias evangélicas podían hacer recomendaciones al gobierno” (page 336).
Robinson 1992: In November 1982 the “U.S. Congress approves $24 million in covert aid to the contras” (page 291).
Freeland 1988: MISURA (Alliance of Miskitos, Sumos and Ramas) is the “first armed grouping of Miskitos, formed in Honduras [in 1981] by Steadman Fagoth. Allied with Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the CIA-financed, Somocista-led contra organization” (page 60).
Payne 1985: “The Nicaraguan Democratic Union restructured its leadership and became the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) [in December 1982]. It now had a military force in the thousands, and in alliance with MISURA, an armed Miskito Indian group led by Stedman Fagoth, was attacking regularly in Nicaragua’s northern provinces” (page 38).