Conaghan 2005: "By 1994, Peru had become the largest recipient of foreign aid in Latin America, and American officials were impressed by Fujimori's successes in counterinsurgency and neoliberal economic reform" (page 75). Fujimori's marriage "was dissolving publicly by early 1994. Higuchi returned to public view, giving interviews criticizing the administration's authoritarianism and failure to help the poor" (page 86).
Degregori 2008: "As a political outsider, Alejandro Toledo did not emerge from a consolidated or well-known party. He was the natural leader of País Posible..., a group he had founded in 1994" (page 267).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: "Por iniciativa de Rafael Roncagliolo, un grupo de investigadores sociales funda la asociación Transparencia" (page 686).
Levitt 2002: "The UPP was created in 1994 as a vehicle for launching the presidential candidacy of former United Nations Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as a more democratic alternative to Fujimori" (page 163).
Nickson 1995: "In 1994 AMPE represented a major democratic challenge to the autocratic government of President Fujimori, opposing the plans to abolish the regionalization program" (page 246).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: Unión por el Perú, UPP (1994) es una "agrupación fundada y dirigida por el embajador Javier Pérez de Cuellar" (page 682).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: Perú Posible (1994) es una "agrupación formada por Alejandro Toledo" (page 683).
Vargas León 2007: "Unión por el Perú, es un partido fundado en 1994 por el ex Secretario General de la ONU, Javier Pérez de Cuellar" (page 237).
Burt 2007: "It was at this point that the extent of the military's power and the subservience of the legislature became evident...In a clear contravention of its legislative powers, the majority in congress passed a bill in February 1994 that granted jurisdiction over the Cantuta case to the military courts" (page 182).
NotiSur April 1, 1994: "On March 11, Luis Caceres Velasquez-the former mayor of Arequipa and leader of the [FNTC]-announced his candidacy for president in the 1995 elections. Caceres Velasquez will run on the ticket of the independent...[Peru al 2000] political movement...The [AP] party has nominated former president Fernando Belaunde Terry as its candidate in the presidential election, although the nominee must yet accept the AP's offer...President Alberto Fujimori is widely expected to run for a second term, which is permitted under controversial constitutional reforms instituted last year. Former UN secretary general Javier Perez de Cuellar is also reportedly considering facing off against Fujimori as the candidate of a broad opposition front" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: "With Higuchi sounding more like a political candidate than a disgruntled wife, the CCD legislated a hasty addition to electoral law in mid-July 1994. It enacted a provision prohibiting close relatives of the president from being a candidate for president, vice president, or congress. The law was quickly dubbed ‘Ley Susana.' Higuchi denounced the law as unconstitutional" (page 86). "By enacting ‘Ley Susana,' the C90-NM majority gave the JNE the necessary legal cover to deny Higuchi a place on the ballot. But Higuchi vowed to challenge the law. She formed her own political movement, felicitously named Harmony 21st Century, and proceeded to gather the signatures required to obtain legal status" (page 87).
NotiSur August 19, 1994: "(T)he public spotlight has been riveted on a new, potentially explosive, political controversy over the new electoral law. The government published the election law on July 23, which set the date for presidential elections for April 9, 1995, and stipulated that parties and candidates must file 180 days before the elections, which is October 8. The law, however, contained a controversial clause that prohibits close relatives of the president from running for president, vice president, or for congressional seats" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: "Higuchi added fuel to the fire with new allegations of corruption and abuse. She characterized Vladimiro Montesinos as being ‘bad for Peru' and said that the nation's intelligence service had been turned into a ‘political police'...But perhaps the most damaging accusations had to do with corruption and her claims that cabinet ministers were taking bribes and involved in other money-making scams. The charges flew in the face of Fujimori's insistence that he and his officials were squeaky-clean technocrats" (page 86). "Fujimori tried to end what had become a national soap opera and a growing political scandal in a nationally televised address, during which he officially deposed Higuchi as first lady" (page 87).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 7/8: "Se convoca a elecciones generales para el 9 de abril de 1995" (page 685). 23/8: "El presidente Fujimori anuncia el cese de la señora Susana Higuchi en la función de Primera Dama" (page 685).
NotiSur August 19, 1994: Pérez de Cuellar "returned to Peru from his home in Paris on Aug. 14...In early August, a political storm exploded when the president's wife, Susana Higuchi, formally protested the [electoral law's prohibition of relatives candidacies] clause and demanded that it be declared unconstitutional...(I)n an action that could potentially cause Fujimori serious problems, on Aug. 15 Susana Higuchi filed a formal legal motion charging government officials with corruption" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: Higuchi "filed a petition with the OAS Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in Washington DC, asking that it issue ‘medidas cautelares' (preventative measures) to ensure her right to participate in the elections" (page 87).
NotiSur September 16, 1994: "On Sept. 12, Higuchi...announced her decision to run for president in the April 1995 elections with the backing of a new political organization, Armonia Siglo XXI...(I)f she is serious about running for president, Higuchi's biggest obstacles will be legal. To register her new political organization, she must obtain the signatures of 100,000 voters. In addition, she must yet get around the new electoral code, which if upheld would automatically eliminate her as a candidate...For the moment, Fujimori and Perez de Cuellar are still officially ‘undeclared' candidates in the presidential race, since neither has formally proclaimed his candidacy...Fujimori has already appointed a campaign manager, and has launched a new political organization to replace the Nueva Mayoria-Cambio 90 coalition that carried him to victory in 1990. The new movement, Acuerdo Nacional, will direct the president's reelection efforts...Neither Fujimori, Perez de Cuellar, nor Lima Mayor Belmont are members of traditional Peruvian political parties, which are much in disfavor among Peruvians at this time. APRA...has not yet indicated whether it will run a candidate for president" (electronic edition).
NotiSur October 10, 1994: "At its primary convention in late September, Acción Popular, the party founded by former president and elder statesman Fernando Belaunde Terry (1963-68, 1980-85), chose Raul Diez Canseco Terry, nephew of the former president, as its presidential candidate" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: "Until just before the October 1994 deadline to register as a presidential candidate, Fujimori was coy when questioned about whether he would run again" (page 78). "The political strategy would be a model of simplicity: President Fujimori had to become unequivocally identified as the candidate who ‘delivered the goods.' To that end, public spending was directed to shore up support for Fujimori, especially in the regions where the government had fared poorly in the referendum. The president already had all the resources in hand for a spending spree...To reduce the resources in the hands of potential rivals, Fujimori tightened the central government's grip over discretionary public spending" (page 79). Gives details. "Long before the kickoff of the official campaign season, the C90-NM majority in the CCD made sure that the justice system would not stymie the president's electioneering...The president and his partisans now were free to proceed as they wished; there were no authorities, institutions, or rules that could hold them back" (page 80). Gives details. "In 1994, more than half of all judges still remained in provisional appointments...Even more troubling was the fact that many provincial prosecutors, by virtue of their responsibility to head the provincial election boards, would be directly involved in the vote-counting process. ‘Caretas' reported that thirty-six of the forty-seven provincial election boards were under the direction of provisional appointees in October 1994...(T)he congress, controlled by C90-NM, was the final arbiter of rules governing the election. It could write and rewrite election laws at will. The entity charged with organizing the 1995 elections was the JNE...(I)t was bound to uphold the electoral laws passed by congress, and the congress was poised to overrule the JNE if necessary" (page 81). "On October 6, the OAS commission recommended that the Peruvian government give Higuchi a ‘rapid judicial or administrative review' should the JNE fail to register her candidacy after the deadline date of October 11...Instead of invoking the controversial ‘Ley Susana,' the JNE issued a ruling on October 18 that rejected the presidential candidacy of Susana Higuchi on technical grounds. The JNE claimed that Higuchi's Harmony 21st Century movement had failed to collect the 100,000 valid voters' signatures necessary to be placed on the ballot. The movement submitted a total of 147,840 signatures, but the JNE ruled that only 11,851 were valid. Higuchi charged that the SIN was behind her problem with the JNE...But in 1994 Higuchi had no concrete proof to back up her suspicions about SIN involvement. Moreover, fourteen other movements were denied registration on the same grounds, making it harder to argue that Harmony 21st Century had been singled out. Since the JNE was the only body with jurisdiction over electoral matters, Higuchi could not appeal her case" (pages 87-88). "When the October 19 deadline for registering presidential candidates came, twenty-seven organizations lined up to register their nominees" (page 90). Lists major organizations. "When the JNE finished sifting through the registration petitions, fourteen candidates were ruled eligible" (pages 90-91).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 8/10: "Luego de inaugurar un colegio...el presidente Fujimori anuncia su candidatura para la reelección" (page 686).
NotiSur October 10, 1994: "At the last minute, Peru's many candidates for the April 9, 1995, presidential elections scrambled to register before the Oct. 11 filing deadline. President Alberto Fujimori registered with the electoral commission....on Oct. 10. His main opponent, former UN secretary-general Javier Perez de Cuellar, who had announced his decision to run on Sept. 22, waited until the last day to register, as did Susana Higuchi, Fujimori's wife. With a field of more than two dozen candidates for the top office, polls are showing Fujimori with a comfortable lead...If no candidate wins more than 50% of the votes on the first ballot, a second round will be held three months later...Perez de Cuellar is running as an independent under the banner of the Union por el Peru (UPP)...The JNE must now rule on Higuchi's eligibility to run. The electoral law, which was passed by Congress in July, bars any member of the president's family from running for president, vice president, or Congress. Although Higuchi insisted that the law is unconstitutional, the Peruvian Congress refused to overturn it and the courts have not yet begun hearings on the petition challenging it...Higuchi's participation in the political race split Fujimori's Cambio 90 campaign organization, when one-half of the national committees joined Higuchi's Armonia Siglo XXI. Although Cambio 90 was founded by Fujimori in 1989 to support his bid for the 1990 elections, Higuchi was one of Cambio 90's most active members and her family helped finance it...In addition to Higuchi, two other women are running for president. [APRA]-the oldest and best organized party in Peru-has named former minister of education Mercedes Cabanillas to head its ticket. Another traditional party, the [PPC] is running Lourdes Flores Nano...(T)he Peruvian left, grouped in the umbrella [IU], will run Alfonso Barrantes...Among the other candidates who registered to run in the elections are Luis Caceres, of the Movimiento Peru al 2000; Sixtilio Leon Velarde of the Movimiento Independiente Nuevo Peru; Carlos Cruz Garay of the Frente Independiente de Reconciliacion Nacional; Ezequiel Ataucusi Gamonal, with the Frente Popular Agricola; and Alejandro Aspilcueta of the Movimiento Tecnocracia...All told, more than 134 political parties and independent movements have registered to participate in the upcoming elections, according to the JNE" (electronic edition).
NotiSur November 11, 1994: "On Oct. 23, Peru's electoral commission [JNE], approved the candidacies of 15 of the 27 presidential hopefuls for the April 9, 1995, elections...Among those whose presidential candidacies were denied was Susana Higuchi, wife of President Fujimori. According to the JNE, only 12,000 of the required 100,000 signatures turned in by Higuchi were valid...The requirement for 100,000 signatures of support applies to parties or movements that are new or that did not receive more than 5% of the vote in previous elections. However, independent Alejandro Toledo, who now has moved into third place in the polls, also did not have the required signatures. Nevertheless, his candidacy was approved when a party that was registered but had no candidate gave Toledo its support" (electronic edition). Gives the list of candidates.
Conaghan 2005: "Underscoring the need for clear rules to regulate the conduct of the president and other public officials during the campaign, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar met with JNE members and called for other international observation teams to join in election monitoring along with the OAS. Pérez de Cuéllar also asked the JNE to remedy another troubling problem: thousands of voter cards issued to military personnel, ostensibly for security reasons, could be illegally used to vote in the elections...Transparencia, a new citizens' group founded to monitor the election process, had proposed the idea of an ‘honor pact' among parties. Representatives from seven political organizations signed the pact" (page 83). "In November 1994, Pérez de Cuéllar took his case to the JNE. He vigorously backed the proposals to radically restrict the president's conduct during the campaign and underscored that the president's uncontrolled use of state resources constituted a ‘deception' of the electorate and, thus, ‘fraud'" (page 91).
Conaghan 2005: "In December 1994, congress passed Legislative Decree 766, the Municipal Tax Law, which completely restructured municipal finances. The law...made municipal governments more dependent on the central government...The new law dealt a punishing blow to Lima mayor Ricardo Belmont, who had emerged as a potentially troublesome challenger to Fujimori" (pages 79-80). "Reacting to the growing controversy about the president's conduct in the campaign, the JNE sent a draft of its recommendations on electoral law to the congress in early December. The JNE proposal contained a provision expressly prohibiting the president from inaugurating public works in the ninety days prior to the April election. The recommendations included giving the JNE the power to fine and remove presidential or congressional candidates from the ballot if they were found guilty of three violations of the election law" (pages 83-84). "Fujimori cast the proposed law as a nefarious plot to keep the president from ‘his people'" (page 84). "In December, both Pérez de Cuéllar and Alejandro Toledo charged that they were being subjected to a ‘dirty war' directed by the SIN" (page 92).
NotiSur January 13, 1995: "The first candidate to withdraw from the race was Lourdes Flores Naro of the [PPC], who pulled out on Dec. 27, citing her low standing in the polls. She will now head the PPC slate of congressional candidates" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: "Unlike the CCD election of 1992, there was no heated debate among opposition leaders on the question of whether or not to participate in the 1995 elections. The results of the 1993 referendum evoked new optimism about the prospects for defeating the regime at the ballot box. Even the ‘maximalist' opposition parties that had abstained from the 1992 CCD elections (APRA, AP, PUM) were ready to participate" (page 89). Discusses issues surrounding the election (pages 90-94).
Degregori 2008: "(W)ithout benefit of a solid organization, [Alejandro Toledo] had hastily run for the presidency as a technocrat with a touch of Bolivian-style ‘indigenismo.' His central campaign promise was ‘Fujimorismo without Fujimori'-a more democratic way of carrying out the reforms Fujimori had left unfinished" (page 267).
The state of democracy: democracy assessments in eight nations around the world 2002: "Regional re-organisation was initiated after the 1992 ‘coup d'état,' introducing a new layer of regional government, but the constitutional requirements to hold elections to these authorities by 1995 were not promulgated" (page 66).
Conaghan 2005: "The legislators passed the final version of the election law with forty-nine votes after opponents walked out of the vote in protest...Commenting on the new law, the JNE observed that it made it impossible for the JNE to ‘regulate and sanction' violations of the law" (page 85). Describes changes from provisions recommended by JNE. Higuchi "announced that her movement would seek legal status once again, in order to register a party of congressional candidates by the January 9, 1995, deadline. But once again, the JNE ruled against Higuchi, arguing that her party of congressional candidates was full of typographical errors that rendered it invalid" (page 88). "The JNE refused to consider a correction of the party, a decision contested by legal experts who argued that the JNE did indeed have the discretion to allow for a resubmission of the party in the case of a ‘material' error...By barring her from the election and terminating legal inquiries into the corruption allegations, the government effectively silenced Higuchi...With no campaign to follow and with no fresh evidence in hand, Higuchi lost the media spotlight in January 1994, as reporters turned their attention to the other presidential candidates and another dramatic story-the outbreak of a border war between Ecuador and Peru" (page 89). "When disturbing evidence that the government was illegally orchestrating the reelection finally did come to light in January, opposition leaders quickly pounced on it" (page 92). Gives details. "In a meeting on January 23, [Pérez de Cuéllar] turned over new documents [to the OAS] that appeared to confirm the charges that local government appointees were being turned into coordinators and organizers of the president's reelection" (page 93).
Klarén 2000: "The election campaign...was overshadowed by the brief border war that erupted between Peru and Ecuador on January 26, 1995" (page 422).
NotiSur January 13, 1995: "The 1995 general election campaign officially opened on Jan. 9, three months before the April 9 elections and coinciding with the filing deadline for parties to register their slates of legislative candidates...Flores Nano's withdrawal was followed on Jan. 3 by the withdrawal of former Lima mayor Alfonso Barrantes, candidate for the leftist coalition [IU]. Barrantes, who belongs to the ‘unaffiliated' wing of the IU, cited infighting within the coalition, the ‘sectarianism and dogmatism' of the member parties, for his decision to opt out of the contest. Much of the internal bickering centered on the numerical ranking of various candidates on the congressional ticket...The IU...replaced Barrantes with Agustin Haya de la Torre, nephew of Victor Raul Haya de la Torre...Just as the official campaign got underway, a major battle erupted over the law governing campaign activities. The JNE sent a bill to Congress that would have prohibited the use of government transportation or communications media for political propaganda. It also would have prevented Fujimori from inaugurating public works during the three-month official campaign. Fujimori objected strenuously to the bill...Congress, dominated by pro-Fujimori deputies, watered down the bill significantly...The version that passed only prevents the president from explicitly proselytizing or criticizing political opponents during public functions...Meanwhile, parties and political coalitions rushed to beat the Jan. 9 deadline for filing their slates of congressional candidates. Peru's Congress is elected under a system of proportional representation...Voting in Peru is obligatory for all citizens over 18 years of age. When the filing closed, 23 parties had registered a total of 2,760 candidates who are competing for 120 congressional seats, an expansion of the 80 seats now comprising Peru's one-chamber legislature. Of the 23 slates that registered, 19 represent independent movements rather than traditional Peruvian political parties...Among the last to register was Susana Higuchi...who heads the slate of 120 candidates running under an alliance between her Armonia Siglo XXI and a group of retired military and police officers called the Frente Militar y Policial (FRENPOL)...Among other prominent congressional candidates, Martha Chavez Cossio heads the slate for Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria...On Jan. 2, [OAS] Secretary General Cesar Gaviria announced that the international body was sending an observer team to Peru to supervise the April elections" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: "The 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, begun in late January, brought the discussion about fraud to a halt, and paralyzed the campaign altogether. Fujimori turned all of his attention to the war. The event offered him a greater opportunity to dominate the news and he took advantage of it...The public rallied around the troops, and opposition candidates fell silent as the military conflict unfolded. The war effectively overshadowed all other political issues throughout February" (page 94).
NotiSur March 17, 1995: "While troops from the two Andean countries were battling on the border, Peruvians gave almost unconditional support to Fujimori. However, since the latest cease-fire, signed in Montevideo on Feb. 28, criticism of the president's handling of the war both diplomatically and militarily has stepped up" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: "By the time a ceasefire was secured, there was a little more than a month to resume campaigning before the April 9 elections...Still, neither Pérez de Cuéllar nor the other candidates threatened to pull out of the election in protest. Pérez de Cuéllar still clung to the hope that he might garner enough votes to force Fujimori into a second-round runoff. Moreover, none of the political organizations had any interest in pulling their congressional lists out of contention...The dream of a second round and the drive for congressional seats trumped all other considerations among Fujimori's competitors, even their own somber argument that they had already been set up to lose" (page 94).
NotiSur March 17, 1995: "Some members of the political opposition have called for a postponement of the elections because the war has prevented a normal campaign...Fujimori, however, has dismissed the call to postpone elections and says the recent fighting will have little effect on the outcome. And, he denies the allegation that he started the war for political reasons...[Susana] Higuchi's slate has been disqualified by the [JNE], who said the list only included 113 candidates, rather than the required 120. However, on March 7, Higuchi charged that the decision was purely political, saying five other political groups, including Perez de Cuellar's, also have less than 120 candidates on their slates" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: "(D)ays before the April 10 balloting, a vote-tampering scandal threatened to upset the election. On Thursday, April 7, news broke that seventeen individuals, including local notables and JNE workers, had conspired to alter the voting results in the provincial town of Huánuco" (page 96). Gives details.
April 9: general election (Fujimori / C90-NM)
Conaghan 2000: "Peruvian congressional election returns, 1995" (page 277).
Conaghan 2005: "Just minutes after the polls closed at three o'clock, exit polls confirmed what everyone had expected: a solid victory for the incumbent president. When the counting was done, Fujimori had his first-round victory, winning 64 percent of the valid vote...But what no one was prepared for were the results in the congressional race. Contrary to the predictions of almost every pollster, the C90-NM congressional party won a majority of seats in the legislature" (pages 98-99). Gives details and results (pages 99-104). "Lost in the victors' self-congratulations was any concern about how many Peruvians had been disenfranchised or altogether forgotten in the 1995 elections. The CCD had enacted an important change in the voting rules used to calculate vote percentages. The calculation was based on the valid vote (which involved subtracting null and blank votes) rather than the total number of votes cast. When viewed through a different mathematical lens, Fujimori's touted ‘victoria abrumadora' (overwhelming victory) took on more modest dimensions. Fujimori's 64 percent of the valid vote meant that only 39 percent of the electorate had cast a ballot for him if abstention, null, and blank votes were taken into account. Similarly, the 52 percent allotted to C90-NM turned into a mere 18.5 percent of support from the total electorate" (pages 103-104).
Dean 2002: "With the political opposition in disarray, Fujimori handily won a second presidential term in 1995, defeating former U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar. Fujimori's reelection was facilitated by the forging of an alliance with a Limeño based business-military caste that appropriated the state apparatus for its own material and ideological ends" (page 204).
Degregori 2008: "País Posible, in conjunction with the small [CODE] alliance, garnered just 3.2 percent of the vote and five of the 120 seats in Congress. After this failure, Toledo promptly returned to academia and vanished from the political scene" (page 267).
Dietz 1998: Fujimori "won a stunning victory, taking about 64 percent of the popular vote; Javier Pérez de Cuellar, his nearest opponent, finished with about 22 percent, while thirteen additional candidates took the remaining 14 percent. His triumph was national in scope; he took an absolute majority in all but one department and more than 60 percent in all but four, while taking over 70 in four. The collapse of the nation's traditional parties was thus complete; those who competed (APRA, AP, IU, and PPC) took a total of less than 10 percent" (page 216).
Fleet 1997: "In April 1995 Fujimori was elected to a second term with more than 60 percent of the vote, while most of the country's traditional parties failed to get the minimal 5 percent to retain their legal status" (page 251).
García Montero 2001: "La candidata del APRA para las presidenciales de 1995 fue Mercedes Cabanillas que ganó las elecciones internas del partido...Estas elecciones no sólo supusieron un descalabro electoral para el aprismo sino también para los demás partidos que observaron con impotencia como Fujimori conseguía, en una sola vuelta, alcanzar por segunda vez la Presidencia de la República" (page 430). "En las elecciones presidenciales celebradas el 9 de abril de 1995 concurrieron aproximadamente 20 candidaturas y Fujimori obtuvo el apoyo de casi dos tercios de los votos válidos emitidos. En estas elecciones subió la abstención hasta el 27%, una cifra desconocida hasta entonces en Perú que tenía un promedio de abstención del 19%...El nuevo triunfo de Fujimori se gestó en una sola vuelta frente al candidato de Unión por el Perú (UPP), Javier Pérez de Cuéllar...En estos años la debilidad del sistema de partidos era tan profunda que el 86% de la población se identificaba como políticamente independiente...Con estas elecciones se confirmó el colapso del sistema de partidos en Perú. Todos los partidos que fueron base del sistema político antes de 1990 perdieron su registro ante el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, al no alcanzar el 5% de la votación" (page 458).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 9/4: "Se celebran elecciones generales y resulta reelegido, con un 64,43%, el presidente Alberto Fujimori. El segundo candidato de fuerza era el embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar" (page 688).
Keesing's record of world events April 1995: "President Alberto Keinya Fujimori was the comfortable victor in presidential elections held on April 9 and became the first incumbent in the country's history to be re-elected for a consecutive term. His ruling [NM-C90] alliance also secured a majority in the unicameral Congress by winning the simultaneous legislative elections. More than 100 international observers monitored polling...Turnout among the 12,421,785 eligible to vote was officially described as high" (page 40498). "Peruvian election results." Table gives percent of vote for each presidential candidate and the number of seats won by each party or coalition.
Klarén 2000: "(T)he seemingly overwhelming victory was deceiving, for this time around the government calculated the percentage on the basis of excluding, rather than including, the number of votes that were null and void. This method increased his overall percentage substantially, for had the votes been calculated in the same manner as in 1990, Fujimori would have won only 52 percent of the vote...The election results for Congress revealed that the traditional parties were all but dead. Fujimori's Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría narrowly won a majority of 52 percent, which translated into a surprising 67 out of 120 seats in the Congress. But the four established parties combined (APRA, AP, PC, IU) received only 12 percent of the vote. In fact, none received the necessary 5 percent required by the National Elections Tribunal to qualify as continuing parties" (page 422).
Latin American monitor. Andean group May 1995: "Divided opposition: 1995 election results, congressional seats held by each party" (page 8). Gives other election results.
Mayorga 2006: "A historic defeat of the traditional parties occurred in the April 1995 presidential election, in which Fujimori won 62.3 percent of the vote while all the traditional parties combined did not obtain even 5 percent. It was the first time ever in the contemporary history of democracy in Latin America that a general election demonstrated the complete breakdown of the traditional party system" (page 144).
NotiSur March 17, 1995: "When more than 12 million Peruvians go to the polls April 9, they will not only elect a president, but also fill 120 legislative seats. Twenty parties or political movements have registered slates of legislative candidates" (electronic edition).
NotiSur April 14, 1995: "Peruvians re-elected President Alberto Fujimori by a resounding 65% of the votes. Despite some irregularities, the huge margin of victory was a clear mandate for the president...The official results of the [JNE], with 90% of the vote counted, show Fujimori with approximately 64.6% of the more than 12 million valid votes cast, followed by Javier Perez de Cuellar with 21.63%. None of the other 12 candidates received more than 5% of the vote. Fujimori will also enjoy absolute control of Congress, with the Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria slate taking 66 of the 120 seats...Union por el Peru took 20 seats, becoming the largest opposition force. If congressional deputies follow tradition, Martha Chavez of Fujimori's...coalition will be the president of the legislative body...(T)his will be the first time in Peru's history that a woman has held that position...The election changes the face of Peruvian politics. Peru's traditional political parties-from the extreme right to the extreme left-have effectively been wiped from the map as political players...More than 91% of the votes in the April 9 election went to independent candidates...None of the traditional parties, including [AP, APRA, PPC, and IU], took the required 5% of the vote to maintain their legal status. Those four parties, which in the past took about 90% of the vote among them, this year took less than 10%. To continue as political parties, each will have to re-register as a new party, submitting 100,000 names of supporters to qualify" (electronic edition).
Obando 1998: "In the 1995 elections the retired institucionalistas supported the opposition candidates and lost badly. Of the fifteen retired military officers who ran for parliamentary office, thirteen were endorsed by opposition parties. Equally telling, none of them were elected" (page 401).
Philip 2003: "When Fujimori stood for re-election in April 1995, Peru was undergoing a genuine economic boom. Fujimori ran a triumphal campaign and carried all before him. Facing what was in many ways an attractive opposing candidate (Perez de Cuellar had been secretary-general of the UN), Fujimori won on the first ballot with nearly 65 percent of the vote" (page 169).
Planas 2000: "Elecciones de 1995. Votación presidencial y parlamentaria" (page 352).
Rospigliosi 1998: "Elecciones generales: abril de 1995" (pages 421-433). "Perú: resultados de las elecciones generales del 9 de abril de 1995. Votación para el congreso" (page 440). "Perú: resultados de las elecciones generales del 9 de abril de 1993 [should say 1995]. Votación presidencial" (page 441).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Congreso 1995-2000. Número de parlamentarios por partido político" (page 66). "Congreso 1995-2000" (pages 76-78). Gives members of congress with their "puesto electo," "puesto lista," "apellidos y nombres," "partido," and "voto preferencial." "Elecciones generales 1995. Resultado nacional (page 444). Gives votes for each presidential candidate, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones generales 1995. Resultado departamental" (page 445). Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones generales 1995. Resultado provincial" (pages 446-453). Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones generales 1995. Resultado distrital-Lima metropolitana" (pages 454-455). Gives by district the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones congreso 1995. Resultado nacional" (page 456). Gives the number of votes and percent of total vote for each party, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones congreso 1995. Resultado departamental" (page 457). Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones congreso 1995. Resultado provincial" (pages 458-465). Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones congreso 1995. Resultado distrital-Lima metropolitana" (pages 466-467). Gives by district the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."
NotiSur May 12, 1995: "The JNE completed the official count of the national balloting on April 23...In the unicameral legislature, 67 of the 120 seats will be held by Cambio 90 delegates...The opposition will be led by [UPP], with 17 seats" (electronic edition).
NotiSur May 12, 1995: "(O)n April 24, Fujimori announced that his...[C90-NM] coalition would not participate in municipal elections in November. He said C90-NM would not run candidates in local elections to provide more opportunity for independent candidates" (electronic edition).
NotiSur May 12, 1995: "On April 26, the head of the [OAS] observer team...said the ‘anomalies' in the elections, in particular the disappearance of 37,000 registration documents in Lima and numerous other voter lists...were serious but not sufficient to question the outcome of the elections" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: "Reveling in the victory, Fujimori could look forward to another five years in power. He had won congratulations from the OAS and the American government on the elections. Now it was time to consolidate power, reward his military allies, and put all the naysayers in their place. Sending a message to dissenters inside the armed forces, the CSJM indicted three high-ranking officers...The drive to put a damper on dissent continued. In the early morning hours on May 25, C90-NM legislators unexpectedly unveiled and passed Law 26457, which mandated a government-directed reorganization of public universities...In another move anticipating the unconventional legislating ahead, the constitutional commission...introduced a package of new rules governing legislative debate" (page 104).
NotiSur April 14, 1995: "On May 5, [the JNE] official confirmed the re-election of President Alberto Fujimori" (electronic edition).
Burt 2007: On "June 13, 1995, progovernment congress members presented a bill that granted amnesty to all military and police officers, convicted or otherwise, who committed or were accused of committing crimes during the war against terrorism. The bill was passed in the early morning hours of June 14, signed by President Fujimori the same day, and published in the official gazette, ‘El Peruano,' the following day" (pages 182-183).
Conaghan 2000: "(I)n June 1995...the government majority enacted a blanket amnesty for all armed forces and police personnel convicted or accused of human rights violations after 1980" (pages 268-269).
Fleet 1997: "Church-state relations reached their lowest level in years in mid-1995, as Fujimori completed his first term and began his second. Fujimori struck the first blow in June, pushing an amnesty bill through the Congress...that exonerated all military personnel implicated in war-related human rights cases" (page 259).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 14/6: "El Congreso Constituyente Democrático (CCD) aprueba la Ley de Amnistía General en favor de militares, policias y civiles comprometidos en delitos comunes y militares, vistos en fuero común o militar. Ésta incluye a responsables de masacres y perseguidos políticos" (page 689).
Conaghan 2005: "The CCD officially concluded its session in late July, turning over its duties to the newly elected congress" (page 108).
NotiSur August 4, 1995: "On July 28, President Albert Fujimori took the oath of office to begin his second term...The oath of office was administered by Martha Chavez, president of the newly installed Congress and the first woman to preside over the legislature in Peru's history...Besides his support from the military, Fujimori will have a sympathetic Congress during his second term. A few days before the inauguration, the 120 members of the new unicameral Congress were sworn in. The president's Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria will control the legislature with 67 seats, Union por el Peru will have 13, and the remaining 41 seats will be divided among the weak traditional parties and smaller political groups" (electronic edition).
Tanaka 2006: "Problems appeared soon after the president's reelection. Since Fujimorism was a highly personalized movement, it required that Fujimori the person stay in power more than Fujimorism itself. The movement had no significant existence beyond its leader" (page 64).
NotiSur November 17, 1995: "Fujimori had originally indicated that C90-NM would not field a candidate for mayor of Lima. Then, in a surprise move at a rally on Aug. 30, Fujimori prsented Yoshiyama as his hand-picked candidate...Yoshiyama-like his mentor, the son of Japanese immigrants-had been president of the Congress during Fujimori's first term" (electronic edition).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 7/9: "Se aprueba la nueva Ley de Política de Población, que incluye la esterilización como medio de control de la natalidad. Durante los días previos y posteriores hubo fuertes críticas tanto de la Iglesia Católica como de diferentes sectores de la ciudadanía" (page 690).
NotiSur November 17, 1995: "Peru's electoral law prohibits government employees and elected officials, including the president, from campaigning for local candidates...Despite a mid-October statement from the [JNE] reiterating the ban on elected officials campaigning for candidates, the ban was largely ignored by the president...Moreover, criticism was widespread that Yoshiyama's campaign advertising was paid for with taxpayers' money...Another cause of opposition complaints was the voter surveys taken by members of the intelligence service [SIN], mostly in poor neighborhoods where many voters were undecided until the last minute. Residents complained that survey takers not only asked about voter preference, but also asked for names, identification documents, and place of work" (electronic edition).
November 12: municipal election
Davila Puño 2005: "A pesar de que en las elecciones municipales del período 1996-1998 el MIAP organizó a distintos candidatos a lo largo de la Amazonía y procedió a su capacitación, los resultados no fueron favorables, especialmente en la provincia de Atalaya" (page 36).
Dietz 1998: "November 1995" (pages 216-217). Discusses the election.
Dietz 2002: "The mayoral race of 1995 again pitted a hand-picked Fujimori candidate (Jaime Yoshiyama, heading the Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría (C90-NM) ticket) against the incumbent mayor of the wealthy district of Miraflores, Alberto Andrade. Andrade won" (page 201). "When Andrade ran on the Somos Lima ticket in 1995 for his first term, class-based voting appeared to have made something of a return" (page 215). Gives details of the election.
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 12/11: "Se celebran elecciones municipales. Somos Perú triunfa en Lima y el Callao, con Alberto Andrade y Álex Kouri respectivamente" (page 690).
Jurado Nacional de Elecciones 1997: Complete source of official statistics on the election. "Elecciones municipales generales. Resultados provinciales por departamento" (pages 33-177). "Incluye número de ley y fecha de creación de la provincia, dirección de la municipalidad provincial, población y cantidad de electores y de mesas de sufragio." "Elecciones municipales generales. Resultados distritales por departamento y provincia" (pages 179-841). "Incluye número de ley y fecha de creación de la provincia, dirección de la municipalidad provincial, población y cantidad de electores y de mesas de sufragio." "Normas legales. Relacionadas a las elecciones municipales generales y parciales de 1995/1996" (pages 857-883). "Materiales electorales. Catálogo de imágenes de los materiales electorales empleados en las elecciones municipales generales y parciales de 1995/1996" (pages 885-893).
Keesing's record of world events November 1995: "In the ballot for the post of mayor of Lima, held on Nov. 12, the leader of the ruling [NM-C90], Jaime Yoshiyama Tanaka, was defeated by the independent Alberto Andrade...[In the] municipal elections NM-C90 lost many seats to independents...On Nov. 17 Fujimori gained a divorce from his estranged wife Susana Higuchi" (page 40819).
Latin American monitor. Andean group December 1995: "Peru's mid-November municipal elections were a sharp turnaround from the landslide general election victory enjoyed by President Alberto Fujimori and his party earlier this year, with ruling party candidates losing out badly to independents...Due to its limited grassroots structure the ruling Nueva Mayoria-Cambio 90 party concentrated its efforts on Lima. The mayor's post in Lima, where a third of Peru's 23 mn inhabitants and 70% of its wealth are located, in many ways is the second most important elected post in the country, but Fujimori's candidate was defeated by an independent, Alberto Andrade, who gained 53% of the vote...In the provinces independents defeated Peru's traditional political parties and Fujimori's ruling party in every major city" (page 8).
Levitt 2002: "Several months after the 1995 general elections, Peruvians again went to the polls to elect municipal authorities...The difficulties that Fujimori faced in the 1995 municipal elections were further exacerbated by the crowded and confusing array of groups competing. Nationwide, most of these were local lists of candidates whose wider political connections were difficult to ascertain" (page 153). Describes the lists (pages 153-154).
McClintock 2003: Jaime Yoshiyama "came to be considered a likely successor to Fujimori and was widely dubbed his ‘dauphin.' However, in 1995, Yoshiyama ran as the government's candidate for the mayoralty of Lima and was defeated by another businessman, Alberto Andrade. In the wake of this defeat, signaling that Yoshiyama was unlikely to win in 2000, the relationship between Yoshiyama and Fujimori cooled" (page 53).
NotiSur November 17, 1995: "On Nov. 12, President Alberto Fujimori suffered a major setback when his hand-picked candidate for mayor of Lima, Jaime Yoshiyama, lost to Alberto Andrade. It was Fujimori's first political defeat since winning the presidency in 1990...About 12.5 million Peruvians-all those over 18-were eligible to vote in the Nov. 12 elections in which voters elected 194 provincial and 1,814 district mayors. The voting, which is mandatory in Peru, occurred without major incident, despite nearly half the country being under a state of emergency and military control...Following the trend that began in 1990 to marginalize traditional party candidates, independent candidates won in the principal cities...Despite the massive government resources given Yoshiyama, however, Andrade won the election 53% to 47%...Andrade heads the independent ‘Somos Lima'...organization whose candidates won the mayoralties in many of Lima's 42 district races, as well as Callao...Greater Lima has two provincial mayors (Lima and Callao) and 42 district mayors, with often overlapping responsibilities" (electronic edition).
Rospigliosi 1998: "Las municipales de 1995" (pages 433-436).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Elecciones municipales 1995. Resultado nacional" (page 405). Gives votes for each party, "votos válidos," "votos nulos," "votos blancos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones municipales 1995. Resultado departamental" (page 406). Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones municipales 1995. Resultado provincial" (pages 407-438). Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones municipales 1995. Resultado distrital-Lima metropolitana" (pages 439-443). Gives by district the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 30/11: "La Policía Nacional del Perú allana una casa en la Alameda del Corregidor, La Molina, reducto del MRTA. Se captura al jefe del grupo terrorista Miguel Rincón Rincón" (page 691).
Conaghan 2005: "The 1993 constitution provided only two routes to amendment. One way was by winning a two-thirds majority vote in congress in two successive legislative sessions. The other route was by winning approval of an amendment in a national referendum, followed by a subsequent ratification of the amendment in congress by a simple majority...The first option...would not be easy...The second option-a national referendum-was risky and the chances of victory were slim. After nearly losing the 1993 referendum on the constitution, ‘oficialistas' did not want another embarrassing experience that might backfire and defeat reelection" (page 121).
Conaghan 2005: "Law 26592, sponsored by Congressman Gilberto Siura (and subsequently dubbed ‘Ley Siura'), passed in April 1996. The law added a new caveat to the constitutional provision for a citizen-sponsored referendum: it required forty-eight or more congressional votes in order for any referendum to be approved. Setting the bar at forty-eight votes effectively ensured that no referendum could pass without the support of the government" (page 124).
Davila Puño 2005: "El Movimiento Indígena de la Selva Peruana-MIAP-surge a mediados de la década del '90 dentro de la estructura orgánica de AIDESEP con la finalidad de unificar a las diferentes iniciativas de las organizaciones regionales indígenas en los distintos procesos electorales bajo un solo símbolo" (page 36).
Levitt 2002: "Civil society groups' attempts to hold a referendum on Fujimori's reelection were unconstitutionally quashed by Congress and the electoral authorities. As signatures were being collected in late 1996, Congress passed a law requiring that proposed referenda needed to be approved by a majority of 48 members of congress. This law...was itself passed by a simple majority in just one legislative session, contrary to the prescribed procedure" (page 97).
Van Cott 2005: "In the 1990s, a few smaller parties were formed in the highlands that attempted to project an identity as a party of the indigenous population. Renacimiento Andino, the party of Ciro Gálvez Herrera, a Quechua-speaker from Huancayo, was founded in April 1996 in that department" (page 169).
Van Cott 2006: "The Amazon organization AIDESEP launched a new party, the Indigenous Movement of the Peruvian Amazon (MIAP), at a 1996 national congress" (page 177).
Tanaka 2006: "Fujimori needed to do more than block the referendum. He also had to keep the [JNE] from being able to declare that there was a basis for challenging his candidacy by invoking its unconstitutionality, so he had to control the JNE...Fujimori's strategy consisted of controlling the institutions with representatives on the JNE. Accordingly, in June 1996, the reorganization of the Judiciary and the Prosecutor's Office was announced. The government took action to ensure that the two representatives of these institutions would not impede Fujimori's reelection plans" (page 65).
Burt 2007: The "progovernment majority in congress passed the ‘Law of Authentic Interpretation' in mid-1996, which basically stated that since the 1993 constitution was not in force when Fujimori was first elected in 1990, his first term did not count, thus making him eligible to run for a third term" (page 183).
Conaghan 2000: "The first move to advance the reelection project came in August 1996 when the C90-NM congressional majority approved what at first appeared to be an obscure piece of legislation that diasallowed the ‘retroactive' application of the 1993 constitution...Without recourse to a constitutional amendment, the law effectively overturned the ban on an immediate presidential reelection, which the government majority had ascribed to in its writing of the 1993 constitution in the CCD" (page 271).
Conaghan 2005: "Law 26657 came to a vote on the floor of the congress in the early morning hours of August 23, 1996. It stipulated that Article 112 of the constitution, the provision that limited a president to two consecutive terms in office, could not be applied retroactively to the 1993 constitution. Thus, Fujimori's 1990-1995 term would not be counted as his first term, rendering him eligible to stand for reelection in 2000" (page 122).
Latin American monitor. Andean group September 1996: "Predictably, the congressional decision precipitated an outcry from opposition politicians, with centrist Popular Action congressman Javier Alva Orlandini describing the move as a coup d'etat...Opposition leaders condemned the congressional vote as an abuse of the country's constitution by a weak legislature subservient to an authoritarian leader, with most anti-government legislators walking out of the chamber in protest" (page 8).
NotiSur August 23, 1996: "(T)he Congress, dominated by pro-Fujimori deputies, approved a bill that ‘interprets' Article 112 of the 1993 Constitution in such a way to allow Fujimori to run for another term. The opposition has charged that the bill was rushed through as a smokescreen to divert attention from recent accusations linking Fujimori's closest advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, to drug trafficking. The new law...was approved in the full Congress by a vote of 70 to 3. Most opposition deputies left the chamber in protest before the vote was taken. The law was promulgated in record time, appearing in the official gazette El Peruano the same morning" (electronic edition). Gives additional details.
Tanaka 2006: "In August 1996, Congress, with a solid pro-Fujimori majority, passed the law of ‘Authentic Interpretation' of the 1993 Constitution. According to this law, Fujimori's first presidential term had not been from 1990 to 1995 but from 1995 to 2000, since his first term had been governed by the 1979 Constitution, not that of 1993. This law allowed Fujimori to stand for his ‘first' reelection in 2000" (page 65).
Conaghan 2005: "Despite the failure of previous referendum initiatives, Congressman Javier Diez Canseco proposed a referendum on reelection on the floor of the congress...Congressman Diez Canseco [and others] made their way to headquarters of the national electoral office Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE) on September 2, 1996. They requested the official forms required for collecting voter signatures. On the following day, Borea [attorney for Foro Democrático] announced that Foro Democrático would spearhead the campaign for a referendum to overturn the reelection law...From the start, ONPE was anti-referendum...But the JNE, the entity charged with overseeing election law, ordered Portillo [head of ONPE] to make the petitions available on the grounds that the language of ‘Ley Siura' was imprecise" (page 124). Summarizes discussion.
Tanaka 2006: "(I)n September 1996, several opposition leaders began collecting signatures to seek a referendum on the repeal of the ‘Authentic Interpretation' law" (page 65).
Conaghan 2005: "The solution was Law 26670, a reworked and more carefully worded version of ‘Ley Siura.' The new law (now sponsored by Congressman Ricardo Marcenaro and referred to as ‘Ley Marcenaro') reasserted the requirement mandating congressional approval of referendum initiatives by a minimum of forty-eight votes. ONPE chief Portillo invoked ‘Ley Marcenaro' to cancel the reelection referendum, but found himself overturned again by a unanimous JNE ruling. Led by JNE president Alvaro Chocano, JNE officials reasoned that ‘Ley Marcenaro' could not be applied retroactively and that the petitions, already in the hands of Foro Democrático, could not be recalled. Unexpectedly, all saber rattling by the C90-NM caucus stopped. The JNE's status as the arbiter of electoral law was clearly prescribed in the 1993 constitution; and the prospect of further wrangling between congress and the JNE had the potential of turning into a full-blown constitutional crisis" (pages 124-125).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 29/10: "Por decreto ley 866 se crea el Ministerio de la Mujer y el Desarrollo Humano (Promudeh)" (page 694).
Tanaka 2006: In October 1996 "Congress passed legislation regulating the exercise of the referendum. A referendum would now require not only citizen signatures but also the approval of at least two-fifths of the members of Congress (that is, 48 votes)" (page 65).
Conaghan 2005: "(T)he political atmosphere was turning more troublesome by the last quarter of 1996. Allegations that the military was involved in drug trafficking dominated the news...Some opposition leaders even wondered if the hoopla over reelection was a smokescreen...Fujimori's popularity continued the downward plunge commenced in January 1996. By November, his approval fell below 50 percent for the first time since the 1992 coup" (page 125).
November 10: municipal election
Jurado Nacional de Elecciones 1997: Complete source of official statistics on the election. "Elecciones municipales parciales. Resultados provinciales y distritales por departamento y provincia" (pages 843-856). "Incluye número de ley y fecha de creación de la provincia, dirección de la municipalidad provincial, población y cantidad de electores y de mesas de sufragio." "Normas legales. Relacionadas a las elecciones municipales generales y parciales de 1995/1996" (pages 857-883). "Materiales electorales. Catálogo de imágenes de los materiales electorales empleados en las elecciones municipales generales y parciales de 1995/1996" (pages 885-893).
Conaghan 2005: "On December 17, 1996, a handful of guerrillas from the near-defunct Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) staged a spectacular attack on a cocktail party at the home of the Japanese ambassador in Lima...(T)he guerrillas released hundreds of the terrified guests, but kept seventy-two high-profile hostages" (page 125).
McClintock 1998: "Despite what might appear to be the contrary evidence from the MRTA's dramatic seizure of the Japanese ambassador's residence on 17 December 1996, the MRTA never posed a threat to the Peruvian state" (page 47). "The four-month-long hostage crisis that followed became a media event of international proportions...In the background, the legal struggle over reelection continued" (page 126).
Del Campo 2008: "La primera legislación de cuotas se introdujo en 1997 (Ley de Elecciones y Ley de Elecciones municipales) y fijaba un 25% de representación de mujeres en las elecciones parlamentarias y municipales, respectivamente" (page 153).
Burt 2007: "In 1997, the constitutional tribunal ruled that the law did ‘not apply' to Fujimori, thereby challenging the re-reelection project" (page 183). "The direct challenge now being posed to the Fujimori regime's re-reelection project by the country's top judicial authority stunned regime operatives and opposition leaders alike. In response, the proregime majority in congress engineered a series of legal machinations, culminating in a late-night session of congress that ordered the dismissal of the three judges who had challenged the Law of Authentic Interpretation" (page 218).
Conaghan 2000: "In January 1997, three of seven Tribunal Constitucional...magistrates ruled that Law 26657 was inapplicable to the question of reelection. In response, the C90-NM congressional majority mounted an investigation of the magistrates, which ended with their impeachment and removal in May 1997" (pages 271-272).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: "El Tribunal Constitucional rechaza la reinterpretación de la Ley de Reelección" (page 695).
Tanaka 2006: "The route to blocking the referendum subsequently involved a congressional confrontation with the judges of the Constitutional Court, which in January 1997 declared by a simple majority that the law of ‘Authentic Interpretation' was inapplicable" (page 65).
Burt 2007: "(T)he MRTA hostage crisis of late 1996 was...exploited by the regime to affirm its tough stance against terrorism...The hostage crisis occurred at a moment of growing crisis for the regime, but it provided an opportunity for the regime to highlight the ongoing threat of terrorism, justify its heavy-handed measures, and assert the need for continuity to avoid slipping back into the chaos of the past" (pages 208-209).
Conaghan 2005: "On April 25, Fujimori brought the four-month hostage crisis to an end by giving military commandos the green light to attack the ambassador's residence. The operation was, in the eyes of most people, a spectacular success" (page 128). "It was a public relations bonanza for Fujimori...The successful operation had come at a perfect time. Fujimori, Montesinos, and General Hermoza were once again audacious leaders in the fight against terrorism" (page 129).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 22/4: "El Ejército lleva a cabo la operación ‘Chavín de Huántar' para liberar a los rehenes de la Embajada de Japón. Mueren todos los terroristas y dos oficiales que cubren a los rehenes" (page 697).
NotiSur April 25, 1997: "In mid-afternoon on April 22, Peruvian special forces carried out a surprise daylight attack on the residence of Japan's ambassador to Peru...During the operation, one hostage, two military officers, and all 14 rebels were killed" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: Describes efforts (ending in May 1997) to discredit and impeach members of the Tribunal Constitucional who had ruled against reelection (pages 126-132). "With the TC out of the picture, the only institution that could still complicate Fujimori's 2000 reelection was the national election board, the JNE. As mandated in the 1993 constitution, the five-member executive board of the JNE was the final arbiter of all electoral processes" (page 132). "It was fortuitous that three of the JNE members, including the president, were scheduled to conclude their terms in 1998-1999. The vacancies offered an opening for Montesinos to make sure that JNE members were individuals who could be counted on in the reelection" (page 133).
NotiSur June 6, 1997: "On May 29, Peru's Congress, controlled by supporters of President Alberto Fujimori, outraged political opponents and human rights workers when it summarily fired three judges of the...Tribunal Constitucional...who opposed the president's bid for re-election...Political opponents called the firing of the judges ‘a new, very subtle technical coup.' Several political analysts expressed concern that next on the government's hit list will be the [JNE]. The current members of the commission are opposed to Fujimori running for another term on constitutional grounds" (electronic edition).
Tanaka 2006: "In November 1997, the government announced the takeover of the public universities, a move through which it assumed control over the deans of the law schools. That accomplished, Fujimori could now count on three out of five votes on the JNE" (page 65).
Conaghan 2005: "On December 10, 1997, legislation was introduced to alter the rules governing the election of JNE members. Law 26898 gave voting rights to prosecutors and judges holding provisional appointments. The objective of the legislation was apparent. Provisional appointees interested in preserving their jobs could be easily pressured to cast their votes for Montesinos's handpicked candidates. Congressional opponents immediately dubbed Law 26898 as ‘Ley de fraude'...The slogan ‘No al fraude' became the mantra of the opposition" (page 133).
Levitt 2002: "The National Elections Tribunal, the judicial arm of the electoral agencies, was also the target of political manipulation. In December 1997, Congress voted to allow all magistrates and prosecutors-whose respective associations elect two of the five members of the National Elections Tribunal--to vote in elections for that electoral agency, regardless of whether they have tenure or are merely appointed provisionally (and thus more susceptible to pressure from the government of the day)" (page 96).
NotiSur January 9, 1998: "The legislature has been paralyzed since mid-December, when the Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria legislators passed a law in a late-night session to allow Fujimori to create temporary judges. The opposition said the new law will allow Fujimori to handpick the judges who will oversee future elections, which could help him win an unprecedented third term of office in 2000...To most observers, each confrontation increases Fujimori's control over the other branches of government as he prepares for his re-election bid. But his heavy-handed tactics have also created enemies and left him isolated, which in turn has strengthened the hand of Montesinos, the most unpopular public figure in Peru and the third member-with Fujimori and Hermoza-of Peru's uneasy triumvirate" (electronic edition).
Van Cott 2005: "In the late 1990s, a new effort was made to unite Peru's campesino and native populations into a single organization. Hundreds of delegates attended the founding [COPPIP] in December 1997 in Cuzco" (page 162).
Van Cott 2006: "A national organization to unite [lowlands and highlands], the Permanent Conference of the Indigenous Peoples (COPPIP), was created in 1997. A group of leaders from Peru's two most dynamic indigenous organizations...left and formed their own COPPIP, substituting the word conference for coordinator. The new COPPIP has adopted a more independent, confrontational stance toward the government, while the original group works more cooperatively with government institutions" (page 163).
Palmer 2000: "President Fujimori thwarted a national referendum in 1998 on the issue of a third term, for which 1.4 million signatures had been secured, by having his congressional majority vote not to accept its validity" (page 243).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: Somos Perú (1998) está "formada sobre la base del movimiento independiente Somos Lima" (page 682).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: Vamos Vecino (1998) es una "agrupación oficialista fundada para participar en las elecciones municipales de 1998" (page 682).
Van Cott 2005: "A national organization that could plausibly claim to represent Peru's indigenous population did not form until 1998...Prior to that time, Peru's indigenous people were unable to form a single, unified organizational structure to represent its demands before the state" (page 140).
NotiSur January 9, 1998: "Peruvian democracy has been battered by recent power struggles between President Alberto Fujimori and Gen. Nicolas de Bari Hermoza Rios, head of the Peruvian military. While the president downplayed the disagreements, the political opposition and the press questioned whether the president or the military is running the country" (electronic edition).
Davila Puño 2005: "El artículo 2° de la Ley Marco de Descentralización N° 26922, del 22 de febrero de 1998, define ‘descentralización' como la transferencia de facultades y competencias del gobierno central y de los recursos del Estado a las instancias descentralizadas" (page 17).
NotiSur February 20, 1998: "A February ruling by Peru's Supreme Court clears the way for President Alberto Fujimori to run for a third consecutive term. The ruling set off protests from opposition leaders, who said it was unconstitutional" (electronic edition).
Conaghan 2005: "The chant [‘No al fraude'] was heard again on May 21, 1998, when C90-NM took another turn to rein in the JNE. Legislation was introduced to change the voting rules inside the JNE. The new measure required that legal challenges to candidacies could only be approved by a vote of four of the five members, rather than a simple majority of three out of five votes. In essence, this meant that almost any legal challenge to Fujimori's presidential candidacy would be doomed, since at least two of the JNE members-those of the supreme court and the prosecutors' board-were sure to be aligned with the government" (page 133).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 29/5: "Emerge la organización pluripartidista Foro Democrático, que en diecisiete meses de trabajo reúne 1'260.000 firmas para pedir la convocatoria a un referéndum sobre la segunda reelección del ingeniero Fujimori" (page 703).
Levitt 2002: The December 1997 "law was complemented by another politically-motivated change in the rules of the game in May 1998. This change required the support of a 4/5 majority of the Elections Tribunal for legal challenges concerning electoral issues" (page 96).
Tanaka 2006: "As further insurance, in May 1998 Congress passed a law changing the kind of vote required for the JNE to declare that there was a basis for challenging a candidacy; the vote went from a simple majority (three votes) to a qualified majority of four out of five" (page 66).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 4 al 11/6: "Se realiza una protesta estudiantil en defensa de la democracia; la Policía la reprime con violencia" (page 703).
Burt 2007: "In July 1998, the opposition presented a petition to hold a referendum on the law signed by 1.4 million citizens. The regime engaged in a series of machinations to prevent the referendum initiative from proceeding, including packing the National Elections Board with cooperative officials, who then voted to uphold a previous law of dubious constitutionality that requires a majority vote in congress in order for a citizen-initiated referendum to proceed. The opposition fell three votes short of the required 48 votes, resulting in the gutting of the referendum initiative" (page 227).
Conaghan 2005: "Collecting the 1,200,000 valid voter signatures necessary for a referendum on the reelection issue was a monumental task...The still-uncoordinated state of the opposition added to the difficulties in organizing the campaign to collect signatures" (page 134). "Foro Democrático took on the responsibility for the campaign. But it did not have a broad-based organization, as it had previously focused its efforts largely on academic events and contacts with university students. For the petition drive, Foro Democrático would have to rely on the help of politicians, trade unions, and other grassroots organizations...On July 15, 1998, leaders of Foro Democrático arrived at ONPE headquarters to present petitions for the referendum" (page 135). "On July 30, a former C90 congressman, Manuel La Torre Bardales, filed a complaint with ONPE. He argued that ‘Ley Marcenaro' shold be applied to the referendum process, despite the previous JNE ruling that the law could not be retroactively applied" (page 136).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 17/7: "Foro Democrático presenta a la Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE) las firmas para pedir la convocatoria a referéndum sobre la segunda reelección" (page 704). 30/7: "El ex congresista Manuel La Torre Bardales impugna el referéndum sobre la segunda reelección presidencial por no haberse conseguido los 48 votos mínimos requeridos" (page 704).
Tanaka 2006: "In July 1998, the promoters of the referendum presented petitions with 1,441,535 citizen signatures to the [ONPE]" (page 65).
Burt 2007: "Since virtually the beginning of the Fujimori regime, power was concentrated in the hands of three men: Fumimori himself; his security advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, and General Hermoza" (page 233). "(W)ith Hermoza out of the picture, Montesinos acquired virtually complete control over the military...Within days Montesinos placed trusted allies in key [spots]" (page 234). "Without the military to provide a counterweight to Montesinos...the regime quickly degenerated into a kleptocracy of the worst kind" (page 235).
Conaghan 2005: "On August 20, the JNE heard oral arguments from lawyers on the Bardales challenge...Just as Montesinos had instructed, the JNE members did their work swiftly, delivering a reversal of their 1996 decision just three hours after final arguments in the case. By a vote of four to one, the JNE upheld that ‘Ley Marcenaro' required a congressional vote in order for a referendum to go forward...The congress was the last stop for the referendum...As the time of the vote approached on the evening of August 27, hundreds of demonstrators joined the students in changes of ‘Sí al referéndum, no al fraude!'...The referendum went down to defeat in a vote of sixty-seven opposed and forty-four in favor, leaving the opposition just four votes shy of the required forty-eight votes" (pages 136-137). Describes agreements made with congressmen to reach this vote. "Montesinos power grab was completed in August 1998. After several highly publicized disagreements between Fujimori and General Hermoza over the terms of the 1998 agreement that ended the Peru-Ecuador border dispute, the general was abruptly forced into retirement. That ended his unprecedented tenure of nearly seven years as the head of the armed forces high command. Hermoza's exit cleared the path for Montesinos's former military academy classmates to assume control of every top-ranking post in the army" (page 165).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 7/8: "Javier Valle Riestra renuncia al cargo de Premier" (page 704). 10/8: "El Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE) declara fundada la impugnación al referéndum" (page 704). 20/8: "Luego de seis años y ocho meses, el Comandante General del Comando Conjunto, general Nicolás Hermoza Ríos, es reemplazado por el general de división César Saucedo Sánchez" (page 705).
Levitt 2002: "(T)he referendum initiative, which had the support of over 70% of all Peruvians and was endorsed by almost 1.5 million citizens, died an unconstitutional death at the hands of the legislature in August 1998" (page 97).
NotiSur September 4, 1998: "The Peruvian Congress has blocked opposition efforts to hold a referendum regarding President Alberto Fujimori's bid for a third term. The Aug. 27 vote effectively ended the opposition's legal moves to stop the president's run for an unprecedented third term...After 13 hours of debate, as demonstrators clashed with police outside, the Fujimori-controlled Congress killed the referendum by a 67 to 45 vote, with one abstention. The majority had refused to postpone the vote until three opposition deputies who were out of the country returned. The opposition fell three votes short of the 48 needed to support the referendum" (electronic edition).
Tanaka 2006: "In August, the ONPE enforced the referendum law of October 1996. Instead of calling for the referendum, it sent the request to Congress, where the opposition did not have the forty-eight votes necessary to approve the referendum" (page 65).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 27/9: "La bancada oficialista, a excepción de Carlos Ferrero, rechaza la realización del referéndum sobre la segunda reelección" (page 705). 30/9: "Las centrales sindicales realizan una marcha a la Plaza de Armas contra la nueva reelección" (page 705).
NotiSur October 9, 1998: Describes the strikes of September 30, 1998 "organized by the Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Peru (CGTP) and the Foro Democratico (FD) to demonstrate opposition to re-election and to defend the state of law" (electronic edition).
October 11: municipal election
Conaghan 2005: "The 1998 municipal elections produced a mixed bag of results, with about a third of municipalities under the control of the government's vehicle, Vamos Vecino, and the remaining two-thirds divided between Alberto Andrade's organization, Somos Perú, and other ‘independent movements'" (page 166).
Dietz 2002: Andrade "was re-elected in 1998, defeating the governmental Vamos Vecinos candidate" (page 201). "In 1998, Andrade headed a Somos Perú ticket [describes results]...In total, Somos Perú won twenty-six districts and Vamos Vecino fifteen; AP and independents each took one...Overall, once again Lima's municipal elections demonstrated the limitations that a strongly personalist Fujimori faced in trying to extend his coattails to a favored candidate" (pages 215-216).
Elecciones municipales 1998: información, educación y observación electoral 2000: Detailed information on the October and December elections, excluding election results.
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 11/10: "En las elecciones municipales, el alcalde Alberto Andrade es reelegido en Lima y a escala nacional predomina la agrupación Somos Perú" (page 706).
Jurado Nacional de Elecciones 1999: "Resultados de la votación a nivel provincial y distrital obtenidas el 11-10-98 y 13-12-98" (pages 11-408). "Relación de alcaldes y regidores de los concejos provinciales y distritales de la república elegidos y proclamados de 11-10-98 y 13-12-98, con indicación de la organización o lista a la que pertenece" (pages 409-639).
Planas 2000: "Elecciones municipales de 1998. Votación reunida por las diversas agrupaciones" (page 381).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Elecciones municipales 1998. Resultado nacional" (page 362). Gives votes for each party, "votos válidos," "votos blancos," "votos nulos," "votos emitidos," "ausentismo," and "total de inscritos." "Elecciones municipales 1998. Resultado departamental" (page 363). Gives by department the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "impugnados," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones municipales 1998. Resultado provincial" (pages 364-395). Gives by province the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "impugnados," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles." "Elecciones municipales 1998. Resultado distrital-Lima metropolitana" (pages 396-404). Gives by district the percentage of vote for each party, "válidos," "blancos," "nulos," "emitidos," "ausentismo," and "inscritos miles."
Van Cott 2005: "In the late 1990s, after the collapse of many Peruvian parties, highland indigenous organizations participated in elections through ephemeral alliances with political leaders. In 1998, through a variety of local alliances, the CCP elected ninety-six campesino mayors, all of whom were former campesino leaders" (page 154). "MIAP and its affiliated lists won thirteen indigenous mayors in various Amazon provinces in the 1998 municipal elections" (page 174).
Conaghan 2005: "President Fujimori joined President Jamil Mahuad of Ecuador in a celebratory signing of the historic peace treaty [between their countries] in Brasilia on October 26, 1998...Toasted...for his contribution to continental peace, Fujimori had managed to distance himself from the unpleasant politics back home" (page 138).
December 13: municipal election
Elecciones municipales 1998: información, educación y observación electoral 2000: Detailed information on the October and December elections, excluding election results.
Jurado Nacional de Elecciones 1999: "Resultados de la votación a nivel provincial y distrital obtenidas el 11-10-98 y 13-12-98" (pages 11-408). "Relación de alcaldes y regidores de los concejos provinciales y distritales de la república elegidos y proclamados de 11-10-98 y 13-12-98, con indicación de la organización o lista a la que pertenece" (pages 409-639).
Conaghan 2005: "Because the reelection machine revolved around the constant commission of crimes (misuse of public funds, illegal deployment of government employees, violations of election law, etc.) and cover-ups, Montesinos's control over the judiciary was vital to the campaign...By 1999, judicial corruption was staggering. Prosecutors, superior court judges, and supreme court justices were on Montesinos's private payroll, receiving regular monthly payments in the thousands of dollars" (page 167). "'Oficialista' attempts to represent the electoral process as normal were being complicated considerably by the national election observation organization, Transparencia. With funding from international organizations and governments including the United States, Transparencia was able to assume a more ambitious agenda of monitoring the preelection environment than it had done in 1995" (pages 175-176).
The state of democracy: democracy assessments in eight nations around the world 2002: "(T)he government passed a law in 1999 disqualifying from the presidential race any public official accused (but not yet tried or convicted) of a crime-this measure is thought to have been aimed at prominent members of the opposition" (pages 63-64).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: "Elecciones municipales complementarias 1999. Resultado provincial" (pages 351-352). "Elecciones municipales complementarias 1999. Resultado distrital" (pages 353-361).
Tuesta Soldevilla 2001: Perú 2000 (1999) es "frente que agrupó a las organizaciones Cambio 90, Nueva Mayoría, Vamos Vecino y Movimiento Independiente Perú 2000, con el propósito de lanzar la candidatura presidencial de Alberto Fujimori Fujimori en las elecciones del año 2000" (page 682).
Van Cott 2005: "For the 1999 elections, the CCP made national-level alliances for the first time...Only Toledo [Perú Posible] was willing to sign an accord with the organization" (page 154).
Vargas León 2007: "Solidaridad Nacional es una agrupación conformada en 1999 por Luis Castañeda Lossio...para postular como candidato a la Presidencia de la República en las elecciones generales del 2000" (page 237).
Conaghan 2005: "To get more mayors onto the reelection bandwagon, pro-Fujimori mayors of Vamos Vecino organized a takeover of the national mayors' organization, Asociación de Municipalidades del Perú (AMPE) in January 1999" (page 166).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 27/4: "Se realiza un paro nacional convocado por las centrales sindicales y que cuenta con la adhesión de partidos y movimientos políticos. Pese a las provocaciones, la movilización fue pacífica" (page 710).
NotiSur May 7, 1999: "Tens of thousands of Peruvians marched in cities across the country on April 28 in a 24-hour strike that tangled traffic and closed many businesses. It was the first national strike against President Alberto Fujimori in his nine years in office...The strike was called by the [CGTP], with the support of 180 other labor and civic organizations and opposition political parties...Lima mayor Alberto Andrade, who leads the polls among potential candidates for next year's presidential election, joined the strike and led thousands in the march on the presidential palace" (electronic edition).
Latin American monitor. Andean group June 1999: "(C)ongress formed a sub-commission to investigate opposition charges that Fujimori abused his authority when he shut down congress in 1992. Two of the three committee members are Fujimori loyalists and censure was therefore rejected. The move does, however, signal that congress is trying to exert more authority. This, coupled with the general strike and increased unease over a third Fujimori term, will raise speculation over a credible opposition to Fujimori. The opposition parties have, however, been severely damaged over the past few years and it will be extremely difficult to form a united front behind any one presidential candidate" (page 8).
July: municipal election
Jurado Nacional de Elecciones 1999: "Resultados de la votación a nivel provincial y distrital obtenidas el 04-07-99" (pages 647-662). "Relación de alcaldes y regidores de los concejos provinciales y distritales de la república elegidos y proclamados del 04-07-99, con indicación de la organización o lista a la que pertenece" (pages 663-673).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 5/8: "Se promulga la ley ‘anti Alan García,' que prohíbe postular a elecciones para el Congreso a ex presidentes de la República involucrados en procesos penales por delitos en agravio del Estado, a pesar de que éstos no hayan sido probados" (page 712).
Latin American monitor. Andean group August 1999: "In a further move to weaken potential opposition, the government has passed a bill which prevents anyone facing court cases from running for political office. This is clearly aimed at former president Alan García, who faces corruption charges. Recent actions by Fujimori indicate that he is strongly considering running for a third term next April. In the presidential race, Lima mayor Alberto Andrade and former government minister Luis Castañeda are both likely to run...Fujimori will...continue efforts to bolster political support and will retain a tight control over the media. The appointment of General José Villanueva as armed forces chief will also strengthen Fujimori's control of the military" (page 8).
Latin American monitor. Andean group September 1999: "Recent evidence suggests that President Fujimori is planning to run for a third term in next April's presidential election. Fujimori is continung to strengthen his political position and he will receive strong support from Martha Hildebrandt, newly elected head of congress. The tight control of the military by security chief Vladimiro Montesinos has been strengthened by the appointment of General José Villanueva as armed forces chief. Significantly, Montesinos, Villanueva and five of the top regional army generals graduated in the same year from military school" (page 8).
Conaghan 2005: "Subterranean efforts to lure or coerce mayors into supporting Fujimori followed the AMPE takeover. Mayors supporting the presidential candidacy of Alberto Andrade began deserting his cause. At least thirty-two mayors affiliated with Somos Perú officially dropped out of the organization from August through October 1999" (pages 166-167).
Van Cott 2005: "The Peruvian highland indigenous movements achieved an organizational milestone in October 1999 when communities in the highlands involved in mining conflicts formed the [CONACAMI]. In a few short years it became the most dynamic sierra indigenous organization" (page 153). "CONACAMI, like other highland campesion organizations before it, does not present itself as an ‘indigenous' or ‘ethnic' organization...Most of its member communities speak Quechua, but Quechua identity is not an explicit part of the movement's identity or rhetoric" (page 154).
Conaghan 2005: "As the principal regulator of the electoral process, the JNE was the centerpiece in Montesinos's plans. In November 1999, Alipio Montes de Oca replaced Luis Serpa Segua as president of the JNE board. Eighteen months earlier, Montesinos had met with Montes de Oca to offer him the post, along with payments of ten thousand per month while he served. In exchange, Montesinos expected his full support in facilitating the reelection" (page 168). "Starting in November 1999, Transparencia published quantitative data proving that the major stations were wildly disproportionate in the time they allotted to coverage of the president versus the time allotted to opposition candidates" (page 176).
García Montero 2001: "El 22 de noviembre de 1999, el Presidente Alberto Fujimori dictó el Decreto Supremo No 40-99 PCM y convocó a elecciones generales para el 9 de abril de 2000 para elegir al Presidente de la República, Vicepresidentes y Congresistas, del período 2000-2005" (page 459).
Historia cronológica del Perú 2006: 25/11: "Trece partidos políticos firman un Pacto de Gobernabilidad con miras a las elecciones del siguiente año" (page 714).
Conaghan 2005: "After nearly four years of nonstop controversy, no one was surprised when Fujimori finally announced that he would seek a third term. On December 27, 1999, television stations aired the president's videotaped statement...At the conclusion, Fujimori pulled out a white placard with red letters that bore the name of his new electoral front for the election, Perú 2000" (page 163). "(T)he political organization was just one of the many fictions of the 2000 election. There was no grassroots movement, nor was there a multiparty coalition backing the president. The organizational center of the campaign was the SIN, and among the many hats worn by Montesinos was that of campaign manager" (page 164). Describes "the reelection machine" (pages 164-170). "Montesinos used state resources to compensate for the absence of a real political party and built an organizational grid across the country well in advance of the election" (pages 164-165). "By the end of 1999, one last legal hurdle remained in the way of Fujimori's candidacy. Peruvian election law established a short period between the time that a candidate filed to appear on the ballot and the time that the JNE accepted the filing. During the interim, ‘tachas' (formal challenges to the candidate) could be filed if there were grounds that the candidate had failed to meet the legal requirements set out in the election law. No one in the opposition honestly believed that the legal challenges would be successful, but the ‘tachas' were duly filed with the JNE after Fujimori announced his candidacy. The JNE quickly rejected the eighteen separate ‘tachas' filed to contest the Fujimori candidacy, refusing to deal with the question of the constitutionality of a third presidential term" (page 168). "(F)ourteen political organizations signed onto the Governability Pact in December 1999, pledging to work together on future democratic and economic reforms" (page 171).
Country profile. Peru 2000: "In December 1999 Mr Fujimori confirmed that he would seek an unprecedented third term as president. He formed a new electoral coalition, Perú 2000, an alliance of four pro-government organisations, Cambio 90, Nueva Mayoría, Vamos Vecino and the new Frente Nacional Independiente Perú 2000 (FNIP)" (page 7).
García Montero 2001: "El 27 de diciembre de 1999, tal y como parecía predecible, se inscribió la candidatura del Presidente Alberto Fumimori para un tercer período presidencial, conforme a la solicitud presentada por una alianza de partidos políticos denominada ‘Perú 2000'" (page 459).
Keesing's record of world events January 2000: Fujimori "announced on Dec. 27, 1999, that he would run as the presidential candidate of the Perú 2000 alliance in the forthcoming elections scheduled for April 9. The political opposition issued a legal challenge to Fujimori's candidacy and urged all political parties to support a single anti-Fujimori candidate in the election" (electronic edition).
Tanaka 2006: "After these machinations, in December 1999, Alberto Fujimori's candidacy was filed. The opposition challenged his candidacy, but ultimately the challenge was rejected by the JNE. The route to reelection involved near-absolute control over all state institutions" (page 66).