street from us. We got to know him and his sister because they lived in a house on Lincoln Avenue, which was a route to our elementary school. We used to turn the corner and go down the little pathway alongside their house, and they would always be very friendly, Kate and Frank. They sort of encouraged us as kids; they talked to us and so forth. It was nice to know them. Later on I discovered that Frank was also a liberal Democrat, and there weren't too many in our neighborhood or in our social situation. I got some kind of understanding in the difference in politics during period. Frank wrote my sister Louise and me up in the annual Christmas poem that he did for the New Yorker. It was a full page, and he would rhyme hundreds of names, and he put us in there at one point, which was very nice of him.

One other thing that's on the record is that Frank was an anticliché type, and he wrote about cliché experts, and he would write everything in cliché, which today makes me aware of clichés. I try to get rid of them in my own language and writing. And that's a very important thing.

One of the other things about Frank is that he wrote about the rape of Mrs. Peet's grape arbor. That was a house just a few doors from where he lived. Every year, as kids, we would creep through the bushes and grab some those grapes, and she'd come out yelling and screaming and
beating on pans and so forth, scaring us off.

CONNORS: This is a short item that you showed me last week in an anthology. Would that originally have been in the New Yorker as a New Yorker piece?

SCHRADE: New Yorker or one of the newspapers he wrote for in New York. He was two to three different newspapers in New York, because he wrote both for New Yorker magazine-- It probably was in the New Yorker. I'm not sure. It could he checked out in the book. I'm sure.

CONNORS: Yeah, we can check that and put it in as a citation of an early record. Okay. Well, where we left it last time was--

SCHRADE: Oh, also on Frank, one of the things when I had returned to Saratoga during my period when I left Yale [University] and joined the UAW [United Auto Workers] and became so active, I would go back and talk to him about this, and he was very responsive. He knew something more than most people in our small town of Saratoga about the trade union movement. It was just a good place to sit down and talk about it all. He was quite interested.

CONNORS: How old would he have been in that period? How many years older than you?

SCHRADE: Probably twenty-five, thirty years older. Yeah.

CONNORS: What had been his background? Do you know much about his own--?
SCHRADE: Mostly writing in college and then joining New York newspapers just writing. He had friends in Saratoga, Monte Woolley, the old, longtime actor, and a guy named [Theodore] Knapp who was also a writer and sort of a Saratoga historian. They often met down in the favorite bar where a lot of high-schoolers went, and they would sit at the bar talking a lot many nights. We'd be in there drinking beer or something during the evening.

CONNORS: When we finished off last time, we were at I'd say, about 1948, where you had joined the union and very quickly became a [?] committeeman. I would like to talk a bit about what your duties as a committeeman were and how you learned them.

SCHRADE: Well, mostly by doing it and studying the contract, talking to Lew Stowe, who was the chair of what we call the grievance committee, sometimes the shop committee. And there's an awful lot of help at that point. Stowe was very good about teaching. And some of the people in the department, as I mentioned before, the toolmakers, jig and fixture, tool and die makers, who were working there had come from their own department over to ours to build jigs and fixtures for experimental aircraft. And they had been active and they knew a lot. So I had a lot of real good advice and support at that point and made a lot of mistakes and got into difficulties
with the company, but--

CONNORS: So this committee was the grievance committee. This was not the bargaining committee.

SCHRADE: Yeah, those were two separate.

CONNORS: Two separate, okay.

SCHRADE: The bargaining committee, or negotiating committee, was elected each time. This was part of the pattern of operation. We had annual union elections and annual bargaining, so there were elections every year for both the officers and the shop committeemen, as well as for the negotiating committee. So there's a lot of politics and a lot of real activity.

CONNORS: It would seem that, once you get elected or get put into place, it's very soon after that that you have to start doing your campaigning again.

SCHRADE: Right, well, you're campaigning all the time, and in a way that's very good. People say you waste your time campaigning. But in a way, it's not just politics in the lower sense of the term, but it's politics of accountability. You've constantly got to prove yourself day to day in your work as an officer or a member of the negotiating committee or grievance committee. You've got to prove yourself and constantly do things so that the membership will support you down the road a year from then. It's an old idea. In the United States' early days,
there was that idea that there should be short terms, a
constant rotation of people in and out of office. That's
the way you learn how to govern yourself.

CONNORS: It's true. I suppose it involves more people
throughout that way, so that you don't have a group getting
entrenched.

SCHRADE: Yeah. And we were constantly moving for more
representation in the shop to involve more people where the
trend in the last twenty years has been to reduce for a
number of reasons. So we were constantly hammering for
more representation and getting people involved.

CONNORS: Tell me more about Lew Stowe. You mentioned him
last time as being somebody who would sort of take you
under his wing. What was his history? Do you know
anything about where he came from?

SCHRADE: He came out of South Carolina. He and his wife
both were active in organizing in the mills of South
Carolina. He got to California, I think, soon after the
war. They both worked at North American Aviation [Inc.]
for a while, she did and then quit. They had two kids. So
Lew was in a position as chairman of the grievance
committee to be in a key position, even though politically
he was part of a minority caucus, the [Walter F.] Reuther
caucus, in the local. He was being challenged constantly
by the regional director, C. [Cyril] V. O'Halleran, and his
guy in the local who was president, E.J. Parkos, and Don Anderson, who was vice president. So Lew was sort of the center of grievance activity as well as the Reuther politics in the local. So after work—Because during those days there was very little time off the job when you're working in the union, and when you were, you got what was called lost time, which meant you got what you actually lost. No overtime pay, but what you actually lost in straight-time pay. So a lot of the time at the union hall was after work in the late afternoon, early evening, where we'd sit down and talk about grievances and work out strategy and so forth. So Lew was very good that way and outstanding in terms of knowing the contract and carrying an aggressive position against the company, which was not the style of the president of the local. He was very soft on the company and the company was soft on him, because they could have used him as their entrance into the union. So I liked Stowe for those reasons. He was very helpful. He knew what was happening and was helpful in terms of training me, but also had a politics that I began to pick up.

CONNORS: When he was back east or the south there and organizing, was he a CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations]?

SCHRADER: No, just a volunteer organizer in the shop, he
and his wife both. Yeah, they weren't uh--And Law--

CONNORS: They weren't United Textile Workers or anything?
SCHRADE: No, no.

CONNORS: Well, you said that he was a representative of this small, fledgling Reuther caucus. Let's talk about that a little bit. That would have put Parkos and Anderson with the [Roland J.] Thomas-[George P.] Addes Group?
SCHRADE: Thomas-Addes, and mainly relating to O'Halleran, who was part of the Thomas-Addes-Leonard group, yeah.

CONNORS: That's Richard [T.] Leonard?
SCHRADE: Yeah, Dick Leonard.

CONNORS: So Thomas was R.J.J. Thomas, the president of the union--
SCHRADE: The president of the union, yeah.

CONNORS: --who had come in--Of course we're talking here about 1948, so Reuther is president by this time, right?
SCHRADE: Yes, Reuther was elected in '46.

CONNORS: But in the region there's still a holdover support group for--
SCHRADE: Yeah, and O'Halleran had made his deal with Reuther at that point with the help of John Livingston, who was looking for a kind of independent political support and was moving with some of the anti-Reuther people left on the board after the '46-47--Reuther actually consolidated in '47. He didn't have the majority of the board in '45, so
there was what was called a mechanical majority, where Reuther tried to be president but was constantly being obstructed by Thomas, who was vice president. And Addes, I believe, was still on the board—

CONNORS: This is George Addes.

SCHRADER: George Addes was still secretary treasurer. So there's this constant conflict. And Addes, who had control of the funds at that point, kept Reuther from doing anything. So Reuther, as based on the constitution, finally went to the banks and said, "Look, under the constitution I have the right to decide these expenditures, and no check will be honored by these banks until I cosign." So he was able to bargain himself into a stronger position in the '46-'47 period. But in '47, that's when O'Halleran made his deal and said, "I'll be a good guy and go along with you, Walter." So Reuther didn't oppose him in '47.

CONNORS: What was in O'Halleran's thinking? Did he really support Reuther at that point?

SCHRADER: Well, O'Halleran probably can be characterized as more the R.J. Thomas, whiskey-drinking, poker-playing, good trade union guy who could carry on a hell of a fight against the company, but who were really not in the Reuther mold, which was taking initiative and doing new things with the union, both in bargaining and in the community. So
O'Halleran was respected for that. We respected him. We were in a lot of organizing drives outside the local in strike situations and so forth. But in terms of moving the union forward, he was not that kind of director. And he has his connections inside our local and controlled the local. So what he tried to do is maintain his own independent political base and not bring the Reuther people in. If he could win locals enough to maintain himself, then his deal with Reuther was much more solid, as far as his own position was concerned. So we were constantly challenging. And at certain points, Roy Reuther, who was on the aircraft staff, a wonderful guy who would come out and sort of discipline us, "I know you're for Walter and I know you want to do the right thing in the region, but we've got this deal with O'Halleran, and you've got to cooperate." But at the same time, when we were running for office, international reps would descend on our local en masse with sound trucks and everything, and just rip the hell out of us in terms of our politics and so forth, and campaign against us. We had a few fist fights out in front of the plant, in front of the union hall near the plant, over this kind of political struggle that was going on. So on one hand, we were Reuther supporters, but we were not getting much in terms of help or support from the Reuther caucus. So we were pretty much on our own, and we had to
build independently and support Reuther, but we were not getting the kind of support—because he didn't want to involve himself once he made these agreements with a certain number of members of the International Executive Board. So he was maintaining his own power relationships on the International Executive Board, sometimes to the detriment of his own supporters like us in Region 6.

CONNORS: In reading some of the many UAW histories of this period and Reuther's biographies and, I guess, Victor [Reuther]'s *The Brothers Reuther*, you get this breakdown of left and right within the UAW. I've always found it really hard to understand, because in some cases, Reuther is considered the right and the Thomas-Addes coalition is considered the left somehow, although R/J. Thomas was not so much of a leftist in his particular politics, but I suppose it's who he aligned with in order to block Reuther. Does that make much sense to you to talk about it in those terms?

SCHRADE: Yeah, because it affected the politics of our union. I was just saying, we had annual union elections, annual contract negotiations, we were also carrying on a struggle inside the CIO, the Los Angeles county [CIO] council, the state CIO council, against the so-called left or communist-dominated unions and were also active out in the politics of the community. It was the [Henry] Wallace-
[Harry] Truman contest, which affected the politics of our union. So we were in this kind of multidimensional, very exciting, intense activity all the time. It's the reason that I decided that this is really great to be involved in all this struggle, even though I had applied to go back to Yale University in 1948, and then, in 1949, I just gave it up. I said, "This is much more interesting and worthwhile than being in chemistry or"--since I was beginning to change my major--"an economist or a political scientist." So the left-right thing, we called ourselves the right wing at that point, even though, in terms of the politics now, it's not the right wing. We were the socialists, the sort of radical Democrats, the liberals, and so forth. So today we would be characterized as the left, and essentially, we were. If you want to argue this out, the sectarian left, those people are influenced by the Trotskyite ideology or the Stalinist ideology, and we had both of those represented in the union. To me, I would consider them right wing, because their idea about democracy and membership participation and goals and so forth were off the wall. And that's why we got into the left-right struggle during that period.

Our own local was affected by this, because it was part of the--The so-called left wing of the union at that point, in the 1941 strike, was eagerly supportive of that
strike. The issues were right. People in the aircraft industry were underpaid at North American Aviation, particularly at that time. But at the same time, they were carrying on this international foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which was not to get involved in the war against Hitler, because Stalin and the Soviet Union had this pact with Hitler. And we saw in our own look at history, where once Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, the communist party line in the United States changed and became gung ho for entry into World War II, pro-capitalist, and pro-company.

Harry Bridges spoke out forcibly for speedup as part of a patriotic effort to prosecute the war against Hitler and for bonuses and for peace rates and all the things that capitalism really stood for. And he and Earl Browder were very direct about that: "We've got to support the capitalist system because that's what's fighting Hitler at this point which I think really messed up the communist party and made it less of a worker's party than it could have been in this country. The Reuther forces were not taking that militant, pro-capitalist position that the communist party was during that period. So even with the red-baiting that was going on after the war, because Bridges and a lot of the people identified with the CP, Slim Connelly, Dorothy Healey, were still advocating speedup and bonuses and peace rate systems, because now was
the time to help the Soviet Union recover from the devastation and brutality of the Hitler campaign inside the Soviet Union. So we found ourselves with the communist party in sort of an antiworker, antitrade union position. And on top of it they were out in politics not supporting Truman, not supporting Helen Gahagen Douglas—who I thought was one of the finest politicians this country's ever had—they were against her and against Truman and supporting the Wallace and the IPP [Independent Progressive Party] movement, which seems to be kind of a waste of time. The third party thing just doesn't work in this country, even though I would like to see it.

So we were, in our own local, building the Reuther caucus. We became embroiled in the struggle inside the Los Angeles CIO council, in the state CIO council against Bridges, in order to implement the national CIO policy, which was to change over the leadership. So we took them on politically in both organizations, and there was heavy campaigning by the national CIO and by us. And for the first time, in '48 and '49, we were able to deliver delegations to the L.A. CIO council and the state council which were anti-Bridges, anti-Slim Connelly. And those times were really exciting and in some way fun because the debate was really wonderful. The contest between the leaders of the right wing and the left wing in the CIO were
really well-staged, effective debates. Paul Jacobs, who became pretty famous in this country, was one of our leaders, along with Leonard Levy, the Amalgamated Clothing Worker's--

CONNORS: Who was Jacobs with at that point?
SCHRADE: One of the unions, I'm not quite sure. Textile, maybe. He was on the staff of one of the unions.

But we'd just get down to those L.A. council meetings because the debate and the political activity on the floor were just very exciting. And we finally won. I think the major error that was made during that period was that the national CIO expelled certain unions, the longshore union [International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union], UE [United Electrical Workers], Fur Workers [Fur and Leather Workers Union], Furniture [United Furniture Workers of America], I guess, and some others, and set up different unions. There was a contest, then, for membership. I think that was a very divisive tactic. I think the general strategy of being political, of going in and fighting for positions in the CIO councils was the appropriate way to do it.

CONNORS: That's funny. I've heard Victor Reuther say that same thing. He said the way they did it in the UAW was to actually let this whole thing unfold in the course of great debate. And he said that it happened in the CIO that you
had, sort of by edict, the situation where Jimmy [James] Carey was then pulled over to establish the IUE [International Union of Electrical Workers] against the UE, and that that debate never went beyond that. It was just a standoff—that it should have gone on differently.

SCHRADE: Yeah, the Reuther position as a socialist was—There was a decision made in the late thirties and through the forties that, as socialists, they would not try to impose socialist party agenda on the UAW, but they would go in and struggle within on the issues that were coming up out of the UAW. This was quite different from what the Communist Party was doing inside the UAW, inside the CIO. In fact, I think part of the very bitter part of the struggle against the so-called communist-led unions led by Phil Murray—Because he found out that Lee Pressman, who was the general council of CIO, was meeting with the communist party leadership and coming back with that doctrine when he was employee of the CIO. He was not an elected member; he was the general counsel. So this was another strong difference. Do you really impose party discipline inside a trade union? And that was a struggle that was finally won. We beat that.

CONNORS: Who was it that you would get together with to go to these L.A. IUC meetings? Were they held monthly or something like that?
SCHRADE: L.A. CIO.

CONNORS: Yeah.

SCHRADE: Yeah, there were monthly meetings, and they were down on San Pedro [Street] near Slauson [Avenue], the old CIO building. The UAW had headquarters there for a while, too. So it was a real center of trade union activity and brought out a lot of people. Those were really--

CONNORS: Whose approach was it that "we have to go there and block the communists?" When did it become a strategy that "we had to get rid of these guys?"

SCHRADE: Well, it became a national CIO and an international UAW policy. We were party to that. It was part of our politics. It was also part of our struggle in the local, because the O'Halleran forces were not reliable in terms of their position against Bridges and against Slim Connelly and these CIO councils. And so we were able to build within our local to participate as part of the Reuther effort to change over the councils.

CONNORS: So who else would have been involved in this effort with you from 387 or--?

SCHRADE: Well, mostly officers. We had to become elected delegates to those councils, too. It was another part of the electoral process which was never-ending. And we also worked with other people in other locals, other Reuther types, Reuther caucus people, like Rex Maynard and Clarence
Stinson from the Alcoa local, Frank Donnelly I think was also from the Alcoa, people like Clarence Wright from Fruehauf [Corporation], Local 811 at that time. Let's see, Red Anger from GM [General Motors Corporation] local 216, and I think Gene Judd from local 216 who had been on the staff, was back in the shop. Let's see, Ben Nathanson was out here during that period as a member of the aircraft staff of the International Union. So we coordinated with the international as well as other people around the local. And we also had what was called the Auto and Aircraft Council, which was a UAW structure. And that's where a lot of the UAW politics was developed, because that was an opportunity to challenge the regional director on policy and on his politics.

CONNORS: Was it an independent sort of structure?
SCHRADE: No, it was built into the constitution of the UAW. Every region or area had an auto-aircraft council which would bring representatives of the locals together as sort of a coordinating body, you know, for strike support, support of bargaining, for political action work, and so forth. But it also became part of the UAW politics and the efforts that any group was carrying on.

CONNORS: This all came to a head in 1949—is that right?—1949 or '50, where the California State CIO was suspended and a new California State CIO was established in short
order.

SCHRADE: Yeah, yeah. And also on a Los Angeles level, too. So we had our own new councils, which then became very dull. It was--

CONNORS: What did Slim Connelly do after that? [laughter]

SCHRADE: --kind of routine bureaucratic work. I don't know.

CONNORS: That's the irony isn't it?

SCHRADE: Yeah. Although the councils, the state council and the L.A. council, served as bases for political operations in the community, or political action work and state legislative work and city council work and so forth. There was a period when one of the wonderful old lefties of the day, Frank Wilkinson, who was in the [Los Angeles] Housing Authority during the [Fletcher] Bowron administration when there was a lot of federal housing going on-- And it was in jeopardy. It was being attacked by the right wing in this country. He took us on tours of the slums around the [Los Angeles] City Hall and around through the Chavez Ravine area. And that was really startling, because I had seen some poverty and known some myself in my hometown of Saratoga, but I had never seen anything like this, because I had never been in big cities enough to see it. It was a very, very important experience. That was an L.A. CIO activity. And we got
into all kinds of campaigns: we were in the Truman campaign, we were in the Helen Gahagan Douglas campaign. And that was the day when we were ringing doorbells and getting a lot of members active out there in their neighborhoods and organizing votes. We helped sponsor some local candidates like Dick Richards. Richard Richards was one of the outstanding politicians. Glenn Anderson, who is still on the Congress of the United States, he came up out of that period. So the CIO was effective in terms of getting into a lot of community, state, and national politics.

CONNORS: Just one item on the Wallace campaign of 1948. That was pretty clear-cut that the UAW would be opposed to this, is that right?

SCHRADE: Yes.

CONNORS: Did you have to debate in the local union?

SCHRADE: Well, there was some lack of clarity at one point, because I think the ADA, the Americans for Democratic Action, was formed during that period, and Reuther was part of that, along with people like Lehman and Eleanor Roosevelt and so forth—Herbert Lehman, the governor of New York and, I guess, a senator, too. They were shopping around for a candidate because there were some activities of Truman they didn't like. And they were talking about Eisenhower at one point, recruiting him and
a couple of other people, maybe Paul Hoffman—I don't know if Paul Hoffman was one of them—but there were certain liberals that they were trying to attract. But when it became clear that Truman was the candidate, then the sharp division between the Wallace supporters and the Truman supporters became very clear to all of us that we were pushing for Truman.

CONNORS: But there must have been some concern because of what Truman wasn't able to do in vetoing the Taft-Hartley Act, for instance.

SCHRADE: Right. He did veto Taft-Hartley.

CONNORS: He did veto it, that's right. But the veto was overridden.

SCHRADE: Was overridden, yeah. Because I think both houses of the Congress were Republican at that point. But he did make that effort. There was one other problem. I don't know if it was during the steel strike or whether that was before the '48 election or not, but he played a pretty big role in that. And I think that there was some problem with his competency, with Cold War liberal policies and so forth, although not too much, because the trade union movement generally was in that bag during that period.

CONNORS: Okay, in 1949, the '49 contract, was that the result of a three-year contract?

SCHRADE: No, there's a--
CONNORS: Or is it—it wasn’t the first contract?

SCHRADER: There were till annual contracts. So we had a contract negotiation in ’48 and then in 1949 and 1950. And ’50 was the first long-term contract. It went for three years, although the contract in Auto went for five, right?

CONNORS: Yeah.

SCHRADER: Yeah, the so-called treaty of Detroit.

CONNORS: Yes, with Charles Wilson of GM.

SCHRADER: Yeah, except there was a wage reopener forced by the UAW during then—Keuther’s living document theory.

CONNORS: Now, the contracts that the local were able to win following the war, say—During the war it would have been pretty much maintained at the same contract that was in force when the war production and all that—

SCHRADER: Yeah. First of all the unions, the Machinist’s union [International Association of Machinists] and the UAW, the biggest unions in the aircraft industry at the time, still were in bad shape in bargaining because of the intervention and direct involvement of the government in setting pay and being the only customer and therefore having great power over what happened within a corporation, along with the fact that the aircraft industry association was constantly together against the unions and generally all the corporations, through their own alliance, and the government were together. There was this alliance of
government and corporations, so unions really had a very difficult time. These companies were making tremendous profits off the war and after the war, and yet would not see that decent wages were being paid. So the unions were in this constant struggle and in many cases not being free to strike, because during the wartime there was a no strike pledge, particularly with this important military product coming off the lines, in terms of aircraft and so forth, but also during peacetime not being able to strike because the pressure wasn't there with the government generally cooperating saying, "Okay, we don't need this product, so let the strike run." And we had those kind of administrations, the kind of government clearance for the corporations to just take the unions on. Because the government, either Democrat or Republican, didn't want to pay more for military aircraft.

The other problem during that period is that the Machinist's union and the UAW were in a constant competition at the bargaining table but also in organizing. One of the first jobs that I had outside the local was as a volunteer to go down and participate in a raid on Convair, Consolidated Vultee [Aircraft Company], in San Diego. The UAW was challenging the Machinist's union there for bargaining rights. They were challenging us at Glenn L. Martin in Maryland, the Machinist's union. So we
had this internal struggle in the trade union movement going on, which had its origins in the old left-right fight of the thirties and forties, with the AF of L [American Federation of Labor] moving the Machinist’s union into the aircraft industry to organize often with government approval and corporate approval, because they would rather deal with a conservative union like the Machinist’s union. And the CIO was sending the UAW and giving the UAW jurisdiction. So the struggle was there with the constant red-baiting by the Machinist’s union and the corporations against the UAW, which was part of the CIO. So you had this thing still going on after the war. So I got exposed to a lot of this. And this, I think, is one of the important reasons why we took this hardline, anti-CP position, because of the earlier ideological questions about what the trade union is, but also because we were constantly being red-baited. So we had to prove ourselves as a legitimate American union that was fighting the good fight for the workers in the aircraft industry. So these struggles were so multidimensional, and, as I said, it was very exciting. It was a really wonderful period.

So we were constantly organizing, signing up, because we didn’t have union shops for a long time, and automatic signup membership, and we wound up doing all that kind of hard work in order to get into a bargaining position.
Politically, in the local, in the '48-'49 period, we began increasing our strength. There was a vacancy in 1948, and that was when our political caucus was born. The vice presidency was open, Don Anderson had gone to the O'Halleran staff as an international rep, and we elected Carl Fisher from the machine shop as the vice president. It was the first Blue Slate victory. Then in 1949, Stowe ran for president against Parkos and lost by seven votes, which was a real challenge. I mean, it was the first time there had been this kind of a challenge on the presidency. Later in '49, we ran the delegate's election for the international UAW convention, and we won practically all those positions. It was the first time the local ever sent a delegation to the international convention which was pro-Reuther. So the bargaining process was also involved here.

CONNORS: You mentioned the Blue Slate and that was the Reutherite political organization within 887. And that was just recently formed in that period, right?

SCHRADE: The Parkos slate was the Green Slate, so we decided to have a different color. We chose blue as a contrast. The Blue Slate caucus still exists in the local as a one-party system.

CONNORS: But in that period, you were there as one of the founders of the Blue Slate, as was Lew Stowe—
SCHRADE: Yeah, and I was mainly the chief campaigner, because I was editor of the paper, I had access to printers and would write up this stuff for the caucus. So we began building from there. 1950 took the presidency and the board.