

SCHRADE: There were a number of reasons. We can consult with the text of ~~that~~. In fact, I have all that stuff here. I've not really read it in years. Maybe next time we'll go back over and pick up some of the actual grounds for the administratorship. But I think it also had to do with the local union newspaper. The Local 600 newspaper, Ford Facts, would have great headlines about betrayal and dues increase questions, a very feisty, hard line, hard-hitting kind of newspaper against the international. And the trade union discipline at that point concerned Reuther and the officers <sup>#4</sup> even though free press is a very important principle, there was a feeling that they were going too far. And how to really deal with that was the question. They dealt with it with by fabricating only the administratorship. CONNORS: Okay.

*Local articles*

SCHRADE: So that was one of the reasons. There were probably other reasons as well. But the case we had was the appeal of the five members who had been expelled, so we held hearings for the local, and they lasted several days. They were all on the record. I've got a transcript of that in the file I just saw recently.

We then continued the hearing to hear the International Executive Board's side of the case, and the committee then considered both sides, the five appellants and the International Executive Board, and came down with a

15/30

recommendation that the appeal should be denied and that the International Executive Board's expulsion from office of these five should be upheld. And that became a very big issue in the convention, because it was, again, part of the anti-communist effort on the part of the leadership of the union to kind of clean up the organization and to deny the Communist Party types access to office in the local union and to lead the organization into what the Communist Party wanted. I think it became the last real effort that way. There's still <sup>12</sup>red-baiting in the union. You see it in indirect ways even now in the 'eighties from the international union and some of the locals. But it seemed to me that the excessive use of this issue saw its end here. And during the debate, it got pretty fierce in the convention. Jack Livingston handled the International Executive Board position on this, and I think he went overboard in ranting and raving about these five guys and their communist connections. And it was well proven that these people had been either members or subservients of the party, and I think the evidence was clear that way.

CONNORS: Just as an example of that, in my reading I saw that--I don't remember their names,--these guys, or one of them, would regularly go to the big youth meetings, rallies, that they would have in Hungary or the Eastern Bloc countries. There was somebody who was promoting and

really recruiting for the Stockholm Peace Pledge, and one of them had been involved who was always known as William Z. Foster's chauffeur when Foster was in town. But it was that kind of evidence that was put together recognizing these people as--

SCHRADE: And all of that's laid out in the report of the Grievance Committee, the report of the International Executive Board, and the rebuttal by the people who were appealing their expulsion. Walter, I knew-- I was sitting with him on the convention platform after making a presentation, then hearing Livingston, and then Reuther made a short presentation. Livingston was quite long and ranting and raving. And Reuther was really upset about Livingston's presentation, that he was going really overboard and hurting what essentially was a constitutional case. And at one point I just restrained him. I grabbed his arm and said, "Look, let the debate go on, and I will try to do the cleanup at the end." And one of the things I tried to do at the end was say, "Okay, based on the current constitution, the International Executive Board is correct in what it's doing. The evidence is there and they were acting constitutionally both on the administratorship and the expulsions, but we ought to look towards a better way of handling this." And before the case was presented to the convention, I pointed out to the convention that we had

passed a new due-process system so that administratorships wouldn't be required, and we wouldn't get into the authoritarian kind of approach the International Executive Board was using in this case. And I think that, in a way, allayed some of the fears of the people who were more civil-liberties conscious and about dealing with people who had been active in the CP. To me, it finally dawned on me that this was not the way to handle it. Even if the person was an active member of the Communist Party, they still should have the right to run for office and let the membership make that decision.

The problem was that a lot of people who are active in the Communist Party were really members, would not expose their position and their membership in the party. They were closet members. And I didn't think that was a good idea in an open political system. So what if you're a member of the Communist Party? Say so and say what you're all about and take your chances that way. But you didn't find many people who were either supportive or actually members of the party doing that sort of thing. And there are good reasons for that. The American Communist Party had the problem of the zigs and zags of the international policy of the Soviet Union and had to switch back and forth as it was dictated from Moscow. And that was something we understand much more now since people in the Communist

19/33

Party broke over Czechoslovakia and broke over Hungary and began explaining these things and the problems they had in dealing with their own progressive kind of politics here in this country and having to deal with the discipline of the party.

So I think in '53, my own politics changed abruptly. I'd been working with <sup>H.B. Franklin</sup> Rex Maynard and Clarence Stinson who were carrying the late-forties, early-fifties, anti-communist line, and I began saying, "We are not really being very fair about this, and there are decent people in our union who may have had some membership, may have been members, or may have been working with the party, who are really decent trade union people." So I had some arguments with them about this and actually broke with them politically during this period to sort of establish a kind of a new politics in the union. Later on, in the fifties, when I was administrative assistant to Walter Reuther, Emil Mazey really held star chamber hearings over an international rep named Paul Siren in Canada who'd been, I think, at that point, an international rep and was discharged and expelled. And it was handled totally against the process that we had determined at the '53 convention. I wrote a memo to Walter <sup>and</sup> couldn't get to see him early enough, so I wrote a long memo to him saying, "We established this due process, here were doing this kind

20134

of thing, this guy's going to the Public Review Board with this case, and we're going to lose it because you can't prove subservience to the Communist Party in this case." And the Public Review Board did reject the international position. So Jack Conway came to me and said, "Walter's very disturbed about your memo and asked why you wrote it in the first place." And I said, "I explained it to him. You took this position in the '53 convention that we had a due process system; now we're not using it. We ought to." So in a way I began adjusting my own politics back in the fifties. And I think it had to do with something, ~~that~~ I joined the [American] Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] at the time, too, in 1950 or '51 and have been a member ever since. And as part of my preparation for my work in the union, I began to read a lot about democracy, about civil liberties, and so forth, and I began to make up my own mind about some of these questions and not just travel with the group. And I think it was a very important job as <sup>the</sup> Grievance chairman, because I had a chance to really play hardball in this issue, because, first of all, I did agree with the International Executive Board about what was happening in 600, and they had it right out of the constitution, but the constitution wasn't right. We did change it more to my liking in '53.

CONNORS: Were you recruited into the ACLU? Or was it

22/35

something that you ran across--

SCHRADE: Just ran across.

CONNORS: --and said this sounds good to me?

SCHRADE: Yeah. It was during a period when Eason Monroe was active. He had been fired as a teacher when refusing to sign a non-communist affidavit. Oh, and probably the other influence, too, was Al [Abraham L.] Wirin, who was a labor lawyer during that period and also active in ACLU questions. And I think it was just part of getting active in the community, too. You join the organizations with which you agree.

CONNORS: And by this time, you had been elected president of the local.

SCHRADE: Yeah, in 1951.

CONNORS: 'Fifty-one, that's right. You were president in 1951.

SCHRADE: 'Fifty-one, '52, '53, '54.

CONNORS: Okay. In Red [William C.] Aston's history of the local, he says that the 1953 election was hotly contested.

SCHRADE: Uh-huh. [affirmative]

CONNORS: What was the contest there?

SCHRADE: I think part of the regional and international politics was beginning to come down on us because we took very strong initiative in the 1952 negotiations in pushing on the inequity question between auto and aircraft. And

there was a certain amount of hostility coming from Jack Livingston, Paul Russo, Bill [William] Kircher, John Allard of the National Aircraft Department at that point. I don't see where their hands were directly involved in this thing, but people they associated with in the local, and O'Halleran, who was still a regional director were associated with, were involved in the opposition. And we had kind of wide open elections, anyway. Part of our reform in the local was to establish balloting at plant gates. We tried to get it in the shop but failed. The company wouldn't agree to that, and we knew they wouldn't. So what we did establish was voting time before work, during lunch break, and after work, so that people going in the plant, coming out, or during their lunch breaks could come to the polls. Because we had a very small union hall fairly close to the plant in both Downey, one other area, main area, and near the airport, and very few parking places, so it was very difficult for people to vote. So we had this kind of wide open politics and democratic process. So opposition was always around, and we felt that we were being challenged by the Livingston and O'Halleran and Allard forces in particular, because of the way we dealt with them in the '52 bargaining. Because we were able to get some hard support <sup>from</sup> for Reuther at that point through Nat Weinberg, who was the research



director. And even though we were going after a wage inequity that had been there throughout the whole history of our union at North American Aviation and in this industry, taking initiative like that is looked upon unkindly, to put it kindly, by international officers. They like to be in the lead, they like to deliver the local and the membership to the corporation <sup>based on their concept</sup> ~~at their price in a~~ contract <sup>settlement</sup> ~~I mean~~, that's a very simple, crude way to put it, but that's really what we're faced with. And over a period of time, most locals now negotiate with the international union about what they're going to demand and what they get in a contract, <sup>Cost</sup> ~~and~~ at this stage we weren't that disciplined. We felt that here was an international union policy on the wage inequity between auto and aircraft and benefits, as well, and that we ought to be taking initiative and being as creative as we could on the local level to get that and put the international union in the position to bargain for a better package. That was our strategy. And it worked in '52. We got a lot of real support from around our own union and the Machinist's union [International Association of Machinists] for carrying on that fight and winning it in '52. So we felt we were going to be challenged by-- The other thing that was happening was that Livingston was beginning to challenge Reuther. We knew that through the grapevine. That he was supporting

38138

O'Halleran, who'd been an anti-Reuther director, as an opportunist way of building support. But Kircher and Russo and Livingston really wanted John Allard as the regional director. So the politics of our '53 election were part of that, because Allard was beginning to move for the regional directorship, and he had every right to. He was obviously a much better and more capable guy and better trade unionist than C.V. O'Halleran. I got to really be one of John's admirers. And the fact that he was in our negotiations was a great benefit to us in '52 and '53. The thing that really proved this all to me-- Because in politics you've got to listen to the rumors and listen to the grapevine, and generally what you're going to get is good stuff, even though you don't have the evidence for it, and you'd better be making your own political plans. But the thing that convinced me was that John Allard and I had coffee at the Airway Cafe once going into the '53 negotiations, and he said he wanted to talk to me. He said, in essence, "Paul, if I do a good job for you in these negotiations"--since he was heading it up for the aircraft department on our level--"would you support me for regional director in the 1953 convention?" Well, that, in a way, took me by surprise, but I also had know that something like this was happening in his politics, in his group, and I just put him off. I said, "Look, John, first

of all, I don't know what's going to happen in the negotiations, I ~~don't~~ know what's going to happen in our own political group or what we're going to do, but I will give you favorable consideration." I said, "I can't do other than that, because I think you're a really good union guy, you do a good job in bargaining, and you're obviously a good influence here in our local." So I put him off at that point ~~(phone rings)~~, he didn't really like that at that point but it was all I could say. I couldn't give him a commitment.

26/40

TAPE NUMBER: IV, SIDE TWO

JULY 27, 1989

CONNORS: Okay, who did you run against in '53?

SCHRADE: I don't know.

CONNORS: It must have been someone.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Maybe we can look that up. But that election was before the negotiations started.

SCHRADE: Right.

CONNORS: So negotiations open up as you were mentioning, talking with Allard and whatnot. What were the demands of the union? Was it a full revamping of the contract?

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Because that had been the end of the three-year contract, right?

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: And the '52 activity was wage reopener.

SCHRADE: Wage reopener of the 1950-53 contract. We had a full set of demands in, and we were going for what we call first-class pay, which meant removal of at least a portion of the inequity between auto and aircraft. We wanted another step forward there, which we had won in 1952, and we wanted to build on that. To us, that was the key issue, because, again, it was keeping faith with the membership right from the beginning, in 1941, with the strike, that we

27/41

would eliminate this. This was a question of fairness that we developed: <sup>##</sup> "We ought to get paid the same as others doing our work, or doing other industrial work of the same or lesser skill level." We also demanded a full union shop. We had a modified union shop during that period from '50 to '53 of-- And major changes in the wage system so that we would eliminate at least the C levels, the third level of most classifications, and some B levels, so that we would have only an A, B, or an A level on classifications. That was the old system worked out during World War II where there's these different levels, merit reviews, and it's very difficult for people to move up to the tops of their classification, many times taking years and years and keeping the cost down for the company and keeping their profits up. So that was a major demand on our part. We wanted more stewards, we wanted a better retirement program-- Not a better retirement <sup>program,</sup> ~~we~~ wanted a retirement program. This is one area in benefits where we hadn't kept up with auto or steel or rubber, because their first retirement programs came in 1948 and '49, and here it was 1953 and there was no retirement plan in the aircraft industry in any company. And so that was a major demand along with the usual improvements in the health plan, which was always a major issue. The company came with its first offer to us, getting rid of the union shop, modified union

26 142

shop, among some other takeaway<sup>s</sup>--less union representation and so forth--being very uptight about what they felt was a major loss to them in the wage arbitration 1952, which was a major victory for us, wanting to hold the line there, and going along just with an aircraft pattern--no change in terms of eliminating that wage inequity. So it was a standoff for a long time.

CONNORS: Well, one of those items, less union representation, that involves the ratio between stewards and members.

SCHRADE: And members, yeah. And the attack on us on the local level was that we're irresponsible, filing too many grievances, they wanted to reduce the representation and reduce the grievance load and so forth. But it always takes two to tango in a grievance procedure, and we found, during that period, a lot more resistance, a lot more hostility from the corporation because of the wage arbitration decision of '52. So here we were being politically challenged by the Livingston-Allard-O'Halleran group within the union, and also, from '52 on into the '53 thing, being challenged by the corporation--strong resistance to going along with grievances where we'd been able to settle before and so forth. So it was, in a way, a very divisive kind of situation we found ourselves in, both in the politics of the union and the relationship with this

corporation. So negotiations were very difficult, and we knew we were heading for a major confrontation with North American Aviation. At that point, we had confidence that, as trade unionists, we'd have the support of the National Aircraft Department [UAW] under Livingston, Allard as representative, O'Halleran for the region and Ray Ross, who was the regional director from region 2A in Ohio, which he represented along with Local 927, the membership at the North American Aviation Columbus plant, which was a large plant which was then part of our corporate council.

One of the other things that bothered us was that we tried, after the Columbus plant came into being in the early fifties and prior to the '53 negotiations, to set up a bargaining council coordinating the Columbus Local 927, Fresno Local 1151, and our own Local 887. And this was a pattern of the process within the union. The General Motors locals had their own councils, Ford, Chrysler, International Harvester, everybody had a bargaining council, and Livingston and O'Halleran resisted that. We pushed for it and finally won it. So here again we're running into difficulties inside the union as well as with the corporation.

As it got closer and closer to the deadline, North American Aviation finally came up with its real offer. In many ways, it was a good offer, and it was developed that

30/44

way in order to put us on the spot. In wages and fringe benefits it was fairly reasonable, except the wage offer did not in any way implement the principle that we had won in 1952 of eliminating the auto aircraft differential. Not one penny. And that was their considered judgment; they were going to hardline it on that. And they refused to go along with even the modified union shop; they wanted to take that away. Now one of the other devisive things at that point was that Livingston and O'Halleran, for the international union, were much more interested in that than in the wage inequity question. They would have gone along with the wage benefit offer. Their issue was the union shop. Our issue was the wage inequity. It was another kind of devisive thing happening. And Starkweather, again, very arrogant and hard and hostile during these negotiations became moreso once they threw this offer on the table. Starkweather just held onto that offer without changing, and he wouldn't agree to any changes. He said, "Yes, I will negotiate" but he never did. And it became part of the pattern during that period, what was called Bulw<sup>a</sup>rism in labor-management negotiations: make a reasonable offer that will make it very difficult for the union to turn it down, very difficult for the union to strike over it, and then hold onto it and don't change it. And that's what we got into at that point. So there

*Remuel R  
Boulware  
1st VP GE  
then  
VP Relations  
Services*

*32145*



were no changes right on into the strike deadline. No matter what we did, he wouldn't bend on the question, the wage inequity, on the union shop question, or anything else. Later, it was cited in all the labor-management journals as another example of Bulwerism.

CONNORS: Bulwerism came out of General Motors [Corporation]?

SCHRADE: General Electric [Company]. Bulwer, I guess, was the head of General Electric at that point and developed this as a new way of dealing with the unions, another way of destroying unions and undermining unions, because negotiations became useless at that point or you had to strike on everything, and unions weren't always prepared to do that.

So we had a real confrontation at that point. Federal mediation came in but were not too helpful. We again were in a position where the Eisenhower-Nixon administration was not favorable to us. We found that out during the strike but we were aware of that before. So then the hard question for all of us became do you strike at this point? We had prepared ourselves. We carried on some very important education work during with the membership at that period for months ahead of the negotiations. The membership was prepared in terms of the issues and were supportive of us because of the victory in 1952 and our

32/14/6

efforts to eliminate the wage inequity, and we felt we were in a fairly strong position but a very difficult one. So it became a very tough issue to decide. So we consulted amongst ourselves. We found then that the division was opening up more widely with Livingston-Kircher-Russo-Allard-O'Halleran beginning to say, "Well, we shouldn't strike at this point" and our group saying, "We have to. We have to defend what we've been fighting for, even though we know it's going to be very difficult and even a long strike. Otherwise, it doesn't prove our commitment to the whole reform of the wage system and the wage inequity."

CONNORS: This is October now.

SCHRADE: This is October, middle of October, with an October 23 deadline. We had a hearing before the International Executive Board on this, on the strike, so we were given <sup>the</sup> go-ahead.

CONNORS: Was that in Detroit?

SCHRADE: In Detroit. We were called <sup>into</sup> ~~in~~ Detroit, because, at that point, Livingston knew he wasn't going to convince us to go with a no-strike pledge and to settle on the basis of the company's offer. So we were called into Detroit. So we talked amongst ourselves, and it was explained that you can't get any assistance from the feds at this point the way we did in 1952. And this is the double standard, that when the government wants something in terms of

production, they're going to intervene and help you out in your bargaining, but when they don't--because the negotiations had opened up on the ending of the Korean war at this point, which was where some of our production was going, the F-100 jet fighter--that became less of a priority for the Defense Department and for the White House. So the contacts that were made with the White House and the Defense Department at that point just chilled any hope that we might have that the government was going to come in and try and mediate this thing, give us something on the wage inequity and maybe the union shop.

So these discussions were held, and we were given a strike authorization at that point by the international union with Reuther's okay on the basis that we would call membership meetings before we did that and explain the situation. Each local had to do that; that was a commitment we made. And at that point, my own decision had to be-- I was young, generally inexperienced in strike activity, and not really sure that we ought to go for broke at this point. But I relied a lot on Bill [William] Beckham and Ray Ross who said, "Yes, we have to do this, even though it's going to be a tough, hard strike to take on." And I didn't have any conversations with Reuther directly or privately on this, or with Jack Conway, but felt that he would have called us in and said, "Look, don't