CONNORS: So it was a very short time before you were--
SCHRADE: I think... was about a year as assistant director, a year on the aerospace staff here in the region, assigned to this region, and then to Detroit on the aerospace staff--
CONNORS: Oh, okay.
SCHRADE: --another year on the aerospace there, and then moving over to administrative assistant to Walter Reuther in '58 to '62.
CONNORS: Okay.
SCHRADE: One other thing that we were involved in, and that's again community politics. One of the high points was that we had a visit from Adlai [E.] Stevenson at our union hall, and we promoted him as a candidate in our union. It was the first democratic party convention I attended, too. I was a delegate for Stevenson from California. And it was during that period when I think the liberals in the party were probably in their best position, because I think that Stevenson was the best of the liberals. And so there was Eleanor Roosevelt and Herbert Lehman still around as against more conservative [Lyndon B.] Johnson-[John F.] Kennedy types in the convention. And we were part of that even though it was a declining force within the party. And so it was a good experience for me in terms of other political activities after that.
One little anecdote about that convention was that Walter's secretary and I thought that we ought to be doing the more traditional thing, and that's having a UAW reception at the convention where people come in and meet Reuther and some of the UAW delegates and so forth. Because we had probably a hundred delegates from the UAW at the Democratic Party convention just to be good guys and gals and talk to other delegates. So we set up this cocktail session which Reuther didn't fully approve of, because he didn't like to drink. And I remember coming out of the elevator with him to go into this reception, and Jack Kennedy came. He was a senator at the time and was also running for the vice-presidential nomination. Our candidate was Estes Kefauver with Stevenson. And if I remember this clearly, Kennedy shook hands with Reuther and said, "Walter, I would like to have your support." And Walter said, "You've got to change your voting record, young man." And that was it. That was '56. By the time '60 came around, both Johnson and Kennedy had changed their voting record from fairly conservative to a more liberal position. So it was the beginning of a relationship between Reuther and Kennedy which became pretty solid during the McClellan Committee hearings, when the UAW was under attack from the Republicans.

CONNORS: I guess Kennedy had introduced labor legislation
before Landrum-Griffin [Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 1959], and it was shot down and Landrum-Griffin is what actually passed. And Kennedy’s package was a lot better for labor.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: A hell of a lot better for labor.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Let’s talk a little bit about just what was happening at Solidarity House. As you’re going there every day—and this is the point of power—was there a pretty good attitude among the work force there? Was it high morale?

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Because I know in some organizations—and I won’t name them—that they get kind of bogged down in a slow pace and the bureaucratic structure. That really does a job on staff morale.

SCHRADE: Well, the UAW during that period was still a very active, progressive organization, and I think people on the staff there were attracted to that. And therefore, I think the morale was high because we were doing things and doing things effectively. The office workers finally wound up organizing a union and having a strike in the sixties, I guess, sometime in the sixties. But it was a good period. I was glad I got involved back there.
I had some difficulty getting integrated into the group there because I was from the aircraft section of the union and therefore was kind of the first person there on Walter's staff from the aircraft industry or the Californian. So I had difficulty getting involved.

One of the reasons that I wanted to be there was that not only was I attracted to Walter and his leadership, but I had some very bad experiences with Woodcock on his staff, because I was out negotiating on behalf of him as vice president in charge of the aircraft department. And one of the reasons that I began meeting with Reuther and Conway saying, "I don't like what I'm doing with Woodcock" was because there were two contracts I remember in particular: one at North American Aviation in Neosha, Missouri, which was part of the expansion of -- And I was sent into those negotiations with a prefabricated settlement that Woodcock had worked out with the top management of the corporation. So I was constrained to negotiate within that framework, and I didn't know that's how we operated. But I found out that's not how we did operate; that was Woodcock's style.

The second time this happened was in the Martin Marietta [Corporation] plant in Orlando, Florida. There, it was even a little more sophisticated program. I was given three sets of demands. The third one was going to be
it, and I was to negotiate from one to two to three. And I got a little pissed at this, to understate it. I worked very closely with the committee, and I began working with the committee—I didn’t inform them of what was happening—to find out those places where I could get additional moves from the corporation beyond what one, two, three said and what the final settlement was supposed to be. So we were able to make some headway beyond, even though the company got a little bit worried about this and began telling me privately, "Well, these are things that are worked out, Paul. Do we have to call Woodcock?" "You can call him anytime you want." We were finally able to get a little better settlement. But I went to Reuther on that and said—So that was one of the reasons that I moved over to—

CONNORS: And so there would be a local negotiating committee—

SCHRADE: Yeah, elected by the membership.

CONNORS: And you’d go there and you’d talk to them and would be expected to carry out this whole other agenda.

SCHRADE: Yeah, yeah.

CONNORS: Despite what they wanted.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Well, it’s sort of more of same of what Livingston was doing back in this area.
SCHRADE: Yeah. And I don't know whether it has—See, Reuther never operated this way, as far as I know. But in a way, I think it comes out of a certain insecurity of being in that very powerful position and not knowing how things are going to come out and also not developing a strategy which builds up the power of the membership so that you leave that to the roll of the dice, finally, and what happens in the bargaining and in this adversarial relationship. It's more to my liking that you build as much support in the membership as you can on the issues and then settle, based upon where you wind up there when you're down on the deadline or in the strike situation. But it seems to me Livingston and Woodcock, in a way, insecure in that position, wanted to be able to predict these things, and to me it's not the kind of unionism that I—

CONNORS: Yeah. And it does take a toll on the role of the membership and its participation. And it just seems to increase that gulf between leadership and membership, which I think is where bureaucracy steps in.

SCHRADE: Right, and where the bureaucracy of the corporation and the bureaucracy of the union sort of have this mutual assistance arrangement. You know, "Let's work things out so we preserve your position and your position." And I think a close analysis of the 1970 strike when Woodcock was president after Reuther got killed would
show that same kind of strategy on Woodcock's part.

CONNORS: So it was this kind of dissatisfaction with working for Woodcock which pushed you into talking more with--

SCHRADE: More with Conway and Reuther to move over.

CONNORS: Well, what were your duties as administrative assistant for Walter?

SCHRADE: Well, they varied. First, reading the mail. [laughter] Reuther's mail, which was very interesting, and responding to a lot of it. We had a really wonderful secretary working and a good group in the office. Reuther had a wonderful staff of secretaries. I was one of four or five administrative assistants. Roy Reuther was administrative assistant, but he was the director of the political action department. There was Bill [William] Beckham, a guy we'd worked with in North American Aviation negotiations out of Ohio, and Larry Gettlinger, Doug Fraser, and Jack Conway, Jack being the top guy, not by title but we all recognized that, and a really wonderful guy to work for. Then I was assigned Public Review Board when that came into play in, I think the '57 convention to work on interpretations of the constitution. Beckham did most of that, but I worked with him on that.

CONNORS: That's a good area of discussion, because in '57, that's when the question of corruption in unions is
becoming pretty much of a public debate.

SCHRADE: Yeah, of the McClellan Committee in '57.

CONNORS: The McClellan Committee and the [International Brotherhood of] Teamsters--

SCHRADE: Landrum-Griffin resulted.

CONNORS: So the UAW response for internal policing, as it were, was this Public Review Board [PRB].

SCHRADE: Uh-huh. [affirmative]

CONNORS: Whose idea was that? Do you know the--?

SCHRADE: I think the person who originated it was Clyde Summers, who was very active in the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], a law professor first in Buffalo, then he was at Yale University. He's now at the University of Pennsylvania at the law school. I worked with him on some legislation now which he has also. But I think it was originally his idea to do this kind of open public review by qualified prominent citizens who would monitor union decisions and be a place where members could appeal decisions of the international officers and the board.

CONNORS: Well, had other unions taken that up, it might have negated the need for something like Landrum-Griffin, which was supposedly--

SCHRADE: Yeah. There was a certain independence in the party unions. We don't want government involvement. We don't want people involved in the union doing these
things. And I don't know if that's an effective way of doing it anymore. I'm more of a critic now, because I'm in a different position than I was during that period. I liked the idea at the time. In fact, one of the persons I nominated within our office group to be on the board, who I thought would be one of the more effective ones, was Henry Steele Commager, whose philosophy about democracy is as good as any—minority rule, minority rights kind of frame. And he did join the board but only lasted a year or two. Because what happens is you get law school people, a rabbi, a monsignor chairing it, an industrial relations professor maybe, one or two of them, elites in their own situation, particularly Monsignor [George] Higgins. He comes from an undemocratic organization himself. And how can they decide questions of democracy except based on the Constitution and the power system in the union. So I was on a panel with Clyde Summers and [David] Klein who is the executive director of the PRB and has been for some time.

My characterization of the PRB is that it's a small claims court, not a supreme court. And even in small claims now, I see a lot of the PRB decisions on questions of grievances of workers. Ninety-nine and 44/100ths percent of the time the International Executive Board position on the handling of a grievance is upheld by the
Public Review Board, so it really is not a source of good decision. I don't know if the decisions are good or not, but it seems to me that the largest number of cases going before the PRB are about the handling of grievances by a local union versus the member who's appealing, and most of them are denied. Now, maybe they shouldn't even be in the process; I don't know. But on some of the major decisions, the Public Review Board has generally come down on the side of the International Executive Board, and I think wrongly so. And I think that's the only way it can be when the international union decides who's on the Public Review Board, and they also are kind of a self-perpetuating body. So vacancies are filled based upon what the PRB wants and what the International Executive Board wants. So it's really not as independent as it could be.

CONNORS: Well, how does that stack against the arbitration system, for instance? Would the Public Review Board compete with going to an arbitrator and having, or-- I guess with the Public Review Board it's strictly interunion. It's a grievance that a member has against the union, not so much a grievance that was badly handled.

SCHRADE: No, it's an appeal on the handling of a grievance--

CONNORS: From the shop.

SCHRADE: From the shop. The grievance is against the
corporation, but the member says, "This case wasn't handled properly by the union" or, "I was discriminated against" or something. And it's very difficult to make a case like that and go before the International Executive/Appeal Committee and then to the Public Review Board. And it may not be the right system.

CONNORS: Because it's like talking of Ted Jones. He was hired often and still is by the UAW to serve as an arbitrator. And it would seem that that's the way of handling it that has been accepted and does work in the way that it does solve these problems that otherwise could build up.

SCHRADE: Yeah. Early on there were some scholarly analyses of the working of the PRB, and I think that's essential again. I try to encourage people who are interested in it in the academic area to really take a look at it to see if it is a mechanism that does make a union more democratic. I don't think so, because I think that the UAW has become less democratic over the years. I don't see the Public Review Board as a successful, functioning organization in terms of making democracy work in the UAW.

CONNORS: After Landrum-Griffin, there was a lot of outcry by the labor movement that this was just a punitive measure and it was completely unfair, and some of the rulings, the regulations that were imposed on unions, really created a
bevoc for their records keeping, for instance, in the way that account books had to be open and public, and there was a lot of shifting in the general way that information was handled. Did that sort of thing take place in the UAW from your perspective within? This is, say, 1959, or whenever the Landrum-Griffin is really put into effect.

SCHRADE: Well, the UAW accounting process got real commendation from the McClellan Committee, because that was an area where competing political groups in the union really made the union more accountable in terms of finances, the union to the membership, the delegates of the convention. And the investigator said the McClellan Committee said it was the best set of books he'd ever seen. Things were cited, like Reuther would submit his expenses for a trip to a union meeting somewhere and crossed out where meals or dry cleaning and so forth—On the other hand, a lot of unions just went overboard to make the life of the leadership much more comfortable in terms of money and expenses and so forth. And we were very tough on these questions. So the main problem with the McClellan Committee and the UAW was that [Barry M.] Goldwater and [Karl E.] Mundt were really out after Reuther as a political thing and tried to make the case against the UAW in a number of different ways, and [John C.] McClellan wouldn't hear of it. I think McClellan was fairly decent
with the unions, more neutral. Jack Kennedy became very helpful, and Bob [Robert F.] Kennedy became very helpful in terms of the UAW, and I think for political reasons as well as knowing that the UAW did have a great deal of integrity and should not be subjected to attack. And it cemented the relationship between Reuther and the Kennedys at that point.

But the Landrum-Griffin bill, in a way—And here again the question is how much involvement should there be of the government in the affairs of unions. Strong arguments can be made that unions ought to be totally independent of government. But on the other hand, the democratic rights of members are nailed down in Landrum-Griffin, which I think are very important in dealing with ratification of contracts and election of members, although the process set up is very difficult to get through for a rank and file member or a local union. But I think that, on balance, Landrum-Griffin, in terms of democratic rights, is a very important document. In fact, there was review of Landrum-Griffin. David [L.] Cole, one of the great arbitrators in this country, headed a commission for [Richard M.] Nixon, I believe, and held hearings with corporations and unions. And Cole's recommendations were to even do more about democratic rights. And the main opposition came from Leonard Woodcock, president of our
union and the other unions. He didn't think the government ought to do more in that area.

CONNORS: This is Nixon's period there, so it would have been after '68 that this is going on then.

SCHRADE: Yeah, yeah. That's when the Landrum-Griffin thing was being reevaluated. There was a commission set up on that. So--Landrum-Griffin.

CONNORS: Landrum-Griffin. That takes us up to about '59, and that might be a good place to stop. But one thing I wanted to just mention to see what you had stored in your recollection there:

in my reading, as far as the problem of automation goes, the UAW was one of the first unions that really started to study it and to say "This is a problem." They started to hold conferences, and it became an issue that labor had to get in on this, because otherwise we're going to find ourselves in a pickle. Who would have been in charge of that? Would that would have been Nat Weinberg's department?

SCHRADE: Yeah, Jack Conway and Walter directly. Those three would be the key persons involved in that, yeah.

CONNORS: You didn't have any-- You would have, of course--

SCHRADE: I've read the stuff--

CONNORS: --heard of the discussions.

SCHRADE: --and was in on some of the discussions and so forth, but not that directly involved.
CONNORS: Of course, you’re coming from an industry which is becoming heavily automated at this point, with computers—

SCHRADE: Yeah, and was a source of a lot of the new technology, too—a high-tech industry for a long time. There was one incident that happened in the office. We found in the file at one point that that mail was labeled "nut mail." There were letters from Clare Booth Luce, who Walter had befriended—they met at conferences and things like that, and they carried on communication—and from Norbert Weiner, the man who invented the word cybernetics and began raising these issues. The person reading the mail just didn’t understand the letter. [laughter] So Reuther and Weinberg put all this in our language and made it a program that we worked on.
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NOVEMBER 28, 1989

CONNORS: Last time we finished off--

SCHRADE: That was a long time ago.

CONNORS: We finished off at about 1959, and I thought we could start today with talking about the Paul Siren case, which was started in 1960, or it came up as a case in 1960 but it harks back to the '55, '56 period. I believe. Maybe we could just give a general description of what the Paul Siren case was about.

SCHRADE: Yeah, it actually harks back to the '53 period when we expelled officers and members of the Local 600 and other Communist Party alliances.

CONNORS: That's right.

SCHRADE: Paul Siren was an international representative in Canada at the time. Canada was a somewhat independent portion of the union, very strong, militant trade union group and also very active in Canadian politics. But there was a complaint that during negotiations with GM [General Motors Corporation] he had a meeting with officials of the Communist Party of Canada. Whether they were meeting as party officials or not or what the meeting was about, I don't think that was all very clear. Anyway, he was fired, and there was an attempt to expel him from the union. He
appealed his case to the board and then to the Public Review Board. The Public Review Board had just come into existence, one of [Walter P.] Reuther's ideas about providing some sort of supreme court for union members to appeal over local union and International Executive Board decisions. I was concerned about this because the process that was used in investigating him and holding a hearing was in the nature of what I thought was a star chamber hearing, a very bad process, due process. His due process rights were not being recognized, so that my complaint to Reuther was that we shouldn't be doing this. We had promised the 1953 convention, after the expulsion of the people alleged to be communists in Local 600, that we would have a due process system with hearings and so forth, and I felt this was a regression on our part. Reuther got very upset with my memorandum on this and didn't talk to me directly about it but did to Jack Conway. And Jack said he asked about this, why I was so upset about it, and Jack says, "Well, you know, he chaired the Grievance Committee in the convention, and he's the one who, along with you, made this commitment to the convention that we would have a due process system, and we weren't following it and felt that it was unfair." Actually, the thing all got settled because the Public Review Board would not recognize the action the International Executive Board took and reversed
Reuther and Mazey, Mazey who was in charge of the investigating committee and so forth.

CONNORS: Let me look at a file on this. I don't know, perhaps--

SCHRADE: You probably know more about it than I do.

CONNORS: I realize that. I have here that memorandum that you were talking about. What they got him on was-- These negotiations were from the-- Was it the General Motors strike of 1936? They were out for a while.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: And during these negotiations, that's when Paul Siren allegedly met with the communist officials. And yet, in 1960 it comes up as an issue, and I'm wondering why that lag in time. I guess George Burt was the head of the Canadian-- Is that a regional?

SCHRADE: It was a region. Yeah, it was Region 7, known as the Canadian region. It's now not a part of the UAW [United Auto Workers] USA anymore. It's now the Canadian Auto Workers, so it's a separate independent union.

CONNORS: So it's a separate union?

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Do they still go to the conventions?

SCHRADE: Oh, no. No, no, no. It's totally left the union, left the UAW, and became an independent union in Canada. There's only one UAW local that didn't go along
with this, one very small local that keeps us as an international union.

CONNORS: But was Siren associated with the Communist Party?

SCHRADE: It's possible, but I don't know, and I don't think that was really an urgent question anymore. I thought we'd gotten beyond that, that we had such diversity in the union that a person could be a member of the Communist Party or the Socialist Workers Party or the Socialist Party or any other political group and not have his membership or position in the union affected.

CONNORS: So he was reinstated by the Public Review Board.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: And what happened to him after that? Do you know?

SCHRADE: I don't know. I'm not quite sure.

CONNORS: Did he remain active in the--?

SCHRADE: I think so. I think he did, yeah.

CONNORS: That was 1960. At the same time, I guess, the Kennedy campaign was getting underway. And I guess on one of the tapes, it might have been the last session, you mentioned that at the '56 convention you happened to be with Walter Reuther, and Jack [John F.] Kennedy got off the elevator and said, "I hope you're going to support me."

SCHRADE: We were getting off the elevator; he was coming
CONNORS: Right. And Reuther said-- I guess he was going for vice president--
SCHRADE: Vice president with [Adlai E.] Stevenson.
CONNORS: He said, "You'll have to change your voting record--"
SCHRADE: "Young man." [laughter]
CONNORS: And I guess he did. But can you recall some of the elements of how the Kennedys' support developed in the UAW during that period?
SCHRADE: Oh, Walter and Jack, Jack Conway, worked with the Kennedys very closely during the [John] McClellan hearings, because the right-wing Republicans, [Karl E.] Mundt and [Barry M.] Goldwater, were really attacking the UAW and were not too interested in the unions that were actually corrupt like the [International Brotherhood of] Teamsters leadership. So the UAW became their political target.
Well, the Kennedys hadn't been close to the UAW, but one of their people, Carmine Bolino, was the accountant who was investigating union funds. And he came up with a really clean bill of health for Reuther himself, personally, as well as the union as a whole, and said that he'd never seen books that were as accurate and on the money as the UAW's. So the Kennedys-- Bob [Robert F.] Kennedy was a counsel to committee and Jack Kennedy was on the committee,
the McClellan Committee, and they became very close personally, and I think that developed into a political relationship where Walter decided that he would support Jack Kennedy for president in 1960 along with Soapy [G. Mennen] Williams, who was then governor of Michigan and one of the people that the UAW supported. So that took place.

But there were problems around the union because [Stuart] Symington was a candidate, [Hubert H.] Humphrey was a candidate, [Lyndon B.] Johnson was a candidate, and some of the people around the union, regional directors, reps, local union officers, were undecided about this. So Walter put down the line that we could be for whomever we pleased, but we'd try to come together as a caucus, UAW caucus, in the Democratic Party convention, work with other unions and other liberal groups and so forth. So that left all of us free to do that. I'd been close to the Stevenson campaigns in '52 and '56 and was a Stevenson delegate to the Democratic convention in '56, and was working with Bill [Willard] Wirtz and some other people in Chicago to push Stevenson. So as administrative assistant to Walter Reuther, I had some status around Michigan, and we had worked up an arrangement with Gus Scholle who was then secretary of the Michigan State AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations], and he liked Stevenson. So we set it up to intrude on the
Williams-Reuther decision, the endorsement of Kennedy, by inviting Stevenson to the State AFL-CIO convention in the spring following his trip to Latin America. We thought a great foreign policy speech with some domestic stuff would be very fitting. So Scholle worked it out. Well, when Stevenson came back from Latin America, we didn't hear from him and didn't hear from him, kept calling his people, and finally he decided not to come. And at that point I just said to Wirtz I said, "Look, I put my job on the line here, and Reuther's not very comfortable with my being his administrative assistant and being on the draft Stevenson movement." And I said, "I'm willing to go the distance if Stevenson is, but it doesn't look like he is." And he says, "Well, I don't think he is either, but we're going to stay in with him because he's got a lot of friends around the country and he wants to make a try." And I said, "Well, I'm going to have to leave the campaign, because I'm just not about to take that kind of a gamble." And so I went to Reuther and Conway and I said, "Look, I think the real threat here in the convention is Lyndon Johnson, and I'll support Jack Kennedy as a compromise to try to put things together." And so they said, "Well, the thing for you to do is to go back to California and start working on the Stevenson people out there who you know, and CDC people. It's a liberal wing of the party and--
CONNORS: CDC. Now, that's the--
SCHRADE: Council of Democratic Clubs.
CONNORS: That's a California democratic uh--
SCHRADE: Yeah, it was sort of a left group within the Democratic Party. Sort of a grassroots liberal group that a lot of us were associated with.
CONNORS: That's right, Alan Cranston was central--
SCHRADE: He was a product of that, yeah.
CONNORS: Okay.
SCHRADE: And was president of the CDC early on. So anyway, I did come back to California for a couple of weeks ahead of the convention, met Bob Kennedy. I'd met him briefly at one point in the airport with Reuther and Conway, but this was a time that I really worked with him pretty closely, because he was taking charge of the Western states, organizing delegates into the Democratic convention. And Larry [Lawrence] O'Brien was sitting on the L.A. operation where the convention was going to be held. So I went out and worked on a lot of the delegates, the Stevenson delegates, and we were able to turn a number of them around to-- We took away Stevenson's majority of the California delegation down to a plurality, and Pat [Edmund G.] Brown [Sr.] was part of that, as well. So we really worked things out to put us in pretty good shape in the California delegation in an effort to stop Stevenson.
CONNORS: Well, how did your Stevenson friends take this? You know, you meeting with them and saying, "Bail out of the draft Stevenson group and come join us?"

SCHRADE: Well, they began to see that Stevenson wasn't a serious possibility, that it was just a sort of over-the-cliff kind of operation, because they could see that we had the votes counted and Stevenson didn't stand a chance in the convention. He might have had enough votes to swing the nomination one way or the other or become a vice president and so forth. So particularly my friends in the machinist union [International Association of Machinists], they wanted Symington or Jackson. So Bob Kennedy was for Jackson, and Symington was still a possibility, and so persuaded them that one of those would be the choice. So many people were persuaded by that. A lot of people were still concerned about Lyndon Johnson, and it seemed that Jack Kennedy was at least a better candidate than Johnson would have been.

CONNORS: Well, I think his national stature was still fairly undeveloped at that point, wasn't it? When did Kennedy really come out as a national figure?

SCHRADE: Mainly during the Mcclellan hearings. And then he got some recognition as a result of his '56 effort to become the vice presidential candidate. So he was sort of equal with Johnson, Johnson was majority leader and the
person who had been campaigning. These guys always campaign, and they were in the late fifties as they were heading for the '60 convention.

So the effort succeeded in stopping Stevenson. In fact, there's one other little anecdote. I'd taken Walter and May Reuther over to a restaurant here in Los Angeles to hear Eleanor Roosevelt making a plea for Stevenson, and Herbert Lehman was there and part of that kind of group just sort of crying about Stevenson not being in a position to really win and wanting to make this last-ditch effort. Well, I'd arranged through Bill Wirtz for Reuther to talk to Stevenson, and he was over at the Beverly Hills Hotel. So after the lunch with Roosevelt, I took Lehman over there and we talked for a few minutes. So Reuther and Stevenson said, "Look, we'd like to meet alone." So Wirtz and I walked around the grounds. And Wirtz says, "Well, what's Walter going to talk to Stevenson about?" I said, "He wants him to nominate Jack Kennedy the way Jack Kennedy nominated him in '56. Stevenson doesn't stand a chance." And Wirtz just blew up; he got very angry. He said we shouldn't be doing that to his candidate and so forth. And I said, "What's the sense of this? He's not going to make it." And he says, "Well, he's a symbol." I said, "Well, that's exactly the reason why he should not be." And this is what Reuther was saying.
So anyway, we got back to the cottage, and Reuther and Stevenson were breaking up. And the guy, a senator from Oklahoma appeared on the scene. He was Stevenson’s campaign manager, Mike. Anyway, so he said to Walter, "What are you doing to my candidate?" He said, "I’m trying to talk him out of running and to nominate Jack Kennedy." He says, "You can’t do that." He says, "This man is a national symbol, an international symbol, and you just can’t ask him to back down like this." And Reuther says, "That’s just the point. He’s going to take a terrible defeat here in the convention, and that shouldn’t happen to him." One other little thing about the Wirtz conversation, he called me a few months after the election, the inauguration, he says, "Paul, a lot of water has gone under the dam." And I said, "Yeah, I know, You’re now Secretary of Labor in the Kennedy Administration." He laughed and he said, "Yeah, that’s what I want to tell you and thank you for, what you’ve done for Stevenson. You were right", and this kind of thing. So it was a strange thing. CONNORS: It would seem to me that by that symbolic action you would bring the Stevenson people into the Kennedy camp and it would all be handing over the mantle to the younger man. It would have a lot of symbolic meaning there. SCHRADE: Stevenson was a very gracious person, but I think he didn’t really know much about politics of the party and
all these maneuverings that go on and that at some point
you just have to say, "Okay, I'm out, you're in, and let's
work it out." I think he was sort of above all that, and
that, I think, was one of his failings as a politician.

CONNORS: Were you approached by Wirtz at all afterwards to
join the Department of Labor in any capacity?

SCHRADER: No, no, no. The other thing--and this is
where I think I developed a good understanding/relationship
with Bob Kennedy--is that during a very significant point
in the convention, the Johnson decision came down. Jack
Kennedy decided he was going to be the vice presidential
candidate, and so people were just rebelling all over the
place on this, including Bob Kennedy, who didn't like the
decision, and Kenny O'Donnell, who was Kennedy's closest
aide. In fact, Jack got very angry with both Kenny and Bob
for their objections and their statements and so forth.

The labor guys were all in Reuther's suite: George Meany,
Jim [James] Carey, the Building Trades [Department, AFL-
CIO] people, and so forth. There was a meeting generally
every day where just to talk about the politics of the
convention, and they were going out of their gourds. They
were crazy. Carey, particularly a very emotional guy, he
was just screaming that Jack Kennedy shouldn't have done
this to him and so forth. So people were very, very upset
about it. And I was in this wonderful position of saying,