

percentage points. We did a poll at that point and showed that we were going to lose it too. Oliver Quayle was doing polling at that point. I don't know if he still is. But he had it right on the money. But at least we generated a lot of activity and a lot of organizing, and we just kept signing up new members, as well, as a result of our efforts to get the union shop, and finally got an agreement from the company sometime in the mid-sixties. And we organized some new shops, so we had several different targets, expanding the bargaining units, getting union shops, as well as going after new plants. And through the sixties, we finally built the membership up to around 90,000 as a result of the-- Well, there was also an expansion of employment, so we were picking up new membership in the already organized shops that way. So some of it was part of the economic development of the country and new war^{part} work^{and space} and all that stuff going on. So we had certain advantages there, but we also were doing a lot of organizing. We had a really great organizing crew, too. We put out some new organizers like Neil Manning and others.

CONNORS: Who did you have working with you? Who was your immediate staff?

SCHRADE: Well, Bill Goldman was the assistant director. I relied on him a lot, particularly in the bargaining area. In a way, I'm like Cesar Chavez; I'd rather organize the

44 260

power and see it used rather than use it. Bargaining can be a very boring function. So many hours are spent just not doing anything. So Bill was good at seeing that the service reps who were in charge of bargaining in all the shops we had, because we had probably 125 contracts in the union at that point, certain major ones, but a lot of small ones. So he was very reliable that way in dealing with the staff and with those bargaining situations. And I'd come in if there was a strike threat or a crisis going on and try to move it. He was very helpful that way.

We went through a series of people in charge of organizing. Bob Burkhardt was one. John Allard was another. We kept shifting the staff around, and those who were the good organizers we'd try to get concentrated there. Because a lot of people were put on organizing in the past just as a way to get rid of them off a service staff because they weren't functioning very well. So you had people just sort of sitting around. So how to get them back into action was a problem. We wound up with a fairly good organizing group.

CONNORS: This is probably a good point to bring in these 1962 aerospace--

SCHRADE: I should go back. One of our other functions, which was well done, was our political action group. Marvin Brody became the key guy there over a period of time.

*Q. Full
credit name?*

Excellent political analysis and helped make a lot of strategy for us during that period in our political campaigns and our legislative activities. In fact, despite our size--we were not one of the big unions in California--we still had a tremendous impact because we organized money, we organized people into campaigns and helped some of the candidates do a strategy.

CONNORS: So you jumped into politics right away?

SCHRADE: Yeah, absolutely. Because not only is it a tradition of trade union movement but also more necessary because of the aerospace locals which are reliant on government contracts, and so you have to for a number of reasons--not just your general social programs, but also the question of jobs are at stake. And we found a lot of responsiveness in membership and organizing the way we did. And we got into the farmworkers movement early on.

CONNORS: What year did you get into farmworkers activity?

SCHRADE: Well, probably '63, '64. George Meany was making an effort. He had people working out of Stockton on a program. It wasn't moving very fast, very far. It had two guys, old-timers, one from the CIO, one from the AFL, Norm Smith and Al Green. Al Green I think came from the Plasterers [And Cement Masons International Association, AFL-CIO] and Norm came from the CIO. There was some contention between them, but they also understood the need

Check date book entry in SF WPR + Norm Smith + Stockton

for it, Al Green coming from very conservative politics but understanding need for union organizing and had a very good relationship ~~with~~, particularly with the Filipino faction within the organizing in the Central Valley. Norm was sort of leaning towards the Chavez group. But before that developed, Reuther sent me up to inspect the program to give him some idea of what was happening, because he wasn't getting any information from [William] Schnitzler or Meany. So I went up. The first time I went to Stockton, I walked in and they recessed the meeting right away and came back. I said, "What happened?" He said, "Well, for the first time in our experience in organizing, we've had a call from Schnitzler. He wants to know what you're doing here." Because the word had gotten out and--

CONNORS: That was William Schnitzler, the secretary treasurer of the AFL-CIO?

SCHRADE: Right. So what happened as a result of that was that we set up a meeting with Norm Smith in San Francisco with Walter so Walter could get even more information directly. We sort of had the blow [^] torch on Meany and Schnitzler to maintain that organizing effort there because Walter, from the early days of the farm labor movement, had always been interested in farmworker organizing. So my appearance there and Walter's interest in it kept that thing going, because it was going to be cut off according

to Green and Smith. And Meany kept doing some organizing, at least putting ~~some~~ money into it, never as much as he put into overseas activities of organizing behind right-wing dictatorships, but at least that served as sort of a pattern on it through the movement, that we became sort of the burr under Meany's saddle to keep organizing going with the farmworkers.

CONNORS: Did you have contact with the Filipino group within the Farmworkers, also?

SCHRADE: Yeah, mainly through Larry Itliong.

CONNORS: How was it that they were brought together to begin with? I guess this would be the farmworker's organizing committee?

SCHRADE: Well, the strike. Well, the AFL-CIO group, which was mainly Filipino, started the strike, and Chavez was originally against the strike. He didn't think they were ready.

CONNORS: Which strike is this now?

SCHRADE: Nineteen^{*}sixty-five. The grape strike.

CONNORS: The grape strike.

SCHRADE: Yeah. He didn't think they were ready but was forced to go along. And he began developing as the major leader of that with his tactics and understanding of strategy and so forth. You want to go on through all of this?

98 264

CONNORS: Well, yeah, I want to--

SCHRADE: This is mid-sixties.

CONNORS: Yeah, this is mid-sixties, and I'm wondering-- I'd like to sort of finish this conversation off with what happened between '62 and '64 with the aerospace negotiations and the Kennedy panel. Maybe there's not that much to say on that, and if there isn't, then we can dig into some of the farmworker activity. But why don't we do that? Why don't we jump back a bit?

SCHRADE: Yeah. I should review some of that stuff in my own head, too. As I remember it, we were really pushing on a number of issues which I can't really state at this point. But we got into a conflict both at Douglas [Aircraft Company] and North American, which wasn't being resolved.

CONNORS: I know you got to a point of taking--

SCHRADE: Risked damaging a relationship that we built with them. And because of the military build up, the Kennedy administration was quite interested in avoiding strikes, particularly at North American, in the missile program that we were involved in. And I know he intervened directly with Reuther on this and set up meetings with the corporations as well. It got juggled around to a point where it was agreed that a panel be set up to take a look at the union shop question as well as some of the other

45 265

issues where they could be worked out on a more harmonious basis. I know that Kennedy did set up meetings with corporations and unions back in the White House, and that was all part of the strategy of putting this thing together. We'll go back over that next time.

CONNORS: Yeah, let me just pause this for a minute. [taps recorder off] We just looked at Leonard Woodcock's aerospace department report for 1964 where he summarizes what went on between '62 and '64. I'd like to, maybe in your words, summarize that, because there were some interesting political ramifications.

SCHRADE: Well, historically, during the late fifties, now the early sixties, the UAW and the IAM [International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers] had come together in a joint operation because of major representation in the aerospace industry by both unions. And we had agreed on bargaining goals, some of which were intensely felt. They requested a union shop, employment security. Where autoworkers had won supplemental unemployment benefits, we'd never been able to do anything about this particular question in the aerospace, despite more difficult problems with the ups and downs in the industry and layoffs and so forth without having any income security during those devastating layoffs that the auto industry really didn't experience. They had their program,

but we didn't. As well as continuing the struggle of bringing aerospace wages for even greater skills up to the level of auto. So these issues were there and in a way risked the harmonious relationship we'd built with North American Aviation over the period, because we were raising old issues that were still felt and still necessary to resolve. And we were able to work out, with a joint bargaining with the UAW, the IAM, and Douglas, a fairly decent package, which included agency shop as an answer to the union security question, and some decent wages and benefits.

CONNORS: What is agency shop as opposed to--?

SCHRADE: Agency shop is a requirement to pay an amount equal to union dues but not requiring membership in the union. So it gets over the objection of those persons who say, "Well, I don't philosophically or politically agree with the union, and therefore I'm willing to make my contribution, or I'm willing to have that contribution forced on me without objection." And the agency shop is considered a valid alternative.

CONNORS: Well, what does that contribution go to?

SCHRADE: It goes to the union.

CONNORS: Oh, to the union.

SCHRADE: To the union, yeah.

CONNORS: So that just equalizes, makes it fair that

at 267

everybody's paying--

SCHRADE: The financial element so everybody pays the same tax, because they're getting representation and the benefit of the union. Because the UAW and the IAM share representation in the Douglas corporate system, we were able to work out a very good agreement with Douglas, but the rest of the industry considered this a sellout, a betrayal by the Douglas management and built up a great resistance to us. In addition, right-wing forces in California, the Right to Work Committee and the Birch Society and others were attacking our unions because we had signed off the agency shop enforcing this contribution, this equal contribution from people who weren't members, because this was an attack on individual freedom. So it became a very intense struggle in the public media as well as in the bargaining.

So the Kennedy administration intervened because they wanted production from these plants. There was this buildup because of the so-called [Cuban] Missile Crisis *and Space program.* ~~And since~~ we were all involved in improving that situation for Kennedy, he wanted settlements. So he set up a panel of labor-management experts in order to try to resolve this, and the unions and companies agreed to sit down with the panel, which was Ralph Seward, Charles Killingsworth, and George Taylor. Taylor was the chair of that group.

What happened is they came down with recommendations which were not exactly what we wanted particularly in the area of wages but were acceptable in other ways. The corporations refused to accept the report, but Jack Kennedy put on some pressure by saying in a press conference that he fully endorsed the panel recommendations and urged the industry to accept the report. So negotiations continued and settlements were arrived at.

We didn't solve the union shop question except setting up a system of voting at North American, Ryan [Aircraft Company], and Convair [Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft], which were the companies involved at that point. Boeing and Vertol negotiations came on later. But the voting requirement was that members and nonmembers in these bargaining units would have to vote by two-thirds to accept a union shop. We didn't win. We got votes like 60, 62 percent, and so we missed the two-thirds requirement and did not get the union shop vote. Although, we picked up the union shop later in the sixties, and our efforts to win the vote gave us some real leverage to sign up more people. So losing the vote wasn't to our total disadvantage. I remember, too, as a result of the settlements, Jack Kennedy invited the corporate leaders and the union leaders in the bargaining process come to the White House where he thanked them. One of the things that

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AS 269

is an advantage to unions is to have someone like Kennedy or [Harry S] Truman in the White House, because he decides what comes out of the treasury for the defense companies on these programs. So with his endorsement of the panel report, that means the corporations have an easier time negotiating more money from the treasury for their programs. Our negative experience was during the strike under the Eisenhower-Nixon administration when they really undercut us in the strike.

CONNORS: You mentioned George Taylor, Killingsworth--I know George Taylor was a figure in labor relations and arbitration, I believe. Now, who were the others?

SCHRADE: As was Ralph Seward. These were mainly arbitrator-mediator persons. Killingsworth I remember came out of Northwestern University, I think. What I liked about Killingsworth is that he began doing the calculations showing that real unemployment was not just the Department of ~~Library~~ ^{Labor} reports but nearly double the figure, because there are so many uncounted persons. It's one of those things that I'm still concerned about, that we don't get a real look at unemployment.

CONNORS: According to Woodcock's report there, I think North American had even taken a strike vote. Was this a serious strike vote? Or was this sort of a leverage kind of a-- Did people--?

SCHRADE: I think at that point, mainly to put some leverage into the bargaining. The corporations were concerned about the strike votes because for the first time we had a major effort with the machinists' union on the whole front, all the corporations, and we'd been able to win at Douglas, which meant that we had, as a matter of our own self-respect, come up to the Douglas settlement, which meant the possibility of a strike, and the corporations knew this. So it was real leverage at that point, which could have gone to a strike, except Kennedy intervened, we felt we had a decent panel to come up with a recommendation, we had the issues pretty well drawn, that the panel would be supportive, which it was, in the main.

CONNORS: Did you meet with machinists representatives during this time?

SCHRADE: Oh, yeah. Constant coordination.

CONNORS: Do you remember who that was, principally?

SCHRADE: Bob White, who was the vice president in the western area and also with the local lodge people, John Snyder--~~[tape recorder off]~~ *of Lodge 727 (Douglas)*

CONNORS: We can end this here and take up next time more with the civil rights activities that you were involved in, the California politics, the national politics, and the farmworkers. I think that would be a good line to follow next time.

Robert White

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TAPE NUMBER: VII, SIDE ONE

FEBRUARY 22, 1990

CONNORS: I'd like to start talking now about the social issues and the social movement of the 1960s. We did start some of that with some mention of the farm workers struggle last time. I'd like to sidestep that for a minute and talk about the UAW [United Auto Workers] and the civil rights movement, especially what was happening here in Los Angeles around the Watts uprising of 1965. I thought it's appropriate because today is almost to the day the twenty-fifth anniversary of Malcolm X's assassination. Yesterday was the anniversary. So I thought I'd start with that now. I'm not sure where to start though. The March on Washington, of course, mobilized so many thousands of people to stand up for civil rights, and labor had a certain representation there, and Walter [P.] Reuther, particularly, most noticeably. What were the circumstances of Walter's getting involved in that? Do you know? By this time, you had come back here, I guess. That would have been--

SCHRADE: Yeah, I came back in '62, early '62. Actually, in late '61 I returned to Los Angeles. But my interest in Walter Reuther, and I think a lot of people's interest in Walter's philosophy as a social unionist versus the whole

X 292

business unionist question, led us into a lot of social movements, in terms of civil rights, women's rights, farm worker's rights. ~~And~~ ^{we} then we, as a union, also got into prisoner's rights. We helped organize a union of prisoners here in California, in Los Angeles.

CONNORS: When was that?

SCHRADE:- In the mid-sixties. There was a group called the United Prisoners Union in order to get better conditions for prisoners. So we're movement-oriented. During that period we had the resources, we had organized a lot of new members in the UAW here in California. And I had an opportunity as the western director to get involved and then persuade a lot of the membership and local leadership to come along, which wasn't too difficult, particularly in the farm workers movement, because the way I analyzed it was that a lot of the people who wound up in the aerospace and the auto industry here in California came from Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma, many dispossessed from jobs, homes, and livelihoods because of the Dust Bowl, and did work in the California farm industry during the thirties and forties, or their parents had. So there was a strong feeling for farm workers even though there may have been some anti-Mexican, anti-Latino discrimination going on. But generally we found it very easy to get people to go Delano [California], to go to give money, food, and so

forth, and help organize the [United] Farm Workers' [Union]. And the membership really consented to our contributing a lot of support for the farm workers from the international union. It was really a wonderful experience that way because there was a lot of solidarity expressed during that period.

CONNORS: Well, since we're on that subject we can speak to that a little bit in more detail. You mentioned last time that you went up to, I guess it was Delano, to meet with Cesar Chavez. You talked about Al Green--

SCHRADE: Yeah, earlier on it was in Stockton. That was the base for Al Green and Norm Smith, an old-line CIO [Congress of Industrial ^{Organizations} Relations] farm worker organizer, and Al Green, who I think came out of the building trades but also was quite supportive of farm worker organizing, although there was a difference in viewpoint, strategy, and so forth, ^{between} the two of them. And I guess it must have been '63 or '64 when I went there because Reuther was concerned that [George] Meany and [William] Schnitzler, the secretary treasurer, were about to cut off aid to organizing farm workers because it wasn't getting very far. At that point, Chavez was organizing among Latinos, and the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial ^{Organizations} Relations] had strong support among the Filipino farm workers, so there was that kind of split going on as

well. So I went there and met with them. Did I discuss this last time?

CONNORS: Yeah, we did discuss it, but very briefly, and I just wanted to maybe pick up on a couple of things. Like you knew that this was going on?

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Was it on your own you just went up there? Or did Reuther--?

SCHRADE: No, Walter Reuther called me and said, "Look, I'm going into an executive council meeting soon and Meany wants to cut this up. Would you go up and find out what's happening, whether it's worthwhile to continue it?"

Because Reuther was an old-line farm-labor coalition politics person, and he really thought that this was our obligation to really deal with the lesser of the workers in this country, the people who had the worst treatment, the worst wages, and so forth. And so there was a real devotion on his part to that, and he didn't want it cut off, but he expected Meany because there was no real effective organizing going on.

CONNORS: Yeah, I know that Meany-- At that point, the AFL-CIO was giving quite a bit of money per month to the effort and had been from even 1960 or 1959.

SCHRADE: But in relation to what the AFL-CIO was doing overseas in the third world and organizing there, it was a

295

pittance. We always drew that comparison, and it was generally based upon supporting right-wing, corrupt dictatorships in order to stop communism, which meant the peasants of the third world were not getting effective organizing through what the AFL-CIO was doing. In fact, were being blocked. And so, at least in our country, American peasants should have been given some opportunity.

CONNORS: Well, farm labor never came under the National Labor Relations Act [NLRA], is that correct?

SCHRADE: No, it was deliberately kept out because of the strong farm-corporate politics of the day, particularly from the Southern states and the Midwest. They just felt that that wasn't a good idea for their profitmaking system. So in the congress in the thirties, they were deliberately left out.

CONNORS: So I suppose the people who drafted the Wagner Act and the labor legislation of the day would have seen going after that as a liability to the coming up with something for the industrial workers.

SCHRADE: Yeah. It was a compromise. And the Democrats relied on the Southern Democrats who were very conservative on the issues, right from slavery on into the farm industry of the time. And during the sixties here, the growers and the banks and the other corporations supporting the growers in the state, that was their ploy: ^{##} "We will support

legislation which will include the farm workers under NLRA." Well, that would have killed any movement of the farm workers because the kind of limitations on all labor in this country under NLRA would have been very harmful to try to organize farm workers. In fact, John Tunney, who was sort of coattailing the Kennedys, would say that, "You know, Paul, I'm for including the farm workers under NLRA." And I said, "Well, that means you're against the farm workers, because they can't organize under NLRA. It's very difficult for factory workers and others to organize under NLRA." So it was a way for the growers and for so-called liberal democrats to cover their ass in terms of being opposed to farm worker organizing.

CONNORS: The Bracero Program came in during the war [World War II], I believe, in the 1940s. I'm not sure of the rationale for that other than maybe the manpower was necessary during the war?

SCHRADE: Yeah, because there was less than around one and a half, two, three percent unemployment during the war, and we're ~~at some limit~~^{ed at} getting people to go into farm work, particularly when there were better jobs, even though in more factories they weren't paying that good of a wage. People were mostly making it in overtime, excessive overtime. But the Bracero Program really served the interest of the growers because it undercut any kind of

5 277

union organizing at that point, because they'd just ship people in from Mexico, go down by bus and ship these hordes of people in here just to work a while, then ship them back, often cheating them out of decent wages and their pay. It was a terribly corrupting system, but it got cut off sometime after the war, too, although there were attempts to return it, or at least to return it on a quota basis. But the government sponsored that--

CONNORS: It was government sponsored?

SCHRADE: --during the war period.

CONNORS: So it would be sort of a contract with Mexico to provide so many able-bodied workers, and then those people would be sent to various places, collected, and then sent back.

SCHRADE: Right. Sent back, yeah. Sort of a rent-a-slave operation.

CONNORS: Well, did those people tend to stay in this country? Or was it just impossible?

SCHRADE: Yeah, some did. Some were able to stay on, sometimes go into the cities or stay in the rural areas, but not many of them, I don't think.

CONNORS: I was reading some of Cesar Chavez's background. He's got a fascinating background where his family were farmers down in Yuma, Arizona, and they lost the farm and actually became migrants themselves. So there

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was that kind of dispossession that he went through as a younger man. But the interesting thing about his connection to trade unionism--maybe you could speak to this--is that his real activation, as it were, was from community organizing and that--

SCHRADE: Yeah, the Saul Alinsky program.

CONNORS: Saul Alinsky, yeah.

SCHRADE: Fred Ross originally recruited him in and became one of the great organizers of farm workers himself, Fred did.

CONNORS: Do you know anything about that particular--? It was the Community Service Organization.

SCHRADE: It was the CSO, the Community Service Organization, they were based in East Los Angeles and had some ties around the state as well, and their strategy was to do urban organizing. At some point, they made the move into Delano to begin organizing among ^{lc} farm ^{lc} workers as a better way of empowering people and giving people some sort of self determination in their lives. So that started in the early sixties. I don't know the time schedule. I think you'd have to check that in Chavez's bio.

CONNORS: Well, he organized the National Farm Workers Association, and then there was the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee [AWOC], which was the Filipino AFL-CIO--

SCHRADE: Right, yeah, organized by the AFL-CIO. The NFWA of Chavez's was independent, and AWOC was part of the AFL-CIO.

CONNORS: Now, did those two organizations differ in strategy and that sort of thing?

SCHRADE: Well, in one important specific, and that is that Chavez didn't think they were ready to strike in 1965, and the AWOC people did, and they started the grape strike. Larry Itliong was a prime leader with AWOC there at that point. Through discussions, the NFWA, under Chavez, joined the strike, and they based their strike at the Filipino hall in Delano. So there was a conjunction at that point that finally brought them together in the strike and also in organizing down the road.

CONNORS: Well, Chavez obviously had organization there in Delano, but nobody had a contract, is that correct?

SCHRADE: Right, there were no contracts.

CONNORS: Which is what the strike was.

SCHRADE: Yeah. It was in grapes, table grapes, not wine grapes at that point. Wine grapes came a little bit later.

CONNORS: That was Schenly [Industries, Inc.]?

SCHRADE: Schenly, yeah.

CONNORS: They targeted--

SCHRADE: Early on, yeah. Schenly.

CONNORS: When was it that you first met Cesar Chavez? Was

280

it at that point?

SCHRADE: Well, ~~Anna~~ Draper with Amalgamated Clothing Workers, who was a good social unionist herself, she recruited me into the free speech movement at Berkeley thinking that labor ought to be supporting that effort with the students, and also into the farm workers movement. She knew who was doing what. So we invited her to speak about this at the regional conference in Fresno [California] in I think probably in October of '65. And Roy Reuther was also there ~~and~~ ^{and} was heading up the political action program of our union. He came in out of Detroit. Anne said, "Look, I'd like you to come down to Delano from Fresno." So after the session we just drove off in a very rainy night in an old rickety car of hers--a little risky on the road. But we finally got to Delano and she wanted us to meet Chavez. She said that the Chavez organization is one we ought to take an interest in and support because he's got some good ideas, good strategy, good politics. So we got to Delano; we went from house to house to house. We didn't know that Chavez was sort of hiding out. He wasn't really dealing with people from outside the area that much. And the farm workers union was suspicious: ^{it} "Who are these people?" you know, before they checked us out. ~~Finally, we got cleared and we got to a house and met with him and talked with him.~~ And Roy was really interested at that

point, so he carried the word back to Walter Reuther about that there is a possible organizing opportunity for farm workers. So that sort of got us directly back into that. Then it just built from there very quickly, I remember, because I think-- Wasn't the AFL-CIO convention in December of '65, too, in--?

CONNORS: Yeah, that would be in San Francisco.

SCHRADE: San Francisco. And we were already into the movement at that point, because we began through the Industrial Union Department [IUD]. I remember I was working with Victor Reuther and Leonard Lesser and Jack Conway and Walter on putting a resolution on the convention floor of the AFL-CIO. And George Meany, even though he was involved in some way, was disinterested in this. We had a tough time getting it through the whole process. It's very difficult to get a resolution launched even if you're from a very big union like the UAW. But we finally got it on the floor and finally got it passed. And at that point, I went to Meany on the platform and said, "Look, now that the resolution has passed, Walter is going down to Delano after the convention, and it would be a good idea if you went down and expressed your solidarity with the farm workers." And he was very nice about it. He said, "Look, my schedule won't permit that, but I'm glad we passed the resolution." And I said, "Would you send a letter?" So he

said, "That's a good idea. Work it out with Lane." Lane who was his assistant at that point, Lane Kirkland. And I went to Lane and I said, "Mr. Meany", as he was referred to, "would like a letter to go to Delano along with the resolution." And he said, "That's your idea; you work it out." So I went to Meany's secretary and we typed up a UAW-style letter expressing solidarity with the farm workers and got Meany to sign it and took it down. But we also organized a chartered plane, a small plane to go down. We took several people from the national press, because now that the AFL-CIO had done this resolution, there was more interest in the labor press at that point. So we took a whole bunch of people down to Delano and had lots of activity down there with Reuther.

CONNORS: The interesting thing politically, from your point of view, I would think, is that suddenly Bill Kircher is back on the scene through the organizing department--

SCHRADE: Not really at that moment.

CONNORS: Not at that moment? Okay. But Jack Conway had come back to the labor movement after his stint with the government.

SCHRADE: Right, yeah, with the Industrial Union Department.

CONNORS: How did that happen? Do you know?

SCHRADE: Jack coming back?

12 283

CONNORS: Yeah.

SCHRADE: Well, he was unhappy with some of the things--
Let's see. I don't know. I'm not sure of that transition.

CONNORS: He was with HUD [Department of Housing and Urban
Development].

SCHRADE: He was with HUD early on in the Kennedy
administration, but he also worked in the OEO [Office of
Economic Opportunity] with [Sargent] Schriver on the War on
Poverty. And I'm not sure what those dates are at this
point. But I do remember that Jack was unhappy with what
he was doing. And in talking about Jack with Walter one
day, I said, "Jack might want to come back." I said, "I
can't say that he will, but he seems to be dissatisfied with
what he's doing now." And Walter got to him, and Jack came
back and headed up the Industrial Union Department, which
was-- That was, let's see-- Because Jack got involved with
the farm workers and also with the Watts ^{Labor Community} ~~labor~~ Committee,
Action Committee. Some of it is part of the War on
Poverty, some of it is part of the IUD. Anyway, we can
work out those dates at some point.

CONNORS: Yeah, I think the point was that--

SCHRADE: But in the San Francisco event, that was kind of
a turning point, because it officially pulled in the AFL-
CIO. A number of things happened in Delano when Reuther
and the national press went in. We had a big rally at the

15 284

Filipino hall with both groups, AWOC and NFWA, representing and giving equal attention to the two groups. And Walter at that point came through with a pledge of like \$5,000 a month which would be shared equally with the two organizations, which became part of the healing process of the bringing together the two groups. We had worked this out with Chavez, because Chavez was not getting any help from the AFL-CIO. So this sort of bringing the two together was one of the good things that happened at that time. We also marched from the Filipino hall to ~~down~~ from warehouse to warehouse confronting the city officials at that point and the police, because they had just passed a resolution, a new ordinance saying there could be no demonstrations, no marches, no picketing, and that sort of thing, which is, of course, against the law but-- [tape recorder off]

CONNORS: We were in Delano, yes.

SCHRADE: In Delano where we marched.

SCHRADE: And the police, we had them in a standoff, and the mayor then asked for a meeting. We met in the courtroom, as I remember, Reuther and--

CONNORS: So this is a big mass of people that you have out there?

SCHRADE: Yeah, there were four or five hundred farm workers and Reuther, and we had some state AFL-CIO people

14285