

SCHRADE: Well, Lacayo was making--

CONNORS: Were you elected again at ~~the~~ '70?

SCHRADE: Yeah, but there was a real challenge going on at that point, and Lacayo was the candidate behind the scenes that Woodcock wanted. If they could have gotten a majority, Lacayo would have moved in, which would be a violation of all of our administration caucus^u rules and everything else, but Leonard was not too concerned about that, and he would have done that.

Part of the problem was that when Walter was getting up in age, there was talk of retirement, when should it be, at sixty-five or whatever, and I really worked very closely with Leonard throughout my term as regional director because he had large commitments out here as the head of the GM [General Motors Corporation] department and the aerospace department. That was a big part of our region. And I liked Leonard and was very close to him and his family. He was obnoxious at times because he was a heavy drinker and became much more obnoxious when he was drunk, but he was a very effective guy, and we got along most of the time.

But there was one conversation that I had with him in '70 where we were talking about successors to Reuther. It was a private conversation in the hotel at the airport where he was staying. We were having dinner and he said,

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"Yeah, but supposing I'm not a candidate, who would you be for?" I said, "Well, on the board, Doug Fraser makes the most sense, and I would really like to see Jack Conway come back. He's still got his membership in the union." I think he was in the IUD [Industrial Union Department] at that point, head of the IUD. "Jack would be very effective. He's got all this experience, very close to Walter and with the program and so forth." So, looking back, I think that was a serious mistake on my part to be that frank with him because he knew, at that point, what I didn't know: that Walter had gotten off him as a successor. And I found out later what had happened was that, during GM negotiations, I believe, in '67, Leonard was either drunk or being outrageous in terms of a strategy session with Walter present, Doug present, Irving Bluestone present, and Walter at that point told Victor and a few others, I think Doug and probably May, that that man can never be president of the union. He's just too unstable. I didn't know that. Leonard probably knew that back in the period when we were having this conversation on the successors. And since he knew that my loyalties were with Walter and that I did like Doug and Jack, that his chances in a contest-- So the undermining began soon after that.

So in the '70 convention, Lacayo was attacking me on not fulfilling my responsibilities as director in certain

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ways. A lot of it had to do with our politics in California. He was running a more conservative line; he was more pro-war and so forth. So we were getting into these kind of difficulties. And he was very ambitious and wanted the regional director spot. I knew all that but had him pretty well contained, because we were from the same local, and I had a lot of base there. But he was constantly cutting me off at the base and attacking me ⁱⁿ at the local. So the confrontation occurred-- What the strategy of Woodcock and Lacayo was ^{was} to make him the assistant director of the region. Harold Clements from the GM Local 216, had been on the staff a long time, was assistant director at that point after Bill Goldman. So Lacayo's strategy was to put me on the defensive so that he could become assistant director as part of this deal. Well, the conservatives on the officer group like [Pat] Greathouse and Woodcock were working at that point.

So what happened was during an International Executive Board meeting, they called Lacayo in to see if we could work this out going into the '70 convention, which means getting a piece of my action at that point. So I kept fending them off and just saying ^{uh} bullshit. It doesn't make any sense for two guys from the same local from aerospace in an auto-aerospace mixed region to be there. What this means is surrendering to Lacayo without good reason,

because the things he's attacking don't have that-- You know, I can take criticism, but what he's trying to do is more than just lay a basis of criticism to get me to change my ways. He wants to take over, and I'm not going to let him do that. I have a right to choose the assistant director." That was a constant inside the politics of the board, that you could override a presidential appointment there. Regional directors demanded that because it's a way to protect yourself and to build the region. So I was not going to do that, and most of the board didn't want me to do that. So we were carrying on these kind of mediation sessions.

I remember, towards the final one, the officers were meeting with Lacayo. I was sitting over in Walter's office, they were meeting over in Mazey's office, and Leonard came in to get me to go back into session with the officer group. The board was recessed at this point; they were just waiting for this to be settled. So walking down the hall, Leonard said, "Paul, I understand you're saying to the other board members that the officers are trying to cut your balls off." I said, "That's a goddamn lie." He said, "I got this from friends of yours who told me this." I said, "Well, they haven't told you the whole story. What I said was this has been my most difficult term in office. I've been shot in the head by Sirhan

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Sirhan, stabbed in the back by Lacayo, and now the officers are trying to cut my balls off. ✓ [laughter] Which didn't sound-- Very unhappy.

Anyway, I went back into the session. What was happening at that point was that the Local 148 delegation still hadn't been elected to the '70 convention, and at that point, it was kind of nip-and-tuck, because 887, as a big local, I had to offset that with another big local. And we thought we had a real chance in 148 because there was a struggle going on there, and our slate looked like it was going to win. So at that point, I just hardnosed and said, "I don't want to settle this today. I want to settle it tomorrow. I need another couple of days to think about this." And they knew what I was doing. I was waiting for the 148 results to come in. They pressured the fuck out of me to give in at that point. I said, "No, I won't." So they finally recessed the mediation session with Lacayo.

The next morning, I got a call at like four o'clock in the morning that we had won the 148, and I just said, "The hell with this. I'm not going to continue these kind of discussions." What they finally did as kind of a facesaver for the officers was to set up an investigation group to come out and check on the problems that Lacayo was raising. So we went through that period, a lot of exchange of paper and meetings and stuff, and finally ended it.

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But, in a way, that was the beginning of the end, because with Woodcock then becoming president a few weeks after the convention, he was administering that. So the pressure kept coming on and on and undercutting, and Leonard was really vicious during that period. I tried to meet him part way on this thing and sit down with him and talk it out, but he wouldn't, because I think, at that point, he'd made up his mind that he was going to get me and make Lacayo the director.

CONNORS: So he was really working hard for the presidency--

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: --knowing that he really wasn't Walter's choice.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: He must have declared right away that he was going for it.

SCHRADE: Oh, yeah.

CONNORS: Was he surprised when Fraser said he was going for it?

SCHRADE: No, because he knew that some of us would follow Walter's position.

CONNORS: What kind of public face did you keep during all this stuff? Did you have to bite your tongue in public as far as--?

SCHRADE: Oh, yeah, and I was prepared to do that. I felt

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that an internal struggle like this should not be out there. In fact, ~~one~~ of the things that happened in '71, we joined a coalition of new peace efforts in a big demonstration in San Francisco, and we had constantly worked with the leadership on the antiwar position. So we had general acceptance, not wholehearted support all the time, but we had a lot of good people who were with us on this thing, and we were able to keep that position pretty sound. And at a regional conference up in Sacramento, Leonard came in as the president and our major speaker, and when we put a resolution on the floor to support the demonstration against the war that was going to happen in San Francisco, I asked him. st I said, "What do you think about this, Leonard?" And he said, "I'm all for it." Well, two days later, at a meeting, he dumped on me and said that this is not the officers' position and he would not support this kind of activity. And that became current around the region, because Lacayo picked that up and began moving with it.

CONNORS: So less than two years is really all you have.

SCHRADE: Yeah, two year^s terms at that point.

CONNORS: So they started right away to put themselves in position. And that was the basis of their argument? That it was improper representation or something?

SCHRADE: Yeah, that I was going out ahead of the officer

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group on the war question. I didn't think that was a question anymore after Walter's statement on Cambodia, and the board's position was pretty good. But Leonard just used everything he could every once in a while to hit me. Now, one other thing occurred. I was invited-- We had done a big conference out here on changes in the automobile industry and the need for taking a look at the world auto market, because we were getting hit harder out here than any other area in the country. Imports were up to 40 percent in California--now it's nationally ~~some~~⁴⁰ percent-- but it was only ¹⁵ ~~fifteen~~, ²⁰ ~~twenty~~ percent in other major market areas in the country. And we kept saying to the board that we've got to begin meeting this challenge. Leonard was on this buy-America kick, and we developed a position-- And we had Nat Weinberg out here and Irving Bluestone, the real intellectuals of the group in Detroit, headquarters. Adam Alinsky came out and Martin Carnoy, who ~~has done the~~ ^{wrote the book} Economic Democracy ^{with Derek Stearns,} ~~stuff~~. We had a really great conference. And one of the resolutions we came up with in '71-'72 was that we ought to be challenging Chrysler [Corporation] closing the plant here in Los Angeles and taking a hundred million dollars, which they said it would cost them to develop a new car, and they bought in to Mitsubishi with that hundred million dollars. We said we ought to begin a boycott of American-

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name? specific

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financed Japanese cars, and we ought to be looking ^{toward} ~~about~~
workplace democracy. We ought to have more of a say in
investments and design and quality and so forth, which I
thought was kind of the UAW line. We talked particularly
about work place democracy. Well, this got some attention
from other regions, and I was invited by the General Motors
locals' conference in New Orleans to come to talk about
this. No regional director had ever been invited to do
anything like this. So I went there and talked about
this. And the next thing I know, Woodcock and Bluestone
are attacking me because I'm saying things that are not
quite policy about workplace democracy, about going to
Japan-- One of the things I suggested at this conference
that they were particular concern^d about was that we ought
to be sending a local union representative to Japanese
factories to see what's going on there, why people consider
it as kind of different. So they sent out a telegram to
all locals: ^{no} locals can spend any local union money to go
to Japan. This is all in the hands of the international
and this kind of thing. And so that became another way to
attack, that I was getting too far out or going around the
national headquarters. So my position was constantly being
undermined with the center. What finally happened was that
Jerry Whipple-- Lacayo, first of all, became a candidate at
that point. He had been a candidate in '70, had a campaign

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going, but sort of unofficially-- My guys are trying to draft me kind of ^U ~~idea~~, which was bullshit, because he directed everything. So he became a candidate in '72. Jerry Whipple, who was chairman of my caucus at that point-- Lacayo had resigned. Jerry Whipple the president of another big local, 509, the amalgamated.

CONNORS: Where is that?

Electric

SCHRADE: It's mainly east side Los Angeles. The big plants are Norris, Cannon, ~~sixty, seventy~~, U.S. Spring and Bumper, Purex, ^{about 60 or 70} ~~a lot of~~ small and some fairly large *factories*.

I felt that Whipple was a good choice, first of all because he said he would never vote any plants against the regional director. This was a long ^{standing} ~~policy~~ that had been ^{about} ~~organized~~ *plants* during that regional director's term. We had put everything in there, every plant we could, which generally was a power play by the past regional directors. They would put it in this local or that local just to kind of keep 509 under control. And one of my first steps in office was a promise that I had made that we would merge the two amalgamateds, 811 and 509. There were two amalgamateds. It didn't make sense to have two, administratively, it was too expensive, and so forth, and we got people from 509 to agree to this, who were my friends. Whipple was not. Whipple was in the opposition, originally. So we put this together. So I felt that

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Whipple was a fair choice *x to be president of the merged locals.*

Well, he double-crossed at that point like Lacayo did, so I was very vulnerable. We went into the convention in '72, and I was just on the verge of being defeated.

CONNORS: And you knew this? You were aware of this?

CONNORS: Oh, yeah. Counting the votes. We were good at that in the UAW. ~~I just couldn't break anything over.~~ It was really marginal at that point.

And then there was a discussion between Lacayo and Whipple, and Lacayo insisted on going as a candidate, so there was a fight between them. And Whipple, who was harder-line than Lacayo and more experienced, although not as qualified, insisted that he be the candidate, and Lacayo had no choice at this point. So Lacayo and Woodcock's strategy to make Lacayo the director faltered at that point. Then there were attempts by Lacayo all through the convention, before the vote was taken, to undercut Whipple and take over. So these two sharks were in the water fighting it out. Finally, Whipple had his way with Lacayo coming in as the assistant director. There was a long period of time when, after the vote for Lacayo, again trying to undermine to get Whipple because he couldn't stand Whipple and he couldn't stand not being the director-- So it was very difficult for him.

Well, during this period, and going into the

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International Executive Board caucus, Fraser and several other board members were really concerned about what Woodcock was doing, and there was a lot of discussion going on about this, because Woodcock was obviously violating the rules of the caucus. We had a mutual support agreement, and here he was supporting Lacayo. He wouldn't admit to it, but everybody knew he was doing it. There was no question about it. So the final confrontation in the International Executive Board caucus was with the board against Leonard, saying, "Leonard, you just can't do this." And other regional directors saw themselves as targets in the future if Leonard, who's fairly unstable at times, would go after them. So I had fairly good support from the board, but that wasn't really helping me very much. And finally, Leonard put it on the basis, "Okay, I will be neutral. I will do nothing to hurt Paul and nothing to help him," which, again, was a violation of the rules, and it was left that way over my protest saying, "Neutrality is just as much opposition, particularly since he's hurt me so badly at this point" because his job is to deliver support where he's got influence at this point. Pat Greathouse was also pulling locals away from me, and neither of them would come through and say, "Yes, I will go out and work for you." So it became pretty dirty at that point. So I felt that I really wasn't going to make it

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unless something happened. And it didn't, so we just went down with it.

CONNORS: Well, was there any relief there sort of as a blessing in disguise?

SCHRADE: Yeah, I was really hurt by it, but then again the kind of union we were going to have with Woodcock was not the kind of union that I wanted because he was much more conservative than Fraser, and that began coming out where we had really very progressive leadership from Walter most of the time, except on the war. The character of the union changed, and Leonard was very difficult to deal with on a personal basis much of the time. So there was some release there, that I was free of that.

We had one other scrap afterwards. He decided that I had no right to go back on the staff, but there were staff rules that I had a right to go on the staff. But he was--

CONNORS: Staff of the region?

SCHRADE: Staff of the union as an international rep, because I had served as administrative assistant, assistant director, national aerospace staff, regional staff, and so forth. So the rules were that I had a right to do this. So I fought that. I went back for a board meeting after I was defeated, and it was discussed there, and most of the board members were for it. So Leonard caved in on that. Then people said, "What are you going to do?" I said, "I

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don't want to do anything. I'm going back to work in the shop." I said, "I don't want to be on a staff. I just wanted to make the point that I had the right and anybody else had a right to do this." I was only making a principle point. But I just did not want to work for Leonard, because, if I work for him, he's going to assign me to northern Minnesota or Florida or someplace, and I'm just not prepared to be an ^{another} outcast on the staff given lousy assignments.

CONNORS: Yeah. Did you ever have thoughts about yourself as maybe becoming president of the UAW after a certain--

SCHRADE: Oh, sure, yeah. In fact, Kenny Bannon and Jack Conway had had really long, hard discussions with me about that possibility and what I should be doing in terms of this. You know, I always had some reservation about it, that I was not that good in terms of holding that high national office. And it's a back breaking job. It's a terrible-- Because I worked closely with Walter and saw Leonard in operation. Well, that became an academic point after I was defeated as director, although I did think about challenging, challenging on issues and maybe running again when I was back to work in the plant, because it was so much a part of my life. You know, "What do I do now?" kind of a thing.

CONNORS: I can imagine.

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SCHRADE: But then I saw it was impossible based upon the constitution and the politics of the union.

CONNORS: Well, you went back to North American [Aviation] which was Rockwell by this time.

SCHRADE: Rockwell, yeah.

CONNORS: And what division did you go into there?

SCHRADE: The Los Angeles division near the L.A. [International] Airport, which was my old base.

CONNORS: Yeah. What department?

SCHRADE: Tooling department. I was what's called an expeditor, trouble-shooter--

CONNORS: So you took up your old job.

SCHRADE: Yeah. I had my own seniority rights, although it took-- Let's see, I was defeated in spring of '72, and I had twenty-five years of accumulated seniority at that point but couldn't get back. It was during layoffs. But finally, in the fall, I did get back. And during that period I worked in the McGovern campaign, became a delegate to the '72 convention, and was on the rules committee, and did a couple of good things there.

CONNORS: Well, what was it like going back to work with your lunch box and your--? [laughter]

SCHRADE: Difficult.

CONNORS: After having been in a very different sort of day-to-day routine--

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SCHRADE: Yeah, but, again, there's sort of a cleansing that goes on. You get into the bureaucracy, and as much as you want to be progressive, democratic, and so forth, there's still a lot of very boring work, shit work to do, and compromises you have to make. In a way, I just felt relieved and back to basic organizing again. I'd really tried to work with the local officers. I went and met with them but was under attack ^{for} being a communist and stuff, and there was no real way to deal with the president of the local, who was an alcoholic and--

CONNORS: Now, who was that by this time?

SCHRADE: Joel Bomgaars.

CONNORS: Bomgaars?

SCHRADE: Bomgaars. He'd been vice president. He was a perfect vice president, but as president he was awful, just couldn't run the local very well, and was constantly getting drunk with the top management, labor relations manager at Rockwell. And I was constantly being spied upon. My supervisor in my department said, "What's wrong with you?" He said, "Labor relations is constantly calling, wondering what is he doing. Day to day they want every detail about what you're doing. The local union is asking these questions about you." And he said, "Everything is going into Detroit."

CONNORS: Geez. Well, you were doing something right then,

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I suppose.

SCHRADE: Yeah. I was getting calls in there. Ted Kennedy would call me at my office and Alan Cranston and some people in local politics. I was also carrying on a lot of outside activities. It was pretty interesting. It gave me kind of a special status because they didn't know what to do about me in that situation, although I always had done my job effectively, because that's always a way to protect yourself, because they're always looking for a chance to fire you. So it was a difficult but sometimes rewarding period.

CONNORS: Well, there were people who you mentioned before like-- Was it Louie Ciccone who had been opposed to you and sort of, by the end of things, ended up more or less together?

SCHRADE: Yeah. Well, he was a Trotskyite--

CONNORS: He was a Trotskyite, yeah.

SCHRADE: The best of the Trotskyites around. A lovable guy and constantly challenging, contesting--

CONNORS: He's still around, apparently. He lives out in Hemet [California] or somewhere? *(He has since died)*

SCHRADE: Yeah, he's out in the retirees thing. And I guess people love him because he sings "Solidarity Forever" lustily at their retiree meetings.

CONNORS: What happened to your group that was around

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you? Did loyalties switch or was it--?

SCHRADE: Yeah, ~~at~~ time. I still had a lot of good friends around the ~~the~~. I go to some of the retirees sessions. It's a very good feeling. I was recently at my retirees' picnic and saw a lot of people who I had known before. It was really good. And there were a number of people from the local I talked to on the phone every week or so to keep abreast.

CONNORS: So it's still home in a lot of ways.

SCHRADE: Oh, sure. Yeah.

CONNORS: Pretty rough-and-tumble politics but--

SCHRADE: Yeah. Great period.

CONNORS: We're near done on this, but I did want to maybe just finish off this--

SCHRADE: One footnote.

CONNORS: Fine, fine.

SCHRADE: About goddamn Doug Fraser. I'll never forgive him for this, because we could have had the presidency at that point, although Doug, as president, wasn't my ideal, anyway, but I think he was better and he could have dealt better with the board and staff and with programs in the union, and I think we would have had a good influence on him. But when Leonard was getting ready to retire, the New York Times reported a conversation with him that Pat Greathouse was his choice for the presidency, for his

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successor. And we knew Doug wanted it. So Victor and I met Fraser in Washington. We finally met him at the [Washington] National Airport because he was busy on some other stuff. So we had about fifteen, twenty minutes with him, and we talked to him about how we could help him in getting the presidency rather than Greathouse. He was concerned, too, and wanted to be president. So we worked out some things. So after that, I said, "Doug, what happened in 1970?" I said, "I was suspicious that something was going on between you and Woodcock." He said, "You were right." So Victor said, "What?" And he said, "Yeah, one session I had with Leonard, he said, 'Look, Doug, you can win this thing.' He said, 'But I want you to know my intentions. If you do, I'm going to resign from the administrative ^{u.} caucuses, and I'm going to go out and campaign against you every day, every week, on into the next convention.'" So Doug said, "At that point, I thought it was best for the union that I not run. I didn't want the union disrupted." "What do you mean disrupted?" I mean, this is a democratic decision, and you didn't tell us, you didn't confide in us that this was going on so we could protect our own backs?" You know, I was really-- It was unforgivable that he did that to us at that point and did that to the union. I think he would have been a better president.

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CONNORS: Doug came from Chrysler [Corporation], right?

SCHRADE: Chrysler, yeah, and was in the anti-Reuther coalition. He identified most clearly with Dick [Richard T.] Leonard during the [George P.] Addes-[Roland J.] Thomas-Leonard days. But ^{Walter} Leonard took him on as administrative assistant at one point, and then he became regional director and one of the directors on the west side of Detroit.

CONNORS: Where was Doug from? He was from Scotland or something?

SCHRADE: Yeah, yeah.

CONNORS: Did he come over here as a kid?

SCHRADE: Yeah, yeah.

CONNORS: So he really grew up then in the--

SCHRADE: A very personable guy.

CONNORS: Oh, he's a very intelligent man. I've heard him speak on different labor relations issues, and he taught for a while.

SCHRADE: Yeah. But then he made a deal with Chrysler on concessions which I thought was way over what should have been done. He just gave away a billion and a half dollars in benefits and money with no real deal on it, nothing in exchange. And when I called Victor one day on that outrage, he said, "Well, you always knew Doug was a yielder when he yielded the presidency to Woodcock."

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CONNORS: Did Victor stay on after Walter's death?

SCHRADE: Not long. Victor and Leonard were not getting on that well, and he knew that Victor was behind the Fraser push for the presidency challenging Leonard in '70. They just didn't make out. It was just a bad-- The other person who left at that time was Brendan Sexton, because I remember, when I was still on the board, Brendan and Leonard were not in agreement on the approach to education at the center. And Leonard, at one point, during the '70 strike against GM, we took a big loan on Black Lake--I think it was collateral for the Teamster loan or something--and Leonard wanted to dump Black Lake. He thought it was too expensive and not that useful. Brendan's approach to education I thought was one of the best we ever had in our union. And at one point in the board meeting, Leonard said, "Brendan's doing so and so and so and so." I said, "Let's bring him before the board, and let's talk about this." Leonard's point was "I can't get answers from him." I said, "Well, we can get answers from him." We ought to give Brendan a chance to raise these issues that he's having problems with in a better setting for him." But Leonard wouldn't do that. So Brendan left, too, and I always think, as part of my way of dealing with that period, that the three of us left about the same time. I was the first to go, but they left soon^d after. And

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those were really good friends and good people I admired a lot, too, so I didn't feel so badly that I was the bad guy who got dumped by Godcock. I carried on a good relationship with Victor and Brendan until Brendan died. It was always good to be with them.

CONNORS: Well, why don't we cut it here?

SCHRADE: All right.

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TAPE NUMBER: XI, SIDE ONE

JULY 24, 1990

CONNORS: We were just talking off tape kind of recapping what we have spoken about before, but you pointed out that you have some minutes to [United Auto Workers International] Executive Board meetings here where some very significant discussions took place on a couple of issues. One was the Robert [F.] Kennedy and the LBJ [Lyndon B. Johnson] issue, 1968, and then the other one had to do with the Vietnam war position that you were taking. You mentioned that, in these board minutes that you have here, that you have here on the table, that none of this discussion showed up in that. Why don't you speak to that for a minute.

SCHRADE: Yeah, the official minutes of the International Executive Board were always taken by a court reporter unless it was an off the record session, and that off the record portion was only by agreement of the whole board. The UAW [United Auto Workers] constitution is very clear on this because there was a problem with records in the past. So we have a record where major discussions were deleted without the approval of the International Executive Board, done either by the secretary treasurer who was in charge of the court reporter operation or the president's office. I would think [it was] most likely the president's

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office. This was when [Walter P.] Reuther was president.

9 The first discussion where I noted this was in November, 1966, when secretary treasurer Emil Mazey and I were both under the gun from the board because ^{we} had been out speaking on behalf of the antiwar movement and there wasn't generally consensus that we ought to do this. In fact, there was a move to censor us. So there was a long night session which was all taken down by the court reporter, but when I got the copies of the minutes--every board member got copies of the board minutes at his or her office--then I went through this and there was no discussion. So I asked Reuther about this and Reuther said, "Well, we decided not to make that part of the minutes, because it probably should have been off the record, but it wasn't done" and so forth. So I talked to him about seeing them, and for a long time he wouldn't give them to me. Finally, I just persisted and said, "That session was for my benefit and for Emil Mazey's benefit in terms of our being outspoken against the war. I ought to have at least a chance to read it." So he loaned me a copy of the minutes, because they had been transcribed and given to him. So I then xeroxed copies so that that record was not lost to history, because I thought it was an important part of UAW history, particularly when I was also personally involved. || The other board minutes are in March of '68

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after I declared my endorsement of Robert Kennedy and was challenged on this by Reuther and many members of the board at that board meeting. I find that afternoon session, there's only a few pages there, and we met for five hours. It was obvious that that portion was also deleted without the approval of the board, which concerns me very much, because, again it's a part of history. And also on the next day, when Reuther challenged me again on this because vice president Hubert [H.] Humphrey and Lyndon Johnson had called him that morning before the board meeting at home and tried to get him to move to get me out of the Robert F. Kennedy campaign--that's when I declared my position that I was not only endorsing Kennedy but was going on the delegation--none of that appears in the International Executive Board minutes. All of it was taken down by the court reporter. There was never any agreement by the board that that be deleted, yet it's obvious that it's there because there are references to the subject in a few statements about adopting the agenda in this board meeting. So, again, dealing with history is a difficult problem in a bureaucracy. Many things are left out and destroyed before anyone has a chance to see it.

CONNORS: Yeah, that's true. And then if a researcher is looking at these Executive Board minutes and going by that document alone, it would seem that this discussion never

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happened. And you're testifying to the fact that it did happen.

SCHRADE: It did happen, yeah.

CONNORS: And to the fact that it was a fairly long, drawn-out process.

SCHRADE: And the other thing that am even concerned about today is what led Leonard [F.] Woodcock, who was then vice president, sort of the executive vice president of the union and heir apparent, to declare himself on my side at that point, because he had been the chief spiritual, intellectual leader of the hawks on the board and himself declared that, had he been in the same position I had been as regional director in California and had to make this decision on California politics and the Kennedy campaign, he would have done the same thing. Why he shifted from being this militant hawk over to somebody who would support Robert Kennedy, who was going against the war and against Johnson's war, then that to me is a very important thing to know about. I would like to get that discussion back into the history.

CONNORS: Last time, we said that we would talk some about the labor relations in the region in that period we're talking about, which includes this period, 1966 to '72, when you left regional office. I guess that one of the big things that was happening was that there was a continued

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struggle in aircraft and aerospace for parity with auto workers^{##} that was still going on. Did the mergers of Rockwell [-Standard Corporation] with North American Aviation [Inc. into Rockwell International Corporation] and McDonnell [Aircraft Corporation] and Douglas [Aircraft Company into McDonnell Douglas Corporation] have a strong impact on the bargaining relations that had been established?

SCHRADE: Yes. Our efforts in the early fifties to win the principle of parity and to build on that-- Well, we kept building on it through the sixties ~~and~~ changing the wage structure and getting rates up and benefits up to the major industrial union contracts in auto, steel, rubber, and so forth. It was a major effort and, in the main, a successful one, although there's still that margin that existed, and it was difficult to finally get over that hurdle. But we did a lot. In fact, I believe we got the first dental program in industry before it was won in auto. And I think the merger of McDonnell of St. Louis and Douglas of California, mainly Southern California, didn't help us as much as Rockwell joining with North American Aviation, because Rockwell was part of the automobile industry and other industries as well, and therefore the management concept was not the strict aerospace industry idea to keep people down in terms of wages and benefits and every other

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thing. So there was a different kind of management developing there where the leadership of the UAW had been dealing on auto contracts with Rockwell, so some of that translated over into benefits for us.

One of the other big problems we ran into, not in what then became Rockwell, but in McDonnell Douglas, was that there was a closure of the first Douglas plant at the Santa Monica Airport. That closed down. So the seniority of those workers there became a point of contention because many of them were being transferred into the Long Beach plant. And the problem was that the Santa Monica plant had always been represented by the International Association of Machinists union and the Douglas plant in Long Beach had always been a UAW plant. So working this out with the Machinists union and the management became very, very difficult. What finally occurred was there were a number of people out of the Santa Monica plant who were brought in with full seniority, and there were other seniority arrangements so that people didn't lose everything as a result of the transfer, and people weren't being displaced in Long Beach as a result of that move. It was long, hard negotiations. Part of the job was just paring it down, paring it down to those essential workers who really had to make the transfer so that finally got worked out. But I think that was the most difficult problem we had.

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