

various states or areas and therefore you have better national control. I challenged this before the Public Review Board and lost the case. But the Public Review Board was wrong on that, and I still disagree. It should have been ~~the~~ regional votes. And Fraser and the International Executive Board finally took the position before the PRB that even if we had not had these regional conferences, the International Executive Board had the right to make this decision, again encroaching on the power of the convention and sucking it up into the International Executive Board.

Which happened under Woodcock with the [International Society of] Skilled Trades right to reject a contract which would then automatically reject the production contract. That was part of a deal made to stop the International Society of Skilled Trades ^{needs on the UAW} at one point, that there would be this veto power by the Skilled Trades and then renegotiations for the Skilled Trades would occur. Woodcock took the position there that, even though this said this in the constitution, the International Executive Board, without membership ratification, had a right to accept the contract or reject the contract no matter what. That was sort of the theme going on. John Dunlop, who was secretary of labor, took the position a long time ago and certain unions in the AFL-CIO took that position,

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that the right to ratify ought to be taken away from the membership. It ought to be in the ^{national} ~~official~~ boards, the officers ought to be able to decide that. So this idea, this concept of antidemocratic kind of thing, was being developed around the country at that point. I still think, under [the] Landrum-Griffin [Act], under the union democracy provisions, unless the constitution gives the right to ratify to the membership, it is in the hands of the officers. So here again, in terms of going back to the AFL-CIO, the whole Skilled Trades thing, the International Executive Board more and more has encroached on the power of the convention and has developed its ^{greater} own power.

CONNORS: What was the Skilled Trades group you mentioned?

SCHRADE: The International Society of Skilled Trades was raiding the UAW, trying to take the skilled trades, the tool and ^{die} ~~die~~ makers, the crafts out of the UAW. It was a big fight back in the seventies.

CONNORS: That's not a union, though, is it? Or is it sort of--?

SCHRADE: Well, I think it is officially considered a union. It calls itself a society because of some sort of snobbish appeal to professional trades, yeah.

CONNORS: Because I know that--

SCHRADE: We won that fight against the ISST, but part of the deal was that if the Skilled Trades were not satisfied

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because of the kind of mediating benefits and wages around a large work force, if they rejected, then the union would go back in renegotiations and hold on the production contract. Once that was done in the Ford contract, I think in the early seventies, Woodcock took the ^{Unconstitutional} position ^{Contrary to} that.

CONNORS: Well, we may as well move on to New Directions, because it seems like this is all feeding into what--

SCHRADE: Yeah, a lot of this has to do with New Directions, because New Directions is a movement for democratic reform in terms of the process and structure of the union itself as well as what's happening inside the corporations with team and jointness, as it's called, and this idea that were building some sort of industrial democracy, workplace democracy, which we are in a very thin, shallow way. But I think New Directions goes to both those questions.

CONNORS: Well, were you there at the founding of New Directions?

SCHRADE: Well, it was really--

CONNORS: Or was there ever an official founding? Was it formally founded?

SCHRADE: Well, there was a convention last year where it was founded.

CONNORS: That's right.

SCHRADE: Yeah, I was there.

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CONNORS: That was in St. Louis in September, I think.

SCHRADE: In the fall of '89.

CONNORS: Of '89, yeah.

SCHRADE: I think it was really founded in the campaign of Jerry Tucker when he quit the staff of the union to run against Ken Worley in Region 5, which is Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, the main base of that region, a large membership. He rebelled against the kind of policies that Worley was executing and was really drafted by the membership of that region and the local leadership.

CONNORS: It seems to me, if my memory serves me right, that Jerry faced one of those same situations that you faced where a contract agreement was already reached, and he had to go and try to sell it to these people who weren't ready to accept it--this was maybe in Texas, one of the locals in the region--and he couldn't, in good conscience, do this, and that led him to-- He was face to face with this problem, and that kind of sparked him on his own opposition.

SCHRADE: Well, Jerry was a top national staff member in Washington for a while and then became assistant director as Worley's appointee. And Worley kept talking about retiring. In fact, he pretty much announced ^{that} at the convention before, and then he was talking about it at the convention and never did. And Jerry was getting frustrated

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because he was a logical successor. As assistant director, he was doing Worley's job. Worley was spending more time on his cattle ranch and was not a very strong leader, anyway.

Jerry is going down in labor history as developing the alternative strike action. In a number of situations in that region, he took on the management by what were sometimes called solidarity strikes, where you strike inside, where you work to rule, you resist management pressures and orders without getting yourself fired and really reduce production in a very effective way. And that came to a head at Ling-Temco-Vought [Inc.] in a very large membership of 15,000 or 16,000 where concessions with the top management in that corporation had all been agreed to by Majerus and Worley. And Jerry, as part of the discipline of the organization, was bound by that, but the membership began rebelling against it. What they decided to do, since Jerry was involved in those negotiations, too--not in the secret negotiations that went on, but generally was aware of what was happening--he worked with the local leadership to have one of these solidarity strikes.

They had a very effective operation going. The company stopped check-off of union dues, they ^{the union was} ~~were~~ able to collect ^{in cash} from everybody, sixty-five people got fired during

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that period by the corporation, they signed up every new person coming in ^a where ~~in~~ corporation normally signs up people now as part of the employment process, and they had that corporation on the ropes. Well, then there was another secret meeting in Hilton Head, North Carolina, on the coast, a long way away from Texas, with Majerus and Worley and the top management, where there was an agreement made to resist the solidarity strike of workers that Tucker and the local leadership were leading and not to use that bargaining power that had been developing there. So the local called for a strike. What finally happened, since there was a leak from the secret negotiations to the local they knew they had the corporation at that point, so they declared ^a strike. I don't know if they actually went on strike or not, but they declared they were going on strike. What happened, the corporation caved in, and they withdrew their concessions, they put everybody back to work, they made great headway in the contract, and this kind of strategy really worked.

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So here's Worley and Majerus, Majerus secretary treasurer and head of the National Aerospace Department, *their* sitting down with the corporation people trying to work against ~~its~~ own membership. So that led to very strong support for what Tucker was doing, that strategy of really taking on these corporations, because those concessions

were uncalled for. Here's a major governmental operation where they're probably stealing from the government just like Northrop [Corporation] and Lockheed [Corporation] and Rockwell and Douglas do and denying workers the appropriate wages and benefits. So the strategy worked, and Tucker became a real strong leader as a result of that. So that local then began campaigning for Tucker to become the regional director in the face of Worley's pronouncements that he wanted to retire and so forth. It became a real struggle with Bieber joining Worley and saying, "You've got to stay in there. We'll give you the money. We'll do everything we can to get you reelected." So it became a real power struggle between the International Executive Board and Tucker and many of the locals in the region.

Well, Tucker came into that convention, fired by Bieber for doing this dastardly deed of running for office, so we suspected at that point-- Victor Reuther joined Tucker at that point, and ^{attorney} Chip Yablonsky, whose father and mother and two sisters had been killed in a similar struggle in the ^{United} mine workers' union where Tony Boyle had total control. And to get rid of ^{Jack} Yablonsky as a candidate for president, he had them assassinated. So Chip Yablonsky, the son of ^{Jack} Yablonsky, joins this because he sees the same kind of thing developing. This kind of undemocratic, total control of the union was bad for

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workers as well as very dangerous to anybody who opposed.
So we had this group operating.

Well, then stories began coming in that certain local unions had not elected delegates, hadn't even posted for elections, because they didn't have the money to come to the convention from Texas to California, in Anaheim, where the convention was being held. So we began to get information, concrete information on particular locals. I was able to get a lawyer out of here to go with a person who had organized, Pancho-- Stop the tape. [laughter]
[tape recorder off]

CONNORS: Okay. We got it. *(Francisco)*

Conrad
SCHRADE: Okay. Pancho Madrano, who had been on the national staff of the union and had organized a plant in Brownsville, Texas, he found out that there had been no posting for the election, no nominees, no election, yet there were two delegates in Anaheim who were representing that local and had been cleared by the credentials committee. So we sent a lawyer down to get affidavits and so forth and got all that stuff back in and presented that to the credentials committee during the convention. They rejected it. Majerus, again playing another autocratic role, decided that wasn't enough evidence. Well, there was evidence of other locals who had sent delegates and who had not been elected, but we could not achieve a challenge that

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would have wiped out those delegates as they should have been.

CONNORS: Now, was is this the most recent convention?

SCHRADE: No, it's the convention before, when Tucker first lost.

CONNORS: The one before that, okay. Right.

SCHRADE: And he lost by seven tenths of a vote which is out of seven hundred votes, which represents an average membership of 70,000. So he loses by seven tenths of a vote, and those two delegates from Brownsville, if they'd been knocked out, would have given him the election.

Well, Tucker and our attorney, we tried to protest this before the credentials committee, had a legitimate case, and we were turned down by Majerus and the credentials committee. In fact, for the first time in a convention, the convention rebelled and would not adopt the election results in Region 5. So there was a real stampede on this one. Because there was a lot of information about this flowing to the convention, the delegates knew that the election had been stolen by the Bieber-Majerus-Worley forces and was being protected now through the credentials committee. But it finally came back on the floor, and the officers had their 800 staff members campaigning on the floor against this decision, and the results were finally adopted.

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Tucker raised the question with Bieber on what to do at this point, thinking there was an appeal process, as there is in the union, against these kinds of decisions, that a challenge could continue inside the union. And Bieber just took this autocratic position again. "Look, if you're going to get relief on your problem, you're going to have to go outside the union." Again, [Walter] Reuther would not have done this. First of all, he would have searched further to see if that election had been stolen. He wouldn't want that blot on his record. But these guys become so powerful and so much in control and so insecure at a certain stage, that they'll do anything like this, and they got away with it in that convention. Well, Tucker then had to go to the Department of Labor to challenge the stolen election, and it wound up in the courts. The courts finally agreed with Tucker, yes, there was money used by the union to defeat him, which was illegal, there were illegal elections, there were elections that were not held, which was illegal. So he won. There was a new election held in the region, and he won. But at this point, Bieber and the International Executive Board were not going to let him operate as a regional director. They wouldn't let him appoint an assistant director of his choice, which has always been the rule inside the union. And other staff members have to be cleared with the president, with the

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regional director usually getting his or her way. They completely screwed up his administration and just fought him. So he goes back into the convention a year later, this recent convention in '89, and was defeated by a narrow margin. But again, that election is being challenged on the same basis: ^{the} union resources illegally being used against him, illegal elections, and some other charges.

But, also, I think--I don't know if this is going to be proven legal or illegal--but the campaign funds of the International Executive Board are collected based upon a contribution from each staff member from each bi-weekly paycheck, which brings in hundreds of thousands of dollars into the national regional coffers for political use. Well, in addition to having those hundreds of thousands--I don't what they are because it's never reported, but the potential can be worked out based upon the amount every staff member pays, eight hundred of them, and every officer pays into it--they had an additional assessment on the staff members. They raised over \$400,000, nearly half a million dollars, to defeat Jerry Tucker and a guy running in one of the Michigan regions, Donny Douglas. So here you have this tremendous political power over contracts, over grievances, over local union elections, these new cadres part of the cooperative effort ^{with} of the corporations. So Jerry did not get the kind of support he had before, but

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there was still a close vote on it, and yet this tremendous power comes down on anybody who challenges. So it becomes very difficult. Even if you win, you lose, because they steal the election, you win because the courts put you into office with a new election, you lose because of all the money and power and the use of the union to defeat.

So this is in great contrast to what's happening in the Soviet Union with perestroika. Even the Communist Party people know that this kind of undemocratic process and structure of total control at the top doesn't work and is destructive. Bieber doesn't understand that yet. How to make him understand that or get the membership to understand that they've got to rise up against this kind of thing I think is the job of the New Directions movement, which is, in a way, the best opposition movement we've had since Reuther⁽back in 1946 when he won the presidency.

CONNORS: Well, and New Directions is also reaching out in pulling in other, let's say, dissident groups within unions, too, I know. Although it's strictly a UAW sort of movement, I understand that at that meeting, at that convention that they had last September, that there were representatives from other unions. I think the UFCW [United Food and Commercial Workers] dissident group was there, and there were people from the ^{United} Mine Workers and the Teamsters for a Democratic Union. So it seems like it's a

rallying point for this same kind of phenomenon that's happening in other unions.

SCHRADE: So there is some potential in the labor movement for dissent and to try to get to a different kind of position that the labor movement is at this point, where it's weak because of loss of membership, mainly because a lot of industrial work forces have been wiped out or reduced. But there's a lot of potential there for better unions and for bigger unions. I think the New Directions movement points that way and has been fairly effective in it's own, I guess, tremendous power. And it's happening in the Teamsters union, the Teamsters probably is ahead of us in terms of having a democratic union again, because the TDU, the Teamsters for a Democratic Union, have positioned the Teamsters union now, along with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, fighting this in the courts, of getting more democratic election of delegates to the next convention and a rank-and-file vote on the top officers of the union, which we don't have in the UAW. It's going to happen in the Teamsters union. Whether they get good leadership and not the corrupt mafia controlled leadership that they've had, I don't know. But at least the potential is there. The potential in the UAW is still distant and getting, what I consider, corrupt in terms of democracy in the organization and the relationship with the

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corporation) We're a long way from solving that problem, even though New Directions is a hope.

CONNORS: With the Teamsters, the Justice Department jumped in there and has been monitoring and basically overseeing and controlling what's been going on within the Teamsters. And you know, the Teamsters came back to the AFL-CIO within the last couple of years, and--

SCHRADE: Disgraceful.

CONNORS: Yeah, I know--

SCHRADE: Jackie Presser, that--

CONNORS: That was the one thing, where I could look at George Meany and say, "Well, at least you had the guts to kick the Teamsters out and to stand up for that." There seemed to be a hope in the Teamsters when Weldon Mathis was looking to replace Jackie Presser, and the board put in old Bill McCarthy there, who was just a--

SCHRADE: Awful person.

CONNORS: You know, one of his first-- Under Jackie Presser, they had a Teamsters History Project going on, and I was mildly associated with this thing. And the first thing McCarthy did was to get rid of this history project because, "That's not what they do. That's not what it's about. We've got our members to worry about." Of course, the union culture, which the history project was part of to enrich or to gather, anyway, was thrown out. Now, do you

think that the activity of the Justice Department in the Teamsters is justified?

SCHRADE: Generally, not justified. But in a situation like this, where the AFL-CIO, first of all, as you said, threw out the Teamsters for corrupt practices--stealing from the membership and carrying on its own financial operations with corporations and with the mafia--AFL-CIO threw them out, and then, without any real change, brings them back in, then who does police corrupt operation in the trade union movement? This is where Reuther was-- His promotion of the ethical practices committee, which was one of the deals he made with Meany, that's what he wanted, when the

CONNORS: Oh, I see. Yeah.

*CIO merged with
AFL in 1955.*

SCHRADE: "Let's do something about corrupt practices." It was done. And then for the AFL-CIO to reverse itself with the corruption still there means that some other body has to take responsibility to deal with that kind of corruption, and all that's left is the federal government or the United Nations. What other more powerful body can deal with that? It's terrible that the government has to get involved this way. First of all, the first line is that a union ought to be self-cleaning and keep itself democratic and honest. When that doesn't occur, then it becomes the AFL-CIO's obligation to do that. And it had the authority to do that and did it, but then it reversed

itself.

So it seems to me, even the [Ronald W.] Reagan administration-- It appalls me that they had to-- Particularly when the Teamsters union was endorsing Reagan for president-- And they've always endorsed to get the kind of protection and recognition that they wanted from Republicans. They've always endorsed Republicans. So now, despite the fact that the government's involved--which I object to--and the ACLU's involved, and the Association for Union Democracy, those kind of alliances are necessary if the membership is going to throw off that kind of corrupt-- I don't see any other way of doing it. Unfortunately, the Association for Union Democracy and the ACLU are moving to enhance what the government is doing to make it a more democratic process and structure, where I don't think the government would really be doing much about that. So we have these other groups involved now, so it's sort of publicly exposed and being dealt with out in public at this point. I think that it's for the good of the membership of the Teamsters, and maybe that membership will be a much better part of the trade union movement and help clean up a major segment of it.

CONNORS: New Directions and these other reform groups within unions, there's no national newspaper that they get their views across through.

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SCHRADE: Well, the TDU has one. What's it called?

CONNORS: Well, there's Labor Notes.

SCHRADE: The Dispatch.

CONNORS: Oh, I know. Okay. There's also Labor Notes, which is hard to find on the newsstand, of course. Here, you can get one over at Chatterton's [Bookstore], for instance, on Vermont [Avenue].

SCHRADE: Not even Midnight Special [Bookstore] in Santa Monica?

CONNORS: Yeah, that's right. It may be over there, too.

SCHRADE: I don't know. I subscribe to it.

CONNORS: But are there any plans to have more of a public voice?

SCHRADE: No. And the media doesn't deal with these kind of questions very often. It occasionally will, but it's generally part of their put-down of the labor movement. I think we've got a very conservative media, and they generally use us to attack unions mainly because they're attacking. Often we find ourselves in a very difficult position and not saying anything to the New York Times or to other newspapers because it's often misused and not in context. I've found myself in that position from time to time.

So there is no real national correspondence going on, or communication, except New Directions has a monthly

newsletter, and the TDU has a monthly newspaper which I get. So you find some of this stuff in Labor Notes and also in the Association for Union Democracy. So there are four going on. Some of the left press carries this too, but not very often. DSA [Democratic Socialists of America] does something, but they're generally working with the leadership of the union and not the rank and file, anyway, so you don't get much from the Democratic Socialists on this. But there is a gap there in terms of communicating.

TAPE NUMBER: XII, SIDE ONE

OCTOBER 15, 1990

CONNORS: This is our last session, and I wanted to cover several topics to sort of close off in a preliminary way. It's sort of like the last chapter isn't over yet, I don't think, so it's really not something that can be summarized. But one thing I wanted to get at is something that we have spoken about in passing before, and that's your connection to the anti-nuclear activity that began developing out here back in the seventies, I guess, and earlier, of course. And one thing I wanted to point out was that I found an interesting item in a very old issue of The Auto Worker, which was [United Auto Worker] Solidarity, right? That's the name?

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: This is August 1954, and it's an attack on the atomic energy legislation that was coming through Congress at that time. It was the updating of the original atomic energy legislation from the forties. This, of course, is the Eisenhower era, and what's happening is atomic power is being offered to private industry. So you have the UAW [United Auto Workers] taking a stand against that, but not against nuclear power as a bad way to get power. It was against this bad legislation because it was a kind of a boondoggle type of legislation.

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SCHRADE: Well, there was also a move by [Walter P.] Reuther in Michigan against the Monroe reactor which was for private power production, and we were opposed to that as a power source. I remember when I was on the staff and just from reading stuff out of Detroit before I went to Detroit, Walter was really hardlining it against atomic power and against underground testing and above-ground testing as well. He was really right out in the front and spent a lot of time in Washington battering the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] on this.

CONNORS: So it was on the grounds of it being unsafe?

SCHRADE: Unsafe.

CONNORS: And untenable?

SCHRADE: Untenable and really an abuse, overuse of technology, that we really didn't have to do it, and it was just another way to privatize government research technology to pay off ~~the~~ the corporations. The other thing, we began moving against underground testing, and then we became fully aware of this when the announcement took place either late '67 or early '68 that the biggest test of all was going to be made outside Las Vegas, an atomic explosion equal to a million tons of TNT, which is a really risky proposition. Well, we did our homework on this. We talked to geologists, biologists, Barry Commoner, who finally ran for president of the United States--one of

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as the
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his big issues was the environment--and collected them and began moving against the AEC in Nevada. They were stonewalling all over the place saying it's perfectly safe and there's no great risk, no earthquake potential, and so forth. But we'd already known-- I think Paul Jacobs was one of the first as a journalist to explode the myth that nobody was being hurt and that livestock and people to the east of ^{the} Nevada had heavier cancer rates than anyplace in the country. This was a lot of hogwash. There was leakage, and the geologists told us there was serious contamination of underground water, there was an earthquake potential. So we did our best in the way of publicity, fired off a telegram to President [Lyndon B.] Johnson, to Governor [Ronald W.] Reagan, to Mayor Sam [Samuel W.] Yorty here in Los Angeles, saying this risk should not be laid upon the people of the United States.

CONNORS: When you say we did this, was that the regional office?

SCHRADE: Yeah. [#] It was within the policy of the UAW, but here was a chance to take some action on a UAW resolution, and we were seriously concerned about. The membership was up to speed on these issues because we talked about them in our education conferences and so forth. And at one point, I called Robert [F.] Kennedy and got Fred [Frederick G.] Dutton on the phone--they were campaigning in Indiana at

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the point--I said, ^W The UAW's good on this issue. What about Bob? Can ~~he~~ ^{he} issue ^{some} sort of a statement against this big bomb test? And Fred said, "Well, Paul, we're campaigning in Indiana at this point, so let's leave that for later." So we didn't get any real response out of Bob on that one.

But we went ahead with it. What happened was the Howard Hughes organization picked up on it and called us and said, "Look, we're terribly interested. We're glad you're involved in this thing. Howard Hughes hates the idea of this underground bomb testing." First of all, he was a clean freak, but he ^{had the} ~~was also~~ understanding that it was damaging ^{to} ~~of~~ people and property and so forth. So when we were over there, we stayed at one of his hotels--I think the Frontier [Hotel] right across from the Desert Inn--and he picked up our hotel bills--so we reduced our expenses on this thing--and also gave us access to the television station which he was in the process of buying, so we had a voice there, as well. And Theo [Theodore] Bikel was in doing Fiddler on the Roof at Caesar's Palace, and he became our spokesperson in Vegas. I don't think he was [Actor's] Equity [Association] president at that point.

CONNORS: Probably not. ^{It} No, it's more recent.

SCHRADE: It came later. So he was really a friend of ours, and we were able to recruit him.

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So anyway, the day came. I was in Detroit for a board meeting, flew back and called Harry Evans, our PR [public relations] guy, and said, "Look, I'm not going to sit here in L.A. I'm going to Vegas. I want to go through this shot," which was scheduled for six o'clock in the morning. And Harry, at my suggestion, had called Dr. [Charles F.] Richter over at Cal Tech [California Institute of Technology] a few days before and asked him about the earthquake potential of this, because Richter is of the Richter earthquake scale, and Richter's response was, "some nut sent the president a telegram. I have sixty calls in here this morning about this. Of course, there's no earthquake potential involved in underground testing." He was very upset. He was in his seventies, kind of crotchety, and not too sympathetic. So we went up and caught Bickel's show, Fiddler, which I had seen before, but I sat through that and then sat up with him and his wife Rita through the night waiting for the shot. There was a delay, and then the countdown took place. And that goddamn hotel just shook back and forth. It was registered 6.2 on the Richter scale, and there were cracks in buildings and stuff. There was no serious damage as a result, but it went against what Richter was saying. So the shot took place.

We did have one confrontation with AEC before the

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shot. They said they would hold a meeting with the media but would not answer any questions. All they did was do their usual dance, and that is that "this is perfectly safe, it's valuable to carrying on our nuclear war activities," and all this nonsense. So they put on this show for us. Well, nobody from the media would get up and ask questions, so I got up and asked a question. Then there was a flood of questions. They were put to the test in that session, which was good, because a lot of good questions were asked, and I think the media got some education out of that as a result of it. So the test took place and we continued our activities against it. They're still doing it. Here in 1990 there were three tests within the last few weeks up there in that testing operation. But again they say it's safe and there's no leakage, which is a lot of bull. They don't know if there's leakage or not. There's certainly greater contamination of the underground water supply, which is a serious problem which really never gets to public attention. So that's about what we did during that period.

CONNORS: After that period, so more into the seventies, mid-seventies, when you were no longer regional director but certainly you were aware and involved in what was going on, there were several anti-nuke initiatives or environmental-type initiatives that were launched. I know

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in 1975 there was Proposition 15 which was the nuclear power plants initiative, which was defeated. And I have something I came across which is a letter from Siggy [Sigmund] Arywitz to all unions and councils of the L.A. County Fed [Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO], January 22, 1975, saying that it would be suicide to assist in placing ^{this} proposition on the ballot. It was a call for organized labor to get out there and oppose this nuclear power plant sighting initiative, which was a very highly regulated sort of thing, so all the utilities were opposed to it, but so was organized labor. Were you aware of what organized labor was?

SCHRADE: What year was this?

CONNORS: This was 1975. So soon after that, it might have been two years after that legislation, the same sort of--

SCHRADE: In other words, the utilities and the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations] were supporting nuclear power plants, which is typical. It's the domination of the Building Trades and being for jobs regardless of the environment and public interest, which was generally there. But I would think the more liberal progressive unions would have opposed that-- the UAW, the [International Association of] Machinists [and Aerospace Workers], and so forth.

CONNORS: Well, Sigmund Arywitz was executive secretary of

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the L.A. Fed at that time. Where did he come out of? Was he a Building Trades guy?

SCHRADE: No, I think he's out of the ILG^{WU} [International Ladies' Garment Workers Union].

CONNORS: That's possible, yeah.

SCHRADE: Yeah.

CONNORS: Well, I don't have the name of this organization that came up as sort of like a committee for the-- Oh, I don't know. It was for a balanced economy. That was the key phrase in this committee. Michael Peevey was the chair of that. You've mentioned Mike Peevey before as having been-- Was he state AFL-CIO education secretary?

SCHRADE: Research director.

CONNORS: Research director, okay.

SCHRADE: Yeah. Probably did a lot of lobbying, too. Yeah.

CONNORS: Yeah, and it's funny that he emerged as being the chairman of this committee which had a lot of names of people from labor and from utilities as sort of a utility and labor coalition in support of nuclear power plants. And Peevey eventually went over to Southern California Edison; he was one of the best presidents of that organization.

SCHRADE: Yeah, right, which was a strange transition for him, because he was one of the better guys in the state

AFL-CIO, when Tommy [Thomas L.] Pitts was the secretary treasurer, and could be relied upon for more progressive positions. Getting them adopted was a problem, but at least he was somebody you could rely on for information and ideas. He also ran for state assembly at one point, too. But he's over with them.

CONNORS: Well, I had another thing. This is a little out of sync with the time element we're talking about here, but Leonard [F.] Woodcock, in 1971, appeared before the subcommittee on air and water pollution--this was the senate committee on public works hearings, June 1971--and Leonard gave this wonderful testimony, which was then subsequently reprinted as "Labor and the Politics of Environment." I don't know if you ever saw of that, but Leonard takes a very enlightened stand on the whole thing. I was just wondering if that was in the same Walter Reuther tradition, trying to be--I remember a quote, to paraphrase Walter Reuther, saying something like, "We get all these benefits for our workers, but what good is all of that if the environment is ruined and if there's no housing? There's no way to enjoy it."

SCHRADE: What year was this?

CONNORS: That's '71.

SCHRADE: Yeah, there was a period when Leonard was trying to emulate Walter. He became involved in the Martin Luther

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King [Jr.] movement, did stuff on the environment, and became more antiwar, but he sort of hit his own speed after that and became a fairly conservative president of the union. I'm sure he believed in these things, but there was no real mobilization of the union like there would be with Reuther in getting behind these things. So the statements were there, but how they were enforced was always a problem with Leonard.

CONNORS: I see, yeah. Because you can't fault anything he says in this, but it's easy enough to get up there and say all kinds of things without following it up with any kind of action.

SCHRADE: Right. For instance, the antiwar stuff. He was at a regional conference where we got the regional conference of local unions to endorse participation in the antiwar demonstration in San Francisco in 1971 when it was really crucial, and he was there. I had invited him out. I knew he was in the process of undercutting me, but I also wanted to keep a very strong relationship with him because, as president of the union, it was important to us here in what we were trying to do in the region. Well, when I asked him what his position was on the resolution, he said he was for it. He said that before everybody. But a couple of days later, in the newspaper it said the executive officers of the union had taken a position

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